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A History
OF THE
TORY PARTY
1640-1714

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A History
OF THE
TORY PARTY
1640-1714

BY

KEITH FEILING

Student of Christ Church
and sometime Fellow of All Souls College



*'The ground whereupon government stands will
not so easily be washed away.'*—Stratford.

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P R E F A C E

THE continuous history of the original Tory party, which may be said to have disappeared in 1714, has not yet been written. The great British masters of this period—Hallam, Lingard, Macaulay, Lecky—approached the subject from a very different standpoint. On the Continent Mazure, Ranke, and Klopp touched upon it only as part of a much greater whole. Special monographs, such as Mr. Roylance Kent's *Early History of the Tories*, or Salomon's brilliant work on the last ministry of Queen Anne, deal, on the contrary, only with sections of the party's history.

To supply an introduction to that history, viewed as a whole, is the primary purpose of this book, but I hope it may have a secondary use in breaking here and there some of the preliminary ground which is still to be cultivated by students of our political biography; for we are still without modern authoritative studies of Clarendon, Danby, Shrewsbury, Sunderland, Nottingham, and Harley—to name only men in the first flight.

Within the time at my disposal, I have been able to explore only a part of the boundless field of material, printed and manuscript, which faces students of the late seventeenth century, and my debt to the great writers mentioned above, as to others, will be apparent to those who have worked on the period. But I have (after 1660) based my study throughout on the original sources, and where possible endeavour to provide a second check by using unprinted material.

If, in pursuing the narrow and elusive thread of a single party's development, I appear to ignore matters of permanent

interest or to take the general history too much for granted, I can only plead that to discuss every point of contact between a great party and the nation at large would have carried me far beyond the limits of time and space allowed me.

The acknowledgements I must make are many. Sir Charles Firth assisted me with invaluable criticism on four of my chapters. Mr. L. G. Wickham Legg, of New College, and Mr. J. C. Masterman, my colleague at Christ Church, performed similar service in respect of others. Mr. C. R. L. Fletcher kindly read the whole in manuscript and helped me with his advice and encouragement at every stage. To Mr. G. N. Clark I am most grateful for his reading and criticism of my proof-sheets. I have to thank the Warden and Fellows of All Souls College for allowing me to use Sir William Trumbull's manuscript memoir, as well as for the liberal use of the Codrington Library. To the staff of that library, of the manuscript room at the British Museum, of the Public Record Office, and of the Bodleian Library I owe grateful thanks for essential and long-suffering assistance.

My deepest debt is to my own College, Christ Church: not only to the Wake Trustees for permission to use the manuscripts in their custody, but to the Governing Body as a whole for the indulgence which made possible the completion of this book.

KEITH FEILING.

January 1924.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

(a) MANUSCRIPT

- B. M.* Manuscripts in the British Museum, from the Additional, Stowe, Harleian, Egerton, and Lansdowne collections
Bodl. Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library, from the Carte, Tanner, Rawlinson, and Ballard collections.
P. R. O. Manuscripts in the Public Record Office.

(b) PRINTED

- Ailesbury.* Memoirs of Thomas Bruce, Second Earl of Ailesbury; Roxburghe Club, 1890.
Bath. Manuscripts of the Marquis of Bath; Historical Manuscripts Commission.
Bramston. Autobiography of Sir John Bramston; Camden Society, 1845.
Burnet. History of My Own Time: (a) for Charles II's reign, ed. O. Airy, 1897; (b) from 1685; Oxford, 1833
C. J. Journals of the House of Commons
C. S. P. Clarendon State Papers; 1767-86.
Cal. C. S. P. Calendar of Clarendon State Papers in the Bodleian Library; 1872-6.
Cal. S. P. Dom. Calendars of State Papers Domestic.
Carte. Thomas Carte, Life of Ormonde; 1736.
Christie. W. D. Christie, Life of Anthony Ashley Cooper, First Earl of Shaftesbury; 1871.
Clarendon Corr. Correspondence of Henry Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, &c.; ed. Singer, 1828.
Clarendon Hist Clarendon, History of the Rebellion; ed. Macray, 1888.
Corr. Bolingbroke, Letters and Correspondence; 1798.
Dalrymple. Sir John Dalrymple, Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland; 1771.
E. H. R. English Historical Review.
Foxcroft. H. C. Foxcroft, Life and Letters of George Savile, First Marquis of Halifax; 1898.
Foxcroft Supplement. A Supplement to Burnet's History of My Own Time; 1902.
Grey. Anchtel Grey, Parliamentary Debates; 1768.
James's Life. Life of James II, by J. S. Clarke; 1816.

- Klopp.* Onno Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart ; 1875-88.
- L. J.* Journals of the House of Lords.
- Lister.* T. H. Lister, Life of Clarendon ; 1838.
- Luttrell.* Narcissus Luttrell, Historical Relations of State Affairs ; 1857.
- Mazure.* F. A. J. Mazure, Histoire de la Révolution de 1688 ; 1825.
- Macpherson.* James Macpherson ; Original Papers containing the Secret History of Great Britain ; 1776.
- Noorden.* Carl von Noorden, Europäische Geschichte im achtzehnten Jahrhundert ; 1870-82.
- North.* Roger North, Lives of the Norths ; ed. Jessop, 1890.
- Portland or P.* Manuscripts of the Duke of Portland ; Historical Manuscripts Commission, 1891-1907.
- Ranke.* Leopold von Ranke, History of England ; Eng. trans., 1875.
- Reresby.* Memoirs of Sir John Reresby ; ed. Cartwright, 1875.
- Salomon.* Felix Salomon, Geschichte des letzten Ministeriums Königin Annas ;
- Sidney Diary.* Henry Sidney, Diary of the Times of Charles II ; ed. Blencowe, 1843.
- Swift.* Letters to or from Swift are quoted (unless otherwise stated) from 'The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift', ed. F. Elrington Ball, 1910-14.
- V. C.* Letters and Correspondence of James Vernon ; 1841.
- Wentworth.* The Wentworth Papers ; ed. Cartwright, 1883.

I

1558-1660

Origins

I

INTRODUCTORY

THE first germs of Whig and Tory in England may be dated (like Florentine Guelfs and Ghibellines) from a wedding—the sacrament which united Henry VIII to Anne Boleyn and signalized our definite disunion from Catholic Europe. Having then the same nativity with Queen Elizabeth, the embryo parties grew in accord with the actions and reactions of the Elizabethan age, at the close of which two twin schools of thought may be discerned, decisively opposed to each other on the causes which most divide mankind—on religious truth and political power. Here we are concerned only with the growth, the flowering, and the decay of that Royalist party which championed the cause of authority—the party which boasted Falkland and George Herbert among its prophets, Strafford and Laud in its roll of martyrs; the party which in robust youth figured as the Cavaliers and walked after death with the Jacobites; which counts Hooker, Bacon, and Swift in its spiritual lineage, and was led successively by Clarendon, Danby, Harley, and Bolingbroke; that party, finally, which after living for three-quarters of a century crowded with heroism, passion, and suffering, disappeared with the last Stuart and vanished as though it had never been.

This party, like its Whig rival, was the inheritor of older ideals, beliefs, and traditions, the origin of which must be explored before the more organized party history of 1660–1714 can be realized. But though a clash of conflicting ideas makes the interest of seventeenth-century party development, and though the politicians of that age were possibly more swayed by ideals than were any of their successors till 1780, still neither ideals nor atmosphere were those of our modern parties, and their distinctions and divisions were in part dictated by conditions so peculiar to that generation as to require a preliminary word. This is the more necessary in that the genius

of Disraeli, in his Young England stage, tried to equate the politics of Falkland and Strafford to those of his own day, to catch from Bolingbroke the 'essential and permanent character' of Toryism, and to identify the Whigs of 1832 with that cause 'for which Hampden died on the field and Sidney on the scaffold'. The old England, however, from which Disraeli drew this new history, was in fact a very different country to that of the fourth William, and the great events of two revolutions rise like barriers of rock between us and the Cavaliers. Those events swept away the provincial, rural, and aristocratic *cadre* of the seventeenth century for ever. All the conditions which give to a party its social background, its prejudices, and its mould of tradition, as distinct from its intellectual ideas, were wholly transformed in the interval between the death of Anne and the birth of Queen Victoria's minister.

Of such governing conditions the foremost in the seventeenth century was provincialism. The great currents of public opinion, now implicit in an educated democracy, a cheap Press, and swift transport, then ran sluggishly and in separate tributaries, with only now and then a fierce tide. London, it is true, was fast growing, but Lord Clarendon's mother for one had never entered it, and conservative families disliked the 'great wen', which threatened to engulf the fortunes of their sons and the characters of their daughters. In spite of a large pamphlet literature, clubs, coffee-houses, and a widely diffused university education, free political opinion, though the ultimate factor, still breathed with difficulty amid ancient barriers. The localism of the Middle Ages had not yet disappeared, the impress of the Reformation had borne very differently upon different areas, and the levelling force of world-markets and uniform economic conditions had not yet sapped the distinctive character of individual English shires. In the political struggles opening before us, and particularly of course in the Civil War, it is possible to discern several bands of territory, each with its marked political genius. Ideas common to the whole country took on a different hue as they crossed the Trent, the Tamar, or the Humber, and the predominant royalism of Kent differed as much from that of the Scottish

border as the Whiggism of East Anglia from that of the Welsh March.

In an age still fundamentally static, when the first concern of Members of Parliament was their own harvest and when the county town was the hub alike of amusement, of justice, and of defence, a man's 'countrymen' were those of his own county, and society ran in genial channels of local allegiance. When the clothier of Wiltshire or Gloucestershire brought his wagons to London, his friends knew they could find him at the Saracen's Head in Friday Street: members from the northern counties dined together each session:¹ Herefordshire and Worcester would, irrespective of party, push their 'countryman' Paul Foley for the Speaker's Chair. The same rules governed other passions than friendship. Half the political battles of the century at Westminster drew their sting from a dispute over provincial precedence, from a local election fight, or from some vendetta of the North touching a franchise or a freehold. Strafford lost his head to the rancour of the Vanes: nothing could long keep in one party those jealous neighbours, the Lowthers and the Musgraves: Herefordshire quarrels of Harley and Coningsby echoed to the very centre of power.

Each great zone of England had, therefore, its own political identity. London, Essex, and East Anglia were bound by a dozen historic causes to the Whig and Puritan side. This was the land of Mary's martyrs and Cromwell's Ironsides, and of the exiles who were planting the wilderness of New England with the village names of Lincolnshire and Suffolk. Here were the dioceses which tormented Laud and harried Wren, 'that damned Bishop Ely', for whose blood the militiamen howled in 1640. Here, under the aegis of Marshall, Calamy, and a dozen other luminaries, Presbyterianism built one of its rare fortresses in England: here, under the protection of the Riches, the Mildmays, and the Grimstons, dissenting teachers preached the Word with impunity in the hottest days after the Restoration. The solid Presbyterian squires, the clothiers who flocked to Rotterdam and Amsterdam for market and Gospel, the Yarmouth fishermen—these were types of that Eastern English

¹ Burton, *Diary*, 16 March 1659; Fleming papers, 174 (1680) H. MSS. Comm. Report XII. 7.

phalanx, 'whose Diana', wrote one of Laud's correspondents, 'is their liberty'. Here and there other districts maintained an almost equally continuous Whig tradition. Buckinghamshire, the home of the regicides Fleetwood and Mayne, of the Hampdens, the Whartons, the Wallers, and the Verneys, kept to the death of Queen Anne that intense Protestant note sounded in many generations stretching from the Lollards to Bunyan. Northamptonshire had a like radical leaning. Nowhere had the 'prophesyings' struck deeper root, nowhere was ship-money more firmly resisted. Banbury and Northampton were the gibe of every playwright for nasal hypocrisy. The 'clothing' areas of the middle West formed another such Puritan zone, swarming with small industrial towns from which proceeded in the second generation a steady race of Whig squires. The Methuens, the Longs, and the Trenchards may stand for a hundred famous Opposition families, and each stage in the Whig Revolution is marked by a Western milestone—Sedgemoor, Torbay, and Littlecote.

On the other side, a Royalist army or a Tory vote was assured in rival areas almost as well defined. In Kent, the garden of England, where Evelyn noted every field was 'even as a bowling green', and which as the corridor between London and the Continent had skipped half the Middle Ages, there lived a Royalism peculiarly metropolitan, 'trimmer', and enlightened, and when the public opinion of Kent was firmly voiced (whether fighting for the Prayer Book or against ship-money), it coincided remarkably nearly with the verdict of posterity. Its ruling families—Finches, Wottons, Culpeppers, and Derings—represented a royalist but staunchly Protestant outlook. Its innumerable homes of the legal, professional, and Crown-service families stood for a conservative moderation, differing entirely from the Royalism of Cornwall or the North.

The last-named great province was itself made up of many variants, each showing in high degree some governing motive which elsewhere might be unimportant. Lancashire and Cheshire Royalism depended on two chief supports—the feudal power of the Protestant Stanleys, and the unbroken Catholicism of many old families—Molyneux, Tyldesley, or Townley. In the country districts of Yorkshire or Durham,

a proud isolation and a dislike of the South, the feeling on which both Margaret of Anjou and Mary Tudor had counted, maintained well into the seventeenth century a purely sixteenth-century social order. From areas like these, long used to viceroys and great potentates, the King's army drew hard-fighting levies. The Northern Borders, where advanced politics could ill contend with armed brigands, thieving, and Jedburgh law, or Nottinghamshire and Derby, still full of forests and of recusants—these again might be counted as fairly solid for Church and King.

But most famous and individual of Tory territories was Cornwall, whose army won the West for the Crown in the first half of the Civil War, and whose placid forty-four votes in the Commons supported the energy of Bolingbroke. The government of the royal Duchy and the organization of the Stannaries had kept this peculiar province apart—still full of ancient and non-Saxon blood, still in the sixteenth century speaking a non-Saxon tongue, connected by its saints and its lineage with Brittany, the little Cornwall over the sea. The dozen great families—Granvilles, Slannings, Arundells, or Godolphins—here preserved a pure Tory type, all the keener because upon their relations with the royal Duke depended their own territorial influence, and here long hung in parish churches Charles I's solemn acknowledgement of gratitude for the loyalty of the Duchy.

Close analysis of the political map would reveal many other such spheres of continuous tradition, but this provincialism, though thus considerable, was not the final power in politics. The national unity driven in by generations of hard royal administration had destroyed the deeper provincial hatreds, which were still the bane of less happy lands: Cornwall was not a La Vendée or a Virginia, Buckinghamshire neither a Catalonia nor a Galloway. Even in belts of territory dominated by one party type, the exceptions were numerous and convincing. The Eliots and the Robartes in Royalist Cornwall, the Cavalier Lucases in Puritan Essex, far more the rifts between men of one family, whereby we find, for example, Cromwells and Fleetwoods in either camp—such instances could be multiplied in every shire, and warn us that division

of ideas had passed, in a country politically so mature as seventeenth-century England, far beyond ties of neighbourhood or links of blood. Religion is thicker than blood, and liberty cannot be quenched by many waters.

The Civil War, again, caught England in economic transition, and the fast-growing industrial towns of the North and West shared the politics, not of the squires who surrounded them, but of their spiritual brethren in the Eastern Association. But such economic and social class-consciousness did not yet play a large part, and the cause of real democracy (so far as it yet existed) was far less adequately championed by the Puritan Commons than by the Crown, which in Star Chamber and Council had at least endeavoured to protect tenant-right, to maintain wages, and to check enclosure.

The ruling force in this period, over-riding all the motives we have mentioned, was unquestionably aristocracy, which ruled with such ubiquity that the formation of English parties, the groupings of party leaders, the strength and weakness of the whole party system, hinged and depended on this cardinal fact. A county's politics were governed not nearly so directly by provincial separatism, or economic formation, as by the views of its great magnates, and Pembroke in Wiltshire, Stanley in Lancashire, or Bath in Cornwall, were each actually, as Evelyn termed the last, a 'great Elector'. To form a party majority involved grouping the interests of enough borough-mongers, and the note-books and postbags of Pym, Danby, or Robert Harley were filled with nice calculations or urgent appeals to a Buckingham, a Newcastle, or a Saye and Sele.

Wherever a focus of strong party feeling is found in England, it may therefore be traced in nine cases out of ten to a powerful and deep-rooted family, and feudalism itself had hardly disappeared. In the age of a weekly Press, the Duke of Beaufort still kept up in the Marches the whole apparatus of a mediaeval baron's household. At dinner in his great hall the guests still sat down with grooms, ploughmen, and a swarm of heads of departments—such as a secretary, the Master of the Horse, surveyors, yeomen of the buttery, and falconers. Lord Shrewsbury, who was destined to preside over the peaceful succession

of the Hanoverians, had as a young man thought of looking at some real war in Flanders, and had then inquired which of his tenants were bound by tenure to 'the obligation of providing money or men on these occasions'.¹ Such territorial power naturally dictated the fate of most Parliamentary elections, for even the county franchise was narrow enough,² and though the days had gone by when constables could be sent with warrants to fetch in the voters, dire threats to tenants who voted wrong extended right over the century. In 1642 a Cheshire Royalist carefully recorded, as 'a perpetual remembrance for those my successors, as they answer me in another world, if such be a possibility', the infamous political views of seventeen Puritan tenants; 'how perfidiously and treacherously these have done against King and Master'.³

This social order, offences against which were so jealously resented, was in fact not merely predominant but daily growing stronger. County government, once disputed by royal servants and commissioners, was after 1642 preserved as their lawful game by the justices. The close vestry and narrow corporation were silently extinguishing, one by one, the rare remaining sparks of popular government in the towns. The Militia Act of 1661 committed national defence to the same masterful ruling caste. They reached out their hands to the new Empire overseas, and the adventurers of 1630, who organized the settling of Providence Island, bore the established Puritan names of Warwick, Saye and Sele, Pym, Rudyard, and

¹ 1678, Montague House papers, i 26.

² I append the figures of four typical county elections at the close of the period.

(1) *Oxfordshire*, 1698

Lord Norreys,	1,539
Sir R. Jenkinson,	1,533
Sir S. Cope,	1,268 (?)
Sir Th. Wheat,	1,096
Bodl. Tanner MSS	22, f 99

(3) *Northamptonshire*, 1705.

Sir J. Isham,	2,483
Mr. Cartwright,	2,478
Lord Mordaunt,	2,303
Sir A. St. John,	2,176
Bodl. Ballard MSS	35, f 99.

(2) *Cheshire*, 1702

Sir G. Warburton,	2,597
Sir R. Mostyn,	2,559
Sir W. Aston,	2,095
Sir R. Cotton,	2,052
B. M. Add. MSS.	29588, f. 122

(4) *Bedfordshire*, 1714-15.

Harvey,	1,263
Hillesden,	1,254
Cater,	1,246
Charnock,	1,229
Ch. Ch. Wake MSS.	(Lincoln, V).

³ H. MSS. Comm. Report XII, 9 (Southwell Cathedral papers); cf. Report VII, 542.

Knightley. The enclosure movement, from which their forebears had a century earlier reaped such harvests, proceeded without a break throughout the Stuart age. Armed riots, forcible throwing down of fences, denunciations from bishops, Council, and judges—nothing could stop it. In this men of all opinions shared, from the first Lord Salisbury to the Whig grandees like Manchester or Willoughby of Parham, and the park for a thousand deer which belonged to Lord Shaftesbury, the people's tribune, attracted unwelcome attention from humbler democrats in Dorset.¹

If there is evidence that more humanity and common feeling than in Tudor times was shown in the reallocation of lands enclosed,² the social effects were ultimately the same and favourable to the big owners, and the economic drift of this century (which might equally well be illustrated from the history of wages) was undoubtedly towards a sharper demarcation of classes, and towards depriving the poor of such economic protection as the Tudor and early Stuart government had managed to keep up for them.

In every channel of national life the aristocratic current poured stronger as time went by, and not least in the Church and Universities, then the sources of political thought. The aristocracy's capture of the monasteries' endowments had carried with it a great mass of Church patronage, and the history of English literature up to the novels of Fielding shows the bad side of this clerical dependence on the squires. Not all peers had the wit of the great Halifax who, when his chaplain prayed for him in public 'as his Lord and Patron', asked 'if he could not be content to play the fool but he must let the world know whose fool he was'.³ The Universities from 1660 gradually entered on their silver age of mediocrity, which after the Hanoverians' accession turned to an age of lead. New and glorious buildings testified as to the classes for whose education the endowments, originally bequeathed for poor clerics, were henceforth mainly to be devoted: 'a few such legacies as Colonel Codrington's would make your colleges

¹ Bodl. Carte MSS. 79, f. 117.

² e.g. Report XII, 2. 459 (1632); similar evidence in the Christ Church Wake MSS., vol. i (1713).

³ Bodl. Tanner MSS. 25, f. 30.

palaces', we hear in 1710, 'and your fellows never able to live in a country parsonage house'. George Clarke, a respected Tory burgess for the University of Oxford, writing in the same reign, described an incident which, though not of common occurrence, aptly symbolizes the governing spirit of his University and his time: 'We have had some eight and twenty merry Hertfordshire gentlemen who stayed here almost a week, to compliment my Lord Salisbury upon his attaining the age of sixteen.'¹

In this golden age of a natural aristocracy the Puritan and Whig gentlemen shared to the full, if indeed they were not its purest exponents. No wind of democracy stirred the serenity of Penshurst, Woburn, or Althorp, whence the Whig politicians directed their campaigns to save English liberties. It is, indeed, noteworthy that the majority of really ancient families either resisted the Crown in the Civil War or stood entirely aside, and the presence on the Whig side of the Sidneys, Percies, Russells, Cavendishes, Montagues, and half the Herberts, affords some substance for that not wholly untrue reading of history, which would make the seventeenth century a contest of King and people against oligarchy. The best country gentlemen of England officered the Parliamentary armies, and the greatest of all the Independents were staunchly opposed to democracy. Ireton took the lead in debate against the Levellers' theory of the rights of man, and his mighty father-in-law, who executed the first democratic agitators, showed a typically conservative inability to appreciate social equality. 'Strange', he thought, 'that men of fortune and great estates should join with such a people.'² The insistence upon the rights of the Peerage by three generations of the Whig Opposition revealed either the class bias of a jealous oligarchy, or an aristocracy's legitimate determination to keep one field at least immune from royal influence. All this we shall see at its height in Shaftesbury and in Wharton: here we may note that the Saye and Sele of the Commonwealth advocated a hereditary Upper House for the colony of Massa-

¹ M. Hutton to Charlett, July 1710 (Bodl. Ballard MSS, 35); George Clarke to Col. Godolphin, 16 June 1705 (B. M. Add. MSS. 28952).

² Firth, *House of Lords*, 180, and quotations there from the Clarke papers; Carlyle's *Cromwell* [ed. Lomas], ii. 342 and 527.

chusetts, and that Devonshire, a Whig pillar of the Revolution, proposed in 1701 that a peerage should require a landed qualification, that such land should be inalienable, and that peers' heiresses should be forbidden to marry (as once before by previous champions of English 'liberties'), unless it were 'without disparagement'. The great English republicans themselves lifted up the ideal of a Venetian aristocracy. Algernon Sidney showed by his pen that he shared his father's choleric dislike of Levellers, while Marvell, like Harrington, bade Englishmen learn wisdom from the lagoons :

To the serene Venetian state I'll go,
From her sage mouth famed principles to know.

From this cold and antique republicanism to the Whig ideal of monarchy—a doge for life representing the ruling caste—the distance was not far to go.

Moulded, then, all alike in this aristocratic order, no social or economic gulf divided the two seventeenth-century parties. The strong ties of neighbourhood kept men, whose education, horizon, and blood relationships were in common, very near together, even when conflicting ideas temporarily estranged them. Hence the vast body of neutrals in the Civil War, hence its humanity, hence the persistence of affections which mellowed the struggle of Whig and Tory. Better men on each side never ceased to lament that war as a tragedy, and in the same way a large body of moderate opinion held to the very end of this period that party was the fever, and not the daily bread, of the Constitution. There were puritanic Cavaliers, just as there were constitutional Puritans, and the highest significance in party history will be found to attach to the 'country', or middle, party, which between the Restoration and the Hanoverians swung between the two extremes. Constitutional conditions favoured this conception, for as long as the sovereign really ruled and did not merely reign, so long all the Commons of England shared one standpoint. Dryden, in describing his cousin John Dryden, M.P. for Huntingdonshire, has set down his 'own opinion of what an Englishman in Parliament ought to be', and most of his contemporaries would have echoed it

Well-born and wealthy, wanting no support,
 You steer between the country and the court ;

* * * * *

A patriot both the King and Country serves,
 Prerogative and privilege preserves
 Of each our laws the certain limit show ;
 One must not ebb, nor t'other overflow.
 Betwixt the Prince and Parliament we stand ;
 The barriers of the State on either hand.

This, then, was the third and the final governing condition of party in that age—that party divisions must not be exaggerated. We shall read of civil war, of exile, of executions, and of impeachments, but before the temptation arises to divide politics by these bitter memories, it is well to register the conviction that to exaggerate that clash of ideas and interests which party signifies, is as untrue in an historian of the seventeenth century as it is wanton in those who make the public opinion of a later day.

The diarist Evelyn, that ardent Royalist, notes a visit he paid during the Commonwealth to his old college, Balliol, then under a Puritan dispensation: 'They made me', he says, 'extraordinarily welcome.' In the arid wastes of party history there are, fortunately for English public life, many such ever-flowing springs of humanity.

II

THE GENESIS OF THE TORIES, 1558-1642

THE very conditions of party are phenomena of the modern world: without nationality, a representative system, a considerable amount of individual liberty, and some freedom of expressing opinion, party can have no real or permanent being. With the growth of these forces party grew also, and it was, then, during an historical epoch which may broadly be called the Reformation, that the English ruling class broke into the two camps of Whig and Tory. That these parties were two and not more, that we were spared, for instance, the factions of Republican, Orleanist, Legitimist, and Bonapartist, which cursed the early history of party in France, may be attributed to the facts outlined above—that in this country no provincial isolation, no dynastic dispute, no economic cleavage, was strong enough to divide a powerful and coherent ruling class—a class which, after many generations of social unity, fell asunder on a conflict of ideas, and essentially upon that alone.

This cleavage showed itself first, and was last prolonged, in the highest plane of life, that of religion. To the eve of the Hanoverian age the Tories still called themselves 'the Church party', and their origin, like that of their rivals, begins with the religious differences of Elizabeth's reign. Religious unity disappeared from the earth with the advent of Protestantism, and from the first days of the Reformation English Protestants conceived two diametrically opposed interpretations of its purport—whether for the State, for the Church, or for the individual. Upon that half (or more) of the nation with whom alone we are concerned, the firm discipline of Henry VIII and Elizabeth imposed an authoritarian view which was to make the Anglican, and hence later the Tory, spirit. The Tudors launched their Reformation not according to the pure word of God, or at the inspiration of a Luther, but rather by piece-

meal legislation, by preserving all they could of Rome except Roman hegemony, and by binding to this remodelled system their subjects' material interests and their national pride. They taught that this Reformation was no revolution, but rather a restoration to the English 'empire' of what had been filched from it, and expressly declared their new Church legislation to be 'for the restoring and uniting to the imperial Crown of this realm the ancient jurisdictions, authorities, superiorities, and pre-eminences'.¹ Claiming this continuity with the mediaeval English Church, for weighty political reasons they retained that Church's episcopal orders, most of its ritual, all its discipline, and selected from the doctrinal welter of the Reformation a liturgy so comprehensive that the vast majority of their subjects, whether with goodwill or with reluctance, felt compelled to accept it. But the continuity they thus postulated was applied with the greatest emphasis of all to the vexed relations of Church and State. They claimed all, and read more into, the powers of mediaeval English kings over the Church, and as the Church's supreme governor, 'whose over-ruler God hath made me', Elizabeth angrily forbade her Parliaments to meddle with religion.

In concert with her archbishops, she enforced ritual that most laymen detested: the clergy were compelled to subscribe to all Thirty-nine Articles and not merely, as contemplated by the Act of 1571, to those touching matters of doctrine and the sacraments; her judges held that the High Commission court, even if unauthorized by statute, might deprive Puritanic clergy, who refused the Prayer Book, by virtue of 'the ancient prerogative and law of England'.²

Such was the Tudor official theory of the Reformation, but, in considering the strength of the religious element in later party divisions, it is essential to remember that this theory was more than one generation in taking shape, let alone in winning acceptance. This royal, political, and legal scheme was but the shell of the building, and to fill it with the spiritual life of Anglicanism was the work of time; but as a second generation of Elizabethans looked back to the perilous begin-

¹ 1 Eliz., cap. 1.

² Judgement of 1591, Usher, *High Commission*, 139.

nings of their Church, they admitted their heavy debt to the Queen, who had kept the *via media* so narrowly and straight: 'by the goodnēss', said Hooker, 'of Almighty God and his servānt Elizabeth, we are.' Yet if the Queen had triumphed, it had been in the teeth of her ablest advisers, and nothing is more certain than the general distaste of Elizabethans for the Elizabethan settlement. The fathers of that settlement held views for which Laud or Sheldon would have driven them from the Bench. Jewel looked upon vestments as 'relics of the Amorites'; Grindal and Horne even in 1567 admitted the cross in baptism and kneeling at Communion, only 'until the Lord shall give us better times'; to Sandys the use of the ornaments appeared profoundly indifferent. On the central point of episcopacy they spoke with a cold and vague detachment: Hooker's position was barely consistent, Andrewes himself did not make it an article of faith, and it was left to the restorers of 1662 to lay down that 'no one is to be counted a lawful bishop, priest, or deacon, without episcopal ordination'.¹

Such examples show the tendency of revealed religion to progress by returning towards its source, and explain the paradox that conservative theologians of one age may seem radicals to the next. The founders of the Anglican system would, then, have been reckoned Puritans in 1660. The famous 'prophesying' movement of 1570-80, founded on the exclusive authority of the Scriptures, was launched with the full support of a third of the bishops: to suppress it required the Queen's personal intervention, and involved the suspension of Archbishop Grindal. Even in circles so conservative as Hooker's there was a steady desire to distinguish 'reformers' from 'innovators', to admit them to the sacraments, and to embrace all possible types of Protestant in the national Church.

The first leaders of English Presbyterianism were by no means obscure men: the fiery Cartwright was Lady Margaret Professor, while Hooker's opponent Travers was sometime tutor to a son of Burleigh, preached to acclaiming congrega-

¹ *Zurich Letters* (Parker Soc. 1842), i; Dixon, *Church of England*, v and vi; Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*, iii. 11. 16, Ottery, *Lancelot Andrewes*; Gibson, *The Thirty-nine Articles* (1906).

tions at the Temple, and as late as 1603 was *persona grata* with the Puritan nobility.¹ Burleigh himself, whom Jewel had claimed as a broad churchman, valued the Establishment only as 'a testimony of unity', and deprecated in a scathing letter Whitgift's drastic handling of the Puritans. Walsingham, Leicester, Knollys, and Mildmay supported Puritanism in the inner circle of the Government, while the normal opinion of politicians ran preponderantly in the same direction.

The protests of the Millenary Petition in 1603 against the sign of the cross, the surplice, and other usages were anticipated by the Lower House of Convocation exactly forty years earlier, and then only lost by a single vote. In the House of Commons one generation after another opposed the royal policy; in 1572 a bill for rites and ceremonies, in 1587 another to substitute Knox's formulary for the Prayer Book, in 1604 a petition against subscription to all the articles, in 1610 a declaration against the Act of Supremacy—these may suffice to show the persistence of the Commons' Puritanic churchmanship. Protests against the 'Roman' tendencies of High-churchmen and against the abuses of episcopacy were common, right up till the Civil War, from the most loyal constitutionalists and the most ardent Cavaliers, and no more passionate reproaches were heard in the debates of 1641 than those from Digby, Hyde, Culpepper, and Falkland. Sir Edmund Verney and Lord Sunderland, two of the first and noblest victims of the war, vied with each other in deploring the 'Papist' dominance in the royal councils.

But slow though the growth of the Anglican system was, and slight the hold of the Tudor Church ideal upon Elizabeth's subjects, by 1640 a Church party was really in existence, not, it is clear, entirely at harmony in itself, but still divided from its opponents by a gulf enormously deepened since the death of the Queen. The differences of Churchman and Puritan were the more uncompromising, in that on one great subject they agreed; for, before 1640, no representative type of either school sanctioned the idea of religious toleration. The Church, in Henry VIII's words 'that part of the body politic called the spirituality', meant to the average mind only the State

¹ E. H. R. xxviii. 17 n.; *State Trials*, ii. 50.

under another aspect. The Commons, who in 1604 wished for 'a perpetual uniformity', declared in 1641 their intention not 'to let loose the golden reins of discipline', and the unity of Jerusalem was Laud's favourite text: 'Divide the minds of men', he said, 'about their hopes of salvation in Christ, and tell me what unity there will be.'¹

Division came, then, not upon the relations of Church and State, but on a prior question—what was the true Church of England?—and though the Cavalier party was not built up on episcopacy nor, still less, in love with Laudianism, its members high or low shared an ideal of the Church which hardly the most moderate Puritan could stomach. This ideal had largely arisen by way of reaction, for the ultimate consequences and implications of the great Protestant upheaval had ended by shocking the conservative and established elements in English thought. They had heard from their fathers warnings against the democracy and anarchy inevitable in sects which were nourished on individual interpretation of Scripture, and, since then, evangelical teaching in England, as previously in France or Scotland, had been applied with explosive effect to the very framework of society. The economic views of Protector Somerset's protégé John Hales, in later life a Marian exile, had been drawn from the Gospel, but they were none the less heresy to the new class of English landowner. The Edwardian Bishop Ponet had, like George Buchanan or Duplessis-Mornay, defended the rightfulness of tyrannicide. Archbishop Parker shuddered at the menace of Protestant democracy. 'If such principles be spread into men's head', he asked, 'as now they be framed, and referred to the judgement of the subject to discuss *what is tyranny*, . . . what lord of the Council shall ride quietly-minded in the streets among desperate beasts, what minister shall be sure in his bedchamber?'² Elizabeth had denounced Puritans as 'dangerous to a kingly rule', and James repeated the same warning to the tutors of his Palatine grandson, Charles Louis: 'Above all things, take heed he prove not a Puritan, which

¹ Sermon of February 1625, before Parliament.

² Hales's views in Larford, *Discourse of the Common Weal*, xxviii et seq.; S. R. Matland, *Essays* (ed, 1899), 79.

is incompatible with princes, who live by order, but they by confusion.'

As time went on, reaction against the Reformation's radical side grew stronger, and even before Elizabeth went to her fathers the counter-Reformation spirit caught England up in its stride. The Anglican system, originally defended on grounds of expediency or public policy, now began to sink deep shafts to intellectual foundations, and the prosaic argument from legal facts was buttressed, if not supplanted, by appeals to history, reason, and philosophy. Hooker stated in a few words the difference between radical and conservative. 'How great a difference', he exclaims, 'there is between their proceedings who erect a new Commonwealth, which is to have neither people nor law, neither regiment nor religion, the same that was, and theirs who only reform a decayed estate by reducing it to that perfection from which it hath swerved. In this case we are to retain as much, in the other as little, of former things as we may': the difference, indeed, put shortly by Laud—'we live in a Church reformed, not in one made new'.¹ In the charge of 'innovating', brought against Laudian bishops, there was, in fact, much substance, if measured simply by early Elizabethan practice, but the answer Laud gave was more profound—a mighty charge! a "novation" of above thirteen hundred years old'.

Gradually men's eyes turned from the struggling Church of 1558 to the majestic and still dim outline of the first four centuries. As against the Puritans' naked deductions from Scripture, Hooker and Andrewes built up a catholic and reasoned defence of law. Parker had been content to defend the Establishment on the negative ground that it represented 'mediocrity', but they, by distinguishing between things necessary to salvation and things 'indifferent', settled the Church on a more positive foundation. The Scriptures, they taught, were indeed 'all-sufficient unto that end for which they were given', but that end was neither the regulation of a surplice nor the ordering of a Commonwealth: such things were left to the devices of human reason, to be settled by the earthly powers of God's ordaining, and not by individual

¹*Ecc. Polity*, v. 17, 5; *Laud, Works*, iii. 341.

subjects: for, 'except our own private and but probable resolutions be by the law of public determination overruled, we take away all possibility of social life in the world.' In the *Ecclesiastical Polity* Hooker painted that magnificent picture of Law as the voice of God, diffusing itself through all His gifts and creations, and building up through the rational work of many generations a prescriptive authority, which must silence the individual's puny protests.

To this prescriptive authority, to intrinsic reasonableness, and to agreement with antiquity, thus making their appeal, the most learned generation in English Church history carried, from Hooker's time onwards, war into the enemy's country, and had by 1640 built up an impregnable position of conservative thought. The strength of this system lay in its width, which contrasted so sharply with the single taut strands of Puritan theology: to individual deduction from Scripture they opposed the historic Church's teaching and the country's laws, to predestination the free-will of reason, to the raptures of unaided faith the livelong renewal through the sacraments. If the first generation of Anglicans had pointed out the logical anarchy of Puritanism, the second and third struck deeper, and laid the axe to Puritan dogmatic teaching. With a sure insight the Arminians attacked predestination as the root of Puritan individualism. Religion, they taught, was 'not the jump into glorification' that the Puritan imagined. 'A working and a doing religion', 'the mechanical labouring part of religion', 'the work and sweat of the soul'—to such a doctrine of works, performed through the help of the Church, the great Anglicans pointed.¹ 'Would we were all saints!' said Cromwell; it was against this very Puritan notion of a Church of the elect, saved by justification and convinced from the pulpit, that the Anglicans lifted up the image of a Church whose membership covered the nation, both saints and sinners, and whose strength came not from the pulpit but from the choir, the school, and the altar.

Carrying on, simultaneously with this fight against Calvinism in all its branches, another struggle against Rome, the sup-

¹ Cosin, *Works* (Oxford, 1843), i. 79, 96; Hammond, *Sermons* (Oxford, 1849), i. 294.

porters of the *via media* created in course of years a national pride for the Church established. If isolated in Christendom, its insularity seemed to them both magnificent and justified, and with Hooker's splendid challenge we may leave it. ' We do rather glorify and bless God for the fruit we daily behold reaped by such ordinances as His gracious Spirit maketh the ripe wisdom of this national church to bring forth, than vainly boast of our own peculiar and private inventions, as if the skill of profitable regiment had left her public habitation to dwell in retired manner with some few men of one livery : we make not our childish appeals sometimes from our own to foreign churches, sometimes from both unto churches ancients than both are, in effect always from all others to our own selves, but as becometh them that follow with all humility the ways of peace, we honour, reverence, and obey in the very next degree unto God the voice of the Church of God wherein we live.' ¹

But who should declare and sanction this voice ? Who, surely, but the ' supreme governor ', the overruler, the shepherd of Israel ? Faced through this long struggle—for long it was, and victory not yet assured in 1640—by enemies on the right hand and the left, the Church's leaders clung to the Crown as their buckler, evolved a political theory of passive obedience to rulers, and exalted the King's constitutional powers against the two-handed engine of a Puritan Parliament and an all-embracing Common Law. It was from this point that the grounds of fidelity to the Crown and obedience to the Church marched together, and though the identification of the two causes was in 1641 far from complete, the work was so far done that fusion was rapid under the stress of common affliction : men, who in that spring had denounced illegal canons, impeached Laud, demanded restrictions on the bishops, and excluded them from Parliament, by the fall of autumn were defending the Prayer Book, and before the leaves reappeared on the trees were up in arms for episcopacy.

Yet the constitutional doctrine of the extreme Churchmen was detestable to the average Cavalier. The absolute obedience preached by Sibthorpe—' whether the prince be a believer or

¹ E. P. V. lxxi, 7.

an infidel, whether he rule justly or unjustly'—or the monarchy of Roger Manwaring's sermons—no 'derivation or collection of human power', but 'a participation of God's own omnipotency'—all this struck no chord but abhorrence in the mind of Royalist politicians. The line dividing English parties in 1641 was never the line between despotism and liberty, and the constitutional position of Hyde or Culpepper was more complex, more admirable, and more immeshed in law.

For whatever the precise place respectively assigned in the Constitution to King and to Parliament, the Tudor and Stuart monarchy rested, in typical Royalist opinion, upon a legal basis. 'Absolute' it was, Sir Walter Raleigh claimed, yet not 'Turk-like': 'an absolute trust', Chief Justice Berkeley said in condemning Hampden, but to be exercised *secundum leges regni*. The high authority of Sir Thomas Smith, Elizabeth's Secretary of State, echoed the Lancastrian minister Fortescue in contrasting the limited English monarchy with the arbitrary kingship of France, and the ardently loyal Bishop Morley, in preaching at the Restoration, made the same contrast as Raleigh—'Despotical Government is that of the Turks and Muscovites; but Political is, and ought to be, the government of all Christian Kings; I am sure it is of ours.'

But what this law was which distributed the powers of the State, who should apply it, and what were its sanctions—these were the points on which a generation all naturally law-abiding took different sides. 'The common law of England,' claimed Hakewill in 1610, 'as also other wise laws in the world, delights in certainty,' but actually it was the very lack of such definition, which forced on the constitutional conflict of the early seventeenth century. This fatal vagueness was the legacy of the Middle Ages. Canopied by the high moral conception of a fundamental, common, or natural law, the mediaeval King's Council had expanded into the High Court of Parliament without losing its mediaeval character. The powers of sovereignty were not yet separated into executive, judicial, and legislative: the line between statute and Order in Council was necessarily blurred while both Parliament and Council were taken as subject to the same fundamental law, which both were bound to interpret or to execute, but not to

alter. The 'rule of law', which the power of the State existed to enforce, worked through no specialized machinery, the organization was still fluid, only here and there hardening into convention. The King's dual capacity was not yet disentangled, the Council overlapped the Household, the King's Chamber obscured the Exchequer. The Council had not till 1540 unwoven its political and judicial functions as between Privy Council and Star Chamber. The conception of an exclusive sovereignty, inherent in any one branch of the Constitution, was still far distant. In Council, in Star Chamber, in Parliament, or in Council of the North—in each of these Henry VIII might exercise any of his powers, whether judicial, executive, or legislative: each had emanated from the King in the beginning, and each expressed the majesty of the law.

Parliament was 'but a concilium', it was argued in 1638 by a royal judge, and even if it were the highest, still it was not the only court, nor was Common Law the sole law. There was law ecclesiastical, law merchant, martial law, and law of state. Further, to such a conception of several laws (all subordinate to the law fundamental) naturally corresponded a departmental view of sovereignty: 'we will proceed', said James's proclamation of 1603, 'according to the laws and customs of this Realm, by advice of our Council, or in our High Court of Parliament, or by Convocation of our clergy, as we shall find reasons to lead us.'

For another generation yet, the notion of 'fundamentals' obsessed men's minds and would not make room for that of sovereignty. 'The law of England', declared Mr. Justice Jermyn in 1649, 'is no written law; it is the law that hath been maintained by our ancestors, by the tried rule of reason, and the puisne law of nature.' The King pleaded the same argument that year at his trial: 'the arms I took up were only to defend the fundamental laws of this Kingdom.' Bicameral government, Nathaniel Bacon told Richard Cromwell's Parliament in 1659, was the people's right: 'long usage hath so settled it, as acts of Parliament cannot alter it.'¹

¹ Burton, *Diary*, iii. 357. Gardiner, *Docs.* 376, McIlwain, *High Court of Parliament*, 84, my obligations to this last work as a whole are deep and obvious.

Such views upon the Constitution explain the noticeably legal, conservative outlook of the Royalist party in 1641, but actually these theories had long sat uneasily to new facts in the national life, which were daily demanding deeper channels and clearer landmarks. A combination of historical causes had broken down the mediaeval balance of powers. That half of human life, governed by the Church until the Reformation, now required new regulation by the State: the local government and order formerly vested in manor and gild had lapsed with their fall into a chaos, crying out for central control; new problems of State—Ireland, overseas expansion, economic readjustment, national wars—began from the late fifteenth century to test and strain the loosely jointed mediaeval government.

The great Tudor dynasty saved this moribund polity by forming an overwhelmingly strong executive power and, assured of general support from the governing social caste, pushed energetically along this plane the half-defined prerogatives of their predecessors. At each crucial point in the battle for good government, they reorganized or created a Council, whether in the North, the Church, or the Marches, and, by the embracing powers of their Council and their justices, knit fast together a great body of jurisdiction in which Parliament and the Common-law Courts were not allowed to share.

But, great though was the emphasis laid on the Crown's conciliar powers, the Tudor period did not mean constitutional reaction, and the mightiest of them could sincerely recognize 'we at no time stand so high in our estate royal as in the time of Parliament'. If, in the first stress of the Reformation, the Council took general control of the new political problems, Parliament still kept a grip on the old, and it was to Parliament that the Tudors turned to carry by legislative enactment their most solid and drastic measures. The first years of Edward VI clearly testify to an increasing deference for statute as against government by Council, and the outstanding constitutional feature of Elizabeth's reign was the desire to resolve executive, legislative, and judicial into their proper spheres. The Commons, with the monopolies question, began to narrow the

sparse remaining fields of royal finance. Common-law judges attacked with protests and prohibitions the unstatutory jurisdiction of the Northern Council and the Church Courts. The division of the King's Council was hardening, and the Star Chamber becoming something like a constitutional tribunal, with settled precedents and conventions. The continuing friction between the Queen and her Commons over the powers of the Church and the High Commission was only one warning of many that the general assent which had made the Tudor body-politic was fast disappearing, and that, where men's deepest feelings were excited, it would no longer be possible to evade the real crux of sovereign authority.¹

At this tense moment in the history of the Constitution, when only superhuman patience and restraint could have averted a conflict, James I ascended the throne of England and the theological hatreds of the Thirty Years' War descended upon Europe. The new king, who joined two kingdoms merely by hereditary right and was fresh from fighting the Presbyterian doctors' theory of contractual monarchy, now formulated afresh that theory of divine indefeasible right which counsellors of mediaeval emperors had once devised to meet the sounding challenge of the Roman Church. That kings were, in Wotton's phrase, 'the images and representatives of God's visible Majesty on earth' most Englishmen of that age would agree, but they revolted when this general position was applied to their own Constitution in detail, when Parliamentary privilege was declared simply a matter of royal grace, and when the King was declared responsible only 'to the high Court of Heaven'.

To solve constitutional questions by such theological short cuts not being the average English way, the Commons' appeal up to 1640 was, pre-eminently, one to precedents and to the old ideal of a fundamental law. In 1628 they still refused to face the issue of sovereignty between themselves and the King — 'We cannot', Pym said, 'leave to him sovereign power, for we were never possessed of it'—and the Petition of Right,

¹ Pollard, *Evolution of Parliament* and *E. H. R.* xxxvj-viii, Tanner, *Tudor Constitutional Documents*, McIlwain, *op. cit.*, Reid, *The King's Council in the North*; Usher, *High Commission*.

which was the climax of this first period of agitation, represented in fact a constitutional stalemate; by it Charles was declared divested of those sovereign powers which every modern state must possess, but Parliament still did not claim to control these powers itself.

In such a position there could be no finality. To appeal to the law, to 'walk in the steps of our forefathers', meant, with the undifferentiated Constitution of those days, simply an appeal to a common constitutional stock out of which flatly contradictory precedents could be drawn. Since precedents thus looked 'the one way or the other',¹ the sovereignty which Coke claimed for the law really begged the whole question, and put upon the judges an impossible task of arbitrating upon a fluid Constitution. 'By this means', Laud justly complained, 'the judges have liberty to retain more *in scrinio pectoris* than is fitting, and which comes a little too near that arbitrary government so much and so justly found fault with.'²

But those who watched this imbroglio with the clearest eyes had long discerned what principles must be invoked to replace these conflicting precedents, if authority was ever to rest on a firm foundation. The Stuart theological argument left most Royalists cold, but many were ready to agree with Charles that somewhere in the community there must be a final sovereign power. Bodin's theory of undivided sovereignty was well enough known to receive condemnation in the Commons' debates of 1628, and Wentworth, for one, was clear enough that, if the Petition of Right were literally kept, 'it would give a blow to government'. The doctrine of an intrinsic and inalienable prerogative, outside and above the ordinary law, and of *salus populi*, which must override law in emergency, had long ago won adherents in the new monarchy. Thomas Cromwell himself had taught it; 'the King with the advice of his Council,' he said, 'even if there were no statute, might, to withstand so great a danger, make proclamations which should be as effective as any statute.' Sir John Davies declared that the King himself could not bind sovereignty by legal concessions: 'if the Philistines come, that is, if any just or

¹ Serjeant Bramston, *State Trials*, iii. 10.

² *Works*, iii. 299.

important occasion do arise, it cannot hold or restrain the prerogative.' In 1627-8 the royal advocates preached from the same text: 'As Christ upon the Sabbath day healed,' said Bristol, 'so the prerogative is to be preserved for the preservation of the whole.' In the Ship-money case, seven years later, Finch capped the argument in fatal words: 'Acts of Parliament may take away flowers and ornaments of the Crown, but not the Crown itself: . . . they are void acts of Parliament: . . . no acts of Parliament make any difference.'

As the contest between Charles I and the mass of his people daily grew more bitter on religion and every branch of policy, the vague sanctions of the old Constitution grew more unsatisfying, and the temptation still stronger, for ardent minds, to cure the State's ills by this new 'strong medicine' of sovereign power. Of this Strafford's life is the highest example, and though his career properly falls outside the ken of party history, he justified the cause of authority by arguments which never lost all their weight with the later Royalist party. By temperament a reforming conservative, he believed that all his life he was pursuing 'the ancient and beaten paths of happiness',¹ and began in 1628 with an attempt to force alike upon King and Parliament recognition of the old legal boundaries as he then saw them. 'Our laws', he then declared, 'are not acquainted with sovereign power': the aim must be merely to vindicate 'our ancient vital liberties'. But, from the first, he declared that the executive must have a discretionary power of action upon 'emergent occasion', and a bitter experience of practical government in the North and in Ireland confirmed his belief, not merely in the 'cancerous malignity' of his enemies, which only 'corrosives' could overcome, but that sovereignty was 'going down the hill', and must be forced up again. With such a task before him as the re-establishment of that ordered authority, on which every man's peace and happiness depended, he would let no individual right stand in the way: 'the ground whereupon government stands will not so easily be washed away.' If he insisted once and again that Ship-money should only be asked 'for public and necessary uses', 'for the very, not feigned, relief and safety

¹ Strafford *L. and D.* i. 180.

of the public', he yet defended its basis as 'such a property of sovereignty, as were the Crown willing, yet can it not divest itself thereof: *salus populi suprema lex*—nay, in cases of extremity, even above acts of Parliament'. Believing 'the prospects of Kings into mysteries of State are so far exceeding those of ordinary common persons', he would leave to the King the 'supreme watches', which in his philosophy any good State must assign to its executive arm.

But the Royalist party of 1641 repudiated the great Deputy and all his teaching, and took their stand on the old law, even against the King. The dim future was to justify Strafford's theory of sovereignty, but had that theory triumphed in Strafford the national liberties must have perished. A deep debt is, then, due to those prosaic lawyers and country gentlemen who, with some false law and history, it may be, but with a sure historical insight, determined to recall the Constitution from the letter which killed to the spirit which makes alive. In the Long Parliament's first year, which destroyed the Tudors' expanded executive, the later Royalists worked therefore in entire accord with Pym and Hampden. Their future generals, Langdale and Capel, had personally resisted Ship-money, and it was on the motion of Falkland and Hyde that it was declared illegal, and that Finch, its apologist, was prosecuted. The Triennial Bill, the Acts to abolish Star Chamber and High Commission, those against Tonnage and Poundage and the Forests, the impeachment of Strafford—all these were introduced with the open approval, or the tacit consent, of the Royalist front bench. Till May 1641 the House of Commons was thus almost unanimous, whether against the King's arbitrary sovereignty or the bishops' innovations.

But while the Royalists, in order to arrive at 'primitive' episcopacy or the 'fundamental' liberties of England, were ready to destroy what they viewed as usurpation, their reforming spirit was entirely conditioned by a purely conservative motive, and they parted company with the Puritans when, from what was viewed as restoration, the reforming process turned into one of revolution. The Puritan extremists thus managed, inside one year, to join together what the whole previous century had contrived to keep apart—that is, the

political and the religious implications of Protestant thought—and finally drove into the opposite camp the defenders both of the Church and the Crown. This formation into one Royalist party, of all those who from many different motives supported either Church or Crown, was the crowning event of the last half of 1641. In this process abstract doctrine played little part: the Royalists did not ordinarily defend the Crown on the maxims of *salus populi*, nor the Church on those of divine right, but in each case took their stand on the law, which, if a broken reed whereon to lean for positive conclusions, formed the best possible negative base for a party on the defensive. The law might not say, with a clear voice, who could arrest without showing cause, who could appoint ministers, or enforce ecclesiastical canons, but it stated undeniably that bishops were an integral part of Parliament and that one House of Parliament could not legislate alone.

The Root and Branch agitation of the previous spring, the massed petitions, and the swarm of preaching sects, roused the conservative defiance of many who had been loud enough against Laud or Strafford. 'If we make a parity in the Church', Sir John Strangways said, 'we must come to a parity in the Commonwealth'; and county petitions began to harp on Queen Elizabeth's old theme, as to the inconsistency of Presbytery with Kingship. Apart from mere conservative feeling, the religious question raised in sharp form the final matter of sovereignty, and the Commons' first revolutionary action was to publish during September resolutions of their own touching ecclesiastical innovations. From this date the course of politics outside Westminster—Charles's journey to the North, the Irish rebellion, the consequent need of an army, and the manifest beginnings of a royal reaction—drove the Commons farther and farther from the moorings of fundamental law, and their constitutional claims from the Grand Remonstrance onwards implied sovereignty for the Parliament, or even for the Commons alone. The appointment of the King's ministers, the control of the army, restrictions on the royal veto or on the prerogative of making peers, and a new conception of treason—here were 'innovations' with a vengeance.

The weapon of *salus populi* had thus passed from the dead Strafford to the hands of King Pym: the constitutional Royalists, who resisted both of them, might well plead that Pym's party, and not they, were the apostates. For their part, they were content to restore, as they believed, the rule of law, and to divide, as the late Elizabethans had begun to divide, the provinces of executive, judiciary, and legislature. With the question of ultimate sovereignty, therefore, they did not meddle; they had repelled it in the King, they now resisted it in the Parliament, and, turning their faces from the future inevitable concentration of national government, rested their notion of liberty, as did their successors in 1701, upon a balance or a separation of powers.

The political principles on which Royalists were all agreed in 1642 were, then, of a negative character. Half their leaders still distrusted the divine right of bishops, and nearly all repudiated the divine absolutism of the King. What exactly their Church should be was not yet decided, and on some particulars of royal power they were equally ready to bargain. Future events were to show up the logical flaws in their constitutional theory: they had not in the least reconciled the divine responsibility they would allow to the King with that responsibility which, they claimed, he owed to the national laws. ✓ Time, in this respect, was to vindicate the champions of sovereignty, whether Strafford or Pym, and the Churchmen, who in 1642 boggled at the constitutional claims of Parliament, were in 1662 and 1688 to be its strongest supporters. ✓

But time alone can permanently advance great causes, and the Royalists of 1642 had gone as far to unravel the Reformation Constitution as their generation could bear. If they would not yet make statute and Parliament solely supreme, they had at least accepted a great widening of their scope: if they still left the King an active rôle in politics, they had rewritten most of those 'fundamentals' which they claimed should control his actions. As each wave of national progress advances, it throws back some conservative minds on the high and dry ground of authority. One such wave had risen in 1628, and thus Wentworth, followed by many smaller men like Noy, Littleton, Digges, and Francis Seymour, had come over from

the Opposition to the Crown. In the high tide of 1641, half of England felt that enough had been done to restore their ancient liberties, and rallied again to the Crown and Church, in which they saw the cause of order. Under the banner of 'the known law of the land', which Charles set up in his first solemn army order, they went out to battle against revolution.

As yet their doubts and aspirations had not acquired the independent status, or the continuous firmness, of a party creed; this was to be achieved by eighteen years of civil war and exile.

III

THE CAVALIERS

THE Royalism of 1642, contained within the formula 'Church and King', had not sprung merely from the twofold political process so far described. It rested, farther and deeper, upon a mass of social predispositions—on the environment, instincts, and deep-rooted sentiments which underlie all political parties, and account, even in more sophisticated days, for the mental processes of party leaders. Such forces of atavism, sentiment, or social impulse weighed, inevitably, far more heavily in the early and undefined days of party, and one cannot appreciate later Tory history till some effort, however cursory, is made to plumb the mind of the Cavalier.

Here, then, we attempt some analysis of the first conditions which prepared men to receive and welcome the Royalism of Church and King. The names with which we shall be concerned are either those of men entirely outside party, or of those who perished before party lines were clearly drawn: we deal sometimes, as it were, with the army's originating brain, and sometimes with its pioneers, but not with the main battle. Even within such limitations, no one intellectual category can cover the Royalist cause. Lindsey, Derby, Capel, Falkland, Northampton, Sunderland, Carnarvon—the peers who fell in battle or on the scaffold; Rupert, Hopton, Newcastle, Hertford, Ormonde, Goring, and Astley—magnates and soldiers, good and bad; the courtiers and royal servants—Jermyns, Ashburnhams, Crofts, and Fanshaws; the country gentry—Pakingtons, 'Strangways, Grenvilles, Windhams, Hastings, Byrons; the wits and the poets—Suckling, Lovelace, Davenant, Cleveland, or Herrick; the Catholics, like Worcester, Langdale, and Gage; the mystics and divine poets—Herbert, Ferrar, Traherne, the two Vaughans, and Crashaw; the artists,

thinkers, and humanists—Inigo Jones or William Lawes, Thomas Hobbes or Sir Thomas Browne, Ashmole or Dugdale, Anthony Wood or Izaak Walton. Nor will a single formula define the warfare of Cavalier against Puritan : we may equally well call it Renaissance against Reformation, Catholic against Protestant, or free-thought against dogmatism, but the half-truth in each antithesis, and the mutual inconsistencies of them all taken together, show that we must make a broader analysis.

Even before the last great wave of the Reformation broke in the Puritan movement, older influences of Classicism and Catholicism had poured back to fill part of the intellectual void made by the first crashing downfall of the Middle Ages ; and then, while the air was still rent by the Euphuist, the Platonist, the Catholic, and the Protestant, the ultimate and last victor joined the fray, in the shape of rationalism and science. It is thus small wonder that the Royalist mentality was confused and inconsistent, for the first half of the seventeenth century was one of those periods in the history of civilization when the great forces, which together make up the modern European mind, were engaged in one of their recurrent struggles for readjustment. The satisfied glory of Elizabeth's reign arose from the fact that all these great influences—chivalry and a semi-mediaeval monarchy, mythology and the classics, Protestantism and the new learning—were for a brief halcyon season in equilibrium. But the *Faerie Queen*, if the epitome of this Saturnian age, had been also its epitaph, and Shakespeare's plays are full of Falklands, shrilly ingeminating ' peace, peace ' and striving with a heavy heart to master all things in heaven and earth.

The oldest of these contending forces was what, for want of a better expression, may be called the Catholicism of England. Round the village church still gathered the immemorial habits of the common people. Sir Thomas Overbury's Franklin ' allows of honest pastime, and thinks not the bones of the dead anything bruised or the worse for it, though the country lasses dance in the churchyard after evensong : Rock Monday and the Wake in summer, shrivings, the wakeful catches on Christmas eve, the Hokday, or Seed-cake—these he yearly keeps, yet holds them no relics of Popery '. Edward VI's

Injunctions had bidden the clergy teach their people that they might in harvest-time work on holy days, to 'save that thing which God hath sent', and the Catholic Sunday as opposed to the Jewish Sabbath was one mark of the Churchman. The parish of Bishop's Canning in Wiltshire, which could 'have challenged all England for music, ringing, and football play', could also, led by its parson, produce a masque for Anne of Denmark; respectable Gloucestershire squires would dance every Sunday 'at the Church-house': the pipe and tabor, maypole and morris-dance, Twelfth-night, mummings and Whitsun ales, processions and 'mothering-Sunday'—these were some of the old customs which saintly George Herbert approved.¹ The faint umbra of a more primitive England still lingered in the Universities, whence the parish churches drew their pastors; there the scholar still sang the Latin gospel after College dinner, and there corporations of celibate clergy still bred young men in the *quadrvivium* of mediaeval Europe. Scattered about England, manor-courts were still performing their immemorial duties. The gentry of Lancashire still wore the Stanley livery. Manorial tenants armed with broadswords still met Assize judges on the Border. The Cornish tongue still was heard in the outskirts of the Duchy, and men still living had sung the mass and cheered the mystery play.² No explanation of the Restoration, no reading even of Queen Anne's reign, would be adequate that did not take into account the immensely conservative power of this body of ancient moralities, built into a people still predominantly made up of villagers and yeomen.

Sharply distinct from these relics of old English society, but like them a conservative force, was the dogmatic Counter-Reformation. Catholics formed no insignificant part of the Royalist armies. The fortune, even the existence, of old Catholic families depended so entirely on the Crown's leniency that their invariable loyalty needs little other explanation.

¹ Cardwell, *Annals*, i. 16; Aubrey, *Lives*, i. 251, ii. 319; *Memoirs of the Family of Guise*, ed. G. Davies, 1917 (Cam. Soc.); Herbert, *A Priest to the Temple*, cap. 35.

² Some, said to be composed as late as 1611, 'were acted in the memory of some not long since deceased': Nicholson to Charlett, 14 Nov. 1700 (Bodl. Ballard MSS. 4).

Since the beginning of King Charles's reign their star had seemed in the ascendant. A natural intellectual reaction was drawing the English Church's most ardent spirits farther away from their father's anti-Popery, and bringing them to cherish the fellowship, and use the mental apparatus, of the whole Church Catholic. With the advent of Henrietta Maria, who was pledged at her marriage to further the cause of Holy Church, there began a stream of conversion, swelled in many instances by contact with Spanish thought. Lord Treasurer Portland, two Secretaries of State in Calvert and Windebank, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer Cottington, represented converts in the Cabinet. 'Wat' Montague, one of the Queen's favourite servants, went over in 1639, and was to end as Abbot of Pontoise. The mothers of Buckingham and Falkland, or the wife of Endymion Porter, may stand for some of the great Court ladies. The Queen's chapel at Somerset House seemed to the Puritans the mouth of the pit, and her devout Capuchins its familiars. The successive legations of Panzani, Con, and Rossetti brought successive relaxations of the anti-recusancy laws. Diplomatic conversations began on the subject of Catholic reunion, and an English resident was sent to Rome. Before it had quite ceased to produce editions of the schoolmen, the orthodox press at Oxford was printing works by the Jesuits, and the noblest of English Churchmen, Herbert and Ferrar, marked, with a translation of Valdez's *Divine Considerations*, that considerable influence of Italian and Spanish mysticism which deeply tinged High-churchmanship in England up to the age of the Non-jurors.¹

Massed more particularly in Cheshire and Lancashire, Wales and its Marches, the Catholic recusants gave men and money freely at their sovereign's call, both for the Scottish and the Civil Wars. The Marquess of Winchester held out in his house at Basing, nicknamed 'Loyalty', until October 1645. Marmaduke Langdale fought through two wars. The Somersets, Lord Worcester and his son Glamorgan, claimed to have spent a million for the Crown, and held every garrison from Raglan and Brecknock to Hereford. 'No subject I have',

¹ Gardiner, *History*, viii. 138, ix. 87, 135, 243; Madan, *Early Oxford Press*; Herbert, *Works*, i. 265 et seq. (ed. 1873); Plumptre, *Ken*.

Charles wrote, 'equals either of you.'¹ Three other names may give some idea of the continuity of the loyal Catholics: those of Sir Henry Gage, the gallant soldier mortally wounded as Governor of Oxford, of his half-brother Francis, from 1676 to 1682 president of the English College at Douai, and of Sir Edward Sherborne, artillery general and religious poet, who lived as a Non-juror into the days of Anne.

More universally powerful than dogmatic Catholicism was the influence of the classical Renaissance, and when we consider the seventeenth-century struggle on its highest plane as a conflict of pure principle, it is well to remember that the men of both sides were steeped in the classic tradition. Plutarch and Seneca, Plato and Aristotle, could not, happily, be the monopoly of one camp, but it is still difficult to exaggerate the support given to the cause of authority in politics by the classic political learning, which filtered through Machiavelli and the Italian humanists, and left so clear an impress on all this generation. The majesty of law, contempt for democracy, mysteries of State—such are the themes of the authors, at whose feet Bacon, Raleigh, or Hobbes imbibed the elements of politics. Ben Jonson, the arbiter of letters till 1640, impressed upon his tribe the respect for form, authority, and intellectual ideals, characteristic of the Latin genius. George Sandys, one of the Gentlemen of Charles's Privy Chamber, was a man of many other parts—son of an Archbishop of York, Treasurer of the Virginia Company, part-author of the metrical paraphrase of the Psalms—but his name lives longest as translator of the *Metamorphoses*. Thomas Carew, another of the Gentlemen, breathed, like all the Court and pastoral poets of the century, the spirit, and often the morals, of Anacreon, Theocritus, or Horace. The King's great doctor, Harvey, who would persist in reading at Edgehill while the bullets whistled around him, bade the young Aubrey 'go to the fountain head', and stick to Aristotle, Cicero, and Avicenna. The clergy, never more learned or more influential, the Universities, never before or since taking so direct a part in public life, fed not only on the mediaeval logic and the Fathers, but on the Classics, both of the Gold and Silver Age. As opposed to the

¹ Charles I to Worcester, 10 January 1645 (Beaufort papers).

Puritan, they reached their faith by the path of learning: 'faith', said Cosin, 'is not on this side knowledge, but beyond it.' The great preachers, like Henry Hammond, poured out in their sermons, indiscriminately, Livy and Homer, Augustine and Aquinas. 'The grave divine', said Falkland's friend Earle, 'counts it not profaneness to be polished with human reading, or to smooth his way by Aristotle to School-divinity.'

To this last end, indeed, the learning of this encyclopaedic generation was chiefly directed: like Pico della Mirandola and the giants of the Renaissance, they tried to fuse all Christian and pagan learning. To the Euphuism of Sidney's school they added Platonism and the Neo-Platonist extravagances. Suckling, amidst many others, tried to show that 'a great part of our religion, either directly or indirectly, hath been professed by heathens', and for his conclusions on the mystery of the Trinity refers his readers to those 'great lovers and lords of reason', Zoroaster, Plato, and Plotinus.¹ The masques, even those composed by Carew and acted by Jermyn or Holland, found it good to uphold a Platonic notion of chastity, and Milton's *Comus*, acted at Ludlow in 1634, was but the greatest of a whole school.²

These wild storms of thought, which Hobbes rode so serenely, threw more delicate spirits from the crest of one wave to another. Chillingworth and Falkland went over to Catholicism, and returned again. Donne, the great Dean who came from Catholicism to St. Paul's, wrote the struggle of the age which he taught:

. . . on a huge hill
Cragged and steep Truth stands, and he that will
Reach her, about must and about must go.

All could not be such deans, but the Royalist cause sheltered many others, whose opposition to the Puritans rested not on any graven tables of orthodoxy but on a half-Platonic, half-Christian mysticism, reduced from all the systems of law, allegory, alchemy, and theology at this time seething in their minds. The gigantic *Theophila* of Edward Benlowe, 'a Spiritual poem which treateth on sub-coelestials, coelestials, and super-

¹ *Works*, 1696; *An Account of Religion by Reason*.

² P. Reyher, *Les Masques anglaises* (Paris, 1909), 235 et seq.

coelestials', paints the devout soul enjoying God—the subject of Plato, as of Crashaw, but drowned by this worthy Royalist in vast oceans of philosophic conceit. Charles Lamb's favourite, 'the thrice noble Margaret Newcastle', she whose black and silver coach set fashionable London staring after the Restoration, showed the portentous effects of this swirling metaphysical 'wit' on a fine brain and a generous nature.

Sir Thomas Browne, author of *Religio Medici* and the greatest prose writer of the age, is worthy of deeper attention, as showing what went to make up one who, by his own account, was 'a sworn subject' of the Church of England, and who certainly was a staunch Royalist, knighted later by Charles II. No Puritan system could have contained one so sceptical, yet so devout. All the classical and scientific learning of his day had given him only a charitable, humble faith, fitting his expressed desire 'to be but the last man, and bring up the rear in Heaven'. He preferred in divinity 'to keep the road' of the Church, to 'answer all the objections of Satan and my rebellious reason with that odd resolution I learnt of Tertullian, *certum est, quia impossibile est*'. He went thus through life listening for the faintest echo of the immortal spheres; 'even that vulgar and tavern music, which makes one man merry, another mad, strikes in me a deep fit of devotion, and a profound contemplation of the First Composer'. The life of Francis Bacon, or the early history of the Royal Society, in which so many Royalist bishops and politicians took a leading part, would go to point the same conclusion as the works of Browne, that the best speculative intellects of that age, as of many others, found in the cause of authority the necessary haven, from which to sail on their far voyages. Cavaliers of less intellectual equipment had sword in one hand and testing-tube in the other: were not Charles and Rupert themselves 'chymists', and did not Lord Worcester, the much-enduring defender of Raglan, pride himself much rather on his invention of moving water by fire?

Still nearer to the scene of political action lay the divine school of poets—Herbert, Crashaw, Vaughan, and Traherne. Indeed, if the permanent elements in a political creed may be tested by its deepest spiritual expression, it is, perhaps, to this

school that we must go to get an explanation of the breadth, the fragrance, and the poignancy of the best Royalist tradition. 'The bright shoots of everlastingness', which characterize all their work, were not won without spiritual struggle. The oldest of them, George Herbert—brother of the philosophic neutral Herbert of Cherbury, spiritual ward of Donne, and Ferrar's friend—abandoned the gross Court of James I, and assured political advancement, for the Wiltshire parish which became holy ground for English Churchmen. His *Priest to the Temple* contains, he tells us, 'the picture of the many spiritual conflicts that have passed betwixt God and my soul, before I could subject mine to the will of Jesus my Master'. It was to this that he dedicated all the talents which had made him Public Orator at Cambridge, and might have made him Secretary of State.¹

To the bareness of much contemporary religion he set in opposition the beauty of holiness. His country parson is to be cleanly dressed, 'the purity of his mind breaking out and dilating itself even to his body, clothes, and habitation': the vessels of the Church must be the same :

O what pure things, most pure those things must be
Who bring my God to me.

A rare colour, a delicate fancy, play like lambent light over his religion. He pictures prayer, not as did the Ironsides seeking the God of battles, but as a mystic ecstasy.² The whole earth, even its things common and unclean, are the Lord's. Holy Scripture 'condescends to the naming of a plough, a hatchet, a bushel, leaven, boys piping and dancing ; showing that things of ordinary use are not only to serve in the way of drudgery, but to be washed and cleansed, to serve even for lights of heavenly truths'. It was, then, as 'the deputy of Christ' that this parson of Bemerton taught the 'labouring people (whom He chiefly considered)', who, Walton

¹ Both the old discoveries and the new-found seas,
The stock and surplus, cause and history,
All these stand open, or I have the keys;
Yet I love Thea.

² Church-bells beyond the stars heard, the soul's blood,
The land of spices, something understood.

tells us, 'let their plough rest when Mr. Herbert's Saint's-bell rung to prayers'. It was as one who would put to religious use the whole of human faculties, pleasures, and equipment, that he gave on his death-bed the last song :

My God, My God,
My music shall find thee,
And ev'ry string
Shall have his attribute to sing.

From beyond Herbert's Welsh Marchland came the two Vaughans, Henry the great Silurist, and Thomas, his queer twin-brother. The latter we must dismiss, noting him only as typical of his age, and even of his cloth, for then even a bishop could publish a treatise on alchemy ;¹ ejected from his living upon charges which included one of bearing arms for the King, he continued not merely 'as a true resolute Protestant in the best sense of the Church of England', but as 'a great chymist' and 'a zealous brother of the Rosicrucian fraternity'.² Henry Vaughan seems also to have fought in some Royalist army, and his hatred of the Puritans is not in doubt,³ though the significance of his work is deeper than this. He was Herbert's greatest and admitted follower, but in framing a philosophy of nature he went far beyond his master. It is for man as part of nature, and partner in the divine plan, that he invokes mercy ; it is

That busy commerce kept between
God and his creatures,

which he admires. And his prayer for the last day, when all things are made new, is

Give him amongst Thy works a place,
Who in them loved and sought Thy face.

Like Wordsworth, he sees in 'those white designs which children drive' the best intimations of immortality.⁴ It is in

¹ Madan, *op. cit.*, 116.

² Wood, *Ath. Ox.* iii. 722 ; E. K. Chambers's note in *Poems of H. Vaughan* (Muses Library), vol. ii.

³ See his preface to the 1655 edition of *Silex Scintillans*, and, among other poems, 'White Sunday'.

⁴ Happy those early days when I
Shined in my angel-infancy.

natural images and nature's gifts that he finds the way to faith :

an ancient way
All strowed with flowers and happiness,
And fresh as May ;

and in such manifestations he finds his final consolation, and gives his real message. We may leave him by his native Usk, waiting the hour

when angels here
Shall yet to man appear,
And familiarly confer
Beneath the oak and juniper.

Yet another Marcher, and another worshipper of God in nature, was Thomas Traherne, late in life chaplain to Orlando Bridgeman, the decent and godly Lord-Keeper of the godless Cabal days. The duty of man, and his sublime destiny, he teaches, is to glorify the creation. Like all his school, he sees that it is the influences known in childhood, and obvious to all, that are the revelations of God :

the liquid pearl in springs,
The useful and the precious things,
Are in a moment known,

Society is God's work, and to give Traherne's litany of praise is to unfold half the native strength of seventeenth-century Anglicanism.

Thou, Lord, hast made thy servant a sociable creature, for
which I praise Thy name,
A lover of company, a delighter in equals ; Replenish the
inclination which Thyself hast planted,
And give me eyes
To see the beauty of that life and comfort,
Wherewith those by their actions
Inspire the nations.
Their markets, tillage, courts of judicature, marriages,
Feasts and assemblies, navies, armies,
Priests and Sabbaths, trades and business, the voice of the
bridegroom,
Musical instruments, the light of candles,
And the grinding of mills,
Are comfortable, O Lord, let them not cease.¹

¹ *Serious and Pathetical Contemplation of the Mercies of God.*

Asceticism and enmity to nature was, for that matter, never the teaching of the Church's greatest leaders: Saul, thought Hammond, for all his worldliness became 'the gallanter apostle of Christ, the more abundant labourer for ever after'.¹

Richard Crashaw sings the same tune, though in another key, and his tale is soon told. As a fellow of Peterhouse, 'he made his nest more gladly than David's swallow near the house of God',² and thence he was ejected in 1649 by the Parliamentary commissioners. A starving exile at first in Paris, and by 1646 a Catholic, he found his way to Rome, where he must have been in spirit long before, and died in the summer of 1649, not yet forty, at the holy place of Loretto. In him the tawdry conceits, the blazing religious fervour, the Latinism, the perfect note of the earth and the child—all those characteristics we have seen in his contemporaries found mixed and most uneven expression. Once more, it is the shepherds, 'homespun things', to whom God on earth appears. The touching familiarity with the divine, only paralleled by the fifteenth-century mystery plays, breaks out in perfect music, whether in the shepherds' song or in the welcome for Saint Teresa in Heaven. All the flights and passions, which Carew would give to a fleeting mistress or half a score others conjure up for Lady Carlisle, are here transferred, hardly etherealized, to the mystical marriage of Teresa and her divine spouse.

Such were some of the chief spiritual influences that gathered round the head-waters of Royalist thought: the ancient folk-religion of the people, the counter-Reformation, the classical Renaissance, mysticism—Platonic or Divine—and the religion of Nature. We must travel now further down-stream, and instance some of the different currents that cross and mingle, as they run from these high grounds, to swell the river nearing the open traversed sea.

Midway between the divine singers and the singers of the Court—a link, indeed, between town and country, between earthly and unearthly, between the followers of Shakespeare and the school of Jonson—will be found Robert Herrick, sometime Buckingham's chaplain in the Isle of Rhé, and from 1629 to 1674 priest (with the necessary interval of eviction) of Dean

¹ *Works, ut supra*, 13.

² Preface to edition of 1649.

Prior, on Dartmoor. If sometimes his invocation of Julia's or Electra's beauties smack rather of those

lyric feasts
Made at the Sun,
The Dog, the Triple Tun,

than of his cloth, Herrick's major muse is of another sort—a country maid, half English and half Latin. Mab and Oberon, Phyllis and Corydon, Bacchus and Hymen dart in and out with his dog Tracy and his Devonshire maid, Prudence Baldwin: the dedication may be to Lar, the imagery borrowed from Horace, but the whole air is heavily scented with English hay, his landscape is backed by the parish church or lit with a harvest home. The *Hesperides* preserve for ever the customs and pieties of older England; the cudgel play and dances, the Twelfth-night wassail, the green rushes for Whitsun, St. Valentine and St. Distaff, the child's grace, and the tapers guttering by watchers of the bier. The carol he made to be sung to Charles, at Whitehall, gives still the authentic piercing note we find in Crashaw or the Elizabethan song-books:

Tell us, thou clear and heavenly tongue,
Where is the Babe but lately sprung?
Lies he the lily-banks among?

And if the faith he professes is that of the little child, the place of the blest he dreams of has something of the langour of Elysium.¹

His politics, as suited the child of Ben or Endymion Porter's client, are simply Royalist. Lanier set to music his pastoral on the birth of Prince Charles. The King, 'brave prince of cavaliers', Hopton and Berkeley, Bernard Stuart and William Lawes—for these he makes the ode or frames the requiem.

The Cavalier singers proper centre round the Court, which to them meant both ideal and livelihood. It was in the masque that they used to the fullest their learning and imagination, labouring by their art to keep monarchy on the pedestal, which

¹ In that whiter island, where
Things are evermore sincere •
Candour here, and lustro there
Delecting.

the Tudors had set up, and at which Spenser and Shakespeare had paid homage. The last of Ben Jonson's masques, *Love's Welcome*, acted before the King at Lord Newcastle's house, Bolsover, in the summer of 1634, depicts the monarch as shepherd of the flock. The best talent of the day—Jonson, Davenant, Carew, Wat Montague, the two Lawes, and Inigo Jones—produced the long series which ceases only with *Salmacida Spolia*, acted on the 21st January 1640. The King and Queen danced in the masques with the future heroes and victims of the Civil War—with Derby, Grandison, and Charles Cavendish, with Holland, Digby, and Wharton. It was the last dance of the age of chivalry in dead-and-gone Whitehall; the masquers move like people in a dream, and we wake to find them on battle-fields, or stretching on the block the heads that had nodded so briskly. In the masque the poets enshrined all the political feeling of a Court blind to the writing on the wall; the hypocrisy of the Puritan, the virulent humours of New England, the folly of democracy, or the triumph (even in the year of Ship-money) of the King's sea-power. Carew's *Coelum Britannicum*—where Arthur and St. George, Guy and Bevis, Mercury and Momus join to praise the 'darlings of the gods', and the crowning scene represents 'the stellifying of our British heroes'—has, for its last stage direction, words of bitter historic irony: 'the great cloud closeth again, and so passeth away overthwart the scene, leaving behind it nothing but a serene sky'.

Carew himself did in fact die before the deluge—wasted by something very like the 'hard, gem-like flame' of the Renaissance. The perfect and elaborated polish of his greatest songs does not obscure the truth, that he is spiritual ancestor to the 'deboshed' cavalier of the Restoration, and his tilting at the 'goblin' honour and chastity is as completely unmoral as the sceptical period of the great Dean of St. Paul's.

Equally unmoral when he chose, Sir John Suckling, with his 'brisk round eye' and red nose, is much more representative of the Cavalier spirit. Son of a Comptroller of the Household and nephew of Lord Treasurer Middlesex, Suckling stepped out from these beginnings to Cambridge, and then to the army of Gustavus Adolphus. His audacious wit, his high

gambling at the Piccadilly bowling-green, his flashes of deep insight, made him the friend of three circles : of Carew, Lovelace, and Davenant, of John Hales, Falkland, and Godolphin, of the Jermyns, the Percies, and Lady Carlisle. The equipment, from his own purse, of his 'scarlet' troop of horse for the Scottish war, membership of the Long Parliament, a share in the first army plot, and a speedy death in exile—these were the later stages.

All the contradiction and inconstancy of his age met in this extraordinary man. The grave author of *Rational Religion* writes the superb *Ballad on a Wedding*, and from the heavy allusive tragedy of *Brennoraik* (aimed at the Scotch) we swing at a gallop into

Out upon it, I have loved
Three whole days together.

The very man who in 1639 was 'walking up and down the banks of Tweed, like the Tower-lions in their cages', cursing the 'men of peace', could write, eighteen months later, that admirable letter to Jermyn, bidding Charles reconcile his people not 'by any little acts, but by royal and kingly resolutions'.¹

But Suckling's sophisticated wit voiced only the secondary stage of Royalism, for men still lived in this Court who had served Elizabeth, and the once full torrent of chivalry still contributed a rivulet to the Cavalier ideal. Honour, right or wrong, was the quality on which the Cavalier especially prided himself. 'A complete cavalier', Symmonds preached to the army, 'is a child of honour. He is the only reserve of English gentility and ancient valour, and hath rather chosen to bury himself in the tomb of honour than to see the nobility of his nation vassalized.'² Hammond was telling the same, with a purer moral, to the Oxford garrison: 'Honour I conceive to be the daughter of heroic action, and specially of victory: and is there any such sweeping triumphant conqueror in the world as the regenerate Christian?' The gallant Sunderland, hating the war and praying for peace, tells his 'Dearest Heart' that, though he would 'rather be hanged' than fight for the Parliament, yet 'if there could be an expedient found, to save

¹ Suckling, *Works*, *passim*; Aubrey; Courthope, *History of English Poetry*, iii. 247 et seq.

² Warburton, i. 414.

the punctilio of honour, I would not continue here an hour'.¹ It was 'honour and gratitude' only which made the Knight-Marshall, Sir Edmund Verney, choose to lose his life, as he did at Edgehill, defending things 'which are against my conscience to preserve and defend', rather than 'do so base a thing as to forsake him', whose bread he had eaten for thirty years.

Of this keen sentiment Richard Lovelace is the best-known voice among the poets. The glorious lines 'to Althea from Prison' were the result of imprisonment in 1642, for the crime of presenting to the Commons the Kentish Petition for restoration of Church and Prayer Book. He, too, was one of the forlorn Oxford garrison of 1645-6, and was once more imprisoned in 1648, but that 'most beautiful gentleman' (and 'when he was in his glory, he wore cloth of gold and silver') died in squalor before the Restoration. One stanza, written in his Westminster prison, explains what harder fighters than he died for:

When, like committed linnets, I
With shriller throat shall ring
The sweetness, mercy, majesty,
And glories of my King;
When I shall voice aloud how good
He is, how great should be,
Enlargèd winds, that curl the flood,
Know no such liberty.

In the history of an English party we must not linger on the words and acts of Montrose, the noblest of all Cavaliers, but borrow our notion of their highest ideal from an English priest, William Cartwright, 'the utmost man could come to'. Sprung from the Cotswolds, Cartwright lived his life at Christ Church, Oxford: there, he said, he had 'great spirited tutors, choice books, and select company'. There, working as we are asked to believe sixteen hours a day, by the alchemy of his wit he turned (and the description may well stand for many more like him) 'the axioms of Aristotle, the problems of Euclid, the summes of Aquinas, the code of Justinian, the contexture of history, the learning of Rabbines, the mythology of Gentilism, the Fathers, Councils, Martyrologies, and Liturgics, and Christians—the poetry, oratory, and criticism of the

¹ To his wife, 21 Sept. 1642 (Ady, *Sacharissa*, 88).

world, into a good man, a great scholar, a most ingenious poet and orator, and an excellent preacher'.¹

There he produced before the Court, in 1636, his play *The Royal Slave* (Cartwright, said Canon Duppa as a prudent member of his governing body, 'Cartwright finds the wit, and we the money'), and there he died in 1643, of the fever then raging in the garrison, in his thirty-second year. 'Tis not to be forgot that King Charles the first dropped a tear at the news of his death',² and oceans of commemorative verse gushed from all the talent of his party—from Orinda and the two Vaughans, from Edward Sherborne and Jasper Mayne, from Henry Lawes, John Birkenhead, and Isaak Walton. Like every follower of Jonson and admirer of Lady Carlisle, he has his blots about him, but no Court poet ever had a truer singing gift. He was, above all, the laureate of Henrietta Maria, and his verses on her landing at Bridlington under enemy fire,

When she was shot at for the King's own good
By legions hired to blood,

have the real thrill of indignation.

But he found a theme more worthy of his rising powers in Sir Bevil Grenville's death. Long afterwards, in the red-letter year of Toryism, 1710, a Cornish parson observed that 'when ever it went well with the Grenvilles it went well with the Church of England',³ and Clarendon paid a noble tribute to this, the best of them. 'I cannot contain myself within my doors', Sir Bevil wrote, 'when the King of England's standard waves in the field upon so just occasion—the cause being such as must make all those who die in it little inferior to martyrs. And, for mine own, I desire to acquire an honest name, or an honourable grave.'⁴

Grenville had been Hopton's right hand in making the famous Cornish army, and with him had conquered at Brad-dock Down and Stratton: he fell on Lansdowne Hill at the head of his pikemen in July 1643. Cartwright, soon to follow him, drew this version of 'the happy warrior':

Not to be wrought by Malicc, Gain, or Pride,
To a compliance with the thriving side;

¹ David Lloyd, *Memoirs*, 1668.

• Aubrey, 1. 148.

³ H. MSS. Comm. Report XII, iii 14.

⁴ Warburton, i. 120, from the Carteret papers.

Not to take arms for love of change or spite,
 But only to maintain afflicted Right :
 Not to die vainly in pursuit of fame,
 Perversely seeking after voice and name ;
 Is to Resolve, Fight, Die, as Martyrs do ;
 And thus did he, Soldier, and Martyr too.

With Cleveland, Butler, Cowley, and Denham we pass out of this far country of antique confused ideals, where we have been so long wandering : the air is that of the keener morning, and the rippling sources we have tracked are soon to be canalized in the party formulas and journalism of the eighteenth century.

Cleveland, the greatest Royalist journalist and sometime Judge Advocate in the Newark army, was forerunner alike of the Restoration ballads, of Dryden, and of Roger L'Estrange.¹ His fame must rest on his political satires : every starving wit in Long Acre could quote his flashy phrases, every squire knew ' The Rebel Scot ' and ' The Committee Man '. ' The Rebel Scot ' gives the tone of his best work and sings the burden of the whole party up to 1650 :

They are the Gospel's life guard : but for them,
 The garrison of New Jerusalem,
 What would the brethren do ? the Cause ! the Cause !
 Sack-posset, and the fundamental laws !

And truth gives a power to the biting lines on the execution of Strafford and Laud :

The twins of public rage, adjudged to die
 For treasons they should act by prophecy :
 The facts were done before the laws were made ;
 The trump turned up after the game was played.

The first part of *Hudibras*, a much greater name, was published only in 1662, and its author, Samuel Butler, survived till 1680 : it is as a product, therefore, of Royalist thought as affected by the Commonwealth period that it should be judged. This masterpiece could be paralleled, as far as its sentiments go, by a hundred Rump ballads and an infinite

¹ If, as it appears, he was in holy orders, his verses do them no credit :

o Never Mark Antony
 Dallied more wantonly,
 With the Egyptian Queen.

amount of speeches in the Cavalier Parliament, and only the salt of the author's wit saves it from a similar oblivion. He puts in short compass the outlook of the Royalist partisan: a few mocking strokes paint the London of 1641,¹ and in four lines (with reference perhaps to his own treatment from the ungrateful Court) he sums up the philosophy of the neglected 'loyal' party:

For loyalty is still the same,
Whether it win or lose the game;
True as the dial to the sun,
Although it be not shined upon.

In Cowley this loyalty had turned to lassitude, and when his cypher work for the King ceased with the war, he bowed his head to the conqueror—convinced, like Hobbes, that peace was worth all other things. In the preface prefixed to his poems in 1656 he speaks of his determination to flee to America, and wishes that neither party should 'make a kind of artificial memory of those things wherein we are all bound to desire, like Themistocles, the art of oblivion'. In his Pindaric odes to Hobbes and to the Royal Society, we move finally out of the realm so long governed by authority or by emotion. 'Bacon, like Moses', led us to the verge of the promised land:

New scenes of Heaven already we espy,
And crowds of golden worlds on high.

The scientific Bishop Sprat has succeeded to Laud, the mathematician Seth Ward is dragooning George Herbert's old diocese, and already we catch from the new countries of thought the chilly breeze of 1688.

The Cavalier, who was to be extinguished by that event, was intellectually the child of the various influences we have tried to illustrate. The idlest profligate, who spent some years drinking at the University, had been plunged in the classics

¹ No sow-gelder did blow his horn
To geld a cat, but cried Reform.
The oyster-women locked their fish up,
And trudged away to cry No Bishop;
The mouse-trap men laid save-alls by,
And 'gainst ev'l counsellors did cry.

and in the Laudian controversies—while the best of them had passed through the University, the Inns of Court, the armies of Gustavus or Frederick Henry, had travelled widely, and touched intellectual life, as their libraries show, at many points, if slightly. Other and more tangible forces, however, than these we have discussed, impinged on their mentality, and the composition of the Restoration Royalist party will be clearer from an examination of some actual types of the Cavalier.

Apart from the Church, the Cavaliers' deepest sentiment was an entire devotion to the King's person—a devotion, it should be said, far removed from the disillusioned, remorseless service of the Crown practised by Strafford or Laud. The Court itself and the royal servants made up a large and heterogeneous contingent. With the Crofts, Porters, Legges, or Berkeleys, as later with the Churchills and Villiers, the Stuart kings familiarly lived, stayed in their houses, graced their daughters' weddings, and found minor office or Irish land for their younger sons. Nothing but such personal contact can explain the long political influence, for example, of a type like Henry Jermyn. Such smaller men's outlook was purely dynastic. 'My duty and my loyalty', said Endymion Porter, a Gentleman of the Bed-chamber, 'have taught me to follow my King and master, and by the grace of God nothing shall divert me from it.' Such a man's politics would be of a simple and rancorous order. His opponents seemed to him merely 'a company of fellows that are possessed with legions of devils, and would make us believe that they have the Holy Ghost'.¹ His son, George Porter—described by that eminently qualified judge, his brother-in-law, George Goring, as 'the best company and the worst officer that ever served the King'—lived to be the typical bravo of the Restoration Court.

Of such 'King's friends', Richard Fanshawe and his wife stand for a nobler type. Cultivated, rigidly Anglican, fervently loyal, they hated the Queen's little group even more than Presbyterian grandees, but through all their wanderings, from Jersey to St. Sebastian, they maintained a hereditary passion for the Crown, which flickered up again in a younger generation during the Regency debates of 1688.

¹ Townshend, *Endymion Porter*, *passim*.

The fascination of the Stuart house, which drew noble creatures like the Fanshawes, or which made Ormonde and Lindsey offer themselves for execution in the King's place, was never better personified than in the Palatine branch of it. The 'meaner beauties of the night' paled, for the great humanist Sir Henry Wotton, before Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia—his 'most resplendent Queen, even in the darkness of fortune', and not for him alone. To this 'same dearest, good, sweet princess' Roe and Rudyard, Strafford, Astley, and D'Ewes all did homage. Of her sons, morose unfortunate Maurice fills an unhappy niche in Clarendon's pages, but Rupert, born under a stormy star at Prague, began as the Cavalier hero and ended his life as a stalking-horse to the 'country' party. Rupert's 'romance' had always been an object of banter from his level-headed mother—in youth he had the odd ambition of ruling Madagascar—but with all his faults he was the greatest fighting asset his uncle, the King, had, and Rupert and his dog Boy (killed at Marston Moor) were shocking bogies to the Puritan child.

By the side of the Palatine group there stands for ever on the canvas the figure of William, first Lord Craven—'a most perfect character', wrote John Donne the younger, 'of what England was, in all her pomp and greatness'. He was the pupil in war of Maurice and Gustavus, and for over thirty years dedicated his great wealth and his sword to Elizabeth of Bohemia. The last appearance of this old Cavalier in history is on a December night of 1688, begging James II's leave to cut his way through the Dutch guards, then fast marching in on St. James's Palace.

We need not cumber our pages with the quarrelsome, hard-fighting, 'deboshed' ranks of Cavalier adventurers. We prefer to put on record three more important and more common types—the high-souled idealists, the great magnates, and the country gentlemen.

Their contemporaries' eloquence has made famous the names of Lucius Cary, Lord Falkland, and Sidney Godolphin :

Two names of friendship, but one star.

Clarendon has immortalized Falkland's circle at Great Tew,

that 'college situated in a purer air', and Jonson, Suckling, Waller, and Cowley sang the praises of 'this great prince of knowledge'. His Royalist politics—anti-Laudian, tolerant, and suspicious of the Court—shone in planes far above those of the average partisan. Where reason led, there he followed. He stands to the Royalist school much as his favourite Erasmus¹ stood to the Lutheran reformers, and Erasmus might well have said, like Falkland of Episcopacy, 'when it is not necessary to change, it is necessary not to change'. With every inducement to take the flowery path like his friends Suckling and Carew, a lover of talk with Earle or Sheldon, fond of getting at foxes' earths with his terriers—we may well believe him that he took 'no pleasure in tumbling hard and unpleasant books'. But a hatred of dogmatism made him verify everything for himself, and he liked to think of the Church as consisting of 'volunteers, and not of pressed men'. As against the claims of infallibility or private inspiration, he championed the rights of all fallible, humble seekers after truth. He defined righteousness as 'seeking the truth impartially, and obeying diligently what is found sincerely, and who treads this way, though he miss of truth, shall not miss of His favour who is the Father of it'. God, who considers rather 'the heart than the head, the end than the actions, and the fountain than the streams', will not damn one 'that hath done his endeavours'; rather than believe such teaching, he 'would cry out with Averroes (whom transubstantiation kept a Pagan), *sit anima mea cum philosophis*'. He carried this rational spirit of peace into the war, and into the peace negotiations he ardently supported, but a musket shot at Newbury ended his reasonings. 'Thus fell that incomparable young man, in the four and thirtieth year of his age, having so much dispatched the business of life that the oldest rarely attain to that immense knowledge, and the youngest enters not into the world with more innocence.'²

'Little Sid' Godolphin was the particular friend of Falkland,

¹ See the preface, by his chaplain Triplet, to the 1651 edition of the *Discourse on Infallibility*.

² Falkland's *Works*; Clarendon; Theresa Lewis, *The Clarendon Gallery* (1852); Cowley. A common saying of his was, 'I pity unlearned gentlemen on a rainy day'.

Suckling, and Hobbes, the last of whom fixed for him a glorious epitaph.¹ His life was a short one: born in 1610, member for Helston in 1640, and mortally wounded at Chagford in 1643. A frail and sensitive plant, 'that a little rain or wind would disorder him and divert him from any short journey', his great spirit, nevertheless, led him always to the active life: as in peace time he went racing and coursing, so, when war broke out, he fought. His lyrics show a penetrating intellect at work on the metaphysics of love, and his 'Hymn' has much the same philosophy as Falkland's.

Wise men in tracing nature's laws
Ascend unto the highest cause;
Shepherds with humble fearfulness
Walk safely, though their light be less;
Though wise men better know the way,
It seems no honest heart can stray.

But neither Godolphin nor Falkland, too sensitive for everyday political rubs, represented the average outlook of Royalist gentlemen, who in this most aristocratic age steered their course largely by the great nobility. Of these, William Cavendish, 'the loyal Duke of Newcastle' (as his self-composed epitaph terms him), was one famous type, and lives most plainly in the life by his duchess, that Margaret Lucas of whom we spoke before, sister to Sir Charles, executed by Fairfax at Colchester in 1648: 'a noble family', she claims, 'for all the brothers were valiant, and all the sisters virtuous.' Newcastle illustrates not the strength of the royal cause, for he loved his ease and was no general, but rather some of the gifts and instincts that explain it. Master of Welbeck and Bolsover and originally very rich, he loved monarchy, Clarendon says, 'as it was the fountain and support of his own greatness'. Before the war he had been the Prince of Wales's governor, and was led to take the active part he did, till the fatal day of Marston Moor, less by formed party principles

¹ 'I have known clearness of Judgement, and largeness of Fancy; strength of Reason, and graceful Elocution; a Courage for the War, and a Fear for the Laws, and all eminently in one man; and that was my most noble and honoured friend Mr. Sidney Godolphin; who hating no man, nor hated of any, was unfortunately slain in the beginning of the late Civil war, in the public quarrel, by an undiscerned, and an undiscerning hand.'

than by a sense of honour, a reverence for the King's person, and a fiery courage continually proved in battle. He had spent prodigies of money on producing two masques of Jonson's, who celebrated his mastery of fencing as 'mettled fire', another £10,000 (borrowed) went to the Scottish war of 1639, and £1,300 on publishing his own folio on the art of horsemanship. He could discuss 'optics' with Hobbes, profess himself the humble servant of Van Dyck, adapt Molière, turn a pretty song, and dabble in chemistry. Had he been less a humanist he had been a more typical Cavalier, but then, without such humanists, our tale would merely be to con the army lists. There is a certain stilted pathos in his letter from exile, at Hamburg, to his old pupil: 'It is no small comfort to me and mine that we have lived to see you a man; . . . could your Highness forget me, I would forgive you, and my last breath would be a prayer for your happiness, and glory that I fell ruined in your service.'¹

We get a truer man in William Seymour, Marquis of Hertford (and, at the Restoration which he just lived to see, Duke of Somerset), great-grandson of Protector Somerset and husband for a few days of Arabella Stuart. With this romance of his youth, his royal blood, and his popularity, Hertford brought great assets to the royal cause. Like his brother-in-law Essex, he belonged emphatically to the centre in politics, for the house of Seymour had no reason to be grateful to the Stuarts. He took a prominent part in the Lords over the reforming measures of 1641, opposed Strafford, and entered the Privy Council with Essex, Bedford, and other Opposition leaders. But, the constitutional grievances removed and his undoubted zeal for the Church awakened, he swung over, like so many others, to the royal party, succeeded Newcastle as Prince Charles's governor, and was appointed the King's Lieutenant-General for twenty-one shires of the West. His optimism in the opening months² foundered later on dreary disputes, wherein he was sacrificed to the Palatine princes, and though he served faithfully to the end, especially by large contribu-

¹ Newcastle to the Prince, 4 Feb. 1645, P. ii. 134.

² 'If God prospers us, as I trust he will in so good a cause, we shall then shortly (I hope) be blessed and cheered up with your Majesty's long-wished-for presence. And hey then down go they!' To the Queen, 11 June (? July)

tions of money for the exiles, his last leading part in politics was advising Charles at the Treaty of Newport. His age, and his love of books and leisure, would anyhow explain it. As senior Royalist peer in England, he was the first in that category invited to the Convention of 1660, but in that October he died.

Tudor royal blood flowed also in the veins of James Stanley, seventh Earl of Derby, executed at Bolton in October 1651. His marriage with Charlotte de la Trémouille united him with the princely houses of Orange and the Palatinate, as King of Man he was a sovereign, and in Lancashire the best families sent their sons, as they had for generations, to serve in the Stanley household. He was, essentially, the great local magnate—full of energy as a big practical landlord, as a magistrate, and as governor of grammar schools. Clarendon had a low opinion of his ability and a high objection to his pride, but he was not too well treated by the Court and he is not to be judged as a soldier. He was a man of education, composed anthems, put down in his note-books the authors who interested him—Plato, Duplessis-Mornay, Sarpi, or Machiavelli—while his own history of the Isle of Man is full of shrewd analysis. His religious sense was the deepest thing about him. He took Hooker's view of the Church; a Catholic is one 'that followeth Universality, Antiquity, and Consent'. His 'Private Devotions' show an entire reliance on the divine, mingled with an intense pride of race. Lathom House is desolate; 'our holy and beautiful house, where our Fathers praised thee, is burnt with fire, and all our pleasant things are laid waste.' The Isle of Man may fall: 'Heavenly Father, assure this country unto me and mine.'

Considering the Puritanism of Lancashire, his own friendship with many of the other side, and the immense local prestige of his house, Derby might well have come to terms with the enemy: he had originally a loathing of the wars,¹ and his share in them, particularly the second, was that of a pure idealist. 'If I be never so close, my heart is my own,' he wrote to his wife from his last prison, 'free still as the best', and he, at least, was sure that he would meet her and their children again, in a place 'where we shall never be plundered'.²

¹ 'God forbid that we should war one here with another': to Sir R. Harley, 13 May 1642 (P. iii. 87).

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The character of the best Cavalier gentlemen might be drawn from many models: 'bright thoughts, clear deeds, constancy, fidelity, bounty, and generous honesty are the gems of noble minds; wherein, to derogate from none, the true heroic English gentleman hath no peer.' To point Sir Thomas Browne's opinion, we might choose a Widdrington, a Pakington, or a Wyndham, but at least we could hardly do better than speak of Hopton and Capel.

From the day we first meet Ensign Ralph Hopton, taking the fleeing Queen of Bohemia on a pillion behind him, till his death in exile thirty-two years later, there is a steady consistency in everything about him, calling for our respect. By 1641 he was an experienced Member of Parliament, sitting for various constituencies of Puritan Somerset, and even subscribing petitions for the proper keeping of the Lord's day: his opposition lasted long, for he supported the Grand Remonstrance. But his moderate Churchmanship, which had been clear before this, presumably decided him, and it was as 'the soul' of the army of Cornwall, in 1643, that he made his name. Wherever we come across him—humouring Rupert, pulling up Maurice's plundering cavalry, stopping the butchery of prisoners, opposing the Prince's Francophil counsellors—he shows always the qualities that Clarendon assigns him, 'a clear courage, an industry not to be tired, and a generosity that was not to be exhausted'. Such could be, at its best, the product of royalist Oxford (where Sanderson had been his tutor) and the school of war in Germany and the Netherlands.¹

Arthur, first Lord Capel, Hopton's kinsman and first cousin also of the Parliamentary general Manchester, began in the same way as one of the middle party. His calling, his crabbed grandfather had written in objection to his taking the grand tour, 'is to be a country gentleman', and it was as knight of the shire for Hertfordshire that Capel led attacks upon Ship-money in 1640, and in the next spring pressed, to his everlasting grief later, for the execution of Strafford. By the following winter he had declared for the King, whose true interests he tried to maintain, during the next seven years, as

¹ Clarendon, Bks. 7-8; Lloyd; Warburton, ii. 359; Gardiner, ix. 353;

his friends Hopton and Hyde viewed them—whether in Wales, or with the Prince in the West, or in the last cities of refuge, Scilly and Jersey. His view of his duty is the purest expression of the Royalist mind. He died, he said repeatedly before his execution in 1651, for obeying the fifth commandment. ‘He had been born and bred under the government of a King whom he was bound in conscience to obey, under laws to which he had been always obedient, and in the bosom of a Church which he thought the best in the world.’ He died, again, not only for God’s truth, but ‘for acting my duty to his servant, the King, whom He had placed here upon his terrestrial throne amongst us.’ The people of England, he wrote to Cromwell, could never be manufactured into republicans. ‘The people and the laws will always be alike. Are their laws monarchical? So will be the affections of the people. . . . The ancient constitutions and present laws of this Kingdom are my inheritance and birth-right: if any shall think to impose upon me that which is worse than death, which is the profane and dastardly parting from these laws, I will choose the less evil, which is death.’ Revolution, says one of his fragmentary writings, must always be moral evil: ‘know this, let the attempts to subvert established rules be successful or unsuccessful, historified they are as beacons and marks to avoid the rocks and sands that honour, duty, and conscience, indeed all the goods that human nature is fraughted with, would otherways shipwreck themselves upon.’

In this faith, and after a pipe of tobacco to compose himself, Lord Capel stoically walked on to the scaffold, ‘his hat cocked up’, and died ‘much after the manner of a stout Roman’. His heart, by his direction, was to be kept in a silver box till the King came back to his own, and Bishop Morley tells us how he saw the box, ‘with that generous and loyal heart in it’, placed in the unworthy hands of King Charles II.¹

Where the heart lies, let the brain lie also.

It was in the hands of the Stuart kings that this great party—massing so much talent and devotion, and reaching back so far to the past—laid hearts, brains, and lives as offerings.

¹ Lewis, ii, 126, 178, 252 et seq.; Clarendon, Bk. XI; Gardiner, *C. and P.*

IV

THE CIVIL WAR AND THE EXILE

FORMED of such diverse elements and only just feeling its feet as a political body, it was no solid Royalist party which fought the Civil War and achieved the Restoration: in any event, King Charles's tortuous mind dominated all policy till his death, and thereafter the contradictions into which he had plunged his supporters baffled them through ten years of exile.

The pilot that weathered the storm was Clarendon, who on this, as on other accounts, may be reckoned the most important single figure in the history of his party. More than any other one man, he brought to an end the reign of 'Thorough', replanted the monarchy on a more legal, if a more narrow, foundation, fixed the Anglican *via media* between the Catholic and the Puritan, and, finally, in a life of ceaseless political and literary construction, formed a canon of Tory doctrine which perished only with the author's granddaughter, Queen Anne.

By origin, as by outlook, he incarnated some perpetual elements in English conservatism. From his father, Henry Hyde, bred like him in Oxford and the Middle Temple and an obscure member of Elizabeth's last Parliaments, and from his mother, who had never left Wiltshire for London, he inherited those private virtues which were to be of such public importance. His family feeling was, like theirs, deep and lasting, and to this his letters to his wife, 'his dear little rogue', from Madrid in 1649-50 are sufficient testimony.¹ His own sons continued the affections he so highly praised in an older generation; it was their father's example that the second Clarendon held up to Rochester in the dark days of 1686, and that Rochester in his dedications to the first edition of the *History* offered as guide and inspiration to the age of the 'Spectator'.

¹ Bath, ii. 80 et seq.: 'indeed, I have no ambition but to be with thee, and to live and die with thee in any condition.'

Outside his family Hyde enjoyed, and indeed has done most to commemorate, as wide and brilliant a circle of friends as that of which Fox was the life and Burke the prophet. In the twelve happy years before the war—‘a time wherein those two unsociable adjuncts which Nerva was deified for uniting, *imperium et libertas*, were as well reconciled as is possible’—he was the friend of many soon to be arrayed in rival armies; Selden, Maynard, and Whitelocke on one hand, on the other Sheldon, Falkland, Sidney Godolphin, and George Morley. If this shows the breadth of his private sympathies, his long correspondence with Ormonde and with Nicholas survives to prove his loyalty to political colleagues.

The friends of his youth were, it will have been noticed, usually men of an older generation, and Hyde, like the second Pitt, was never really young. In any case, it was from an older and an idealized England that a man of his temperament obtained his scheme of things. ‘For all that I have yet seen’, he wrote to his wife from exile, ‘give me old England’,¹ and it was the passion of his heart to restore to England the ideals he had learnt as a boy, from the Hydes who had served Queen Elizabeth. The aim of his friends, he wrote in 1646, had been to uphold the ‘good old frame of government’; to keep Christmas with one’s neighbours in the country is ‘the good old fashion of England’.² Their task, he told Parliament in 1660, was to restore the nation ‘to its old good manners, its old good humour, and its old good nature—good nature, a virtue so peculiar to you, that it can be translated into no other language, and hardly practised by any other people’.³ In early manhood the expression of a steady and legitimate conservatism, this temper turned in old age to unreasoning dislike of new faces or changed fashions. The picture which the old Chancellor, in his final exile, painted of Restoration England reminds one of Thucydides on Athens after the Plague, or the lament of the Piagnone Landucci for the lost age of Savonarola. ‘Children asked not blessing of their parents; . . . the daughters of noble and illustrious families bestowed

¹ Bath, ii. 82.

² *Hist.* 4, 430, 463.

³ Lister, ii. 59. Words, says the hard Bolingbroke, ‘which I could never read without being moved and softened’ (*Works*, ii. 33).

themselves upon the divines of the time, or other low and unequal matches ; . . . there was a total decay, or rather a final expiration of all friendship.' ¹

To such jeremiads had fallen 'the jolly temper after the old English fashion', which Evelyn applauded. One cannot wonder that King Charles II grew weary of those 'many lectures on the politics', ² and above all, perhaps, of the pressure put on him by the Chancellor to interview political personages at 8 in the morning, ³ while Danby's bitter complaint that Clarendon would allow 'no vessel to swim without his hand at the rudder' ⁴ illustrates the arrogance which was another cause of his fall. Yet even these faults had a reverse side, and no career in party history affords better proof than does Clarendon's of the political truth, that victory, even though it be temporary, goes to the man whose aim is single. In this lay his strength: that from 1641 to 1660 he pursued a single purpose, to restore the King and the Church on the old foundation of 'those admirable and incomparable laws of government' ⁵ bequeathed by Queen Elizabeth.

Both in private letters and in full-length historical argument, Hyde has clearly recorded the scheme of his ideal. The function of kings is 'a *classis* by itself'; 'God hath reserved them to be tried only within his own jurisdiction and before His own tribunal'. ⁶ Yet is their power a trust from God; 'God hath trusted the King with a Kingdom rarely and admirably moulded and constituted'—it was 'to defend the laws and government established, against any innovation or invasion whatsoever' that arms were drawn. ⁷ In this ancient frame of government the Church formed an integral part. As a good Royalist, Clarendon must say of the Puritan preachers that 'a minister of Christ's turning rebel against his prince' and 'his preaching rebellion to the people as the doctrine of Christ' was the sin against the Holy Ghost. ⁸ As a constitutionalist, he must argue that 'the ecclesiastical and civil state was so wrought and interwoven together, and in truth so incorporated in each other, that like Hippocrates' twins they

¹ *Life* (1827), i. 359, 361.

² Burnet (Ranké, vi. 82).

³ *Council Notes of Charles II and Clarendon* (1896), p. 8.

⁴ Grey, i. 7 Nov. 1667.

⁵ *Hist.* iii. 302.

⁶ *Ibid.*, ii. 420.

⁷ *C. S. P.* ii. 326, 337.

⁸ *Hist.* ii. 322.

cannot but laugh and cry together'.¹ True, he never claims that episcopacy (or for that matter monarchy) is so *iure divino* 'that all other forms of government are concluded Anti-christian', but yet it 'is as much fenced and secured by the laws, as Monarchy itself, and an entire part of the frame and constitution of the Kingdom'.² And now we must follow the fate of this ideal, in the nineteen years from 1641, when it stood threatened but still the law, till 1660, when it returned in the blare and clashings of a legal triumph.

The negative and destructive work of the constitutional Royalists was done by August 1641. Till that date they had formed the right wing of a virtually unanimous Parliament; after that they became the left wing of a Royalist party. The most burning issue, that of religion, was at this date still undecided. The Commons, in the first week of September, published resolutions ordering the removal of altars, the cessation of bowing at the name of Jesus, and the encouragement of lectureships. The Lords retorted by commanding the performance of divine service 'as it is appointed by the Acts of Parliament', and by the end of October Sir Edward Nicholas was circulating among the King's servants directions sent by Charles from Edinburgh, that he was 'constant for the doctrine and discipline of the Church of England as it was established by Queen Elizabeth and my father' and resolved to 'live and die in the maintenance of it'.³

Not merely ecclesiastical lawlessness, but the whole course of events during October, in Scotland and in the Irish rebellion, brought to a head the question of sovereignty. It was a small thing, perhaps, that the Puritan Commons had to admit that their bare resolutions had no binding legality,⁴ but it was infinitely dangerous to them that a king who was ruled, as their fevered minds portrayed, by a junta of malignants, might soon dispose of an army of Highlanders, or be inevitably armed with an expeditionary force for Ireland. Hence the clear issue raised in the debates of the 28th October, the claim for the Parliamentary approval of ministers. It was on this day that Hyde and Falkland appeared definitely as champions, so

¹ Ibid., i. 406.

² Evelyn, *Memoirs* (Bray), ii, App. 37.

³ C. S. P. 11. 308.

⁴ Ibid., 43.

Nicholas told the King, 'in maintenance of your Prerogative',¹ and the printing of the Grand Remonstrance in November was perhaps the real beginning of English parties. Those who had formed the centre party in the session of 1640-1 had now to make their choice—Rudyard and Selden in one way, Hyde and Falkland in another. A few weak spirits like Edmund Waller wandered uneasily in the no-man's-land, but the trenches were drawn for the fighting rank and file. Whatever offers were made in December to the Puritan leaders,² they could scarcely be repeated after the affair of the five members in January 1642, and even if Falkland, Hyde, and Culpepper had been able 'to give a public security of the king's intention', as Pembroke privately urged in August,³ no security they could have agreed to would, by then, have satisfied the enemy.

The suspension of constitutional conditions naturally cut short the Royalist development as a party proper, and it would be absurd to discover a party programme in terms of peace extorted by misfortune, or in expedients offered to purchase military assistance. But the treaty of Uxbridge of January 1645 may be taken as showing the length of concession to which Royalism could go, while the two parties still kept something like military equality. The Parliament, now at the height of the struggle between Presbyterians and Independents and induced to offer negotiations mainly as a move in the Scottish campaign against Cromwell, had proposed terms amounting to a capitulation of the King and his party, and a transfer of all executive authority to themselves. The King was to sign the League and Covenant, Presbyterianism was to be enforced without exception, control of the army and navy, and nomination of the chief officers of state, were to be vested in Parliament, the royal children were to be educated by Parliament's chosen tutors and governors, and, finally, not merely all Papists or persons who had assisted the Irish rebellion, not merely all who had adhered to the Oxford Parliament, but 106 Royalists, by name

¹ Evelyn, *Memoirs* (Bray), II, App. 49; Gardiner, x 41.

² For Pym's refusal to be Chancellor of the Exchequer, see Sir E. Dering's letter of 13 Jan. 1642, quoted by Forster, *The Five Members*, p. 48.

³ C. S. P., II. 147.

specified, were to be excepted from pardon, whether in life and fortune, or from office and estates.¹

No such complete surrender could ever be obtained; 'there are three things', Charles himself told the Parliamentary commissioners, 'I will not part with—the Church, my crown, and my friends.'² But on two vital points the royal proposals, as modified during February, showed a notable advance. The King was willing to leave command of the army for three years to a body of commissioners, half only to be nominated by himself. As to religion, he agreed originally that a bill should be 'framed for the ease of tender consciences', with the assistance of a national synod; early in February, influenced no doubt by the obvious divisions between the two sections of his opponents, he ordered his commissioners to put forward a more definite scheme—by which episcopal jurisdiction was to be exercised with the assistance of Presbyters, and freedom left 'to all persons of what opinions soever in matters of ceremony'. The Oxford clergy actually deviated into recommending toleration, and though Charles's insincerity and the obstinacy of Parliament brought this project to an end, the point of agreement reached at the last moment when the King still held his own is worthy of mention.³

After Naseby the King plunged deep into that 'wilderness of prudential motives and expedients'⁴ which he had before so often skirted; it was to be the great task of Clarendon, who failed in the father's case, to draw the son back on to the Anglican high road. Yet nobody ever so clearly stated the essentials as Charles I himself—though he might go near to shipwrecking them, in his struggles for life and liberty. 'Let my condition be never so low, my successes never so ill, I resolve (by the grace of God) never to yield up this Church to the government of Papists, Presbyterians, or Independents, nor to injure my successors, by lessening the Crown of that ecclesiastical and military power which my predecessors left me, nor forsake my friends.'⁵ From this resolution—whether

¹ See the terms in Gardiner's *Documents*, pp. 275 and following.

² Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, ii. 25, quoting Holles's narrative, Tanner MSS. lxi. 203.

³ *G. C. W.* ii. 69; *Documents*, 286.

⁴ Hyde to Digby, 30 Nov. 1648 (*C. S. P.* ii. 459).

⁵ The King to Nicholas, 25 Aug. 1645 (*Evelyn*, ii, App. 104).

at Newcastle, at Holmby, at Hampton Court, or at Newport—he never really departed. He would authorize Presbyterianism for three years, but would not extinguish episcopacy, nor commit the ‘undoubted sacrilege’ of alienating the bishops’ lands. The power of the sword he would cede for ten years, or if need be for the term of his life, but only with the ‘clear and perfect assurance, that it shall freely return to my son and successors, as Queen Elizabeth and my father enjoyed it’.¹

In arriving at these conclusions Charles’s logic was forcible and incisive. ‘A king’s friendship will no longer be trusted, but while he sticks to God and his crown;’ the Church is ‘as necessary a flower of the Crown as the Militia’.² Again, ‘the difference between the two governments (Episcopal and Presbyterian) is one of the least differences now among us, even in points of Religion. For under the pretence of a thorough reformation (as they call it) they intend to take away all the power of the Ecclesiastical government from the Crown, and place it in the two Houses of Parliament. Besides, they will introduce that doctrine which teaches Rebellion to be lawful, and that the Supreme power is in the people; to whom kings (as they say) ought to give account, and be corrected, if they do amiss.’³ Finally, ‘except religion be preserved, the militia will not be much useful to the crown; . . . if the pulpits teach not obedience, which will never be, if Presbyterian government be absolutely settled, the crown will have little comfort of the militia; . . . I am most confident that Religion will much sooner regain the Militia, than the Militia will Religion.’⁴ Such reasoning, addressed to the Queen and those with her who urged closer alliance with the Scots, brings us to the heart of those divisions in the Royal party, of whom nine-tenths were, since Naseby, possessed by ‘an universal weariness of the war, despair of a possibility for the King to recover’.⁵ The natural tendency to seek peace by accommodation with the enemy took two normal forms:

¹ The King to William Murray, 15 Oct. 1646 (*C. S. P.* ii. 276).

² To Jermyn, Culpepper, and Ashburnham, 10 Oct. 1646 (*ibid.*, 273).

³ The King to the Queen, 16 Oct. 1646 (*ibid.*, 277).

⁴ The King to the Queen, 21 Nov. 1646 (*ibid.*, 295); to Jermyn, Culpepper, and Ashburnham, 19 Aug. 1646 (*ibid.*, 248).

⁵ The words are Digby’s (*Warburton*, iii. 160).

either, to buy the alliance of the Scots and English moderates by accepting Presbyterianism, or to found on toleration and limited monarchy an alliance with the English army against the Presbyterians, who were the original authors of the war. If either policy had triumphed, it is plain that the history of the two historic parties would have been immeasurably altered.

In the whole period up to the Restoration, the first alternative, that of alliance with Presbyterianism, was more than once within an ace of success, and between 1646 and 1651 was the ever-present nightmare of the Anglican Cavaliers. Not only was Charles I 'an immoderate lover of the Scottish nation',¹ but the Scots had a real pride in their native kings; their army was, moreover, the only force in being which could hope to fight the New Model. The English Presbyterians included the mass of the Puritan grandees, a solid phalanx of country gentlemen, and the governing class of London. More important still, the Catholic Queen was a Presbyterian politician. Reconciled in 1643 to her former enemies, the Hamiltons,² Henrietta Maria worked from 1645 in half-conscious accord with the French government, whose aim it was to perpetuate English divisions, and to restore not the English king but a Presbyterian dog. Of the leading English Royalists, Jermyn, Culpepper, Ashburnham, and ultimately Digby were convinced that here lay the best hope of safety. It was in accord with this policy that Charles fled from Oxford to the Scots in April 1646, that the Prince of Wales left Jersey for France in June, that the negotiations taken up the same year at Newcastle were later resumed in the Engagement of December 1647, and found their consummation in the second civil war. The King's flight to the Scots was decided on the strength of promises made by one French ambassador, and the enormous pressure put upon him to accept the Propositions of Newcastle was directed by another. Behind this Franco-Scottish policy of *realpolitik* were arguments which, after Naseby, stole into the stoutest heart. Jermyn and Culpepper put them to Charles with brutal brevity; he was not, they told him, 'obliged to

¹ Clarendon, *Hist.* iv. 490.

² Everett Green, *Letters of Henrietta Maria*, pp. 56, 186.

perish in company with Bishops merely out of pity (and certainly you have nothing else left to assist them with),’ nor was it their opinion ‘that monarchy ought to fall, because Episcopacy cannot stand’. They agreed in the abstract with his preference for episcopacy as a political force, though they denied its exclusively *iure divino* character. But that, they declared, was not the immediate point. ‘Presbytery, or something worse, will be forced upon you, whether you will or no. Come, the question in short is, whether you will choose to be a king of Presbytery, or no king.’¹

But it was not by such hands that the true lamp of Royalism was kept burning; for that we must look to Jersey, the last Norman possession of the English king. Here Hyde, Hopton, and Capel remained, having refused to endorse a policy they detested by accompanying the Prince to France, and in their daily Church service at St. Hilary’s or in their evening walks on the sands, there was more future for Royalist principle than in the wretched exchange of devices between Newcastle and Saint-Germain. The alliance of France they thoroughly distrusted; ‘it must be the resurrection of the English courage and loyalty must recover England to the king.’² Hyde’s principle was to ‘stand fast upon the old rock of established law’, to eschew expedients which would ruin the real Royalists, and to wait on the turn of the tide. ‘In God’s name, let them have all the circumstantial temporary concessions; but let not the landmarks be removed, no pillars, upon which the fabric relies, be taken away: let him like a good pilot throw over his goods and his merchandise, his officers and his honours, to save the ship; but if he throws over too his mariners and his passengers, that the ship may be the lighter, he may be in no less danger after the tempest, than he was before.’³ ‘Abandon your principles, and there is no judge of reason left, but plurality of voices and strength of hands; . . . though a war may be carried on by a new model, a firm peace can never be established but by the old. I do not say, an honest, or an honourable peace, but a firm peace; let it be never so

¹ To the King, Sept. 18/28, 1646 (C. S. P. ii. 263).

² Hyde to Cottington, 15 Nov. 1646 (C. S. P. ii. 291); to Nicholas, 12 Dec. 1646 (*ibid.*, 307).

³ To Culpepper, 8 Jan. 1647 (*ibid.*, 326).

showy a one, it can never last, if the old banks be not kept up.'¹ For the Royalists 'to quit the proper ends for preservation only', to 'suffer themselves to be made a property to either party, out of animosity to the other'—this, Hyde indignantly declared, was a death-blow to 'the honour of all brave men who have lost their lives in this incomparable quarrel'. How much better to have held out in Oxford, 'to the last biscuit!'²

The five years between the surrender of Oxford and the battle of Worcester fully vindicated Cavalier distrust of this Franco-Scottish policy. The King's own resolution prevented, indeed, complete surrender to 'those vile propositions'³ of Newcastle, which were pressed upon him by the Queen and Mazarin, but the Engagement of a year later, and its aftermath in the war of 1648, showed not only the practical difficulties involved in joint military operations by two nations, who could hardly meet without fighting each other, but the far heavier nemesis waiting for politicians who propose to fuse two parties starting from contradictory principles. The Engagement itself contained, from the pure Royalist point of view, 'so many monstrous concessions, that, except the whole Kingdom of England had been likewise imprisoned in Carisbrooke castle with the King, it could not be imagined that it was possible to be performed',⁴ and when applied to actual politics it broke in its makers' hands. The Scottish Covenanters repudiated it, the English Royalists hesitated and were lost; the Prince's Council in Holland, the London Presbyterians, the very sailors of the royal fleet, bickered and delayed—everywhere in the field, as in the Council, entire lack of concert and objective.

Nor did the King's death unite his supporters. The year 1649 passed in ceaseless faction fights. The pure Royalists saw, till Cromwell dashed their hopes, the best hope of revival in the young King joining Ormonde in Ireland. Of Presby-

¹ To Berkeley, 6 Oct. 1647 (*ibid.*, 379).

² To Lord Hatton, (?) 4 Feb. 1648 (*C. S. P.* III, 3); to Earle, 12 Feb. 1647 (*ibid.*, II, 338).

³ 'There being in them no seeds left, out of which Monarchy may again possibly spring': Hyde to Sir R. Browne, 14 Aug. 1646 (*Evelyn*, loc. cit., 178).

⁴ Clarendon, *Hist.* IV, 302.

terian assistance they still breathed deep suspicion; 'they are so inconsiderable in England, so false in Scotland, and both so averse to monarchy', wrote a Cornishman, 'that the very conditions they offer upon which to assist the King evidently destroy him'.¹ But the King, rightly or wrongly, took the other side, and on the 1st May 1650 signed the draft treaty of Breda with the Scottish commissioners; on the 21st Montrose, though still bearing the royal commission, was executed by the Kirk: on the 11th June Charles signed the final terms. He was thereby sworn to enforce the Covenant upon England and Ireland, to assent to bills 'passed or to be passed' in any of his Parliaments for a Presbyterian establishment, and to abandon Ormonde and the 'Engagers'. Was not this 'all the infamy imaginable', which Hyde had prophesied? Small wonder that he would rather 'fly to the Indies' than be partaker of such councils, and in fact by accepting a mission to Madrid² in the previous October he had washed his hands of them.

Dunbar and Worcester decided the question. The passive attitude of the great mass of English Royalists bore out Lord Hatton's prediction—'they will never fight to be under a Scotch and Louvre dominion',³—and the year 1652 opened a new stage. The Commonwealth had triumphed over the three kingdoms, and no formed body existed to oppose them. The Royalism of the Restoration entered on its own existence, freed at last from the pressure of Scottish militant Presbyterianism, which with all the other elements of the Civil Wars was for the time being crushed under the heel of the New Model.

We come, then, to the continuous period of Royalism in exile, and the brand of the émigré is stamped on the generation after 1660. The fierce un-English bitterness towards opponents, so different from the attitude of the Hoptons and Capels of 1642, the personal feuds in the royal party, the depravity of public as of private morals—such evils came from a dozen years of starved dependence upon foreign courts, of political schemes divorced from any contact with political reality, of

¹ Joseph Jane, 'disabled' M.P. for Liskeard (Nicholas papers, i. 137).

² C. S. P. ii. 518; *Cal. C. S. P.* ii. 47.

³ Nicholas papers, i. 172; 11/21 May 1650.

the eternal temptations besetting a party in exile, which sees its women and children hungry, and its homes in others' hands. Political moderation could not be picked up on the Paris pavements, and wretched poverty rarely ennobles political morals. Even the angelic temper of Mr. Secretary Nicholas began to show signs of wear. 'Sure you cannot be in earnest', Hyde replied to his reproaches, 'when you seem to accuse my want of kindness in not helping you to money, which it seems Mr. Long used to do; I want shoes and shirts, and the Marquis of Ormonde is in no better condition, what help then can we give our friends?'.¹ Every budget of Royalist news tells of hungry exiles in Paris, in the pleasant towns of Normandy, in Antwerp, and the cities of Flanders, and when the King himself was asking doles from his mother or when Hyde could not afford firewood, it is not surprising to come across courtiers whose patched clothes do not allow them to appear in the presence, or clerks to the council borrowing eight dollars at a time to get bread.² It was with this keener edge to his patriotism that Arlington wrote from Madrid, reminiscently of his good meals at Cologne and Bruges, and longed for 'good old England, where one turf is worth all Spain'.³

In this hot-house of misery, all the feuds which had ever cursed Royalist armies and Councils blossomed out again, and Rupert, Digby, Herbert, Long, Jermyn, Berkeley, and Wilmot formed as impossible a shadow-government as ever afflicted a leader of opposition. For that was the place taken by Hyde after 1654, when the consistent policy he advocated began to triumph over the King's character. Charles II had, indeed, from the first, as Halifax discovered twenty years later, 'as little mixture of the *Seraphick* part as ever man had', while for the period of exile we may leave it at Ormonde's scathing judgement—'I fear his immoderate delight in empty effeminate and vulgar conversations is become an irresistible part of his nature, and will never suffer him to animate his own designs and others' actions with that spirit which is requisite for his quality and much more to his fortune.'⁴ If gradually

¹ 3 April 1654 (C. S. P. iii. 229).

² Nicholas papers, i. 73, iii. 238.

³ *Cal. C. S. P.* iii. 384.

⁴ To Hyde, 27 Jan. 1658 (C. S. P. iii).

the wiser elements in his councils prevailed, it was mainly because the factions over-reached themselves. A brazen attempt to oust Hyde upon charges of intrigue with Cromwell, Henrietta Maria's unscrupulous efforts to convert the young Duke of Gloucester to her Church, Berkeley's schemes to divide York from the King—all this had the effect of outraging Charles who, at his worst, never lost a saving ability to see that his boon companions could smile and smile, and yet be villains. Departure from France in 1654 freed the party from the worst effects of the miasma distilled by priests, women, and French money. The noble influence of Ormonde, who spoke to his old master's sons like one gentleman to another, greatly helped to pull things round, and the reappointment of the veteran Nicholas as Secretary of State in the autumn of 1654 may be taken as definitely marking Hyde's supremacy.

There were four alternative policies to be considered, each involving some danger to the true Royalist tradition. Restoration might be accomplished (1) by assistance from a foreign power; (2) by a Catholic policy, hingeing upon Rome and Ireland; (3) by collaboration with the Independents and Levellers; or, (4) by alliance with Presbyterianism. The first was always a remote danger. Till 1653 Mazarin used the exiled Court simply as a pawn, and the Spaniards were, not without reason, entirely unimpressed by the begging mission of Cottington and Hyde.¹ The *beaux yeux* of Charles Stuart did not weigh heavily in the chancelleries as against Blake's guns, or Cromwell's red-coats. True, when France and the British Commonwealth became allies, Spain promised to lend Charles 6,000 men, but this offer was conditional on a good opportunity, and stipulated a heavy price for restoration, such as the surrender of Cromwell's West Indies conquests. Till the very end of 1659, even after the Peace of the Pyrenees, both France and Spain refused assistance, not much to the sorrow of Hyde, who had, ten years earlier, made plain his dislike of foreign aid. He admits that when he heard fellow Royalists congratulating each other on such a prospect, 'I found myself not equally affected with joy.' It was true that 'the

¹ Guizot, *Cromwell*, i, App. 390 et seq.

Patria, which is the object of our reverence', was to be identified not merely with the soil but with the ancient Constitution of England, but he paused, he tells us, 'out of apprehension that the frame of government would be more absolutely suppressed by those friends, than it is like to be by the other enemies.'¹

Not unconnected with these Continental schemes were plans for restoration on a Catholic basis which, though dangerous, were also never near achievement. As in his dealing with the Scots, so too here Charles II's wildest concessions did not deceive the other party to the bargain. The negotiations he had opened at Rome in 1649 were immediately belied by the treaty of Breda with the Scots, and his readiness to reconsider his faith, upon conditions, was hardly the way to deal with Pope Innocent X,² who stipulated that 'the security must be positive'.³ But, with his grandfather's and father's examples before him, the King could give no pledge to repeal the penal laws, and academic statements of good wishes towards his Catholic subjects were not good enough. Yet hopes of assistance from some Catholic prince—whether Spain, Lorraine, or the Duke of Neuberg—kept the Catholic scheme alive. Marmaduke Langdale and Father Peter Talbot were anxious to unite into a great coalition the Catholics of England and Ireland, the Jews, and the Levellers voiced by Overton and Sexby. Langdale, 'this day for the Presbyterians and the next for the Catholics', was a glaring example of the good soldier turned inferior politician. Talbot had spent, on his own account, 'one and twenty years in examining these matters of state', and certainly no less time could have realized his coalition.⁴ In all these paper combinations, there is no evidence that the solid Catholic families of England took any part. Ireland had in any case been shattered by Cromwell's army, but, apart from that, the ultramontaniam of the papal legate Rinuccini had temporarily destroyed there the loyalist section of Irish Catholics. For English Royalism

¹ C. S. P. ii 339.

² Gardiner, *Commonwealth and Protectorate*, ii. 95 n., iii. 124; C. S. P. iii. 291.

³ Ibid., ii. 533.

⁴ Ibid., iii. 165, 270 et seq.; Nicholas papers, ii. 3, 7, iii. 50.

it was well so ; for restoration by force of Irish Catholic arms would have brought the ruin which the mere notion of such a contingency accomplished in 1715.

Direct collaboration with the Independents was more possible. Hyde himself had, in 1649, deliberately preferred them to the Presbyterians ; they lacked the original guilt of rebellion, were less subservient to military tyranny, and had more weight in the army. Some specious concessions could, he thought, be safely held out : the King might promise to consent to any acts offered to him in a free Parliament, ' for the ease of tender consciences in the circumstances of divine worship ', as well as to measures for legal reform, poor-relief, and frequent Parliaments.¹ But, disappointed during Oliver's life of any support from solid Independency, he viewed later approaches to the Levellers with a cynical eye ; ' you cannot extol the privileges of *Magna Carta* too much ', he told Ormonde, who was meeting their representatives.² What he really feared from the Independents comes out in a curiously prophetic letter of 1646. ' I have not the same opinion and contempt of the Independents that other men have, from the opinion of their abhorring rules of government. . . . I pray God I tell you not true, when I tell you they will keep up Monarchy to the height, and probably improve it, but, being conscious of offences that cannot be forgiven, change the Monarch and his line, and make choice of such a one as may owe his crown to them.'³ This danger, of a transaction between the defeated Royalists and the triumphant soldiers, was no chimera. A crown for the Duke of Gloucester had occurred to the army leaders in 1648, and might not some semi-dynastic arrangement bridge the gulf from the house of Cromwell to the house of Stuart ? The Duke of Buckingham's relations with Titus and Lilburne were one of countless strings to his bow ; the proposal solemnly forwarded by Lord Hatton in 1659 that the King should marry Lambert's daughter—and ' the Lady is pretty '—was not isolated ; Mordaunt and Nicholas (unknown to Hyde) entertained the idea of this very match for

¹ Advice to, the King, Sept. 1649 (Nicholas papers, i. 138).

² C. S. P. iii. 289, 316 ; *Cal. C. S. P.* iii. 213.

³ To Nicholas, 12 Dec. 1646 (*C. S. P.* ii).

the Duke of York.¹ The long obedience given to the Protectorate by thousands of Royalists, the immense prestige of the Puritan army, the looseness of political principle in an age of revolution—many such factors magnified this nightmare for the pure Royalists.

That it did not materialize was due, not only to the vitality of Royalist principle, not only to the rigour of the pure republicans, but much more to the steady drift of the Presbyterians towards restoration. How intimate and far-reaching this tendency was will soon be seen, but it is plain that for Royalism it might be a fatal alliance. 'The design of the Presbyterians', a royal agent declared in 1651, 'is if ever they get power into their hands to set on foot the concessions made by the late king at the Isle of Wight . . . and to restore the parliament to the same condition and members as it had the day of their seclusion, viz. 4th December 1648.'² From this design their leaders never strayed till the Restoration. Yet it was these very two conditions which Hyde had noted in 1649 as outside the pale of discussion. Many clauses of the Newport treaty were 'very mischievous, if not destructive, to the kingly power', and 'never to admit the resurrection of the old accursed Parliament by virtue of the bill for continuance' was one of the two negative conclusions which he pressed on the King as fundamental; the other, 'to treat with no party which shall refuse frankly and entirely to join with his Majesty's party', reached the same conclusion by another route.³

Such were the outstanding dangers threatening the existence of the pure Royalists, and it is to that party's fortunes in England that we must now turn. Their tradition had ultimately to depend on the vitality of their affections and their hatreds, and these were strong enough to survive the vacillation of the King, the apparent extinction of the Church, the treachery of some trusted leaders, and the gross incompetence of others: so little does the survival of a party depend upon its leaders. Not, we think, that any great wave of popular sentiment comes into the question; the 'people' in this sense hardly existed in

¹ Ibid., iii. 592; Professor Firth's article on Lambert, *D. N. B.*; Ranke, iii. 263.

² Thomas Coke's confession; P. i. 596.

³ Nicholas papers, i. 145.

seventeenth-century England.¹ It was rather the persistence of the narrow Royalist feeling which aroused the despairing anger of the Protectorate. 'To breed up their children in the memory of the quarrel', said Lambert, was their rule; 'they are, haply, now merry over their Christmas pies, drinking the King of Scots' health, or your confusion.'² Most striking testimony of all was the official declaration of the Protector's government in 1656; 'they have kept their conversation apart, as if they would avoid the very beginnings of union; have bred and educated their children by the sequestered and ejected clergy, and very much confined their marriages and alliances within their own party, as if they meant to entail their quarrel and prevent the means to reconcile posterity'.³

Of this sharp-edged party feeling the chief motive-force was, without doubt, the Church of England. Though legally proscribed and its incumbents sequestered, the Church, often with the connivance of the Government, kept up a great number of services;⁴ Bishop Skinner of Oxford was secretly ordaining a new succession of clergy at Launton,⁵ Bishop King of Chichester was doing the same. Hyde, meanwhile, was concerting arrangements for the consecration of bishops, if need be, to vacant sees.⁶ The ejection of a great mass of fellows of Oxford and Cambridge colleges did not really sever their connexion with those great clerical seminaries.⁷ In every village the ejected parson formed the nucleus of a revival; even those who had taken the Covenant, and continued as Presbyterian ministers in their old parishes (a number larger than usually supposed), kept up a real, if an indecent, continuity.

And yet, as time went on, it became increasingly plain that restoration could never be brought about simply in the

¹ Haselrig thought 'the people care not what government they live under, so as they may plough and go to market': Burton, *Diary*, iii. 257.

² *Ibid.*, i. 240.

³ *A Declaration of His Highness*; Gardiner, *C. and P.* iii. 184.

⁴ Evelyn attended services in a dozen different places at least in or near London, hearing sermons from Ussher, Gunning, Pearson, and Jeremy Taylor.

⁵ Plumtre, *Ken*, i. 54: see also *Journal of Nicholas Assheton* (Cheetham Society) for ordinations by the Bishop of Elphin in Lancashire.

⁶ *C. S. P.* iii, App. C.

⁷ See the correspondence between Taylor and Sheldon in Gosse, *Life of Taylor*.

King's name ; the Royalists must make friends with some part, at least, of the mammon of unrighteousness. The key obviously lay in the creation of divisions in the Puritan *bloc*. That had long been Hyde's policy ; ' If I did not assuredly believe that . . . they will at last determine the confusion and be each other's executioners I should be very melancholic ; for I have really more hope from that than from all the armies and fleets you and your enterprising friends will be able to draw together.' ¹ Ormonde and Arlington formed the same opinion, and so did the observant French envoy, even in 1659.² Actually, events were to prove that the Restoration would necessitate a triple alliance—Royalism, moderate Presbyterianism, and some of the best heads among the Cromwellians, and the way to its formation was strewn with set-backs and disillusion.

Downright treachery accounted for many of them. Thomas Coke's confessions in April 1651 gave away the whole organization for a great rising projected in the previous year ; many of those who intended to revolt in 1655 were delated by the traitor Henry Manning ; and every dangerous movement in the succeeding three years was betrayed by Sir Richard Willis—one of those trusted with the party's innermost secrets. Again, the organization of conspiracy was thoroughly faulty. A very necessary scheme had been put forward, as early as 1649, for an inner council, ' to meet constantly and consult upon all matters that may concern his Majesty's service, as the means to unite the hearts of all the sober Royalists, allay the extravagant humours of the indiscreet ones, resolve how far to join with the Presbyterians and upon [what] reserves ', and other essential purposes.³ But nothing seemingly was done, and the staff work of rebellion was bad in the extreme. Direct communication between the King and individual provincial leaders vitiated efforts at centralization ; the Presbyterian ministers of London carried on a separate propaganda of their own ; the vital understanding between Cavalier and Presbyterian was

¹ To Nicholas, 21 Nov. 1653 (C. S. P. iii. 198).

² Nicholas papers, II. 97 ; Bordeaux to Mazarin, 3 June 1659 (Guizot, *Richard Cromwell*, I. 399).

³ William Coventry to Nicholas, 12 Nov. 1649 (Nicholas papers, I. 154).

not cemented.¹ By 1654 a central body, 'the Sealed Knot', representing the older generation of Cavaliers, had come into existence,² but the miscarriage of the 1655 rising cannot justly be set at their door. The King overruled their reports, accepted the advice of their accusers, and sent Rochester to supersede them. The mass of the Royalist gentry made no move. Some disliked Rochester's wide powers, and asked for Ormonde who, though 'ready to try for a hanging', plainly dreaded the outcome, and Penruddock's fiasco in Wiltshire was the sole fruit of this chaos.³ Once again the promised Presbyterian support had not been forthcoming. They had called for some Declaration of the royal policy, and none was given them; 'the nature of that beast'—opined (the future bishop) Captain Peter Mews—'is such that it will rather the plough stood still than it should move by any but their assistance.'

This year marked the nadir of the Royalist cause. The prisons were full of their warmest partisans, and the Major-Generals' new militia confiscated their arms, broke up their meetings at horse-races or cock-fights, and stopped their every movement. The decimation tax crushed old delinquents. All known Royalists were expelled from London. Many of the humbler sort were transported as slaves to Barbadoes.

But the reaction of all moderate English opinion against rule by the sword began to raise Royalism out of this slough. In the comparatively free atmosphere of Oliver's last Parliament, voices were raised for milder electoral qualifications, which would not exclude submissive Royalists; members were found to support a petition for 'the noble family of Derby'. The Wiltshireman Grove openly attacked the High Court of Justice: 'divers suffered by that Court, whose death I would be loth to have a finger in.' The restoration of an Upper House, and the pressure put upon Cromwell by conservative and legal interests to take the Crown, naturally alarmed republicans. 'The old constitution', said one of them, 'is Charles Stuart's interest.'⁴ Richard Cromwell's accession

¹ Nicholas Papers, i. 238: Coke's confessions in Portland papers, *ut supra*.

² It included Lord Bellasis, Sir William Compton, Col. John Russell, and the traitor Willis.

³ C. S. P. iii. 265; Nicholas papers, i. 218, 268; *Cal. C. S. P.* iii. 12.

⁴ Burton, *Diary*, i. 263, ii. 85.

accelerated the current of reaction. Both Presbyterians and nobility counted on his moderation, and the removal of Oliver's strong hand opened that prospect for which Hyde long had waited—a fight to the death between the successive phases of the Revolution. Attacks by the republicans on Richard's title and powers immensely assisted the Royalist cause. The 'Humble Petition and Advice', Haselrig preached with iteration, was passed by 'a forced parliament, an imperfect parliament, a lame parliament'.¹ The retort was obvious: 'I shall collect his omissions of part of the history', proceeded the next speaker—prior to enlarging on the natural theme, whether the authors of Pride's Purge could, with any decency, complain of force. 'The Long Parliament did great and glorious things', said a third, 'for the first eight years. Then, I confess, it is best to sigh them out in sorrowful silence.' The logical conclusion of the argument was painfully clear to Cromwellians; 'if Charles Stuart had a Parliament of his friends, what could he do better for his service than to void all done since '42?' The Presbyterian aristocracy, so long out of harmony with the Government, began to turn from sullen neutrality to closer contact with the Royalists, who had long hoped to secure Fairfax. His daughter's marriage to Buckingham in 1657 fluttered the Puritan doves, and his chaplain, Edward Bowles, was apparently a crypto-Royalist: Manchester, too, was in touch with Royalist agents by March 1658.² Nor was this aristocratic discontent confined to Presbyterians; Saye and Sele and Wharton had refused to sit in Cromwell's Upper House, on the express ground that it involved the end of the peers of England, 'the chiefest remedy and prop' of the Constitution. Innumerable social and historic threads were tugging the aristocracy back towards the Crown.³

Since 1656, then, when Hyde had first dared to hope he might 'eat cherries at Deptford again',⁴ the general outlook was much brighter, though Willis's paralysing treachery, unsuspected by Hyde till May 1659,⁵ continued to wreck any

¹ Ibid., iii. 101.

² Ibid., 105, 120, 554; P. i. 586; C. S. P. iii. 392.

³ Firth, *House of Lords*, 250.

⁴ To Sir R. Browne, 25 Aug. 1656 (Bray, *Evelyn*, ii, App. 256).

⁵ C. S. P. iii. 463, 542.

positive success, up to and including Booth's rising in August of that year. It was something gained that at last a really capable agent had been found in John Mordaunt, brother of one Earl of Peterborough and father of the hero of Barcelona. Not engaged in Royalist politics till 1657, one of 'the many young gentlemen that were never before of their party'¹—Mordaunt chafed at the dilatoriness of the 'Sealed Knot' and the older Cavaliers—complaining bitterly to Charles of 'those who confess they cannot restore you on their own account, and yet out of diffidence and caution will not join with others'.² Presbyterian assistance, he maintained, was 'necessary, both to your restoration and to the happiness of it'.³ It is a rare refreshment, after dealing with Buckingham or Daniel O'Neill, to find in a royal agent this moderation and good sense.

But no one man could remove in a moment the mountains of obstruction, and one special difficulty embarrassed any advance. Hyde refused to allow the King to adventure himself on invasion, till there was an open rising in England; there, on the contrary, many conspirators declined to budge, till assured of support from royal troops. In addition to this, deep dissension continued in the party. Buckingham was a main source of it: his ideas were simply to 'give the law' to others, to 'destroy the Lord Chancellor', and to direct Presbyterian London like Paris of the League, 'but he will make, I doubt', O'Neill said drily, 'an ill Duke of Guise'.⁴ Nothing yet was done towards the real and admitted need for unity of command. Ormonde's flying visit in February 1658 revealed the depth of the gulf between Royalists and Presbyterians. In April 1659 Mordaunt reports, 'we want a good pilot, and that want may be our ruin'; as for the Knot, 'unless an angel should appear to them', they will not agree on action.⁵ In June the party of action (Mordaunt, Willoughby of Parham, Booth, Newport, Sir William Waller, William Legge, Rumbold, and Charlton) sent a formal protest to the King: 'the obstruction proceeds from some phlegmatic wari-

¹ Firth, *Last Two Years*, &c., ii. 70, quoting Thurloe, vii. 83, 99.

² *C. S. P.* iii. 446; compare Massey's letter of 22 April 1659 (Nicholas papers, iv. 115).

³ *C. S. P.* iii. 587.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 452.

⁵ To Hyde (March 1658, *C. S. P.* iii. 391).

ness in the Knot ; . . . to justify this cold, unconcerned, prudential wariness, they make it their business to gain proselytes', and ' what we do in the day, these destroy in the night '.¹

In vain Hyde begged the old Cavaliers to trust Mordaunt and his lieutenants ; they stood aloof, considered themselves slighted, and, when at last roused to promise action, backed out at the last moment, and abandoned Booth to his fate.² It was not merely that they ' did take themselves to be above the direction of Mr. Mordaunt and Mr. Newport ', thinking their powers ' too great for their years and experience ' : the controversy was more fundamental, for they refused to approve a rising, before an open breach came about between army and Parliament. And though the King and Hyde were converted to the party of the offensive, Charles himself actually going to St. Malo *en route* for England, the objections of these ' prudential gentlemen ' were not, in fact, baseless. Mordaunt summed up the difference of policy in a few words. ' These gentlemen are of opinion, under 7,000 men, you ought not to land. Others, that your appearance only will do it with the present preparations. These gentlemen believe the army cannot settle. Others believe it may. . . . In fine, Sir, these gentlemen . . . expect from delays what we pretend to gain by action. Theirs is the safest way, if it succeeds ; ours is the noblest. ' ³ And even if Mordaunt's programme were the right one, the entire uncertainty as to the King's platform, or what terms he would give to the Presbyterians,⁴ was far more responsible for failure than the personal short-comings of the veteran Cavaliers.

Yet the chance was a golden one. The confusion of parties in Richard Cromwell's Parliament was such that the concealed Royalists, whom Hyde had strongly encouraged to get themselves elected, might hope to hold the balance. Their policy was obvious ; ' to concur with this party to-day and that to-morrow ', to incite the Commons to provoke the army, and ' your friends in the army to affront the Parliament, and the

¹ To the King, Hist. MSS. Comm. Report X, vi. 191, 207.

² C. S. P. iii, *passim*.

³ Hist. MSS. *ut supra*, 208, 210 ; C. S. P. iii. 470, 486?

⁴ They had long been clamouring for declaration of a general toleration : Massey to Nicholas, 5/15 March 1659.

agitators to do any acts of outrage'.¹ But these tactical instructions did not really solve the wider question of strategy. The idea in the early part of 1659 was to play the part of 'hypocrite patriots', and to join the Commonwealth-men in attacking the Cromwellians. The ship of state was to be driven on to the rocks. But what if it stuck there, and the Republic was consolidated by Cavalier votes? Might it not be better to close with the moderates and Presbyterians, even on their exorbitant conditions? Or perhaps a bargain could be struck with the Cromwellian nucleus—Richard and Henry themselves, Thurloe and St. John?²

Such doubts assailed the Royalists as Thurloe's majority held on by its teeth against the mixed Opposition. Yet the King's aversion to announcing his platform in advance was intelligible enough. What, for instance, was to be done with the Revolution land settlement? To promise peaceable possession to all who had got hold of delinquents' lands would offend the whole Cavalier interest, but Puritans otherwise well disposed had been hinting at this, as an essential, for the past four years. In these circumstances Charles instructed his agents to make no general promises, but merely pledged his word that individuals joining him should never suffer in their material interests. Right up to the summer of 1659 this rule of no general declarations, which Hyde had insisted upon for ten years past, was faithfully observed.³

For the Royalists this, in short, was becoming the paramount question, whether they could drive through to the end this policy of a restoration unfettered by pledges. Their Presbyterian allies were restive. The great magnates sat passive during Booth's rising; as it was, Sir Thomas Middleton's immediate proclamation of the King offended the Presbyterian ministers on whom Booth counted. On the last day of October Mordaunt warned Hyde of a 'cabal', who were putting forward 'the articles of the Isle of Wight': before the following April this had grown to a serious danger, which personal negotiations with Manchester and Fairfax entirely failed to check. The

¹ Hyde to Rumbold, 10 March (C. S. P. ii. 436); to Mordaunt, 4 June (Hist. MSS. 204, loc. cit.).

² C. S. P. iii. 432 et seq.

Ibid., iii. 437; Nicholas papers, i. 146, ii. 349; Hist. MSS. *ut supra*, 196.

admission of the old secluded members at the end of February 1660, after the final downfall of Lambert and the swordsmen, enhanced it. Both in and outside the new Council of State the Puritan grandees were in constant conclave: Manchester, Northumberland, Bedford, Wharton, Ashley Cooper, Pierrepont, Holles, Alexander Popham, and St. John were all implicated, and Fairfax was 'debauched' from previous undertakings. They hoped to make 'a noble Rump' by excluding all but selected peers: they proposed that the Treaty of Newport should be confirmed, that all places of trust should be disposed of by Parliament, that all royal commissions should be 'nulled since the carrying away of the Great Seal to Oxford', and that the whole land settlement should be confirmed. 'Lady Carlisle lays about her too, and says no engagements will tie the King, who will break all'; the cry was, not to allow 'so much as a kitchen boy to be about the King, of his old party'.¹ Up till the end of March, at least, good observers thought that such a programme might be realized, and the French ambassador was in touch with those who had no objection to a conditional Presbyterian restoration through the good offices of France.² That this attempt and others later failed was mainly due not to any popular passion for the King, and only in a small measure to the ability of the King's advisers; it must be ascribed, almost without reserve, to the influence of Monk who, though no Cavalier, exercised at this crisis an influence on Cavalier history only comparable to that wielded later by the two other marshals of our history, Marlborough and Wellington.

The idea of Monk as the chosen instrument had occurred independently to several of the King's advisers after Oliver's death, but it was Culpepper who, a year before the decision, foretold the precise course of events. 'The way to deal with him is, by some fit person (which I think is the greatest difficulty), to show him plainly, and to give him all imaginable security for it, that he shall better find all his ends (those of honour, power, profit, and safety) with the King, than in any other way he can take. Neither are we to boggle at any way

¹ C. S. P. iii. 553, 594, 705 et seq.

² Ibid., iii. 713; Guizot, *Monk*, 211.

he shall propose in the declaring himself, let it at the first be Presbyterian, be King and Parliament, be a Third Party, or what he will, so it oppose the present power it will at last do the King's business, and after a little time he will and must alone fall into the track we would have him go in ; when he is engaged past a retreat he will want you as much as you will want him, and you may mould him into what form you please.' ¹

Monk was hardly to prove such a malleable tool as this ; he represented, rather, all those forces which made the Restoration, though in form unlimited, in reality a political compromise. His political affinities were with that 'sober gentry' whom he bade Richard Cromwell cherish, and whose solid strength was proved in the free elections of this March and April.² He was a connexion of the Sidneys, and kinsman of William Morrice of Devon, 'his sole confidant' in important matters, and a typical solid Puritan of the West Country, and in Morrice's acquaintance Sir John Grenville the necessary go-between was found. Monk, it is possible, would have made up his mind sooner, if Booth could have held the field. As it was, no English subject since has held such issues in his hands. He might have been Protector with the support of the English republicans or the French monarchy, but this 'clouded soldier' had the genius, the honesty, or the instinct to declare for a free Parliament. At every critical stage—the return of the secluded members, the dissolution of the Rump, or the admission of all peers, and of all duly elected Commons, to the Convention—Monk's intervention was decisive in favour of the Crown ; indeed, the three single persons who did most to secure restoration were Monk, who had governed Scotland for Cromwell, Montague, who had offered him the crown, and Fairfax, who had helped him to his greatest victories.

But in one sense Culpepper's prediction was not falsified. In the latter half of March Monk sent his terms to Brussels.³

¹ To Hyde, 20 Sept. 1658 ; (*C. S. P.* iii. 412).

² See, for instance, the change in the members elected for Norfolk from 1658 to 1660 ; Burton, i. xxv n., and iv. 487.

³ Ranke, iii. 299, and note 2 ; the 'General's Paper' in Lister, iii. 500, looks like an attempt, after the Restoration, to get a final settlement more favourable to the Puritans than the Declaration of Breda promised to be.

There was to be a general amnesty, with only four or five exceptions, a general toleration, and safe possession for all holders of confiscated Royalist lands. His terms were, formally, accepted, but only with the very saving clause, which he had himself made the 'open sesame' of politics, 'the assent of a free Parliament'. To draw back now (had he wished to) was no longer in his power: he had crossed the Rubicon. The City had petitioned the Council of State to invite the King's return, the elections were returning Cavaliers who had fought in arms, and by May unconditional restoration was the only alternative to bloodshed.

Yet the last few weeks preceding the King's proclamation on the 8th May were anxious ones for Royalists. Their ballad singers besieged the General with their entreaties:

I remember the time when you fought for the King;
And the Cause was good, though you did not prevail;
O let not the boys in the street now sing,
He was once for the Head, but now for the Tail.¹

The indiscretion of their own hot-heads did not make their 'George's' path easier. Foolish clergy were preaching 'revenge for my Lord of Canterbury's and my Lord of Strafford's blood', and young Royalists in the Commons threatened to upset the whole land settlement; small wonder that a friendly alderman reported that the Presbyterians 'begin to flag a little now, and fear the settlement of Episcopacy, and that your Majesty will slip in without conditions'.² Moderate Royalists in many counties felt obliged to issue protestations, that they were anxious to bury the past; their London manifesto carried the signatures of the surviving leaders of the Knot, of Bishop Morley and of Jeremy Taylor, besides a row of names (Northampton, Lexington, Ashburnham, Penruddock, and Legge), representing the most passionate incidents of the Civil War.³

The coming year was to show the worth of these signatures. The present fact was that Monk, carried away by the tide, had determined upon immediate restoration. No other interpretation could be put upon the admission, on the 27th April,

¹ *Ratts Rhimed to Death* (London, 1660).

² *C. S. P.* iii. 716, 727, 739.

³ *Baker's Chronicle* (1674), 722.

of the young lords who had never sat in Parliament before, for these thirty-six additional votes swamped the Presbyterian peers' junta. The first fortnight of May was harassing enough for the Royalist agents; Mordaunt was on tenterhooks, the King himself wrote to Monk, urging expedition and reiterating his promises.¹ But the essential, time, was won: on the 25th May the King stepped ashore at Dover from the *Charles* (formerly the *Naseby*), unfettered by conditions save by those he had publicly declared at Breda, or those more secret pledges he had given to Monk.

¹ Lister, iii. 99; Firth, *House of Lords*, 283

II

1660-1690

Organization

V

THE RESTORATION AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CLARENDON

ON the 29th May 1660, when Charles on his thirtieth birthday entered London, along 'ways strewed with flowers, the bells ringing, the streets hung with tapestry, fountains running with wine', the Royalist revival began which carried the party back to political fortune. 'The world of England was perfectly mad', wrote Anthony Wood, and this delirium was naturally highest in the older Cavaliers. The bad times were gone, the King, and they with him, should enjoy his own again. They would eject the Puritan colonels from their ill-gotten lands, the schismatic and the presbyter from their parish churches. They had left England as a group of beaten factions, they returned as a solid unforgetting interest. In the thousands of petitions, which rained in during that intoxicating summer, we may read the exiles' desires for home and reparation, the greed of those long hungry for place and office, the thirst for vengeance, and the insistence on real victory. The Postmasters for the Western road, turned out for their loyalty, wish to be restored. John Collins, who lost a leg at Edgehill, would be a turn-broach in the royal kitchen. Bridget Rumney asks for replacement in the office of furnishing flowers and sweet herbs to the Court; her mother and her two sons were killed at Naseby. Captain William Hikes begs to be made butler of Christ Church, Oxford,¹ in place of Thomas Fifield, who betrayed the College plate to the enemy. Lord Craven asks that he be restored to all his estates, with indemnity for damage. The families of Derby, Capel, and Slingsby request the trial of those who had sat in judgement on their fathers.

¹ A post, under Dean Fell, clearly reserved for sound loyalists: in 1682 Captain Woods, 'an experienced soldier in the late wars', held it: Fleming papers, 186.

The 'Royal and Loyal Party' complain that, having lost all for the King, they now find the enemy preferred before them. There were deeper suggestions that the King should resume all royal demesne lands, raise a standing army, elevate the nobility, and govern on the French model.¹

All these hopes and longings took little stock of the real situation. Of the twin dangers through which Clarendon had to guide the ship of state, the one rock of reaction and the other of Puritanism, the latter was still the more dangerous, and the Monarchy was not nearly so strong 'as the bells and the bonfires proclaimed it to be'. Monk was indispensable, but his relations with Clarendon were not cordial, and kind friends did their best to make them worse.² He had, it was true, put down early attempts in the Convention to raise the ghost of the treaty of Newport, but the Convention, in spite of the Royalist electioneering, was from the start dominated by the experienced Presbyterian politicians of the Commonwealth. Some of this section had already demurred to the high office given to Clarendon and Ormonde, and all of them joined during May and June in supporting legislation on the lines which marked Monk's idea of Restoration.

Apart from the question of religion, which we may for the moment reserve, life and property were the great points at issue—a bill to give indemnity as to the lives and security as to the lands, of the Puritan interest. The General's latest proposals were to except, as to life, not more than seven of the regicides; to allow soldiers of his army to keep for ninety-nine years, and others for sixty years, the Church and Crown lands on payment of rent; and to confirm purchasers of other lands, pending reimbursement with interest. Against such leniency, a stubborn minority in the Commons, and the majority in the Lords (now reinforced by the exiles and by the creations made at Oxford), fought tooth and nail. By the 13th June the Commons had agreed to add twenty exceptions, though not for execution, to the seven singled out for death. In spite of a royal message the same day urging expedition

¹ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1661 and Clarendon, *Life*, *passim*; Hist. MSS. House of Lords (7th Report); Ranke, iii. 312 and note

² *C S P* iii 744: Clarendon, *Life* (1827), i. 322; Lansdowne, *Works*.

of the bill, for nearly a month longer unforgetting Presbyterians, like Prynne, and a persistent band of Royalists poured in provisoes and exceptions—to exclude all who had signed the Instrument of Government, all decimators, major-generals, members of the High Court of Justice, and abjurors. Only a majority of 30 (181 to 151) was found to defeat a clause, that all officers of the Protectorate should refund their salaries.

The Lords even more truly reflected the Restoration rancour, of which Bristol, in a speech of real eloquence, gave the cue. 'I find myself set on fire when I think that the blood of so many virtuous and meritorious Peers, and persons, and others of all ranks, so cruelly and impiously shed, should cry so loud for vengeance and not find it from us. That many of the wickedest and meanest of the people should remain, as it were, rewarded for their treasons, rich and triumphant in the spoils of the most eminent in virtue and loyalty, of all the nobility and gentry of the kingdom.' Still, 'smooth water is only to be found in the generality's security from their guilty fears, and in the two houses' union between themselves, and with their sovereign'. He urged them, therefore, to pass the bill as received, with one exception; 'that part of the bill which relates to our sovereign's murder, I find it so short, and so much out of the way of what we owe, both to the severity and solemnity of that revenge, that I cannot but think it in some sort (pardon the expression) a profanation of the due right of that sacred expiation, to handle it in the same bill promiscuously with other more vulgar things'. The Lords, though not pursuing his suggestion for a separate bill, responded to his demand for more 'justice', but even their additions, such as to condemn without exception all who had taken part in the High Court of Justice, did not satisfy the hot Cavaliers. 'The Lords pursue justice', one writes, 'though with mercy beyond merit. The Commons prefer mercy, even to the detriment of justice.'¹

It required the Ministry's intervention to settle this question. Monk had already told the Commons that 'he knew His Majesty's mind was inclined to moderation and mercy'. It

¹ *Parl. Hist.* iv. 67 et seq.; C. J.; L. J.; Sutherland papers (Report v 172)

might, too, be as well not to inquire too deeply into the past; Thurloe, it was rumoured, had declared that, 'if he were hanged, he had a Black Book which should hang half of them that went for Cavaliers'.¹

The King's speech to the Lords on the 27th July was of extraordinary candour: would they prevent him, he asked, from keeping the promise he had made at Breda? 'which, if I had not made, I am persuaded, neither I nor you had been now here'. He thanked them for dealing with 'the immediate murderers' of his father, but 'I will deal truly with you, I never thought of excepting any other'. Even now, it was only with difficulty that the Commons were induced to pass the money bills before the question of indemnity was settled, and all the energy of Clarendon in the Lords, and Heneage Finch and Dudley North in the Commons, were needed to bring about the eventual compromise. By it Vane, Lambert, Axtell, and Hacker were condemned to die, though both Houses petitioned that the first two might be spared: the King's judges who had surrendered were also excepted, but on the understanding that a special Act of Parliament would be required for a capital sentence.

The passing of the Act of Oblivion, together with another 'for the confirmation of judicial proceedings', automatically terminated another and far more dangerous controversy. Nothing, in this of all centuries of English history, roused such passion as the ownership of the soil. Comparatively early, it had been agreed to restore *in toto* Crown lands, Church lands, and those confiscated merely for adherence to the King. Beyond, and indeed even inside, this agreement, everything lay in dispute. Monk's Coldstreamers had purchased land—were they now to be dispossessed? Were those who had improved sites in London or Westminster to be evicted without compensation? Were the hundreds of Cavaliers, who had sold lands to compound for crushing fines, to have no redress? Once again a buzzing swarm of petitions. Lord Newport points out that his father and himself had, in order to pay a fine of £10,000, been forced to convey their rectories and

¹ Charles Talbot to Sir R. Leveson, 15 May (Sutherland papers): cf. *ibid.*, 18

tithes in Shropshire to William Pierrepont : he begs the Lords not to 'interpret his and his father's loyalty and faithful adherence to his late Majesty as a crime'. On the other side, the Puritans brought forward bills to protect purchasers and sitting tenants; the Royalists, led by Geoffrey Palmer and the moderate Meres, fought these and a series of such proposals right up to the end of the Convention. The solution arrived at, of course, could only be rough justice. Briefly, the Crown, the Church, and the Royalist magnates (whether by remedy for confiscation or by private bill) were restored—while the rank and file, who had sold their lands to pay delinquency fines or to finance the King's cause, were left to suffer. No measure was perhaps more necessary to close the epoch of the Rebellion, but none brought more odium upon Clarendon and those who had counselled it. For this settlement was the most lasting triumph of the Puritan revolution; to take one instance only, it was at this time that the great manor of Hawarden, destined one day to become the Mecca of nineteenth-century Liberalism, passed from the Cavalier house of Derby to the Presbyterian Glynnnes. The average Cavalier declared, with Roger L'Estrange, that these measures 'made the enemies to the Constitution masters, in effect, of the booty of three nations'.¹ We shall hear the reverberation of this grievance again in later years; meanwhile, it is true to say that no one single action so much contributed to fix the moderate Puritans to the Crown, and so, in course of time, to widen the basis of Royalism itself.

The disbandment of the army and the settlement of the King's annual revenue at £1,200,000 were the remaining great measures carried in the Convention. Bolingbroke later attributed the salvation of the national liberties 'to those great and good men, Clarendon and Southampton. Far from taking advantage of the heat and fervour of the times, to manage Parliament into scandalous jobs, and fatal compliances with the Crown, to their immortal honour, with gratitude and reverence to their memories be it spoken, they broke the army, stinted the revenue, and threw their master on the affections

¹ C. J., *passim*; *Parl. Hist.* iv. 80; Report VII (House of Lords MSS.), 141; *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1661, 271 et seq., Lister, II. 36, Ailesbury, I. 5.

of his people'.¹ In point of fact, once the Indemnity Bill had passed, there was never a question of maintaining the army; the Presbyterians were at least as anxious to get rid of it as the Cavaliers, the country groaned under monthly assessments, it caused (as William Morrice said) 'a perpetual trembling in the nation'.

The wider point deserves more examination, for Bolingbroke did not coin it merely from his exuberant fancy. Southampton, we are told upon Sir William Coventry's high authority, urged the King to hold his hand over Indemnity, 'till he had got his power restored that had been diminished by the late times, and his revenue settled in such a manner as he might depend on himself without resting upon parliaments, and then pass it', but that Clarendon, thinking he could 'have the command of parliaments for ever', pressed its passing. King James II declared that Clarendon could easily have secured a larger revenue, and in this contention other authorities support him.² Whatever the truth of this persistent tradition, it certainly cannot apply to the Convention; many agreed to the grant of excise with great reluctance, and spoke of coupling it with a remonstrance against abuses. But, in relation to the next Parliament, the story has a great likelihood of truth, and the attitude attributed to Clarendon is in keeping, it will be seen, with all that we know of his general position. The constitutional result was, in any case, of some importance, for the Crown, loaded with three millions of debt accumulated during the exile and always spending in excess of its allowance, was never henceforth self-supporting.

On the 29th December the Convention was dissolved. Ardent Royalists had long been clamouring against it, promising the King they would elect a better, and from its unconstitutional origin its life could, plainly, only be a short one. Its views were not popular at Court; it had begun its operations with prayers led by Calamy and Baxter, and to the end it was discussing fast days on which to seek the Lord, or bills for the better observance of His day. On the religious

¹ *Works* (Bohn, 1844), ii. 32; cf. Burnet's speech at the trial of Sacheverell.

² Pepys, 20 March 1669; James, *Life*, i. 393; Macpherson, i. 17; Welwood, *Memoirs* (1718), 109; Burnet, i. 278; Eachard, 783. The last authority names Alexander Popham as offering to 'set a revenue of £2,000,000 settled.

question it could offer no agreed settlement, its attitude to a bill for the militia was highly critical, and it boldly asked the King to marry a Protestant. Yet all Clarendon's constructive work was done under its shadow, and this will be apparent from his attitude to the burning questions of the day, as compared with that of the average Royalist.

The composition of the Ministry and the Council was the initial stumbling-block. The leaders of the exile took the principal offices. Culpepper died in 1660, but Hyde himself continued as Chancellor; Southampton, most loyal but most moderate of those who had stayed in England, became Treasurer; Ormonde was made Lord Steward and Deputy of Ireland, and Nicholas principal Secretary of State; the two law officers were Clarendon's old friend, Geoffrey Palmer, as Attorney-General, and Heneage Finch, the outstanding Churchman of the Convention, as Solicitor. On the other side, Monk was Captain-General for life, Montague Admiral of the narrow seas, Manchester Lord Chamberlain, Robartes Privy Seal, William Morrice Secretary of State, Ashley Cooper a Privy Councillor and from 1661 Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Council was made up on the same plan—Puritans like Northumberland, Leicester, and Arthur Annesley balancing the Royalists Hertford, Lindsey, and St. Albans. But this careful distribution did as much to mark, as to obscure, that jealousy between Presbyterian and Royalist which had darkened the passage of Monk's army into England,¹ and haunted the whole of Clarendon's administration. Resentment at the favour shown to the old enemy rankled in every Cavalier heart. Honest Sir John Bramston could only put it down to the poverty of 'the loyal gentry', and to the adroitness of old Parliament men in persuading the King, that Presbyterians had done the real work of restoration. He was only one of multitudes, who thought these appointments 'too much', who felt, what one of them dared openly to say in the Convention, that 'he that drew his sword against the King committed as high an offence, as he that cut off the King's head'.²

Some such allotment of offices was, however, inevitable, and

¹ Fairfax correspondence (Civil War), ii, 166.

² Bramston, 117; *Parl. Hist.* iv, 42; Sutherland papers, 184. 207

it was conservatism itself as compared with Monk's first proposals. Moreover, the inner councils were composed of pure Royalists, and it was to Southampton and the Chancellor that the King entrusted the management of the Commons.¹ All the more remarkable, then, is the firm stand against blind reaction taken by the Ministry during 1660-1.

His own generation, and the next, ascribed the controlling voice in these resolutions to Clarendon, the only business man of his party. In the 'jollity of the return' Charles left to him the reins of business: Southampton stuck close to his Treasury work: Nicholas was an aged drudge, though an honourable one, and Ormonde was already busied with the government of Ireland. Everything tokens the immense, and for the nation the beneficial, weight which Clarendon attached to the continuity of national life. He insisted upon rapid passing of the Indemnity Act, and refused to have it reopened. He continued the Commonwealth judges in office. He headed a protest in the Lords against any breach in the land settlement. He damped down talk of a revival (which even in 1646 he had thought undesirable) of the Star Chamber. Having made promises, he believed that they must be kept, and this made him endure claims from Monk and Monk's friends, whom he did not like, and stick to Montague against his rivals. It was equally his conviction that things must be done 'by degrees',² whether in restoring the loyal members of a corporation, or in re-erecting the national Church.

The one thing most certain about Clarendon is that he was not author of 'the Clarendon Code'. In November 1660 we hear that the Presbyterians 'build much upon the Chancellor's favour, I hope without ground, though not without appearance—that party carrying all places and profits. . . . They have the best offices in Court and city, while we poor Cavaliers are ready still to starve.'³ In February 1661 the Lord Chancellor, 'resolved to oblige the Presbyterians', won over the leading bishops and the Duke of York to uphold the Convention's act, now threatened by the Cavaliers, for the confirmation in their benefices of ministers in possession.⁴ In the disputes over the

¹ Clarendon, *Life*, ii. 197; Lister, ii. 6.

² *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1660-1, 264.

³ Sutherland papers, 174, 196.

⁴ Rawdon papers, 137.

Act of Uniformity he played throughout a moderating part. He opposed its most bitter clauses, he supported a projected suspension of it for three months,¹ he backed a proviso giving the King power to exempt selected ministers, he is found even in August 1663 discussing plans with the Presbyterian Anglesey for healing measures.² Evelyn summed up the charge, and we think the fact, at the Chancellor's fall: 'the truth is, he made few friends during his grandeur among the royal sufferers, but advanced the old rebels.' And when that fall came, only the Presbyterians (for their own ends, it is true) made any effort to save him.³ Apart, then, from his monopoly of power, his royal relationship, his love of acquisition, and arrogance, Clarendon was supremely obnoxious to the Cavaliers as the man who stood to warn them off their lost Paradise. Of this the Cavalier Parliament was to give ample proof.

The Convention, much against its will, was dissolved on the 29th December. London had already watched the execution of the regicides, and heard Harrison predicting from the scaffold the resurrection of the 'good old cause'. On the last days of the year thousands saw the mighty dust of Cromwell and Ireton vilely dug up from the Abbey and hanged on the gallows at Tyburn. On the 7th January Venner's resolute band of fanatics put the guards to the run; little sleep for London in these moonlight nights, when Sir John Reresby was searching the woods at Highgate, and Samuel Pepys ('with no good courage at all, but that I might not seem to be afraid') patrolled the streets with sword and powderless pistol. On the 10th a proclamation issued against conventicles, and the prisons began to fill: even before this, energetic Royalists anticipated the law by indicting dissenting ministers at petty sessions, and deputy lieutenants were suppressing 'unlawful' meetings.

¹ A well-informed correspondent of the Bedford family says that Clarendon actually initiated the petition of Calamy and other Nonconformist leaders to the King: Bodl. Rawlinson MSS Letters, 109, f. 87. In his *Life* (ii. 147) Clarendon naturally glosses over this episode.

² Lister, ii. 188; Ormonde (Kilkenny) papers, iii. 71; cf. also the angry Royalist Monckton's narrative in Lister, ii. 532; but then Monckton was always 'mixing his loyalty, his zeal, and his sufferings in all he said' (Essex papers, ii. 4 July 1676).

³ James, *Life*, i. 431.

The return of the royal family, crowds flocking to be touched for the evil, preparations for the coronation, consecration of bishops, fears of the disbanded army—with all these things Royalist emotions were roused to a frenzy, and boiled over in the general election of January 1661.¹ News of the election of four Nonconformists for the City failed to stop the landslide, and the new House included less than sixty Presbyterians.²

Royalism of the future was represented by the two Hydes, Edward Seymour, Christopher Musgrave, and Thomas Clifford. Of the older Cavaliers we may note Philip Warwick, John Ashburnham, Richard Fanshaw, and Allen Apsley among the royal servants, Hugh Pollard, William Compton, Thomas Middleton, of the conspirators under the Commonwealth, and Winston Churchill, father of the great Marlborough.

The King's opinion of his faithful Commons was to be as mixed as his metaphors, but if he was later to think that Parliaments, like cats, grew 'curst with age', in 1661 their exuberant loyalty made him vow to 'keep them till they got beards'. Well might Daniel O'Neill say, 'there is nothing relating to the good of the kingdom and his Majesty's satisfaction but this Parliament is prepared to do; and if the King fail after this to be at ease, it's his own fault'.³

No diagnosis of this Parliament would be complete which did not allow for the Royalist pressure goading it from the outside. 'The poor cripples, that have lost their limbs in His Majesty's service', asked for relief. The distressed Royalists declared it 'a hard piece of justice that the price of public freedom (when restored) should be the ruin only of such as with their utmost perils chiefly asserted it . . . how will it multiply neuters, to observe noble families extirpated, and their estates possessed, as many will be apt enough to collect, by wiser men—viz. such as took the strongest side'.⁴ Their demand for priority in all government employment was as

¹ Pepys, *passim*; Evelyn, 6 July, 17 Oct., 30 Jan.; Burnet, i, 278; Reresby, 50; Bodl. Rawlinson MSS. Letters, 109, f. 12; *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1660-1, 515.

² 'About forty in number', wrote Sir Richard Temple in 1668-9 (B. M. Stowe MSS. 304, f. 83).

³ To Bramhall, 23 May (Rawdon papers).

⁴ House of Lords MSS. (7th Report), 147; *Parl. Hist.* iv. 236.

embarrassing to those who cared for the Act of Oblivion as to any who regarded efficiency in the public service.

Lord Bruce's bill of May 1663 for settling all offices, civil and military, on such as had been 'loyal and conformable to the Church', was firmly resisted by moderate Royalists like William Coventry, who pointed out that for twenty years the Cavaliers had been unemployed—the best had 'given themselves over to look after country and family business', and 'the rest to debauchery'; there were hardly more than three Royalist captains fit to command at sea. The same applied to county business, like the militia, where a staunch Royalist complained there were 'few of the old stock of people left who had formerly managed business, and few of the new who knew which way to go about it'.¹ But judicial appraisal could hardly be expected in men who saw a conspirator in every Puritan, and an incendiary in every disbanded soldier. This conviction obsessed the Royalist mind for the next decade, furnished the text of countless royal speeches, and the pabulum for the Commons' debates.

Nor was it quite groundless. Attempts to seize Berwick and Newcastle in the spring of 1661 were followed in the autumn by a plot involving most of the middle West; in the North we meet naked Quakers, crying in the market-places 'woe to Yorkshire'—arousing memories of James Naylor and the 'Sword of Gideon'. A joint committee of both Houses² in the next Christmas recess reported there was a formidable plot of the Commonwealth's men. In 1662 Government ordered the arrest of all Nonconformist teachers in Berkshire. The Farnley Wood conspiracy in the late summer of 1663 brought out the Duke of Buckingham with the militia of Yorkshire. Informers advised that the rebels would demand toleration, repeal of the excise and chimney money, and 'a Gospel magistracy and ministry'. In Somerset the same year

¹ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1663-4, 132; Sutherland papers, 195; Pepys, 7 May and 24 June 1663. Monk's Duchess made exactly the same point as Coventry; she 'wished the king would send her husband to sea with the old plain sea captains that he served with formerly, that would make their ships swim with blood, though they could not make legs as captains nowadays can'.

² Including, of the Opposition or non-Cavalier element, Albemarle, Ashley, Meres, Robert Howard, Richard Onslow, and Vaughan.

a meeting of a thousand swore, it was said, 'they would lose their lives sooner than their parson'. The Governor of Chester reported that the Presbyterians from Lancashire to Stafford could raise 8,000 troops in three days. In July 1664 it was under consideration in Durham to obtain from the parish clergy registers of those who had served against the King. In 1666 the more rabid Dissenters openly hoped for a Dutch landing. Even in 1667 armed bands, within a few miles of York, rescued political prisoners from the dragoons.¹

Informers and *agents provocateurs* played their usual part in this agitation, but the Cavaliers' fears and indignation were genuine enough. The Deputy Lieutenants, we hear from Kent, were too drowsy, for 'lawyers are ill swordsmen'. The gentlemen of Cornwall maintain that 'the same destructive principles' still cling to the Puritans, in spite of royal indulgence.² The Grand Jury of Herefordshire is not doing its duty, nor is the Grand Jury of Kent, where 'the honest souls, especially Church officers and others, are much afflicted to be reviled and affronted in the performance of their offices by the bold faction'.³ At Exeter 'Jack Presbyter stands a-tiptoe and looks high, and not down, upon the Book of Common Prayer'. The trained bands are a broken reed, and merely arm the enemy. The Dean of Carlisle suggests that Raby Castle should be made a city of refuge for the endangered loyalists.⁴

Such was the fevered atmosphere in which the Cavalier Parliament conducted their deliberations. Frustrated by the Ministry in attempts to undermine the Act of Oblivion, they paid no attention to the hint in the Chancellor's opening speech, that it was unreasonable to imagine that 'the distemper of twenty years can be rectified and subdued in twelve months', nor to his recommendation of 'a temporary provision of an easier and lighter yoke', for those who had been 'so many years without any yoke at all'. They seized, rather,

¹ *Parl. Hist.* iv. 227; *L. J. and C. J.* of 19 Dec. 1661; *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1661-6, *passim*; Reresby, 58; Bodl. Rawlinson MSS. D. 204; Kilmorey papers, 372 (Report X, iv).

² *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1661-2, 541; *ibid.*, 1663-4, 57.

³ *Ibid.*, 295; 1665-6, xxxi.

⁴ J. Kelland to Sir E. Seymour, 21 Jan. 1662 (Duke of Somerset's papers); *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1663-4, 300, 381.

upon his denunciation of preachers ' who tell their auditories, that the Apostle meant, when he bid them stand to their liberties, that they should stand to their arms '. If the King had closed the main door to persecution, they would use the postern he left open, when he told them, ' be as severe as you will against new offenders, especially if they be so upon old principles, and pull up those principles by the roots '.¹

Before the Commons broke up this summer, they had made all their members take the Anglican sacrament; they had decreed the Solemn League and Covenant to be in itself an unlawful oath, and burned it by the common hangman; they had declared that ' the sole supreme government, command, and disposition of the Militia and of all forces by sea and land . . . is and by the laws of England ever was the undoubted right of his Majesty, and his royal predecessors '. They had put the penalties of *praemunire* on any who said that either House of Parliament by itself enjoyed a legislative power. By an Act for the security of the King's person and government, any who should ' maliciously and advisedly, by writing, printing, preaching, or other speaking, express, publish, utter, or declare any words, sentences or other thing or things, to incite or stir up the people to hatred or dislike of the person of His Majesty or the Established government ', were made incapable of office in Church or State. The Act against tumultuous petitioning expressly referred to the methods of Pym and Hampden. ' We cannot forget ', the Speaker said, in presenting it for the royal assent, ' the method how our late miseries, like waves of the sea, came in upon us. First the people were invited to petition, to give colour to some illegal demands. Then they must remonstrate, then they must protest, then they must covenant, then they must associate.' The Corporation Act of the autumn secured local government to ' persons well affected to His Majesty and the established government, it being too well known that . . . many evil spirits are still working '. The Corporation commissioners were empowered to impose on all office-holders and municipal councillors an oath against the right of resistance, and a declaration against the Covenant, as well as to remove those

¹ *Parl. Hist.* iv. 179 et seq.

refusing, or (by a majority) even those consenting, if deemed 'expedient for the public safety'. The Militia Act of 1662 required of Lord-Lieutenants and their deputies, officers, and soldiers, an oath 'that it is not lawful upon any pretence whatsoever to take arms against the King', with the clause, 'I do abhor that traitorous position, that arms may be taken by his authority against his person'. The Act of Uniformity had applied similar oaths of non-resistance to beneficed ministers. The Five-Mile Act of 1665 extended them to the ejected clergy.

But party rancour is not the same as constitutional reaction, and the Cavaliers of 1661 were not of the school of 'Thorough'. Constitutionally, these 'younkers'¹ deserved well of the English people, though one great initial blunder must be put to their charge. In 1662 they had discussed, but abandoned, a motion for the unconditional repeal of the Long Parliament's Triennial Act,² but a royal speech of March 1664 revived the idea. The fanatics, Charles complained, 'by some computation of their own upon some clause in the Triennial bill', fancied the present Parliament was at an end; the rebels in the North spoke of assembling without writs, as the Act of 1641 premised. A minority led by Vaughan, Meres, and Richard Temple opposed repeal, but they could not muster over eighty votes, and the Act, as amended, went through with merely illusory safeguards for the holding of future Parliaments once at least in every three years. The loyalists had bowed to the Court, but both in the House and the country the repeal was widely resented.³

But the Cavaliers had, much earlier, over the Declaration of Indulgence, shown the limits of their devotion, and many observers (some not friendly to Royalism) noted the startling outburst of constitutional opposition. Finance, after all,

¹ Bodl. Rawlinson MSS., Letters, 109, f. 87.

² Influenced apparently by Vaughan, who moved that another bill be brought in, without such clauses 'as are not thought respectful enough to the King': *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1661-2, 330.

³ *Parl. Hist.* iv, 290; *C. J.* 22-8 March 1664; Bodl. Rawlinson MSS., A. 130; Verney papers (7th Report), 484; Burnet, i. 353; Pepys, 21 and 26 March. For a riot at Newbury against repeal, see *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1663-4, 553: 'The place is mad against King and Church, since the repeal of the old Triennial Act'

touched the squire as much as the Roundhead, and in June 1663 Charles had to tell them 'there hath not appeared that warmth in you of late, in the consideration of my revenue, as I expected'. Such appeals to their 'old alacrity', and to the danger from fanatics, were beginning to wear thin, and it was only by a small majority (159 to 111), that the Commons resolved to give a present supply.¹ Well might Andrew Marvell tell his Puritan constituents, that 'the House is as zealous as ever for His Majesty, but is sensible also of the necessities of the country'.

By their line over the Corporation Act of 1661 the Commons proved that they kept their party and the Constitution in separate compartments. The packing of the corporations was to be entrusted to good Anglican magistrates, and by no means to the Crown: they would have nothing to do with the Lords' amendments, which would have given the Crown a practical veto in the nomination of mayors, clerks, and recorders, would have forced all borough charters to be renewed, and made county justices *ex officio* magistrates within corporate towns: 'so total an alteration of the government', they argued, 'may have an ill influence upon the free elections'.²

But it was the Dutch war, its expense and its humiliation, which so finally embittered the loyal Commons' temper that as early as 1666 men could describe it as 'grown like to that in '41'.³ They had met the Crown's first call with unprecedented generosity, and in 1664 agreed (by 172 to 102) to a grant of two and a half millions, to be spread over three years; Sir Robert Paston⁴ had been put up by Government to move the motion, which even now was opposed by Sir John Holland and others of their ordinary supporters. In the Oxford session of October 1665, after hearing in Christ Church hall an elaborate vindication of the war and its cost from the Chancellor, the Commons, finding their three years' grant spent in one, gave one and a quarter millions more. With this was coupled a proviso, moved by Downing as teller of the

¹ C. J. 12 June 1663; Pepys, 13 June.

² Marvell to Richard Wilson, 6 June 1663; C. J. 24-5 July 1661.

³ Conway to Rawdon, 30 Oct.

⁴ Paston's corner in the House was known as 'million corner' in later years: Grey, i. 186.

Exchequer, that the money should be given for the war alone.¹ The principle of appropriation was not new to this Parliament—they had discussed a bill for the purpose over two years earlier²—and the King himself, influenced by Downing's experience of Dutch finance, made no objection. But the Solicitor-General Finch had, before hearing the royal wishes, opposed it as 'introductive to a commonwealth', and both Clarendon and Southampton were openly hostile.

In the autumn of 1666, frayed by fire, plague, and ill-success at sea, and legitimately angry at the waste of public money—the leakage of which perturbed even Admiralty officials—the Commons, after a grant of £1,800,000 had been snatched before all the county members had appeared, struck much harder. They demanded the production of accounts for the Navy, the stores, and the Ordnance. 'Not from any want of ardour in the House to supply the public necessities,' says Marvell, 'but out of our House's sense also of the burthen to be laid upon the subject', and 'very careful to avoid the perpetuating of any imposition', they carried after long debate an assessed land tax against the Court's wishes, to hold good for eleven months only. To other supply secured by means of a poll tax, they attached a proviso (later turned into a separate bill), for a committee to examine the public accounts: this clause was carried by 119 to 83—Seymour and Garroway being tellers for the majority. The Court had made desperate efforts to defeat it, and took its passage as a mortal blow. The twenty-four commissioners named by the Commons included Meres, Lee, Temple, Garroway, and Littleton, the pillars of the 'country' party—William Coventry, the administration's ablest critic, and Thomas Osborne, of the Buckingham faction. It was agreed in the Cabinet to resist, if need be by the royal veto. The King's wishes were communicated to the Lords, who, as a compromise, petitioned him to name commissioners himself; the Commons, without a division, declared their action 'unparliamentary and of dangerous consequence'. For the moment here the matter dropped, but

¹ C. J. 25 Nov. 1664; *Parl. Hist.* iv. 306, 318; Bodl. MSS. Rawlinson, A. 130; Clarendon, *Life*; Lister, ii. 311.

² Ormonde (Kilkenny) papers, iii. 53.

members of the 'country' party placed on the royal commission questioned its legality, and it came to nothing.

It was only after Clarendon's fall that the Commons reached their goal. A bill passed in December 1667 set up new commissioners, not to be members of either House. Their personnel commanded confidence, while their report, presented in 1669, disclosed the peculation of £1,500,000, and fully justified the Commons' persistence.¹

This constitutional aggression was, in itself, enough to involve the downfall of Clarendon, an event which for many reasons marks an epoch in Royalist development. But the main reasons of that fall are disconnected with the history of party, and opposition to him was so mixed and so universal that it is necessary to disentangle the little ephemeral factors from those of real importance.

There were, in the first place, the not insignificant elements, disdainfully described by Evelyn as 'the buffoons and ladies of pleasure': Bab May, who 'caught the King about his legs and joyed him, and said that this was the first time that ever he could call him King of England'; Lady Castlemaine, whom Clarendon had forbidden his wife to visit, whose grants and patents he had quashed, in whose rooms Henry Killigrew used to mimic him for the King's amusement—she too, in her nightgown, stood looking into Whitehall Garden, 'joying herself at the old man's going away'. There were three future Cabal leaders: Lauderdale, whose Scottish supremacy he had postponed, Arlington and Buckingham, with whom he had a longer score. There were the discontented Cavaliers, 'that think their loyalty is not considered',² still thinking of their lost lands, still crying for the stars of office, seeing in Clarendon's wealth only 'the price of ruined families'. There were the contradictory voices of those who assured the King 'that upon his Restoration they intended both to have raised his authority, and to have increased his revenue', but for Clarendon's discouragement,³ and on the other hand of those who denounced him as the enemy of Parliaments and the champion

¹ Marvell, 27 Oct., 6 Nov. 1666, and 5 Jan. 1667; Pepys, 8 Dec. 1666 and 1 May 1667; Clarendon, *Life*, iii 129.

² Pepys, 19 Nov. 1665.

³ Burnet, i. 451; he names Clifford, Osborne, Seymour, and Littleton

of standing armies. There was that terrible public anger of England in defeat, looking for a scapegoat, and finding one ready made in a statesman who was found to be building a palace in a time of desperate national emergency—the anger which flared up in the English sailors who mobbed the old exile in 1668.

In fact, even at its highest, Clarendon's position had never been secure. Great revolutions leave a deep stamp of deterioration on the following generation, and the public morals of Restoration politicians were an infamy. With Bristol, Buckingham, and Lauderdale he had had differences of policy stretching back for years—to Bristol's unhappy influence at Oxford, to Lauderdale's share in the Engagement, and to Buckingham's intrigue with the Cromwellians. His hold on the King had been that he alone would 'drudge in the matters of state',¹ and royal influence had carefully supported him hitherto against a multitude of enemies. But Lord Halifax has explained why the tenure of Charles II's ministers was at best always shaky. 'Charles Stuart would be bribed against the King'; he 'did always by his Councils as he did sometimes by his meals: he sat down out of form with the Queen, but he supped below stairs'. Clarendon himself has told us that the King 'did not naturally love old men'—more especially, we might add, when they showed disapproval of young men's vices, and the King suffered, like others,² under his old Chancellor's domineering in the Cabinet. Indeed, the offender himself pleads guilty to a fault, 'which he had used to accuse the Archbishop Laud of, that he was too proud of a good conscience'; but others called it by a harsher name. The King, finally, had always resented the idea of a Prime Minister, and if it delighted Pepys to hear the old man ask after the health of his sickly royal grandsons with a 'How do the children?', the connexion probably accentuated the royal displeasure.

Moreover, as time went on, the Chancellor became more and more isolated. The scanty rank and file, who followed him personally in politics—the venerable Sir Hugh Pollard, the rollicking Allen Apsley and Alan Brodrick, his secretary

¹ *Hatton Corr.* i. 34.

² See the complaints of Coventry and Downing in Pepys, Sept. 1667.

Matthew Wren or the Treasurer of the Navy, Carteret, were antiquated, inefficient, or insignificant. In the seven years of his administration no fewer than 129 seats in the Commons had a change of member, and this told against him.¹ In the Cabinet exigencies of time and politics removed, one by one, his best supporters. Ormonde's move to Ireland in 1662 was the first blow, the loss of 'that faithful bosom' the Chancellor had most trusted in. Heavier, because of its aftermath, was the enforced resignation of Nicholas in October of the same year, planned, so the victim thought, by Bristol, St. Albans, and Bennet, and the succession of the last-named to the Secretaryship of State. Bennet, like Nicholas, was a Cavalier, and wore with pride a plaster on the nose cut at Alresford, but of all Clarendon's enemies he was most dangerous. Thoroughly at home in the King's pleasures, he was for all that a diligent worker, and the only Restoration politician, except William Temple, who could handle foreign affairs; it is entirely in keeping with the two men's outlook, and with British custom, to find Bennet interpreting for Clarendon at official interviews with the French ambassador. The peculiar importance of Bennet's appointment was that he was specifically the King's man: he had violently quarrelled with York during the exile, was (whatever else) certainly not an Anglican, and the type of modern opportunist most antipathetic to the Chancellor.² The latter's account of his new rival is jaundiced, and we give it with all reserve: 'he used all his skill and credit with the King to lessen the credit of all those who had had any trust from his father, and long experience in affairs, declaring them to be only men of form and of narrow comprehension, and who guided themselves by obsolete rules of law and conscience, which were not now a good standard to govern the State by.'³

Shaken more by this change than he admitted,⁴ the Chancellor's influence certainly suffered more seriously in the next

¹ Prof. W. C. Abbott on 'The Long Parliament of Charles II' in *E. H. R.* xxi (1906).

² Jusserand, *French Ambassador at the Court of Charles II*, 203; Barbour, *Arlington*, *passim*.

³ *C. S. P.* iii, Supplement, lxxxiv.

⁴ 'I cannot tell you that I find, whatever other people discourse, my credit at all diminished with the King': to Ormonde (cipher), 25 October 1662 (Laster).

year. The Declaration of Indulgence of December 1662, the bill founded upon it and introduced in the Lords the following February, the absurd attempt to impeach Clarendon in July, were the work of a coalition—Arlington, Ashley, Bristol, Buckingham, and Robartes—and marked a demonstration against the whole Clarendonian system. The attempt was premature: the Chancellor fighting for the Established Church was on his best ground, the bishops rallied round him, and his supporters hoped 'the river will take its old channel'.¹ But much damage had been done. The King had set his heart on the Indulgence, he had received Presbyterian ministers, and he attributed the Commons' resistance to the machinations of his Chancellor, who had hit off the royal policy as 'ship-money in religion'. The Nonconformist trading element were strong for liberty of conscience. Bristol had brought together Papist and Puritan opposition in joint meetings. All the Irish influence was cast against the supposed champion of the Act of Settlement. The people were sullen and provoked, rather than conquered, by the uniformity policy: they drank openly to Bristol's health, as 'the champion of his country'.²

Whether or no yet 'irrecoverably lost', as Lord Sandwich thought, it is certain that the old intimate confidence between King and minister had perished. The administration broke into two or three cabals, and the direction of the Commons passed into other hands. Hitherto, Clarendon and Southampton had concerted Parliamentary policy with Geoffrey Palmer, Pollard, and other veterans of their choice, but leading Royalists like William Coventry, Bennet, Clifford, and Winston Churchill pressed the need of organizing a royal party, and the King now directed that the first two should henceforth assist in the management. The decline of the Chancellor's influence thus proceeded *pari passu* with growing contact between the King and the leaders of the Commons.³

¹ H. Coventry to Ormonde, 20 March 1663 (Ormonde papers): 'Lauderdale and Ashley-Cooper are now quite silent, and as I suppose taken into the Chancellor's friendship'; Lord Salisbury to Lord Huntingdon, 1664 (Bodl. Carte MSS. 76, f. 7).

² *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1663-4, 64; Ormonde papers, iii. 71, 117; Jusserand, 218; Clarendon to Ormonde, 11 April 1663 (Lister); Clarendon, *Life*; Burnet, i. 345.

³ *Life*, ii. 204; Comminges to Louis XIV, 4 Feb. 1664 (Jusserand); Pepys, 29 April 1663; E. I. Carlyle in *E. H. R.* xxvii (1912).

The Dutch War, of which Clarendon disapproved, and the financial lapses associated with it, for which he was not personally responsible, were the crowning disasters, and showed up two radical weaknesses in his management. Though unconsulted, he was the official figure-head of an unsuccessful policy, and he was incapable of correcting the administrative scandals attacked by genuine reformers of Coventry's type. Southampton's death, on the 16th May 1667, gave both courtiers and reformers their opportunity. Though long ailing and with a tendency to procrastination, the old Treasurer had a high reputation for honesty, and some broader political links than the Chancellor: these were now removed. The new commissioners of the Treasury—Albemarle as a figure-head, Coventry, Ashley, Clifford (at this time Arlington's close adherent), and Sir John Duncombe, who was of Puritan stock and a supporter of Coventry¹—put Clarendon's enemies at last in command of the most important office in the State.

Against the opposition cemented by the war the Chancellor merely reiterated the maxims of 1641, for to him the appropriation of supply, or the Commons' examination of accounts, simply breathed of Pym and Hampden. Personal conservatism stiffened this constitutional rigidity, and pure lack of sympathy with young men drove into the Opposition many politicians of genuine Royalist sympathies, like Coventry, Sir George Savile, and Lord Lucas. And if Clarendon became personally unsuccessful he was lost; for on its merits his whole conception of government was obsolete. It centred upon the Privy Council. 'The body of it is the most sacred and hath the greatest authority in the government of the State, next to the person of the King himself';² it must be composed of men 'fixed to monarchic grounds, the preservation and upholding whereof is the chief end of such a council'—men who would ignore the pernicious doctrine, that councillors must not give advice 'not agreeable to the sense of the two Houses'.³ The members of this Council should properly be great officers of State, headed by the Chancellor and Treasurer—to whom all

¹ Pepys, 22 and 31 May 1667; Burnet, 1. 478.

² *Continuation of Life*, 912.

³ *Hist.* 1. 267.

councillors, till Sir William Coventry's time, he bitterly noted, 'how little soever they cared for their persons, had ever paid respect in regard of their offices'.¹ To put the Treasury into commission seemed to him a device only fitted for a commonwealth. He laments that the King, 'by the ill principles he had received in France, and the accustomed liberty of his bedchamber', unhappily under-valued his Council—the true guardian of all those 'regalities' and 'mysteries' inseparable from Clarendon's ideal monarchy. In sober fact, and on practical grounds, Charles was thoroughly justified: the direct submission of all the great departments, more particularly of the Treasury, to the Privy Council had resulted in administrative chaos.

As to Parliament, of which he always professed himself a champion, his views had been advanced for 1640, but after the twenty passionate years succeeding were clean out of date. He had defended Parliaments against Charles I, had done all that mortal man could do to make the King and the law stand together, and had rebuilt the royal cause on a constitutional foundation. But all this was not enough for the new generation. The many thousands of printed pamphlets in the Civil War period were, in themselves, proof of that developed public opinion which undermined the older conception of the Commons; the contemporaries and supporters of Danby or Halifax were no longer resigned to fill the rôle of a milch-cow, producing a stream of taxation at recurring intervals, or to act as a more exalted edition of a grand jury. The words Clarendon reports himself saying to the King on the first shock of his fall—that Parliament 'was more, or less, or nothing, as he cared to make it', light up the depth of his misapprehension. Newsletters and coffee-houses, which he wished to suppress, had canalized and multiplied public criticism on the events of the Dutch War—a criticism which, long pent up, burst in the storm of 1667.

In its later phases Clarendon's Ministry was a mockery of Parliamentary government. In his last four years Parliament was in session little more than fourteen months, and this determined attempt to keep the conduct of war, negotiation

¹ *Life*, ii. 461.

of peace, and financial expenditure out of their control brought its own nemesis. The winter session of 1665 occupied less than one month ; Parliament did not meet again till September 1666, and then sat only till February. In 1667 it was common talk, even in April, that peace would be made on any terms, since the Chancellor 'dare not come before a Parliament';¹ in June, when for four days the Dutch men-of-war had been in the river and Dryden could hear the guns as he rowed towards Greenwich—Clarendon, backed by York, Carteret, and Sheldon, fought fiercely till the 25th against the summoning of Parliament : 'Queen Elizabeth did do all her business in eighty-eight without calling a parliament, and so might he do for anything he saw.'²

When the Houses did meet, on the 25th July, the debate was naturally unpropitious. On the motion of Sir Thomas Tomkins, supported by Garroway and by assurances from Coventry even more dangerous than denial, the Commons without a division asked the King to disband the newly raised forces, as soon as peace was made. On the 29th, to the popular fury, Charles prorogued them ; peace had, in fact, been signed on the 3rd, though its articles were not yet public, and when the proclamation issued on the 24th August the terms did not relieve the universal anger and humiliation. The seals were taken from Clarendon on the 30th of that month. Even then, if he had retired quietly to Cornbury, he might have avoided impeachment, but encouraged by the older race of royal servants, Ashburnham, Carteret, and Legge, he stayed on in London to face his accusers. The Duke of York was openly on the war-path in his defence ; he cleared his bed-chamber of anti-Clarendonians, and early in September William Coventry resigned his post as the Duke's secretary. Coventry, it seems, was the moving spirit in the determination that the Chancellor's removal must be permanent ; it was significant that the Presbyterian magnates, who had not forgotten the disillusionment of 1660, were insisting on it merely as a preliminary to the amendment of other grievances.³

¹ Pepys, 3 April.

² *Savile Corr.* 15 ; Pepys, 25 June ; Clarendon (see the *Life*) had raised the legal objection, that Parliament could not, after a prorogation, anticipate the period fixed.

³ Burnet, 1. 459 ; Pepys, 29 Aug., 2 and 8 Sept. : Evelyn 27 Aug. and

In the early stages of the impeachment it was younger Royalists who took the leading part. Sir Thomas Osborne, like Savile, was still taking his cue from Buckingham, whose huge political influence, now so surprising, was derived not merely from an unbridled ambition and a great territorial position in Yorkshire, but even more from loud patriotic professions and considerable skill in marshalling all the elements of opposition. He had never entirely lost the ties he had formed during the Commonwealth with Puritan politicians, and, even on the evidence of his great enemy, he 'had an incredible opinion with the people'. In the violent session of 1666-7 he had centred round himself all anti-Clarendonians, and his coalition included—in Osborne, Seymour, Garroway, Richard Temple, and Robert Howard—those who were long to be influential on the right, the centre, and the left of politics.

When in February 1667 Buckingham suffered one of his periodic dismissals from all offices, including the Lord-Lieutenancy of the West Riding, Osborne resigned the commissions he held under him, but an interview with the King in June sharply distinguished his attitude from that of the extreme opposition. Charles, after bitterly attacking Buckingham, reproached Osborne for co-operating with those 'ill men in the house' who, by their clamour for the Commission of Accounts, 'would divest him for the future of so much power in himself as to take an account of his own money'. Osborne defended his action, threw out a hint that the King should impart his wishes more freely to those who 'had no other design than promoting his service', and protested that he should not make 'the same construction of all those who agreed in those votes which sometimes displeased him'. The meeting ended on a friendly note; Charles said that, if Osborne 'would leave him judge in his own business', he should find him as much as ever a friend, and it was, no doubt, such conversations, which were repeated with Seymour, Littleton, and Clifford, that partly explain the King's decided line in the autumn. It was impossible, he wrote to Ormonde, 'to do those things with the Parliament that must be done', without removing Clarendon; it

9 Dec.; W. Coventry to George Savile, 3 Sept., cited by Foxcroft from Spencer MSS.; James, *Life*, i. 426; Bodl. Rawlinson MSS., Letters, 113.

was the Chancellor's ill conduct, he told his sister, ' which has forced me to permit many inquiries to be made, which otherwise I would not have suffered the Parliament to have done '. The Duke of York, the bishops, and the royal servants were commanded to offer no obstruction to impeachment.¹

From a very different angle, yet another section of Royalists worked for the Chancellor's fall. These were the discontented of the old Cavalier school, who saw in this event a hope of reviving prosperity ; all would be well, they thought, if only ' the Cavalier party may be convinced that the King loved them more than any sort of men '—if only ' the whole party once more may be cheerfully united and knit together '. As a beginning the sixty-six Commissionerships of Excise should be reserved for Parliament men, and the 400 sub-commissionerships for approved Cavaliers ; if necessary, some of those brave men, ' who live obscurely in the country and are forgotten ', should be brought from the North and the West to act in the old Associated counties, or in other parts of the Kingdom where Royalism was rare.²

Standing then between the old world and the new, the narrow isthmus of Clarendon's power washed rapidly away. On the 10th October, the first day of the new session, an address thanking the King for dismissing the Chancellor was sent for consideration to a Committee, quickly rushed through its later stages, and presented to Charles on the 16th by both Houses. In the ensuing long weary debates on impeachment and banishment the Royalist opposition took at least their full share. Edward Seymour moved first, on the 26th October ; he it was who put the famous words into Clarendon's mouth, which unhappily only too nearly resembled his real opinions, ' that four hundred country gentlemen are only fit to give money and do not understand how an invasion is to be resisted.' Osborne dragged instances even from Barbados to prove the charge of arbitrary government. Older men, including some members of the Ministry, were more moderate: Heneage

¹ Clarendon, *Life*, Lister, III. 471 and note ; Charles to Henrietta, 30 Nov., in Ady, *Madame*, 248, James, *Life*, I. 430 ; Burnet, I. 451 ; B. M. Add. MSS. 28042 (endorsed by Danby : ' K. Ch. 2 : his discourse to mee abt. the Duke of Bucks June 1667 ').

² B. M. Add. MSS. 28053, f. 7, Anon., 30 July 1667

Finch referred with some pathos to the fall of Strafford, and John Holland demurred to unproved charges. But the most influential commoners, the leaders of the 'Country' party—Littleton, Garroway, Maynard, and Vaughan—were against him to a man, while in the Lords his opponents included not merely sycophants like Dover and Rochester, but the pure Cavalier names of Bath, Northampton, Byron, and Lucas, his old rival Albemarle, Bristol, Buckingham, and Arlington, and three bishops.¹

The King's will and the nation's opinion were clear and irresistible. The Commons' votes steadily mounted against Clarendon; on the 6th November, a motion to refer back the charges for more proof was rejected by 194 to 128, but 89 only were found to vote against the 16th article, that he had betrayed the King's secret counsels, and only 42 on the 18th December opposed the third reading of a bill for his banishment. The vote of the 2nd December, that the Lords' refusal to commit Clarendon was 'an obstruction to the public justice of the Kingdom', showed the managers' desperation; staid persons like Anglesey thought it savoured of the Rump, but in reality it marked one more stage, and this taken by the Cavalier Parliament, towards the responsible government which Clarendon had refused to recognize.²

So fell the greatest pilot and apologist of the older Royalist tradition. He was the last great minister, not a soldier, who stood almost above the level of a subject, and his fall was a decided advance towards our modern political system. From that fall, as King James II wrote, 'one may date the beginning of all the misfortunes, which happened since, and the decay of the authority of the Crown; he generally supporting that prerogative, which his successors never minded'.³ For himself,

¹ Not Ashley, who seems to have been on friendly relations with Clarendon in 1667—or on bad terms with the Arlington party, perhaps through disappointment over the changes in the Treasury; even in November 1668 he was spoken of as a Clarendonian: Colbert to Louis XIV, 15 Nov. 1668 (Christie, i. 312); cf. Pepys, 30 Dec. 1667.

² *Life*, iii. 301; *Parl. Hist.* iv. 369 et seq.; James, *Life*; another account, with some fresh details, in Bodl. Rawlinson MSS. A. 131; Pepys, 12 Oct.; Anglesey to Ormonde, 9 Dec. (Lister); Grey, 7 and 9 Nov. 1667, 15 Feb. 1668.

³ Macpherson, i. 39; cf. Pepys, 24 June 1667—the Duke's marriage with Anne Hyde 'hath undone the Kingdom, by making the Chancellor so great

he would have disclaimed with indignation the name of a party leader, and this (with the personal factors we have mentioned) goes far to explain his fall. He had lost the King's ear—he had not, he said, been 'above twice with His Majesty in any room alone' in the whole year before his exile. But the government of England after 1660 required 'the greatest unanimity'¹ among the King's servants; if this was utopian in an England which had just emerged from two armed camps, firmness of policy was dependent either upon a King with a policy, and prestige and courage to enforce it (which Charles was not), or upon a minister so directing and representing the feelings of a dominant party as to be able to keep the King on a firm road.

This was to be the work of Danby, Shaftesbury, and the Junto, but for Clarendon it was too late to grasp the corollaries of the constitutional royalism he had erected. He could hardly be expected to see that the compromise of 1641 was doomed, and that sovereignty must go either to the King or to Parliament. As it was, moving in a constitutional transition, he had lost the favour of the King, without retaining the confidence of the Cavaliers.

From a national point of view his services had been beyond price; he had brought the Crown back from absolutism, he had resisted the efforts of a party majority to make the Restoration a white Terror, he had spent half his life in championing the freedom of Parliament. But after 1664 his every utterance shows incapacity to realize that times had changed. He could discern, in a dim and detached way, the source of his troubles—'the great misfortunes of the kingdom have proceeded from the war'—but neither his theory, nor his practice, of government allowed him to offer a remedy. Embarked in a foreign policy he hated, he retained office, but never once, on his own account, 'was he ever known to presume to give an advice'; yet when Parliament dared to suggest alternative remedies, above all in finance, none so positive as the Chancellor against such 'usurpation'. If, again, he resisted the Irish Cattle Act

above reach, who otherwise would have been but an ordinary man, to have been dealt with by other people'.

¹ Anglesey to Ormonde, 27 August 1667 (Lister)

with righteous anger, his fiercest invective was reserved for the argument, 'that the house of Commons was the fittest judge of the necessities and grievances of the people.'

He was, in short, in the fullest sense of the terms, both representative and *laudator temporis acti*. That Coventry was 'a declared enemy to all lawyers', that Halifax was rumoured to be 'an atheist', was quite enough for him. The Peers' new-fangled habit of meeting as late as 10 a.m. was decadent. Banks and national debts were unnecessary and dangerous. His mind still moved in the deep grooves cut by the civil wars—the names and associations of its sieges and battle-fields haunted the inner chambers of his mind: 'Lyme', he wrote just before his fall, 'hath not a good name.'¹ Yet the *tempus actum* he worked for, and this is his greatest glory, was not the isolated impotence of Charles I, but the golden age of Queen Elizabeth, working in and through a loyal and deferential people.

There is one historic figure to whom he may justly be compared, the admirable and impeccable Guizot, like him the prop of a restored monarchy, a *bourgeois*, a historian, and an exile. In each were the family virtues and public integrity developed to high degree, in each the stock of spiritual imagination was small, and the ability to understand a new generation still smaller.

And if Clarendon (unlike Guizot) may be viewed as a constructive, not merely as a conservative, statesman, if he may justly be termed the founder of the first Tory party, it is not because he passed the Conventicle Act, or even that he restored Charles Stuart. Rather, it must be that his tenacity alone preserved the fabric of Hooker and the Cecils through a season of terror and surrender; even more, because his pen was the magic which transmitted, to generations of party men yet unborn, an ideal of government in Church and State conceived long before party was thought of.

In bringing Royalist development to the fall of Clarendon we have anticipated one important matter—the party's connexion with the Church—which calls for separate treatment. For the Church was the symbol of the whole cause; the flame that often burned so dimly at Whitehall was fed day and night

¹ To Duke of Richmond, 11 July (B. M. Add. MSS. 21947, f. 98).

in the ancient Universities, in hundreds of parsonages and homes of England, and when Cavaliers lost faith in Charles the Deliverer, they turned to the shrine of Charles the Martyr.

The Church's two ancient antagonists, Papistry and Puritanism, still confronted her. The former ultimately brought the Royalist party to abandon, first, their passive obedience, and then their King. But this issue was postponed, pending the succession of a king who would risk more for a heavenly than for an earthly crown, and the real import of the religious question for Royalists in Charles's reign was the Church's relation to Protestant Dissent. On this point, Restoration Royalists spoke with a single rancorous voice, filling sermons, pamphlets, and debates without number. 'At whose door lies the blood of King Charles the Martyr?' asked Roger L'Estrange's brass and cymbals. Their tender conscience! 'If conscience bids them kill the King, rob the Church, and tear up the foundation of both governments, they'll do it; nay, all this has been done, and Providence itself proclaimed for the doer of it.' Thirteen years after restoration, the same note was sounded in the Commons by a moderate Secretary of State: 'I will never receive the blood of my Saviour', said Henry Coventry, 'from that hand, that stinks with the guilt of the blood of my great master.'¹

Here and there a voice, like that of the gentle Stillingfleet, rose for toleration, even from Churchmen, though it was not until the Roman danger seemed serious that any considerable number began to echo it. But such Christianity did not represent the Mosaic outlook of the average Cavalier, and retribution followed the Puritans to the very letter of their own oppression. The one-fifth of revenues, which they had assigned to clergy ejected under the Commonwealth, had generally fallen into arrears: their own ejected ministers were, by the Act of Uniformity, deprived of any revenues whatever. The Ordinance of 1646 had forbidden the Prayer-book to be used in family or private worship: the answer was the Conventicle Act of 1663. The University Visitors of 1646 had banished recalcitrant

¹ L'Estrange, *Toleration Discussed*, 1663; *A Memento Directed*, &c. (quoted by Bate, *The Declaration of Indulgence*, 1908); *State Divinity*, 1661, Newton, *The House of Lyme* (1917), 253.

Royalists to a distance of five miles from Oxford. 'Five miles' became a landmark never to be forgotten by ejected ministers.

The restoration of episcopacy, the cause for which, accurately speaking, King Charles laid down his life, was of course never in doubt in 1660, and Bishop Morley, on his reconnoitring mission during April and May, found this tacitly accepted by the Presbyterian leaders. Nine pre-war bishops survived, headed by Juxon, Lord Treasurer in 1640, and the permanence of the Royalist reaction, without doubt, largely depended on the happy chance, that at the Restoration the Church's leaders formed a real galaxy of force and learning, well fitted to stamp on a whole generation of laymen their own immovable and massive principles. Morley himself, 'the best man alive' according to Clarendon, and the chief speaker at the Savoy Conference, ruled Winchester from 1662-84. Seth Ward at Salisbury, Sheldon's favourite colleague, and most active in attacking West-country Dissent; Cosin at Durham, Gunning at Ely, Brian Duppa, Hinchman, a pillar during the Commonwealth and Bishop of London from 1663-75, the moderates Earle and Henry King, Thorndike, Bull, Bramhall, and Sanderson—even a few names, on the episcopal bench and off it, give an astonishing impression of the Church's strength.

But the masterful spirit of Restoration Churchmen was admittedly Gilbert Sheldon, Bishop of London in 1660 and, from Juxon's death in 1663 till his own in 1677, Archbishop of Canterbury. Bred in a College, All Souls, which Laud as Visitor had done his best to weld into a rock for Church and King, Sheldon had also been a member of Falkland's circle, and it was to one of them, Edward Hyde, that his political allegiance was early given.¹ From All Souls, over which he presided from 1635, came Royalists like Brian Duppa, who was with Charles at Newport, Stewart, commissioner at Uxbridge and the Church's prop in early days of exile at Paris, Jeremy Taylor, who filled the Anglican pulpit at St. Gregory's authorized by the Commonwealth, Henry Coventry, the future Secretary

¹ Sheldon to Hyde, 6 Nov. 1640 (*Cal. C. S. P.* i. 209); Bath papers, ii, for Hyde's messages to 'the honest Warden' during the exile.

of State, Dudley Digges, who died of fever in Oxford garrison but left behind him a notable political pamphlet, and John Birkenhead, the editor of *Mercurius Aulicus*.

Constantly with the King during the war, and the recipient in 1646 of his vow to restore the Church's impropriations, Sheldon, after being ejected by Parliament from All Souls, gave himself up to keeping the Royalist cause alive. In the general chaos till 1650 he seems to have officiated frequently in his Buckinghamshire parish, and thereafter, wherever he was, he kept in touch with great numbers of dispossessed clergy, collected money for the King, and maintained correspondence with the exiles.¹ It is at least certain that he was looked on, from the Restoration, as having, more than any other Churchman, possession of the royal ear, and that he preserved this confidence till Clarendon's fall. As a member of the Privy Council he was an active politician, and without question his ability and absolute intransigence had a great part in fixing the lines of the Restoration settlement. A friend of Falkland, of Clarendon, and the saintly Sanderson, champion of Hooker, patron of Isaak Walton and of 'the matchless Orinda', Sheldon's wide sympathies did not in the least affect his narrow policy. The Catholic recusants, he wrote, were just like the Presbyterians, 'who cry out persecution, persecution, unless they may do and say what they like',² and against both he showed a front of iron. He it was who, at the end of August 1662, broke one projected Indulgence; who after its definite issue in December told Charles that he was taking 'liberty to throw down the laws of the land at your pleasure' and inviting 'God's heavy wrath and indignation'; who drove on the Five Mile Act, and spurred his diocesans to persecution. His only lament was that the Uniformity Act was not fully executed, and that due attention was not paid to the policing of schools.³ Strength, not charity, must cover his faults, and strength we find in all his actions—in his royal buildings and charities, his courage

¹ Entries in the parish register of Ickford given in Staley, *Gilbert Sheldon*, 1913; Wood, *Athenae*; Burrows's *Worthies of All Souls*; for a year or two of the Commonwealth, Sheldon seems to have been in Glamorganshire, Aubrey (ed. Clark), ii. 8.

² 28 Oct. 1662, *Cosin Corr.* (Surtees Soc.).

³ Burnet, i. 350, 402; Pepys, 3 Sept. 1662; Bate, 37; B. M. Harleian MSS. 7377.

during the Plague, and his refusal of the sacrament to the royal lover of Lady Castlemaine.

In 1660 the Church leaders' policy was to play for time : to appeal to the King's hatred of Presbytery and his respect for his father's memory, to take the law of the land as their defensive armour, and a synod directed by the King as their offensive weapon.

The debates of the 9th and 16th July, in the Convention's grand committee for religion, showed that the Puritan moderates recognized some sort of episcopacy as inevitable, even if they wished to cut its claws. Royalist lawyers, led by Heneage Finch, took it as axiomatic that episcopacy was still the law, and pressed the necessity of episcopal reordination for Puritan ministers. But agreement in the Convention could not be expected, and the motion carried by that supreme realist Ashley Cooper, that the Church question should be referred to the King and a synod of his choice, in effect shifted the responsibility to the next Parliament.

The political conditions of 1660 had, however, generally favoured the moderate Puritans. They had materially assisted the Restoration, they were rich, numerous, and compact, above all in London: the Declaration of Breda had promised liberty for tender consciences, subject only to Parliamentary approval: Charles himself notoriously favoured toleration, while Clarendon cherished hopes of winning Presbyterian leaders, by personal preferment and a minimum of ceremonial concession. All that the Chancellor dared to hope at first, was that the Church, unless ruined by her friends' indiscretion, would 'be preserved in a tolerable condition, and by degrees recover what cannot be had at once'.¹

This was the policy, inaugurated by the Court against the bishops' opposition, which governed the deliberations leading to the King's declaration of the 25th October. Beginning in the June meetings at Manchester's lodgings, the negotiations went on again in September, and in the final conference on the 22nd October at Worcester House, Clarendon and Ormonde, with Sheldon, Morley, and six others of their brethren, met the Presbyterian divines, and in Charles's presence approved

¹ To Cosin, 23 April 1660 (*C. S. P.* iii. 732); cf. Bate, 6, note 20.

the Declaration. The model for this document was Archbishop Ussher's scheme of 1641: Presbyters were to be associated with bishops in ordination and jurisdiction, ceremonies most scrupled at were to be optional, and clerical subscription to the Articles was to be limited to those touching the faith and sacraments.

The temporary nature of this Declaration, pending a synod's meeting, was insisted on, but with it went offers of bishoprics and deaneries to leading Puritan ministers, and Reynolds, who accepted the see of Norwich, was not alone in thinking it the basis of a permanent compromise.¹ But it is clear that the Court had decided to carry out such a compromise on lines of its own choice, and to mark time, pending the settlement of public opinion. The rejection, on the 28th November, of Hale's motion to turn the Declaration into a bill was certainly agreeable to the Government.² The debate showed the Presbyterians fighting for dear life—Monk's brother-in-law Clarges, Prynn, and Annesley all pressing for permanent legislation. The Royalists stood firm; Masham spoke of 'an excellent Declaration metamorphosed into a very ugly bill'; Thurland, with whom the Puritan Maynard agreed, declared it gave too much toleration: Meres said 'it would wholly remove all conformity'. Brodrick and others pointed out that they were under sentence of dissolution (the royal message of the 20th to this effect being, perhaps, not unconnected with this controversy), and moved that the whole question be left to the new Parliament. Members of the Government took a decided line: Finch said the King did not wish a bill, and the Presbyterian Secretary, Morrice, moved that it be laid aside. A second reading was therefore refused by 183 to 157.

The Savoy Conference of Divines opened on the 15th April in the glare of the triumphant Cavalier elections; before it dispersed, empty-handed, on the 25th July, Parliament had burned the Covenant, drafted the Corporation Act, read the Uniformity Act, and passed a third act for the restoration of bishops. Sheldon's attitude was to repudiate, as far as he

¹ It is difficult to interpret Morley's letter of the 23rd October (Lister, iii) in any other sense.

² Nicholas to Pennet, 1 Nov (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1660-1); Sutherland papers, Report V, 196.

dared, the spirit of the royal Declaration: already in March he had defied it, as well as the Convention's act for confirming ministers, by issuing orders to Presbyterian leaders in his diocese to read the whole Prayer-book, under penalty of eviction. Dissenters, that is, were not to be treated as colleagues co-operating in an agreed settlement, but as criminals asking a remission of sentence.

But the new House of Commons stood in no need of episcopal stimulants. On the 3rd July they suspended Love, member for the City, for not taking the Sacrament: on the 5th they passed the third reading of the Corporation Bill by an immense majority: on the 9th followed a bill for Uniformity, and on the 13th another, long clamoured for, to restore advowsons and tithes to 'the royal party'. Over and over again in the next year they pressed the Lords to expedite the Uniformity Act, and it was to their fanaticism that its most savage clauses were due. A proviso introduced in the Lords, by the King's order, would have allowed him to dispense ministers who still scrupled at certain ceremonies, but though carried there by the energy of Clarendon and York, it was rejected in the Commons. They did the same with another proviso, added by the Lords, for the payment of pensions to ejected ministers,¹ and it was only their insistence which extended the act's penalties to schoolmasters.

Clarendon stood, we have seen, so far as he could, between these furious Churchmen and their victims. But the royal Declaration of Indulgence of December 1662 raised an entirely different question and, in opposition to attempts undermining the very principle of Uniformity, he received the Cavaliers' passionate support. In part representing the rising supremacy of Bristol and Arlington, in part Charles's more secret Catholic leanings, the Indulgence also reflected some of the ministers' fears, that the ejection of the Puritan clergy would result in civil disturbance.

But as the Cavalier Commons loathed the Indulgence's prerogative aspect, so they ignored the popular discontent, which undoubtedly explains part of Clarendon's comparative

¹ Rawdon papers, 141-3; Pepys, 21 March 1662; *C. J.* 22-6 April; Christie, i. 263, and App. vi.

lenity. To the open expression in the King's speech of the 18th February 1663, declaring for general toleration with safeguards against Catholics getting office, a gigantic majority replied on the 25th, by 269 to 30, that they would take both the Indulgence and the speech into immediate consideration. An address, drawn up by a committee with Finch as chairman, was presented to Charles on the 28th: after thanks for his promise to avoid 'all sorts of military and arbitrary rule', they declared that the Declaration of Breda could not tie the hands of a freely elected Parliament, that his Indulgence would 'establish schism by a law', and jeopardize the national peace.

The year 1664 marked another milestone in this rake's progress of political theology. The Conventicle Bill, long hung up by the Lords, became law in May. Though passed only for a three-year's term, it gave to Justices of the Peace powers to convict without a jury, defined a Conventicle as a meeting where more than four, outside a family, were present, and established a savage tariff of penalties up to seven years' imprisonment for a third offence. This was the first measure aimed at the average Nonconformist layman, and only the impossibility of carrying it out prevented wholesale persecution.

The Five Mile Act of October 1665 for the time being completed the penal code. York, the bishops, and all the Clarendonians gave it warm support, against an Opposition including Southampton, Lucas, and Earle, the excellent Bishop of Salisbury.¹ The Act demanded from dissenting ministers an oath, not to take up arms against the King or those commissioned by him, nor to 'at any time endeavour any alteration of government either in Church or State'. This, the Speaker said, was the 'shibboleth', to distinguish those 'that have an infectious disease upon them'. A bill extending this declaration to the whole country was only beaten this session in the Commons by six votes: the occasion was important as revealing the differences in the Ministry—Arlington's creature Littleton and the Buckingham faction; represented by Osborne, voting in the majority against the pure Churchmen.

¹ Bodl. Readin. MSS.

The fall of Clarendon marks the end of the Church's predominance in the King's inner councils, but the religious frenzy of the average Royalist lasted throughout the vagaries of the Cabal. The new Ministry, backed by men so influential as Hale, Bishop Wilkins of Chester, and Baxter, pushed a Comprehension Bill, and the royal speech of the 10th February 1668 asked Parliament to think of some course, 'to beget a better union and composure in the minds of my Protestant subjects'. The Commons' fury, growling at the dark rumours of such a bill, broke loose with its appearance in daylight. On their demand (and Charles had to get supplies) a new proclamation issued against Conventicles, and the Royalist pamphleteers poured out once more the good old story of the 'good old cause'.

The debates of March and April proved the Royalist rank and file to be still unconverted. Giles Strangways denounced the 'mushrooms' of Dissent, which defied the law's majesty, and a mild motion that the King should be asked to bring a conference together, on the subject of Protestant union, was rejected by 167 to 70. Court pressure and quarrels with the Lords failed to check the Commons, and the passing of the second Conventicle Act in April 1670 represented their most malicious, though their last, triumph.

From this time new forces of the future raised their head in Church politics. The opponents of the Conventicle Act included men of every school—the 'country' section represented by Lee and Vaughan, Buckingham's school of Royalists like Seymour and Trevor, and the more liberal heirs of Royalist houses, such as Lucas, Essex, and Halifax. In 1673 we shall find the same Cavalier Parliament discussing bills for 'easing' Dissenters, while Danby attacked them, no longer as schismatics, as had Laud or Clarendon, but simply as politicians of the opposite party.

The reasons for this real change were many. The gradual disappearance of older Cavaliers who had suffered sequestration; persistent pressure for toleration from the highest quarter; advent to power in the Church of the new broad school, exemplified by Tillotson and Stillingfleet; the steady growth of scientific detachment of mind, illustrated by the

Royal Society, or by a mentality like Halifax; most of all, perhaps, the administrative impossibility, without a standing army, of executing the penal laws. On this last point the evidence is overwhelming—Archbishop Sheldon's correspondence, for example, forming one long commentary upon it. The Indulgence of 1672 was perfectly decisive: for over a year hundreds of Conventicles were authorized by the law of the land, and it proved as impossible later to restore the Church's monopoly, as it had in 1660 to restore the constitutional predominance of the once-abolished House of Lords. Whether, as some bishops thought, Dissent could have been crushed out, if the law had '*ab origine* been put in execution constantly',¹ is an academic question; the fact remains that the law's execution rested in Secretaries of State and Justices of the Peace who were increasingly indisposed to apply it.

Moreover, when the Puritan revolution had entirely settled down, a certain sediment of moderate Dissent remained deeply ingrained in English life. Families, like the Russells,² the Harleys, and the Onslows, retained their favourite dissenting ministers and, except at abnormal times of political excitement, pastors and congregations acted with impunity. One of the most famous, John Howe, preached all over Devonshire almost unchecked, and this licensed transgression was taken from the highest model, for had not the King himself protected Andrew Marvell against the Anglican censor L'Estrange? Not even Tory Churchmen could escape the tone of the age in which they lived, and at a dozen different points that age was undermining dogmatism. Jeremy Taylor, twenty-five years earlier, had advocated toleration for all but Anabaptists, and if he was an exceptional type of Restoration bishop, still persecution varied almost indefinitely from one diocese to another. The first moderate individuals in the series of King Charles's bishops, such as Reynolds or Earle, were reinforced by those appointed under the Cabal, like Wilkins of Chester, and within a few years by the mighty force of the Latitudinarians. From 1672, again, the Roman danger

¹ Bishop Barlow of Lincoln to J. Hutton, 20 April 1683 (Bodl. Ballard MSS. 9).

² Bodl. Rawlinson MSS., Letters, 109 *passim*

oppressed the Anglicans and cemented Protestant feeling, and the two chief architects of toleration for Protestants were the Duke of York and Louis XIV.

We move, then, not long after Clarendon's fall, out of the age when the Royalists and the Church had been coincident, and must now slowly descend the road leading to their separation: before thirty years have gone by we shall find 'the Church party' led by a Nonconformist, in the shape of Robert Harley.

VI

THE PERIOD OF THE CABAL AND THE FIRST DANBY MINISTRY

FROM the fall of Clarendon to the death of Charles II there are four clearly marked stages of party history: the Cabal, the government of Danby, the Popish plot, and the Royalist reaction. It is with the first two of these only that we are now concerned. The personal influence of the King—always (except perhaps in the two years from 1679-81) the decisive factor in the political grouping of his reign—was at its height in the age of the Cabal, of the 'grand design', of the treaty of Dover, and the third Dutch war. Purely personal motives were never again so powerful until under far other conditions the Duchess of Kendal stood behind Walpole, or till George III decided to govern as soon as he began to reign. But neither Hanoverian mistress nor Hanoverian king matched the third Stuart and his seraglio, and the dark confusion of Cabal politics comes from the imperious weight of non-political forces—from the tears of Lady Castlemaine, the jealousy of the royal brothers, or the intrigues of a hundred adventurers and creatures of the Court.

One fixed, or at least comparatively fixed, element in this chaos was the determination of the mixed group who had expelled Clarendon to drive out of politics all survivors of the Clarendonian interest, and by 1670 they had succeeded in this, the sole common object of their discordant coalition. The pillars of the Restoration one by one sank to the earth. Monk, for the last ten years a prop of conservatism, died in January 1670. His kinsman Morrice, the Secretary, gave place in September 1668 to Trevor, sometime a 'courtier' in Cromwell's Parliaments, and now a client of Buckingham. Archbishop Sheldon was called no more to the Cabinet; pure Royalists like Bishop Morley or the younger Hyde were not admitted.

to the presence.¹ In February 1669 Ormonde lost the Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland; his immediate successor, the morose Robartes, was certainly better than Orrery, Buckingham's choice designate, but Berkeley of Stratton, who followed in 1670, threw himself into the arms of the ultramontane faction and admitted the firebrand Catholic Archbishop, Peter Talbot, to his Privy Council. To the Cabal, thus engaged in ejecting Cavalier leaders and subverting Cavalier policy, the continued existence of the Cavalier Parliament became irksome, and its intractable attitude on religion, on the auditing of accounts, and on the Triple Alliance, naturally infuriated ministers bent on the reversal or the secret burial of these policies. Twice at least they seriously considered a dissolution,² and the brief and scattered sessions, culminating in a long prorogation between April 1671 and February 1673, were the text to Ormonde's grim comment that 'the meeting of the Parliament is become dreadful to those who have taught it to fly upon Ministers of State'.³

In all these things the Cabal met with little organized resistance. The huge Cavalier majority had long lost such steady coherence as it had ever possessed; it had decomposed under the influence of Court, place, and office, of the irresponsibility of Buckingham, and of a ministerial policy contradictory in all its elements, whether at home or abroad.

A few matters and occasions, of course, still remained on which a solid Cavalier nucleus could be found, for it was clear enough that 'the Clarendonian party must down if the Duke of Buckingham stand.'⁴ At a party meeting of November or December 1669 'the Church and Cavalier Party' resolved, (1) 'That the present Church Government should be stuck close unto. (2) That the Cavalier interest should be upheld. (3) That in order thereunto qualifications should be made that none but such be capable of election to Parliament or to any places of trust. (4) To adhere to the Duke of Ormonde against all opposition. (5) To prosecute Lord Orrery as an enemy to the principles aforesaid.'⁵ But this programme represented only

¹ Pepys, 27 Dec. 1667; Burnet, i. 464.

² Macpherson, i. 51; Ranke, iii. 490, 505.

³ To Ossory, 24 Sept. 1668 (Carte, ii, App. 64).

⁴ Add. MSS. 36916, f. 120.

⁵ Harris, *Lord Sandwich*, ii, App. F.

the views of the Right wing and met with no immediate success. A narrow majority in the Commons voted to drop the formal charges against Orrery,¹ Ormonde took no serious part in politics till 1673, and a bill to exclude Dissenters from office and Parliament had to wait till 1675. A certain measure of party strength, again, was afforded in 1670 by the case of Lord Roos, whose application for a bill enabling him to remarry, was generally considered a *ballon d'essai* from Buckingham on the subject of divorcing the Queen. The full pressure of the Court and elaborate canvassing² carried the bill quickly through the Commons, but in the Lords the Duke, the Clarendonians, and the Churchmen fought it desperately, and it passed the third reading against twenty-nine peers dissenting. But neither in this case, nor in the financial debates of 1670-1, did voting proceed strictly on party lines; in foreign affairs the Triple Alliance, and in religion the Conventicle Act,³ satisfied the susceptibilities of the great mass of members, and other forces governed politics than the old division of Cavaliers and Puritans. In truth all the ingredients of the future parties were, between 1669 and 1674, still in the melting-pot. It is as impossible to predict the future, twenty years ahead, of a Royalist of the Cabal period as that of a Peelite of 1841, and for the ancestry of the Tory party of 1688 we must look to four or five separate groups.

Within the Ministry itself, Shaftesbury and Lauderdale do not directly concern us. The former may be found, it is true, co-operating at different moments of his life with Clarendon, with Arlington, or with Halifax, as for that matter he had served Cromwell; for two hectic years he appears as a supporter of the prerogative, but never as a Tory, and his egoism and his ideals were alike independent of political combination. Lauderdale, again, was never trusted by the average Cavalier; to the elder generation he spelled the Engagement and the betrayal of Montrose, to the younger and the more liberal the French alliance and rule by the sword. Yet in the mastery of Scotland, in barefaced exaltation of the prerogative, and in the King's

¹ By 121 to 118, 1 Dec. 1669.

² Marvell, 26 March 1670; Harris, *op. cit.*, ii, App. H and I.

³ 'Attended with a great shout at its passing': Anon. to Sir W. Godolphin, 12 April 1670 (B. M. Add MSS 28052 f. 20v).

favour, he continued for another decade unshakable, and like an earlier Thurlow dominated successive Cabinets as the King's friend.

Clifford, 'the mad Cethegus of our age', until 1671 played second fiddle to Arlington, his political creator, and fell from power in 1673 before he had formed wide party connexions. What he unquestionably lacked in administrative talent he made up in courage and sympathy; his influence was based on readiness to disburse bribes that he did not touch himself, on naturally high prerogative notions, and on a close intimacy with the royal brothers, by whom he was instructed in the Catholic secret. He was ever foremost in the imminent deadly breach—the arch-adviser in the stop of the Exchequer, a leading spirit of the Dutch war, the first to denounce the Triennial act as 'contrary to Monarchy', and paramount in wrecking the Cabal by fierce and transparent resistance to the Test Act. That his Catholicism was genuine is pretty plain, that it went back to January 1669 at latest is probable, and his own apparently self-inflicted death merely followed a political suicide that cut him out of the sympathies of his countrymen.¹

The remaining members of the Cabal, Arlington and Buckingham, though hardly Tories, both deeply marked Tory history. They had combined in pulling down Clarendon, and they joined hands eighteen months later in evicting from Treasury and Council Sir William Coventry, the ablest and best of their supporters hitherto and the greatest House of Commons man of the reign—one too of whom Arlington was insanely jealous.² These things done, their perennial jealousy of each other opened out, and the Kings of France and Great Britain, their legislatures and their mistresses, served only as instruments to their ambitions. Arlington, though the truer Cavalier, stood the further removed from party politics. Content to give implicit obedience to the royal wishes, he secured by that lever the ultimate victory, while his rival quarrelled and made it up again with the King, or oscillated between sacred and profane love as represented by Presbyterian ministers and Lady

¹ Evelyn, 27 Nov. 1666, 18 Aug. 1673; Grey, i. 74, 83; Burnet, i. 402, ii. 6; Pepys, 26 April, 23 June 1667, 6 March 1669; Temple, *Works*, ii. 429 (cited by Airy).

² Ormonde to Ossory, 21 Nov. 1668 (Carte, ii, App. 67).

Shrewsbury. Up to the early part of 1670¹ the star of Buckingham was still in the ascendant, but Arlington's good sense and moderation, which contemporaries united in admiring,² and his pliant but very real diplomatic ability gave him in the long run a triumph over his shallow and showy adversary. By the last months of 1672 Buckingham was 'out with King and everybody else'.³ Old-fashioned and high-principled men like Ormonde thought Arlington 'a very little gentleman', but there is, in his conduct of foreign affairs, an historical case which still needs an adequate answer. Reluctant to embark on the French adventure⁴ and the real author of the Triple Alliance, he attempted throughout the war to strike a balance for Britain between Dutch and French interests.⁵ He was the first to advise withdrawal of the Declaration of Indulgence, as he was first to desert the French alliance, and he lived to figure in the Colman correspondence of 1679 as 'the capital enemy of France' and 'the champion of Parliaments'.⁶ Timidity alone is an insufficient explanation of his policy, nor do his firm and candid answers at the Commons' bar in 1674 under threat of impeachment ring like those of a timid politician, while the speeches then made in his defence by some of the weightiest and best men in politics—Henry Coventry, Daniel Finch (the Nottingham of the Revolution), Duncombe, Henry Capel, and Sir John Holland—are striking evidence of the solid and intermediate place he filled in that generation.⁷ With two of his protégés, Clifford and Sir Joseph Williamson, the self-seeking official who succeeded him as Secretary of State, we need not here further deal; but a third, Sir Thomas

¹ 'Tis said the Cabinet Councill now are these 5. the Duke of Buckingham, the Earl of Lauderdale, the Earl of Orrery, the Lord keeper, and Sir John Trevor' (Newsletter of 19 April 1670, Add. MSS. 36916, f. 170).

² 'The law and prophets of England; . . . his credit is established on almost as solid foundations as the crown': Colbert Croissy to Pomponne, 20 June 1672; and Evelyn, 10 Sept. 1677.

³ Christie, ii. 98; *Hatton Corr.* i. 76.

⁴ Lionne to Colbert Croissy, 3 April 1667; Louis XIV to the same, 7 Nov. 1668 (Forneron).

⁵ See Williamson's note of June 1672, in Foxcroft, i. 92.

⁶ Dalrymple; Ormonde papers, iv. 459.

⁷ Grey, ii. 275 et seq. A different, and in some ways a fuller, version of his replies to the Commons' questions is in B. M. Add. MSS. 28045—e.g. as to the stop of the Exchequer: 'I know not who directly advised it. All concurred in it'

Littleton, offers a more valuable study in party evolution. Like most of the 'undertakers', or managers of the Court interests in the Commons, Littleton soon secured minor office, and for three years bickered with Osborne, Buckingham's nominee, in the joint Treasurership of the Navy. When ousted from that he gravitated towards the 'country' party, was a leading spirit in the impeachment of Danby, and in this phase of his life enjoyed the admiring friendship of Burnet. But his closing years, in spite of the temporary receipt of a pension from the French ambassador Barillon, showed a conservative reaction and, after efforts to stave off a Whig attainder of Danby, he is found taking a principal part in opposing the third Exclusion Bill.¹ It is still in conjunction with Arlington that he is named in 1681 as deep in the King's design for the dissolution of the Oxford Parliament, and if Burnet's account of his political sagacity and uprightness is to be trusted, the choice of Littleton as a confidant is creditable to his patron's judgement. One should note, finally, that Arlington's supporters in the Commons, where his chief agent was his brother-in-law Sir Robert Carr, were a thorn in the side of Danby's managers to the very end of the Cavalier Parliament.²

The grouping round Buckingham was more characteristic of this transitional stage in party development. In part made up of ex-Cromwellians like Orrery or Secretary Trevor, in part of future Whig leaders as Vaughan the Exclusionist, or Sir Robert Howard, in part again of 'country' politicians like Sir Richard Temple of Stowe, his following also included the ablest Tory leaders of the immediate future, in Thomas Osborne and Edward Seymour. If we add that in 1669-70 the Catholics Bristol and Berkeley and the great anti-Anglicans Ashley and Lauderdale ranked as the Duke's allies, and throw in some Yorkshire members who were tied to his territorial interests, the net result is typical of the age and the man.³

¹ Pepys, 29 Oct. 1668; Burnet, i. 415, ii. 92; Dalrymple; Grey, iii. 48. He died, it seems, in April 1681 (Luttrell).

² *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1675-6, 478. Carr was struck off the Council in June 1678, on account of a by-election at Grantham where he had used his local influence against the courtier supported by the Berties and Danby; Ormonde papers, iv. 431.

³ Rawdon papers, 15 March 1670; Harris, *Sandwich*, ii, App. F.; Marvell, 14 April 1670.

We turn from Buckingham to his Tory henchmen. The key to power in England was not yet oratory, and Osborne's active intervention in the Commons between 1668 and 1673 was very rare. All his actions, when he became more of a free agent, testified to that inveterate hatred of the Puritan which ten years earlier had made him the moving spirit of North-country conservatives against the Yorkshire conspiracies. Otherwise, though he protested against the Declaration of Indulgence and advised Buckingham not to tamper with the Triple Alliance, his general attitude both in public and in private was to wash his hands of his patron's idle bravado, and to stick closely to departmental work as the surest path to promotion.¹

That promotion came rapidly. He was successively Commissioner for Irish accounts (against the expressed wishes of Ormonde), then joint, and after 1671 sole Treasurer of the Navy, and lastly from March 1669 a Commissioner of the Treasury. Content at first to collaborate with Buckingham in attacking Ormonde and the surviving Clarendonians, by 1672 he had achieved some political influence on his own account; in May of that year he came on to the Privy Council, and by its close was in the inner circle of the Ministry in its relations with the House of Commons.² Meanwhile he was quietly advancing his family, amassing that financial experience which was to be the ladder and the sustaining source of his power, and acquiring that habit of mind which made him apply a material test to every situation, and revealed itself in daily memoranda of stocks and shares, or in his last jottings of tips given to his grandson at Eton.

Edward Seymour, 'from being a wild spark about town', climbed more slowly and on different lines. Marvell, in 1670, was writing of him in Miltonic prose as one of those 'apostate patriots' who 'fell to head the King's business'; in modern terms he was making his way to office via the cross-benches.³ In the debates of 1668 his voice was still ringing loudly for

¹ Bodl. Carte MSS. 81, f. 159; Danby to Buckingham, 18 Dec. 1669 (B. M. Add. MSS. 28053, f. 28); see also Browning, *Danby*, p. 68, note 25 (1913).

² Add. MSS. 28040, f. 4; 28053, f. 20; H. MSS. Comm. Report XI, vii (Leeds papers, 8); Montagu House papers, i 423; *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1672-3, p. 630 (21 Dec., 'Meeting at Lord Arlington's lodgings about the Parliament': from Williamson's journal).

³ Marvell, 28 Nov. 1670.

' a remove of counsellors and counsellors ', redress before supply, and appropriations ; but in 1670 he was foremost in securing the royal supply.¹ Personally he was a mass of glaring faults. His pride and insolence, which he did not spare his father or his sovereign, maddened lesser men even in that patrician generation, and when he was Speaker it passed all bounds.² Never forgetting that he represented the elder line of a house which had bent to ally with the *parvenu* Tudors, he could reproach Charles II at his own Council board for ' prevarication ', and made his adhesion to Orange at Exeter in 1688 with all the pomp of a carriage drawn by seven horses.

But despite, or perhaps partly owing to, these externals, there was much in Seymour very grateful to the Commons of his day. He was, to begin with, a great commoner, and the first outstanding country gentleman to become Speaker. He was, too, pre-eminently a ' country ' man, prouder of ruling Devon than of controlling England, and to him the solid phalanx of West-country members, at this time grossly over-represented, more and more looked up as their natural leader.³ In the most cultivated of their tastes, as in building or a love of pictures, he was thoroughly representative. He shared, too, their strongest prejudices ; Peers who claimed exemption from Acts of Parliament, Irish cattle, Popery, or Dutch politics—he hated them all alike. His loathing of Popery led him, like the earlier generation of Broad-Churchmen, to look with more sympathy on the Dissenters and in 1668 to speak for comprehension ; it was characteristic that he put the case for concession on material grounds—fines only made the Dissenters ' desperate by poverty ', and the Uniformity Act had been ' much for the good of Holland in point of trade '. In all his views there was a certain disarming candour—' I am one of those ', he said, ' that welcome all propositions that have a

¹ Grey, i. 75, 85, 149.

² He observed to Colonel Birch, from the Speaker's chair, ' that it was indecent for him to brush his beard without a looking-glass ' ; Grey, vi. 39. Cf. his father's complaints, Duke of Somerset's papers, 152.

³ The Western Alliance (North). Bonnet (Ranke, vi. 169) puts the number of members from the ' canton of the west ' at nearly 100 : so ' the Members from the West have a great influence in the resolutions of the House of Commons, and especially in the granting of money ' : Harley to Stepney, 10 Nov. 1704 (B. M. Add. MSS. 7059, f. 45).

tendency to ease Lands'—and he unquestionably inspired in some of the best of his contemporaries, like Lord Keeper Guilford, confidence that he was a 'man of honour and cordial to the true English interest'.¹ Few things bring the man and his life more clearly before one than the scene recorded in the Tory House of Commons in March 1701, when with solemn and unanimous vote they gave thanks to the veteran for his public spirit in investigating, and proving, the corruption of the new East India Company; 'tis an honour, Sir, to you that you are descended from ancestors who have been successful in commanding armies and fleets of this kingdom and from a Protector of the realm, but 'tis your personal honour that you have protected the constitution of this place.' Seymour replied (was it with a blush?) that he was 'extraordinary happy' in their approbation; the honour they did him would, he said, 'be so great an ornament to my escutcheon, that it will wait upon me to my grave.'

The Cavalier school proper, of whom Seymour was an advanced representative, was the largest and the best-defined group in politics. The Crown and the Church, and particularly the latter, were their lodestars. These were the men who were ever talking of '41', who feared Popery less than they hated Presbyterians, and drank the King's health on their knees as David the Lord's anointed. Yet they too in their generation were to advance constitutional causes, for if David could do no wrong, his evil counsellors, more specially those who sinned after strange gods of Rome or Geneva, could be brought to book. Here were Sir Philip Warwick, one of the surviving 'Straffordians', and since then Secretary to the Treasury successively under Juxon and Southampton; Sir John Birkenhead, sometime editor of the *Mercurius Aulicus*; and the old soldiers of the civil war like Sir Philip Musgrave. Three types of their leaders will show, briefly, both their affinity to other groups and the limitations of Cavalier politicians.

Heneage Finch, burgess for the University of Oxford, Solicitor-General at the Restoration and Attorney since 1670,

¹ Burnet, ii 79, North, i. 299; Bodl. Carte MSS 130, f. 305; Grey, i. 103, 114, 161 and v. 196; Evelyn, 21 June 1693; Portland papers, iii. 374 Marvell, *Growth of Popery*, &c.

was perhaps the most eminent of his long line—a harder and more stable man than his son Daniel, the Nottingham of 1688. From the Buckingham school he was distinguished by his ardent churchmanship and his studied moderation in regard to Clarendon, as well as by the decency and affection of his family life. In constitutional questions he was the model Royalist lawyer. He was ever ready to champion the Commons' financial privileges, or to resist the Lords' aggressions of jurisdiction, and took a leading part in defeating the monstrous addition which the Lords proposed to the Conventicle Bill of 1670, which would have given to the King (on the pattern of Lauderdale's legislation in Scotland) unlimited powers of suspending the ordinary law. On the other hand, he was not satisfied as to the illegality of the Indulgence, and clearly wished the handling of Protestant Dissent left to the royal discretion. He deprecated, too, the Commons' new-fangled demand to see treaties—a 'farewell', he thought, to 'all royal prerogative', and tantamount to 'a change of government'.¹

Henry Coventry—brother of Sir William, uncle of Halifax, and brother-in-law of Shaftesbury—had about him, from these connexions, a more liberal air than Finch or most of his school, but he had been with the King in exile, had apprenticed himself as a Gentleman of the Bedchamber, and retained a high notion of the King's service. His allegiance was more particularly given to Ormonde, and he appears always as the pronounced anti-Puritan; comprehension, he said, would bring 'enemies into your garrison', and as to the Conventicle Bill—'never was there a more merciful bill, that punishes, neither with blood nor banishment, a people that has punished us with both these.' As Secretary of State, Coventry did his best to bridge the widening gulf between the King and the Cavaliers, and with some success; for 'he was', as Roger North puts it, 'an ancient member and had the nice step of the house, and withal was wonderfully witty and a man of great veracity.'²

A much more average type of this school may be represented by Colonel Giles Strangways, M.P. for Dorset. Son of 'that

¹ Burnet, ii. 43; Grey, i. 85, 192, 246, 438; ii. 20; Finch papers, i, *passim*.

² *Lives of the Norths*, i. 119; Grey, i. 227, 229; Foxcroft, i, *passim*; Marvell, *Growth of Popery*, &c.

great enemy of the Puritans',¹ Sir John Strangways of Abbotsbury, whose house Shaftesbury had stormed and sacked during the wars, he nursed up to the last days of his life 'a bitter venom against the fanatics', and at the height of the anti-Popery agitation in 1673, when the 'easing' of Protestant Dissenters was thought inevitable, he was still bidding the Commons 'remember what principles brought the King to the block'. But even Marvell, who in 1675 was exulting at the death of this 'great pillar' of persecution, 'iron Strangways', has done justice to his activity against constitutional innovations like the excise, and no one was so fierce as Strangways for the removal of Lauderdale and Buckingham; 'men of sobriety and honesty', he said, ought to be near the King—honest country gentlemen he meant, 'not bred at Inns of Court and Universities, to furnish their expressions with elegancies', for 'those who have fought for the King may be pardoned in their expressions'. As for his opposition to the French alliance and to standing armies, it was typical of his whole generation.²

Another section, the courtiers and Court officials, need not detain us. Persons like Edward Prodgers the King's valet, or the cofferer Henry Brouncker—'the procurers' as Marvell labels them—neither adorn nor affect party development. More decent figures like Sir Stephen Fox, the Paymaster-General, Sir John Ashburnham, groom of the Bed-chamber, or Sir Allen Apsley of the Duke's household, could be counted on in considerable numbers for a safe Government vote in any but the most extraordinary circumstances.³

Many who would normally vote with the Court would on special occasions be included among the 'country' interest, that most elastic of terms, which could (like the 'law of nature') be given almost any meaning between 1660 and 1702. Just so long as royal influence was a reality and the question of ministerial responsibility still unsolved, so long no proper theory of opposition was tenable; at a given moment a whole

¹ Shaftesbury's *Autobiography*; Christie, i, App. xix.

² Marvell to Ramsden, 24 July 1675, and *Last Instructions to a Painter*; C. J. 14 Dec. 1666; Grey, ii 242, 268; *Parl. Hist.* iv. 594, 696.

³ Sir Stephen Fox lost his place for voting in favour of Danby's impeachment; Ormonde papers, iv. 290.

'country' vote might spring up in the night against the 'court', and members holding ministerial views or even ministerial office will be found vociferous in condemnation of royal policy. As distinct, then, from the genuine anti-dynastic left wing represented by Delamere, Love, or Marvell, through whom a continuous tradition ran from the Commonwealth to the extreme Whig party, the 'country' school included at different times many of Royalist stock, and so was continually shading into some of the groups above mentioned. In its ranks we find Halifax, Essex (son of the loyal Capel), and Sir William Coventry, and a famous group of commoners, Garroway, Lee, Meres, and Temple. From this centre of politics proceeded some later labelled as Whigs, and others as Tories, and if most of them inclined like Sir Richard Temple to be 'Vickor of Bray still, let who will reign',¹ to be a trimmer in that generation in a sense still counted for praise. Sir Richard Temple himself left on record the best diagnosis of politics at the end of the Clarendon era. 'The bulk of the house', he wrote naïvely, was composed of 'less active country gentlemen'. Now 'the Clarendonians have only two things to gratify the middle party (or country gentlemen) of the house with, viz. persecution of phanaticks and the Duke's favour'. But very few, he adds, really believed in persecution, and the Duke's favour was an even less safe security.² If Clarendonianism then could only offer this negative programme, it was natural that many of the centre in politics took themselves to more liberal views.

William Garroway, member for Chichester, is one famous example of these divergencies. He had suffered much for the King, but neglect at the Restoration drove him into opposition, his attacks concentrating particularly on the financial lapses of the Clarendon Ministry. By 1670 he was reckoned as the head of a distinct group, ever foremost in demanding 'ease' for Protestant Dissenters and in sustained attacks on the Cabal. Neither his place in the Customs, nor receipt of bribes (if indeed any credence should be given to the loose charges of Burnet and Marvell), seem to have deflected his essential policy; he supported Danby against impeachment in 1675,

¹ Verney Mem. iv. 448.

² B. M. MSS. Stowe 304, f. 88.

but two years earlier he had led the movement to refuse supply, and in 1678 he loudly championed the Commons' right to choose their Speaker against the Court veto. If the next year he accepted three hundred guineas from Barillon, in 1680 he backed the policy of constitutional Limitations against Barillon's alliance with the Exclusionists.¹

The career of Sir Thomas Meres, for over half a century member for Lincoln, showed even more markedly these personal and political commutations. Originally, it would seem, of the Buckingham faction, his tireless fluency on every subject soon brought him into prominence; perhaps his endless changes came partly from the want of balance not surprising in one who was reckoned 'but a talker'. In 1673, being a consistent Churchman, he attacked the Indulgence, and was spoken of as a possible Speaker, or Secretary of the Treasury, under Danby. From 1674 to 1678 he stood more firmly with the Opposition; he deprecated the impeachment of Arlington, worked (though a commissioner of the excise) for the removal of Danby, and supported Russell's motion to exclude the Duke of York. Yet in the next revolutionary years he played a conservative part; if he wobbled over the removal of Halifax in 1680, he had been Court candidate for the Speakership in March 1679, he was not ill disposed towards Regency in 1681, and even in 1688 belonged to a 'Loyal Club' of which several of Danby's followers were members.² Always mentioned as a coming man, but never quite arriving, never a Whig but never quite a Tory, Meres survived till 1710, to represent a pre-party age and the middle school of the Restoration.

These being the possible constituents of any Tory party of the future, we must return to the testing years of 1673-4, to the end of the Cabal and the making of the Danby administration. The harmony of 1670-1, resting on persecution of

¹ Burnet, ii. 15 and note; Marvell, *Britannia and Raleigh*, and letter of 21 March 1670 to Ramsden; Grey, *passim*; Pepys, 6 Oct. 1666; Dalrymple; North, *Examen*, 456; *Halton Corr.* i. 68.

² *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1675-6, 563; Reresby, 99; Pepys, 17 July 1667; Verney papers (Report VII, 490); *Letters to Wilhamson*, i. 106; Grey, ii. 316, iii. 44; *Examen*, 456; Ormonde papers, iv. 346, 498; *Parl. Hist.* iv. 1326, 1329; B. M. Add. MSS. 28053, f. 390.

Dissent, and expressed in large grants of supply, did not long survive. The disuse of Parliament between April 1671 and January 1673 roused protests even from corrupted courtiers.¹ The Conventicle Act stood idle and unexecuted on the statute-book,² the constant interviews between the King, the Ministry, and Dissenting leaders excited Church feeling and prepared the way for the definite issue of the Indulgence in March 1672. Simultaneously, the declaration of the third Dutch war came like 'a clap of thunder in a frosty day', and loyal country politicians were sore and mystified at being left in the dark.³ The stop of the Exchequer in January had destroyed all credit. Open Popery in the heir to the throne, agony of Holland over-run by French arms, French treachery at sea and the death of the gallant Sandwich at Solebay, high tyranny of Lauderdale in Scotland—all poured oil on the flames. The rise of Clifford to be Treasurer and the replacement of Lord Keeper Bridgeman by Shaftesbury in November were ill omens to moderate men. The French Treaty and the receipt of French money were almost open secrets.⁴

In these dark days the notorious feuds in the Government offered the best hope of breaking their measures, and certain appointments made during the year showed that some ministers at least were alive to the necessity of placating public opinion. In April Essex was appointed Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, and Halifax was admitted to the Privy Council; in May Henry Coventry became Secretary of State; in November Sir John Duncombe, an old friend of William Coventry and destined long to be a pillar of the Treasury, was made Chancellor of the Exchequer.⁵ Now Duncombe had begun his career as a client of Arlington,⁶ who (though disappointed at not getting the Treasurership) had now outdistanced Buckingham in the royal favour, and was perhaps already preparing a strategical retreat

¹ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1671, 577; C. Musgrave to Williamson.

² *Ibid.*, 1670, 243.

³ Temple, *Works*, ii 255; *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1671, 563.

⁴ *Hatton Corr.* i. 100; cf. Strangways's speech of 31 Oct. 1673, 'the public articles are ill enough, what are then the private articles?' (Grey, ii. 200).

⁵ There is high praise of Duncombe from both Pepys and Burnet, which may outweigh Marvell's diatribes.

⁶ Pepys, 12 Feb. 1669; Burnet, i. 478. The two men were on bad terms in 1669; Carte, ii. 376.

from the impasse of the French-Catholic design.¹ Actually, the replacement of the Cabal by another administration was accomplished by two stages; a first from February to July 1673, and a second running from that October till the autumn of the following year.

Inspired perhaps by Shaftesbury's *Delenda est Carthago* declaration against Holland at the opening of Parliament, the Commons on the 7th February 1673 with one accord offered a large supply of £1,200,000 to be spread over eighteen months, but they were as clearly resolved not to turn their offer into fact until they were rid of the Declaration of Indulgence. Officials like Danby, Scymour, Coventry, and Finch vainly suggested a petition rather than a vote, and tried to avoid a general condemnation of the King's legislative power; the rank and file, voiced by Strangways, refused to follow them, and increasingly hostile majorities met the royal prevarications until the final cancelling of the Indulgence on the 8th March.² In spite of all the pleadings of Danby and Coventry, it was not till the 26th that the Commons, finally assured of a safe passage for the Test Act, definitely voted supply.

The harmony of the Royalist school was restored in attempts made to reduce to the humblest proportions the bill, introduced at the same time, for the ease of Protestant Dissenters. Danby, Coventry, Francis North (the new Solicitor-General), and Duncombe all backed the insertion of a clause to prevent Dissenters becoming Members of Parliament. Beaten in that, they then concentrated against a proviso, which would have exempted Presbyterians from that solemn renunciation of the Covenant which had been stipulated by the Act of Uniformity. Danby was ready with his perpetual *motif* of new rebellions, and Coventry declared this would 'bring twenty in to throw a thousand out'. The bill passed the Commons accompanied by similar maledictions from Duncombe, Warwick, and Birkenhead, and Secretary Coventry's openly expressed hope, that the Lords would 'amend' it, was soon justified by its destruction.³

¹ *Hatton Corr.* i. 76; *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1671, 223, for an instance of his friendly relations with Ormonde. He and Ossory had married sisters.

² Grey, ii. 17 and *passim*; *C. J.*; Portland papers, iii. 335.

³ Grey, ii. 40, 93, 102. The bill fell with the prorogation, the Commons disagreeing with the Lords' amendments.

Such was the stage reached by the Commons in the spring session of 1673. More inflamed against Papists and less against Dissenters than were the Royalist officials, and less tender than they of the prerogative, they had broken the spring of the Cabal policy, and clearly meant to make a total abandonment of that policy the condition of their continued assistance for the war.

Arlington recognized first that it was time to shorten sail. While the other ministers were even in the first week of March urging Charles to stick to his Indulgence, and if necessary to dissolve Parliament, while Buckingham and Lauderdale spoke of bringing in Scottish troops and Shaftesbury suggested an appeal to the Lords, Arlington advised that a successful issue to the war was all that mattered, and that a future House of Commons might yield what the present rejected.¹ A furious speech from Clifford on the Test Act had set the Commons, on the 21st March, growling against evil counsellors, and before the month was out Arlington was hinting to Colbert de Croissy that the 'great design' must be abandoned and peace be made.² Shaftesbury had not, there is reason to believe, waited to learn the truth about the Treaty of Dover³ before he, too, veered over, for earlier in the session he had been in touch with leading members of the Opposition and had shown clearly enough his sympathy with the Test.⁴ As the ground crumbled under their feet, the ministers most imperilled were clutching at every tuft or ledge to break their fall, but the King himself still hoped to reach a solid, if a more modest, platform for his foreign policy. He did not love abrupt changes, and if he must bow to the Commons' Protestant frenzy, he would appoint new ministers who would staunchly uphold his prerogative, safeguard his supply, and make the transition easy. The choice fell upon the two leading commoners of what

¹ Dalrymple; Ranke, iii. 535 (Colbert to Louis XIV, 9 March 1673). Little credence, surely, need be attached to Colbert's later story (20 Nov.) that Arlington supported the Test Act in order to oust Clifford; the hostility of his henchman Sir R. Carr, and of members of the Ministry, to the Act, as shown in the debates, seems enough to refute it.

² 24 March, Christie, ii. 138; Barbour, *Arlington*, 215, note 41, quoting Colbert's letters of April, from Arch. Aff. Étr.

³ From the invariable Arlington, according to the French ambassador.

⁴ Christie, ii. 134 and App. xxix.

had originally been the Buckingham faction—each of whom had in the past year proved both his Churchmanship and his respect for the Crown.

In February Edward Seymour was placed in the Speaker's chair, at this epoch a well-paid and highly important Government office.¹ On the 19th June Sir Thomas Osborne, with the good offices of York, Buckingham, Lauderdale, and Clifford, succeeded the last-named as Lord Treasurer. In the same month the reappearance in the Cabinet of Ormonde, a supporter of Arlington, but also the strong tower of the older Cavaliers, proved a new trend of policy, even if it kept the balance of factions. Thus was accomplished the preliminary stage of the transition. Buckingham and Arlington still disputed the stricken field, but their forces were mutinous and escaping from control, and Cavaliers were 'not altogether in despair that the old honest party will weather the storm'.²

When Shaftesbury as Chancellor formally admitted Danby to his high office, he said, surely with a malicious smile, 'how-ever happy you have been in arriving to this high station, yet *parta tueri non minor est virtus*.' And in fact, within a month, Yorkshire was full of rumours that the Treasurer was soon to be evicted, and the struggle for him and the Royalist interest to clinch their victory was to be a stern one.³ At the opening of the October session Sir William Temple could descry four parties in Parliament: (1) One, he thought, was led by Shaftesbury, and 'made chiefly' to get the King a divorce. What at any rate was made evident by the Chancellor's opening speech was that he meant to repaint himself in the canvas as the champion of Parliament, of peace, and of 'the interest of old England'.⁴ (2) A section led by one of the Coventries,⁵ Halifax, Russell, and some of the 'country leaders'—bent on

¹ Speakers Turner and Seymour are said to have got £1,500 a year as 'allowance' (Carte MSS. 130. f. 286). Clifford in a letter to Danby of Sept. 1673 speaks of £3,000 or £4,000 (Add. MSS. 28053, f. 73); cf. Ormonde papers, iv. 517.

² *Letters to Williamson*, i. 57, 77; *Hatton Corr.* i. 107.

³ Add. MSS. 28051, f. 13; Christie, ii. App. lxxii.

⁴ *Letters to Williamson*, ii. 22. The speech tried to water down *Delenda est Carthago*, and spoke of the stop as a 'public calamity'.

⁵ The text, as printed, says 'Sir William Coventry's brother', but Henry Coventry hardly fits the context.

a clean sweep of the ministers, and particularly bitter against Buckingham, Arlington, and Lauderdale. (3) A strong party headed by Powle and Strangways, ardent for peace and religion, but not violent towards the King or his ministers. (4) A still more moderate wing, led by Sir John Holland, who would vote supply if peace were made.¹ But on peace with Holland and the end of alliance with France all these groups were unanimous, and except on these conditions would refuse supply.

Within the single week allowed for their effective sitting, the Commons crowded a refusal of supply ('unless it shall appear that the obstinacy of the Dutch render it necessary'), a protest against the Duke's marriage with Mary of Modena, threats against evil advisers, a resolution attacking standing armies, and a project for a new test to disable Catholics from sitting in either House. The stoutest Royalists were loudest in demanding a change. Strangways tabulated grievances, Finch admitted them, Cornbury voted against supply. The King's 'conscientious good friends' were sore at his neglect of their addresses,² and after the prorogation of November the most compliant placeman hoped that Charles would now grant of his grace, 'what he could not without diminution of his prerogative have assented unto upon their boisterous demands'.³

The attitude of the new ministers was reserved, and their position precarious. In public estimation Danby was, till December at least, merely the client of Buckingham; his feud with Ormonde and his close friendship with Orrery assisted to keep him to these old moorings.⁴ The same was the case with Seymour, though he was averse to Buckingham's French policy,⁵ and the Arlington faction had already made one desperate effort to dislodge him from the Speaker's chair.

On the 9th November the ministers made a great step forward, by the overthrow of Shaftesbury and the appointment of Heneage Finch as Lord Keeper, and from this point the

¹ To Essex, 25 October (*Essex Corr.* i. 173.)

² Sir Robert Wiseman to Williamson, *Letters*, ii. 78 (Wiseman in 1676 was reckoned a creature of Danby; *Hatton Corr.* i. 122).

³ G. Talbot to Williamson, *Letters*, ii. 70.

⁴ *Letters to Williamson*, i. 99. Danby had pressed Orrery in July to come over from Ireland.

⁵ Christie, ii, App. lxix, note 2.

triumvirate, Danby, Seymour, and Finch, clearly played a concerted game. They would use Buckingham, so long as his (in some ways damaging) alliance could help them; they would nurse their Parliamentary influence to humour the King's wishes; with regard to France and the Duke of York, they would temporize as long as they dared, and ultimately 'bring the King off both'. By early December they had secured the invaluable patronage of Lauderdale.¹ The game needed both nerve and good fortune, but the best qualified of all men to judge, Sir William Coventry, had from the first predicted Danby's triumph; 'I believe this Lord Treasurer will play his cards more dexterously than the last, and if he can keep himself in the dark till the session of Parliament be over, will be too hard for them all, as experienced and crafty as they are'.²

By the New Year 1674 the ministers had still further improved their position. Henry Coventry's harmonious influence, and Finch's³ good relations with Arlington, drew them farther from his rival Buckingham; till September the latter had used his territorial authority in Danby's favour, but in January was already thick with Shaftesbury and the Opposition. The Duke was, in fact, simply out to win any adherents who would destroy Arlington—the debauchees by drinking with them, the sober by grave and serious discourses, the pious by receiving the sacrament at Westminster'.⁴ But Buckingham's gauzy transformations did not hide his nakedness from the searching eye of King Charles, who never lost hold of political reality, and knew when he was beaten. His intention now was to defend the three remaining Cabal ministers, and to delay a definite peace treaty, as long as he could, but if Parliament persisted he was prepared to give way.⁵

The session of January and February 1674 on the whole bore out the triumvirate's calculations. The personal followers of Danby and Seymour failed, it is true, to carry the impeach-

¹ *Essex Corr.* i. 132 et seq.; Christie, ii. 155 and App. xlii.

² *Ibid.*, 149 note; Coventry to Thynne, 7 July.

³ *Essex Corr.* i. 140; Christie, ii. 157. His son voted against the impeachment.

⁴ Kenyon papers, 96; *Letters to Williamson*, ii. 105.

⁵ Conway to Essex (information from Finch), 30 Dec. (*Essex Corr.* i. 159); *Letters to Williamson*, ii. 112.

ment of Arlington—a surprisingly composite majority upholding him on a vote of 166–127. But the treaty of Westminster with Holland, not obscurely supported in speeches from Finch and Seymour, settled the most burning question in politics, and Cavalier votes backed addresses asking the removal of Buckingham and Lauderdale. For the rest, the session closed in clouds of boding discontent; old grievances of supply, the army, and Popery still darkened the air, while in some proposals of the ‘country’ party in the Lords, now openly led by Shaftesbury, to secure the Protestant succession, appeared the first flashes of a colossal storm.¹ At the end of February Danby buried his past by taking for himself the Lord-Lieutenancy of the West Riding, which Buckingham had forfeited. In May the dismissal of Shaftesbury from the Council, and in June Arlington’s enforced resignation from the Secretaryship, completed the ministerial revolution, and the stage was cleared for the second Protestant-Cavalier experiment.

Danby’s administration has this permanent importance—that almost for the first time a minister who drew his entire resources from Parliament presented the King with a clear and coherent programme of action. His plans were threefold: to restore the Crown’s independence by wholesale financial reform, to bring it into accord with national opinion on questions of foreign policy, and to achieve these objects through a Parliamentary majority built on the old foundation of Church and King.

The task called for that faith which can remove mountains, for range after range of obstruction appeared as far as the eye could see. The King’s personal authority was still both theory and practice of Cavalier politics. The power of a Prime Minister, resting on a basis independent of the Crown, had not yet arrived, and a Parliamentary majority could only be created or maintained by deference to King and Duke, by humouring or conciliating half a dozen rival personal groups, and by courting the territorial magnates or the solid territorial interests, in whose hands lay the real political balance in this rural and purely aristocratic England of the last Stuarts. Compared

¹ *Letters to Williamson*, ii. 156; *Foxcroft*, i. 112.

with the influence of a single minister, the channels through which these forces worked were deep, secret, and innumerable. For twenty members who could be trusted to follow the Treasurer, a hundred would take their cue from the countless agents of the Crown—from the Duchess of Cleveland, from the rulers of the backstairs like May or Chiffinch, from Bath or Arundell, from the Legges or the Grahams.¹ The Stuart King was, moreover, a great 'borough-monger'. The Welsh Presidency, the Duchies of Lancaster and Cornwall, were to this primitive Parliamentary England what the Forests had been to the England of the Angevins, *penetrabilia Regis*—the inner defences of the Crown. And not only had Danby to deal with a King whose power was very real, but with one who had made a power out of vacillation and had, as a later Secretary of State concisely put it, 'a natural and therefore inimitable force in dissembling'.² In vain the Treasurer upbraided his master with 'unsteadiness of resolution' and 'want of vigour to discountenance all such as pretend to others', in vain he begged him 'to let the world see he will reward and punish';³ the King's policy continued to move on inner and secret lines, behind the common rules of political action. Thus we shall find that the prorogation from November 1674 till April 1675 was without Danby's previous knowledge.⁴ His Church policy was paralysed by orders from a Secretary of State to bishops and mayors, enjoining gentle execution of the recusancy laws, and by an entire uncertainty as to the King's real wishes.⁵ His foreign policy shipwrecked on the same concealed rocks.

And while the King was an uncertain quantity, the Cabinet was sure only to be factious. Beyond the King, both the Duke of York and Lauderdale, who in 1674-5 formed with Danby himself the ruling junta,⁶ stood on their own foundations.

¹ For this, see the lists of members in *S. P. Dom*, *Charles II*, 376, Nos. 152-3, marked with the names of persons ('the King', 'the Speaker', &c.) who could influence their votes.

² MS. memoir by Sir William Trumbull [All Souls College, Oxford].

³ Draft memorandum of June 1677, 'for the King', B. M. Add. MSS. 28042, f. 13.

⁴ The decision was announced at a Council meeting of Sept. 1674; Essex papers, i. 259.

⁵ Bohun to Sancroft, 29 Sept. 1674 (Bodl. Tanner MSS. 290); Henry Coventry to Bishop of Bristol, 9 Feb. 1675 (B. M. Add. MSS. 25124, ff. 22, 33).

⁶ Marvell to Ramsden, 24 July 1675 (*Essex Corr.* i. 258).

With the latter his interests, till 1677 at least, usually coincided,¹ but this was by no means always so with the Duke, who was outraged by the new Anglican programme, and was consequently found supporting in October 1675 the move for a dissolution of Parliament. Nor did the Treasurer control the other great officers of state. Ormonde's influence was at best neutral. Arlington, still Lord Chamberlain and never entirely powerless (since he knew too much), was irreconcilable. An hour's amusement from Buckingham in Nelly's lodgings might lose fifty votes on a division, for the King must be amused and Buckingham could mimic Lady Danby to perfection. The courtiers were as hostile to the new minister as they had been to Strafford or to Clarendon. 'Such small things as Bab May, Chiffinch, Godolphin', wrote his brother-in-law Lindsey, intercepted confidence between Danby and his master. The Duchess of Portsmouth must be placated with pearl necklaces out of Treasury funds, or with grants for the little Duke of Richmond.²

Marching in these quagmires, the Treasurer could make himself safe only by reaching the firm ground of financial solvency, and if effort could do it he deserved success. The hereditary revenue, fixed in 1660 at a nominal £1,200,000, had never yet in practice yielded over £900,000, but in 1674 and 1675—years, it is true, of trade revival—Danby raised it to over £1,400,000. Unaided (except for some arrears of the eighteen months' assessment of 1673) by any Parliamentary grant till 1677, he paid off the costs of the Dutch war, and for the one and only period of the reign balanced the national accounts. In the autumn of 1675 a season set in of declining trade: moreover, the accumulated debt, the refusal of supply in that year, the King's demands for secret service, and his ambitious rôle of European mediator, left no margin. Danby met the crisis, like so many before him and after, by an attempt to fix a maximum expenditure. An Order in Council of the 28th January 1676, intended to continue in force till the 31st March of the following year, fixed £1,175,000 as the

¹ Reresby, 12 May 1677.

² Ormonde papers, iv. 376; Lindsey to Danby, 25 Aug. 1675 (Lindsey papers); Verney papers, 467.

annual outlay and strictly rationed each Government department accordingly. But the one thing indispensable, the King's firm support, was not forthcoming; the cost of the armed peace up to the treaty of Nimwegen was excessive; and the normal independence of Parliamentary grants which Danby desired was never attained. Indeed, even before the period of financial depression, Charles, by the secret negotiation of August 1675—unknown at the time, in all probability, to his Treasurer—had entered upon financial relations with France.¹ The Treasurer became, then, more dependent on Parliament than he had bargained for, and it is to the collapse of his Parliamentary policy—a failure apparent even before the Popish plot—that we now turn.

It was beginning to be noticed in the summer of 1674 that he seemed to be freeing himself from the thralldom of York and Lauderdale, and 'to stand a little more on his own bottom',² and the departure of Ormonde for Ireland in June, in something like disgrace, further assisted to incline the Cabinet balance in his favour.³ Yet, for all that, it was a policy after Ormonde's heart that he meant to press on the legislature.

The whole tenor of his life and upbringing, his relationships, and his attitude during the Test Act agitation, testify to his sincerity in resuscitating the Cavalier policy. His aim briefly, as Lindsey put it, was to 'settle the Church and State; to defend the one against schismatics and papists, and the other against Commonwealth's men and rebels'.⁴

By the autumn, at latest, he had won the King's support to a policy of firing Cavalier votes by an appeal to Anglican prejudice; in November some bishops were summoned to give their advice, and early in January 1675 a meeting to draw up recommendations took place at Lambeth, attended by Sheldon and a few of his suffragans, and by the leading ministers. On

¹ Dalrymple, ii, App. 99 (misdated); Danby knew, of course, of the treaty by the New Year. For the preceding paragraph, see Mr W. A. Shaw's introductions to the *Calendars of Treasury Books*, 1672-9.

² Francis Godolphin to Essex, 16 July (Essex papers, i).

³ Henry Coventry 'complains that nobody takes his part since Ormonde went away' (ibid., 259). In February the 'foreign committee' had consisted of Arlington and Coventry of the one group, Danby and Finch of the other; Temple, *Works*, i. 377 (1720).

⁴ 25 Aug. 1675, Lindsey papers.

the 29th the King announced in Council his intention to enforce the existing law resolutely against both Papist and Protestant Dissenters, a proclamation followed, and then rapid action. In early March London was excited at the spectacle of magistrates and red-coats arresting the great Dr. Manton's congregation—Lord Wharton, Lady Bedford, and other Puritan notables included.¹

Letters issued to selected private members by Mr. Secretary Coventry in the first half of April showed what was to be the main plank of the session. Sir Francis Windham was urged to support the King in 'restoring Church and State to their true and loyal settlement'; the variant to Colonel Sandys ran, 'their natural and loyal condition'; Sir Job Charlton was reminded that the King counted on 'his old friends of the loyal party'.²

The Lord Keeper's speech at the opening of Parliament on the 13th April, read with the King's words preceding it, outlined the Government policy. The King denounced the campaign of 'ill' men to obtain a dissolution—this with a glance no doubt at Shaftesbury, who had issued a circular letter during February asking his supporters to concentrate on getting a new Parliament;³ far from it, the King continued—not merely had he called them now to 'know what you think may be yet wanting to the securing of religion and property', but he intended an autumn session also. The Church of England, Finch said, was in the King's opinion that which 'best suited the Monarchy'; they did not intend to oppress conscience, but religion was 'a necessary part of our government' and they regretted to see 'how slow many inferior magistrates are in the discharge of this part of their duty'. It was 'better to have a strict rule than none at all', and non-execution of the law would 'turn a national church into nothing else but a tolerated sect or party'. With rather peculiar emphasis, he begged his hearers to beware of 'a zeal for the public which is not according to prudence', and advised them not 'to pursue good ends by violent means', nor 'in the

¹ Essex, i. 293; Montagu House papers, i. 321; Portland papers, iii. 348; *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1673-5, 390, 549.

² B. M. Add. MSS. 25124. See also Danby's whip to Lord Ogle, Portland papers, ii. 150.

³ Christie, ii. 200.

heat of that pursuit lose the good they might have compassed'. The state of the Navy, he concluded, also deserved their consideration.¹

The Keeper could hardly have put more plainly Danby's programme for the year; if Parliament would be patient, trust him, and grant reasonable supplies, he could promise them the supremacy of the Church and a gradual redress of grievances. His personal prestige was still in its hey-day; the mass of the country party did not rise to the impeachment brought in against him at Arlington's instigation on the 26th April, and the only recorded division on the subject showed a very substantial majority in his favour²—four of the most famous country leaders, Garroway, Lee, Vaughan, and Richard Temple, speaking in his defence. Nor did the Opposition's red-herrings succeed any better; little capital could be got out of the no-Popery cry under such a Government, and a projected Place Bill fell flat on its second reading.³

But the legacy of the past and the King's obstinacy wrecked Danby's policy this session, if it be viewed as a whole.

The Commons' first measure was an address for the removal of Lauderdale. Since their first address against him, Charles had given him an English earldom, which was naturally interpreted as a defiance, and the Opposition could not have chosen ground better calculated to split the Royalist *bloc*. The King's answer on the 7th May amounted to downright refusal, and Danby and Seymour loyally supported their colleague.⁴

Even more damaging was the long-drawn-out series of demands for the recall of British subjects in French service, for on this question loyalists like Strangways and Finch reinforced a solid country party. The Ministry, we may

¹ *Parl. Hist.* iv. 672.

² Essex papers, i. 319, and ii (27 April); Temple, *Works*, i. 404. Besides Russell and Cavendish, Arlington's client Littleton was prominent. Grey, iii. 41.

³ By 145 to 113. The speeches of Strangways and Vaughan in the debate of the 29th April are memorable for their advocacy of the solution finally worked out in Queen Anne's time; that of Daniel Finch gives a remarkably able argument against the crude proposal of a total exclusion of placemen from the Commons.

⁴ See the speeches of Sir E. Jennings (one of Danby's intimates), of Sir J. Tredenham (Seymour's brother-in-law), and others of the official circle, in Grey.

conjecture, put every possible pressure on the King, but his reply was once more evasive.¹

These two questions in themselves were enough to defeat hopes of reconciliation. Far from listening to proposals for further supply, the Commons not merely passed an address to prevent further anticipations upon the customs, but introduced a bill ear-marking part of the existing customs revenue for three years to the use of the Navy; if they supplied the fleet, it should be by compulsory application of old revenues, and not by the grant of new. In any case, the opening of a furious quarrel between the two Houses, summed up in the case of Shirley *versus* Fagg, brought about a deadlock and hence made prorogation certain; the quarrel was deliberately fanned by the Shaftesbury party, with a view to causing dissolution. Richard Legh of Lyme put ordinary Royalist opinion in blunt terms; 'the divell Presbyterian in both Houses does all he can to force the King to dissolve us, and the Lords were never higher but in '42'.²

In a sense, therefore, only an academic interest attaches to the abortive test bill which Lord Lindsey introduced in the Lords on the 15th April. Returning to the 'shibboleth' which had failed in 1665, the bill proposed to apply to officials, members of both Houses, and justices of the peace, the oath and declaration already taken by clergymen, militia officers, and members of corporations: the oath, that is, never to attempt any alteration of the Government in Church or State, and the declaration, that taking of arms against the King or those commissioned by him was unlawful on any pretence whatever. The Opposition fought the bill till the 2nd June with extraordinary energy and dexterity, often till eight o'clock at night,³ while on the other side the King himself came constantly to the Lords to support his Ministry, for whom Bishops

¹ For Seymour's casting vote in favour of reporting the second address on this subject, see *C. J.* 20 May, Grey, iii 184, and Jennings's speech, *ibid.*, 120; cf. Danby's implied reproach to Essex for conniving at such recruiting in Ireland, Essex papers, ii. 12.

² Grey, iii. 261 et seq.; Newton, *The House of Lyme* (1917). Halifax (Reresby, 100) and Marvell (*Growth of Popery*, &c.) were of the same opinion. Sir John Fagg, we may note, was in later years an Exclusionist of a violent type; *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1680-1, 473, and Sidney, *Diary*, i. 115.

³ Bodl. Carte MSS. 79, f. 11: till midnight on the 31st May, Essex papers, ii. 23.

Morley and Seth Ward, the Treasurer, Lauderdale, and Finch led in debate. Even with moderate Royalists the bill was not over-popular, but Danby was resolved to sit till it passed, and up to June was confident of success.

In certain respects he modified it to meet the criticism of the Shaftesbury and Halifax groups; a fine of £500 each session was to be the penalty, instead of deprivation, for recalcitrant members of the two Houses, while the oath was qualified to uphold the 'Protestant' religion as established. Passed in this shape through the Lords, the bill would in the ordinary course have undoubtedly satisfied the Commons' Tory majority, but the privilege dispute between Lords and Commons was now in full blast and prorogation followed on the 9th June.¹

Yet the events of the recess made it plain that Danby meant to hold on his way. The *doyens* of the Cavalier cause, Bishop Morley and Colonel Strangways, became Privy Councillors, while Shaftesbury and Cavendish were forbidden the Court.² For the moment the Treasurer had triumphed over the dark intrigues now hatching to prevent the further sitting of this Parliament and, as before, letters issued during September to members on whose votes he could depend, calling for their punctual attendance.³ He could not, of course, yet know that the next session was by the King's agreement with France to be allowed only on probation, and that if supplies were refused, and the Commons continued hostile to France, they were to be dissolved.

But this doomed autumn session of 1675, if it marked a further stage in Danby's failure to get the co-operation of King and Parliament, also indicated more sharply than ever the growing consolidation of party, and raised questions of principle only to be solved thirteen years later. In three pamphlets of extraordinary vigour, and in his remarkable speech of the 20th November, Shaftesbury identified the cause of the Lords' jurisdiction with the subject's common-law

¹ Grey, iii, *passim*; L. J.; *Parl. Hist.*; Ralph; Lingard; Essex papers, ii. 11 and 22; *Examen*, 62.

² Verney papers, 492; Marvell to Ramsden, 24 July. Strangways died on the 20th July (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1675-6); the Court candidate won the subsequent by-election against a Shaftesburyite.

³ *Cal. S. P. Dom.*, *ut supra*, 302 et seq. The Opposition attacked this action in the next session as unconstitutional: Grey, iii. 370.

liberties against divine right, appealed to the gentry to beware of prerogative, and to the country party to make terms with Dissent, and declared a standing Parliament and a standing army the great dangers confronting the nation. For dissolution, indeed, the mass of the Commons were not yet ripe. 'There is a strict conjunction', said Seymour, 'between the fanatic and Papist to dissolve this parliament', which would mean 'the shaking both of Church and State', and the moderates of the country party, led by William Coventry, were not prepared to go all Shaftesbury's lengths. The real threat to the Ministry came from the Lords, where a motion praying the King to dissolve (20 November) was lost only by 48 votes to 50.

And, even apart from the revived feud between the two Houses, Danby's essential objects were stultified by the Commons' resolutions on finance. The £300,000 granted for the Navy (by 176 to 150) was entirely inadequate, as the experts predicted at the time and as the event proved,¹ and only a majority of eleven defeated a distrustful motion to lodge this sum in the Chamber of London, instead of the Exchequer: more fatal still was a vote (carried by 172 to 165), that the House would not assist in paying off the debt of some £800,000 which lay upon the revenues. By such financial rigour the Commons were, as Duncombe hinted, putting 'extremities to work', or in other words throwing the King back on French assistance, but the atmosphere of suspicion was too dense to break, and indeed too well justified, and with the fifteen months' prorogation of November 1675 Danby's Parliamentary policy came for the time being to a standstill.

The failure to get a Royalist majority in Parliament, which would secure supply, carried its consequences into foreign policy. Into that dark mystery, not explored by the public until the revelations of November 1678 and lying outside the ken of party, we need not look too closely. But beside the French envoy's testimony that Danby tried at the time to prevent the making of the secret treaties,² we should put on

¹ See Pepys's speeches in Grey, iii. 406 et seq., and *Cal. Treasury Books*, 1676-9.

² Ruigny to Louis XIV, 9 Jan. and 27 Feb. 1676 (Dalrymple).

record the points which the Treasurer impressed upon his master. 'Till he [the King] can fall into the humour of the people he can never be great nor rich, and while differences continue Prerogative must suffer, unless he can live without Parliaments. That the condition of his Revenue will not permit that.'¹ Again: 'When men's fears are grown so general and so great as now they are by the Success of France, neither his Majesty nor any of his Ministers shall have any longer credit if acts do not speedily appear some way or other to their satisfaction. That upon this will not only depend all the good which can be expected from another Session (in which my hopes are to make a good future Establishment or never) but I dare with confidence affirm that next Session (without something done in the mean time) will not only be the worst that we ever yet saw, but that the hearts of the people will be so alienated from the Government that there will be few concerned for the change of it to whatever offers itself. Whereas in the contrary there appears to me the greatest conjunction of Honour, Wisdom, Glory & national advantages that ever offered it self to any Prince or Nation.

'1. In being the Redeemer of all Christendom from an universal Calamity if not thralldom.

'2. In being the restorer of so many Kings and Princes to their just rights.

'3. In making yr. selfe not only safe at home but great & having by it an opportunity of s (?) bling yr selfe for the future both in the hearts of yr people & in those Establishments of Revenues wch nothing but such an opportunity could ever make us hope for.'

He bids the King 'consider also how fixt that resolution seems to be even in this Parliamt (than wch I never hope to see a better) that they ought to meet often & that (though they are convinced the revenue is too narrow for the necessary expence) the Crown ought from time to time to be beholding to them for those additions wch may be wanting at the year's end'.² The King cannot hope to rule by force, but no Parlia-

¹ Danby's draft memorandum ('for the King'), June 1677 (B. M. Add. MSS. 28042, ff. 13-14).

² Ibid., ff. 9-12; memorandum of 4 April 1677.

ment, new or old, will help him financially, unless he definitely abandons France. He himself refused to have anything directly to do with handling the French money.¹

Successive French ambassadors, Courtin² and Barillon, named the Treasurer as the head of the anti-Gallican party: the marriage of Princess Mary with William of Orange in November 1677 was his work, and on the Dutch connexion he pinned his hopes; his long intimacy with Sir William Temple, whom he twice pressed to be Secretary of State, formed another link in the chain.³

Before 1689 no Royalist or Tory minister was big enough again to build on this national foundation, and the charge of partiality to France and Popery hung round the Tories till the Prince of Orange, whom Danby had supported, became with his assistance King of Great Britain. So fierce was his opposition to France that Louis XIV finally determined to pull him down, and it was reserved for Russell, Sidney, and the founders of the Whig party, in subsidized co-operation with the French ambassador, to destroy the chances of that national war, to the verge of which Danby twice brought the vacillating King.⁴

But neither the misfortunes into which the Treasurer was plunged by the King's recourse to France, nor the unpopularity of the long prorogation, seem at first to have affected his prestige, or weakened his resolute policy. Of this a first sign was the dismissal of Halifax and Holles from the Council in January 1676. In April Sir John Duncombe, Chancellor of the Exchequer, whose proud independence seems to have offended, had to resign, and was succeeded by the more pliant Erneley.⁵

Danby's jealousy of able subordinates was, in fact, as marked

¹ Undated note 'for ye Kg', B. M. Add. MSS. 28042, f. 17; Alfred Morrison papers, Report IX, 452.

² Burnet, II. 97.

³ Temple's *Works*; Barillon; Lindsey papers; Buccleuch papers; and Reresby—for proof of this general position.

⁴ On Danby's attitude to the money treaties, see his letters of 14 Jan. and 25 March 1678 to Ralph Montague, in the Hodgkin papers, that of 8 Jan. 1679 to Temple in the Lindsey papers, and Temple's *Works*, I. 461.

⁵ *Hatton Corr.* I. 122. Some good Tories like Bishop Dolben took Danby to task about this (Evelyn, 14 Jan. 1682).

as his nepotism, and there is some evidence that these defects were already straining his most important colleagues. His relations with the Chancellor certainly did not improve, and his warm alliance with Seymour now began to break (apparently through the rasping influence of Lady Danby), and with fatal consequences in the next session.¹ His wife's family, the Berties, were a numerous and grasping clan, and he centred an excessive amount of power in Charles Bertie, who dispensed the secret service money and acted as his general factotum, dealing with everything from Cabinet minutes down to recommending the Treasurer's discharged cooks.

As regards public policy, Danby was still hopeful that the King was 'every day more fixed to show his steadiness to the Church of England'; he did his best to put the laws in execution against Dissenters of all sorts, attempting to convince Charles from statistics of the small numbers involved, and the ease of suppression.² After all, there was still plenty of Cavalier feeling dormant, and against the organized campaign now set on foot for dissolution the Ministry could employ arguments that might still keep a majority. They could appeal to the undeniable fact of the King's prerogative, and they had a vulnerable target in the personalities of the Opposition leaders. This was the line taken, for instance, at a Gloucestershire party meeting: 'Tis highly worthy our note what sort of men they are who first set this business on foot; . . . of the seventeen Lords, by whose order and in whose names the address³ was presented to the King, there is not one who either to himself or his father can lay claim to any honourable service performed either to the King or to his father during the time of the late rebellion; but on the contrary I find several of their names subscribed to the Covenant.'⁴ The Treasurer, who may justly be viewed as the first leader of an organized Tory party, watched likely men and likely by-elections with an eagle eye, and pushed warm supporters into

¹ Lindsey papers, 384; Temple; Foxcroft, i. 129, and note; Keresby, 103.

² Danby to Finch, 4 April 1676, and figures for the dioceses of Winchester and Salisbury, Leeds papers, pp. 13 et seq.

³ i.e. for a new Parliament.

⁴ 'Reasons offered by a person of honour at a meeting of the Gentlemen of Gloucestershire' (1676?) (Hodgkin papers, 316).

important places. Thus a little flattery, a piece of local Yorkshire service, and a few home truths about the country party, were enough to convert the ingenuous diarist, Sir John Reresby. The old Cavalier Henry Compton, in Burnet's opinion merely 'a property to Lord Danby', was this year appointed to the see of London. In negotiations during the summer he netted some larger fish, inducing the Duke of York to give one more trial to Parliament, and coming to some sort of *rapprochement* with Ormonde and Henry Coventry.¹

The next two years, 1677-8, brought Danby within an ace of triumph, and then as quickly plunged him into ten years of impotence. At the opening of the session in February the Opposition's initial mistake of tactics in declaring Parliament dissolved greatly helped the ministers,² who at first won comfortable victories. A motion implying dissolution was beaten by 193 to 142: on the 21st February the Commons agreed, by a majority of 34, to vote £600,000 for the Navy; on the 5th March they rejected, by 51, a motion to tack an appropriation clause to the supply. But this success stopped when ministers turned to foreign policy, for while the Opposition refused to enable Charles to make war until he plainly declared his alliances, he on the other hand would not be pushed into yielding one inch of his prerogatives.

Still even this sterile session, which closed in June, furnished some features of great moment for the future. With the Duke of York's consent, Danby introduced a bill to provide that future sovereigns should take the declaration against transubstantiation; in the event of refusal, their Church patronage should go to an episcopal commission, and their children be educated from the age of seven to fourteen by direction of such bishops. In point of fact, the bill after passing the Lords never received a third reading in the Commons; the country party developed unusual objections to restraining the prerogative, and disliked the powers given to the Established Church. But the scheme was the first feeble adumbration of that Tory policy of Limitations on a Catholic successor, which

¹ Reresby; Leeds papers; Essex papers, ii. 49 et seq.

² Ormonde to Lord Chancellor Boyle, 27 Feb. 1677 (Ormonde papers, iv. 20).

was to do battle, in 1680-1, with the Whig scheme for entirely excluding such a successor from the throne.

In the course of debate, again, differences had come to light as to the proper scope of the prerogative, which were deeply to tinge party history. 'The King', said Williamson, 'has but few prerogatives, as coining money and making peace and war, and they are as landmarks.' The King, Henry Coventry added, 'is not obliged to follow either his privy council or Parliament if his opinion and reason be against it'. Charles's final reply of the 28th May rubbed in his ministers' teaching: he would not suffer this fundamental power of peace and war, 'so essential a part of the monarchy', to be invaded; for if he did so, 'no prince or State would any longer believe that the Sovereignty of England rests in the Crown'.

The address which called forth this protest was passed by a majority of 40; a good number of 'Court' votes, besides the Speaker's friends, had either supported it or abstained,¹ and the French alliance imposed an intolerable strain on Tory feeling. It was, in fact, slowly driving home another nail in the coffin of the old monarchy.

But at the moment this expression of patriotic opinion helped Danby, and the succeeding period from September 1677 till January 1678 witnessed his greatest apparent triumph. The ink was hardly dry on another secret treaty, planning to prorogue Parliament till the following April, before William of Orange arrived in England. His marriage with Mary on the 4th November 1677, the signature of a treaty between England and the States-General on the 30th December, the recall of British troops from French service, and the sudden calling of Parliament for the 28th January, at last brought within measurable distance the war for which the Treasurer had been working. The Opposition had spoken of 'French counsels': here was the heiress to the throne married to the arch-enemy of France. They had made supply conditional on a Dutch alliance: here was the treaty signed and sealed.

Into the tangled diplomatic history of this year we cannot enter, but if Danby and Orange had succeeded in making war, much later party history would never have been written, and

¹ The division was 182 to 142; Grey, iv. 388; Foxcroft, i. 129.

the Parliamentary and party causes of their failure have therefore a real significance. The King himself, it must be premised, was no doubt against war, unless he were guaranteed an assured success, a speedy peace, and means to maintain after that peace the standing army which war would give him. He might well hesitate when invited to war with a king who was not only his paymaster, but the director of the greatest war-machine hitherto known in Europe. But given a prompt and secure supply of money, with the conduct of war and peace left to his discretion, he might conceivably have taken the plunge. His real fear, perhaps, was that expressed to Temple, that the 'factious leaders . . . had a mind to engage him in a war and then leave him in it, unless they might have their terms in removing and filling of places'.¹ The Duke of York on the contrary, in the last stages at least, was full of war-like ardour, and in later days Charles blamed him for the crisis.²

But without Parliament, whatever King or Duke felt, Danby could do nothing, and at this crisis his majority proved faithless. They did indeed agree to the principle of supply, but it was only by a too narrow division, and on the actual grant of a million it sank to insignificance.³ Moreover, these votes were only given after repeated demands to see the treaties, and were coupled with the impossible request that the King's confederates should undertake not to lay down their arms till France was brought back to the Treaty of the Pyrenees. The rest of February was spent in 'leaping from twig to twig how to raise this money',⁴ while Ghent and the heart of Flanders fell to the French armies. When the Poll Bill, the first positive fruits of supply, did finally pass on the 8th March, it bore with it 'an appropriating penal clause',⁵ that all the proceeds should be actually expended on hostilities against France. On the 15th an address demanded immediate declaration of war—a motion being only beaten by five votes to add a clause

¹ Temple, *Works*, ii. 411 (Lingard).

² Temple to Ormonde, 2 July; Southwell to Ormonde, 28 Sept. 1678; Barillon, 6 July 1679 (Dalrymple); Klopp, i. 88.

³ 'By twenty voices', Ormonde papers, iv. 405: no figures are given in the Journals or in Grey.

⁴ Henry Coventry, 21 Feb. (Grey).

⁵ Southwell to Ormonde, 5 March.

requesting the removal of those who had advised Charles's reply of the previous May, respecting the prerogatives of war and peace. In a statement of reasons for their vote of 'immediacy', given at a conference, with the Lords, the Commons alleged that nothing could be more 'destructive to the laws, liberties, and properties of the subjects of this kingdom' than the presence of the army in England. On the 15th April, being adjourned for a fortnight, they ordered a committee, previously appointed to investigate Popery, to sit continuously.

On the reassembly of Parliament on the 29th, the Lord Keeper emphasized the plain intention of the Dutch to make a separate peace, and on the King's behalf asked for their advice. The Commons' answer was twofold: a demand to see the treaties, and a resolution to 'lay no further charge upon the people how urgent soever the occasion be that require it, till their minds be satisfied that all care and diligence is used to secure the kingdom, and prevent the dangers that may arise' from the countenance given to Papists. This was carried by 129 to 88, Sir Henry Ford (ordinarily a courtier) being a teller for the majority. On the 4th May by a majority of 16 they condemned the treaty of 30th December with Holland, as 'not consistent with the good and safety of the kingdom', simultaneously exhorting the King to enter into the general confederacy of the Allies. On the 7th they asked him, by 154 to 139, to remove from his councils those who had advised his answers to their addresses of 26th May 1677 and 31st January 1678. On the 30th, despite a royal message to the contrary, they begged that all forces raised since the 29th September be disbanded. On the 15th June it was resolved, by 164 to 154, to disallow after the 18th any further motions for supply, and, finally, on that day a direct proposal from the Crown for a committee to consider new sources of permanent revenue was negatived without a division.

So ended the summer session of 1678, the last over which Danby continuously presided under Charles II. The majority on which he had counted had failed him, but not mainly through any fault of his own. The Crown's refusal to divulge before May the treaty they had made with Holland in December

was a bad blunder. Doubts whether Charles really meant war were, as Danby wrote in one of his amazingly frank letters to Orange, 'not without cause'.¹ Besides this, there were faults of party management, as Mr. Secretary Coventry himself admitted; he was growing old and gouty, and his fellow Secretary, Williamson, was wooden and uncongenial.² How far the Government's collapse was accounted for by the changed attitude of Seymour must remain uncertain, but the 'rheumatism' which caused his absence for a month was judged by some to be diplomatic; the Opposition resented his temporary supersession³ as Speaker, and his immediate intervention in debate on return was hostile to his old colleagues.⁴

But the most potent factor, without question, was the tactics of an able and very unscrupulous Opposition. 'They go on,' said Southwell, 'contending and disputing every particular step that is made, having a greater number of able and contentious speakers, though they are outdone in votes.' He adds that 'nothing seems more doubted of than a war by all that are ardently for it', and this specially so 'since Monsieur Ruvigny's being here'.⁵ Wittingly or not, he had hit on the real explanation. The left wing of the Whigs, desperately anxious to get peace and disbandment at any price, even at that of alliance with the Duke of York,⁶ had struck up a connexion with France. This move, in distinction to Charles's use of French money to buy off opposition, had begun with Courtin in the spring of 1677,⁷ and was brought to its perfection in November by Barillon, his successor. In January a second intermediary appeared in the younger Ruvigny,⁸ a first cousin of Lady Russell and well known in Whig society. His part was to direct the higher and only vicariously mercenary business with Russell, Shaftesbury, and Holles, while

¹ 9 Feb. 1678, *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1677-8, 639.

² 'Parlamentarius valde invisus': Waldstein's dispatch of 8/18 Feb. 1678 [Klopp].

³ Ormonde papers, iv. 421.

⁴ Grey, v. 327: 'I think it must be our duty to lay before the King the miserable condition the kingdom will be in by those Leagues and Treaties, and to show your disapprobation.'

⁵ To Ormonde, 9 Feb. and 9 March.

⁶ Macpherson, i. 86; James, *Life*, i. 513.

⁷ Courtin's account in Dalrymple. The 'Doctor Carey', to whom 500 guineas are given, was imprisoned for a pamphlet alleging the dissolution of Parliament; Grey, iv. 165.

⁸ Not without Danby's knowledge (Hodgkin papers, 187).

Barillon began a commerce with subordinate spirits that was to last for three halcyon years. In the year ending December 1679 the ambassador accounted for some £4,200 distributed between Buckingham, Sidney, Baber (the manager for the Presbyterians), Littleton, Powle, and Harbord; in the ledger of 1679-80 he notes the additional names of Garroway, Edward Harley, Foley, Sacheverell, Hampden, Bennet (Shaftesbury's secretary), Boscawen, and Herbert.

Promised party funds on condition that war was prevented¹ and assured of Louis's help towards a dissolution, the Whig managers arranged—since directly to oppose war would be unpopular—to evade it. Sometimes, as Barillon put it, 'they proposed war, believing it would not be made; now, when they see a good disposition towards it, they try to put obstacles in the way'.² On the 14th March Russell told him they would clog the million grant with such provisions that the King would never accept it, and, when disappointed in this by his conciliatory attitude, they dragged into debate everything most vexatious to the Court in order to force a dissolution. In one thing only were they consistent, in paralysing their own country; the vote for an 'immediate' declaration of war was concerted with the national enemy, and the conqueror of Flanders was invited to support them by a diplomatic protest to the Court of St. James against 'provocative armaments'.³ Finally, when Louis's high-handed stand in July on behalf of his Swedish ally once more threatened a rupture, it was the Russell opposition who through Barillon pressed him to give way.⁴

Proof positive of these dealings was presumably lacking to the Ministry, but Royalist opinion on the Commons' attitude was outspoken. 'Those who seemed to be most zealous for a war with France last session', wrote York to Orange, 'are those who obstruct most the giving of a supply.' The Commons 'at the same time advise war and disband Troops, but no great prospect as yet of money for either', was Henry Coventry's dry comment.⁵ As to an immediate declaration of war, Danby 'urged the necessity above all things of being

¹ Barillon, 24 Feb. (Ranke, iv. 46).

² Ibid., 3 March.

³ 14 March and 11 April (Dalrymple).

⁴ Barillon, 25 July (Ranke, iv. 52 and note).

⁵ York to Orange, 5 Feb. 1678 (Dalrymple). Coventry to Hyde, 22 Feb.

unanimous at home and having a full supply ; showing how that already in preparations for sea and land there is already incurred a debt of £500,000, and that if we jump preposterously into a war the allies will leave it upon our hands and obtrude unreasonable conditions upon us'.¹ In the debate of the 7th May for the removal of ministers, his adherent Jennings struck another note, which in the next decade innumerable Tory pulpits and pamphleteers were to make tediously familiar. 'These proceedings', he declared, 'look too much like 1641, and may be drawn into that consequence ; and now we are come to 1642. This was in the first of the nineteen propositions, and I must come at last to 1648. What is this less than "making no more addresses to the King" ?'

But it was reserved for the Lord Chancellor to do the hardest hitting, in a speech much resented by Powle, and other actual or potential pensioners of France. The Dutch, he told them, might have been held to the league of the 30th December, but for their (the Commons') obstruction ; as it was, 'they concluded within themselves, that it was in vain to rely any longer upon England, for England was no longer itself', and turned to their separate peace again. Now that we had given offence to France, we must at least be put in a position to defend ourselves ; factious divisions would disarm the nation, and 'no fears of arbitrary Government can justify, no zeal to religion can sanctify, such a proceeding. Have we forgotten that Religion and Liberty were never truly lost till they were made a Handle and Pretence for Sedition ? Are we so ill Historians as not to remember when Prelacy was called Popery and Monarchy Tyranny ?' As to Popery, 'hath not the late Act made it impossible, absolutely impossible, for the most concealed Papist that is, to get into any kind of employment ?' The King must, he continued, have supply to pay off the forces 'raised by your advice', but the new innovation of Tacking would 'alter the whole frame and Constitution of Parliament.

. . It does, at last, give up the greatest share of legislature to the Commons and, by consequences, the chief power of judging what Laws are best for the Kingdom. . . . These Innovations the King resolves to abolish and hath commanded me to say to you, *Stare super vias antiquas*. . . . Let the World

¹ 18 March (Ormonde papers, iv. 416).

now see, that your zeal to preserve the Government is the same it was when you were ready to die for its Restoration ; and know, 'tis an Act as meritorious, and an act of as great Duty and Loyalty to stand between the King and all those practices of Libelers which tend to create a misunderstanding between Him and His Parliament, as it is to fight for him in a Day of Battle.' ¹

Full though it was of home truths, Finch's speech spelled the downfall of the Danby administration ; in face of the national distrust of the King, which carried even Royalists away with it, a programme of constitutional negation and trusting to the Crown was simply obsolete. It is, therefore, needless to pursue farther the Parliamentary history of 1678. The national concord for which Danby had worked was already destroyed by the King, by Louis XIV, and by the Commons, before the Popish plot, which must sooner or later have brought down the Ministry, came in the autumn to transcend all ordinary politics.

With a judgement clouded, perhaps, by desperation, Danby, in meeting the plot, committed one tactical error after another, and conceived (like Wolsey in dealing with Henry VIII's divorce) that he could attune his policy to the new clamour, and even use the plot to oust the Duke from politics, or to secure his own position with Parliament. But England was in one of its recurring fits of political mania, and the Protestant Minister was involved in the panic of No-Popery. ' So the Fire-ship was at length grappled to him and blew him up ' : his efforts to bring Temple into the House were baffled,² the Arlington interest was marshalled against him, and on the 19th December the betrayal of the secret treaties by one of their chief architects, Ralph Montagu, late our ambassador at Paris, finished the story. The motion for Danby's impeachment was carried that day by 179 to 116. The letters of Montagu produced by Charles Bertie, from which the truth could have been found, were brushed aside—Russell being bold

¹ *L. J.* xiii. 222.

² ' By the ingratitude of a Corporation to his Maitie and the ill practices of Mr. Montague to debauch them ' ; Danby to Temple, 19 Nov. (Add. MSS 28054, f. 196).

enough to say, 'I defy any man alive to charge me with any dealing with the French.' Perhaps we should condone, as we should in Charles James Fox, the unpatriotic rôle of Russell, a true patriot like Harley, Foley, and others connected with Barillon, and leave the matter with Titus's remark in winding up the debate—'All we here very well understand Lord Russell's character. But how after ages may understand it, I know not.'¹

A note of Lord Keeper Guilford, in the sententious memorandum he made for his own edification, marks both the constitutional significance of Danby's fall and the tactical mistakes that accompanied it. 'A great statesman once resolved to oppose France and Popery, which were popular measures one would have thought him safe in. But France tempted him with that which to have refused would have made his master ruin him. The plot accusers loved his adversary better than him, and when he cherished them they accused even him. A statesman should not rely, as he did, upon tools (Doctor Tong, Oates) that are guided by others.'² To reconcile a national Royalist policy with the ends and prerogatives of Charles II, to use even the Popish plot in the interests of the Crown—such were the political circles which Danby, the first by choice and the second by force of circumstance, had undertaken to square. Events had shown that the aims neither of King nor of Parliament could any longer be contained within the bounds of the old Tory scheme. Future Tory ministers would necessarily have to take a very different line towards the King's control of national policy, and adopt a very different tone to Protestant Dissent. 'Church and King', in the sense of exclusive Anglicanism and unfettered monarchy, had ceased to be possible, when a Protestant Church was governed by a King with a Catholic policy.

But to move with the times in revolutionary days is not, after all, proof positive of immorality in a politician, and Danby lived twice to see,³ and once to lead, a Tory Parliamentary Ministry directing the politics of Protestant England.

¹ Grey, iv. 360 et seq.

² Dalrymple.

³ He notes in his last journal a 'conference of consequence' with Queen Anne on the 10th June 1710 (Add. MSS. 28041).

VII

THE POPIISH PLOT AND THE ROYALIST REACTION, 1678-85

FROM Danby's fall to the death of King Charles intervened nearly seven unhappy years, divided at a point round the Christmas of 1681¹ into two acutely contrasted halves, the Whig frenzy and the Royalist reaction. Each was, in different ways, unfavourable to party organization; in the first stage the Tories were crushed, while in the second all Parliamentary government was suspended. Yet this period created the very names of Whig and Tory, linked the development of party strife to the older principles of the Civil War, and in a fierce orgy of debate, pamphleteering, and propaganda, fixed the traditional lines of division for another generation.

Parliament was prorogued on the 30th December 1678, and on the 24th January following dissolved; half of its original members were dead, and the Cavalier sentiment of 1661 was grey and ageing. In the last weeks of its existence the two Houses came to a deadlock on the impeachment of the Treasurer, supplies were refused, and it may be questioned whether the dissolution (in which Danby and York concurred) was the tactical mistake sometimes represented. It was by two votes only that this House of Commons exempted the Duke from a bill to prevent Catholics sitting in Parliament, they had swallowed Oates's accusation of the Queen, they had begun to talk of Exclusion.

Danby no doubt hoped to disarm opposition in the new Parliament by prosecuting the plot, by pushing the limitations on a Catholic successor outlined in the Royal speech of the 9th November, and by getting the Duke sent out of England before the next session.² But the dissolution did not save him,

¹ 'Here is an end of the popish plot' (Luttrell, Sept 1681). In the following March York returned to the royal counsels.

² This the King did on Danby's advice (Lindsev papers 401)

and the optimism which he shared with the whole Ministry, except Seymour, was shattered by the elections—which, if ‘not so bad’ as Ormonde had feared, were indeed bad enough.¹ The great ‘country’ leaders, Garroway, Powle, and Mcres, all reappeared; Ralph Montagu was elected for Huntingdonshire, the violent Sacheverell returned for Derbyshire without spending a penny; another John Hampden appeared for Buckinghamshire, and a John Trenchard for Taunton. Two Berties lost their seats in Lincolnshire and a third in Wilts., Sir Richard Temple was beaten at Buckingham, Daniel Finch was not elected, and his brother the Solicitor-General, though the nominee of the Chancellor Ormonde, was only returned with difficulty for the University of Oxford. Everywhere there were ‘great endeavours to choose men of warmth’, and only among the ‘heathen’ of Cornwall did the Court get anything like a solid *bloc*.²

The two next general elections, of August 1679 and February 1681, made little difference; if Danby’s heir Latimer won Buckingham in the first, Sir Ralph Verney replaced him in the second, and the Tory gains were entirely insignificant. ‘The Russell faction’, writes Ailesbury, ‘was like a spring tide at full moon,’ and if anything it ran more strongly as time went on. The division lists tell the same tale. An abortive Exclusion Bill in May 1679 was given a third reading by 207 to 128, but only three members were bold enough to oppose the bringing-in of the second bill in November 1680, and the majority of 213 to 101 on an address for the removal of Halifax in the same month showed, on the last recorded big division of the three Exclusion Parliaments, a set purpose to overturn even moderate ministers. In this continuous two years’ agitation the Whigs imparted a modern energy to their political machine; in the 1681 election Shaftesbury and Buckingham organized a whirlwind campaign from their head-quarters in the City, recommending model candidates from their Green Ribbon

¹ ‘I believe that the major part of the house will be composed of men affected to monarchy and the Church’: H. Coventry to Ormonde, 15 Feb. (Ormonde papers, iv. 325); *contra*, Seymour to Williamson, cited by Lipson, *ut infra*.

² Fitzherbert papers, 13; Ormonde papers, iv. 317; Grey, vii 458; Lipson, *E. H. R.* xxviii. 84, quoting *S. P. Dom.*, vol. ccccx.

Club and issuing model instructions to be administered by constituencies to their members.¹ An atmosphere of cruel panic—of plots, meal-tubs, Jesuits, and murder—brought back the worst days of 1641, and to breathe a word for the Crown was to brand oneself as a Papist; well might a Tory member exclaim, ' 'tis purgatory to stand it ' '.²

But only this progressive violence of the Whig majority can make intelligible the later reaction. The schemes of 1681, when the Whig Lords rode armed to Oxford, were not the fruit of sudden or eleventh-hour decisions, but were knit up by daring brains at the beginning of the business, grasped firmly, and never relinquished. Proposals to embody the militia were debated even in November 1678,³ and a scheme for an Association on the model of 1585 was brought forward in April 1679; exclusion of James was from the first the aim, the majority refusing with scorn the immense concessions more than once offered by the Crown, which would have gone far to anticipate the solution of 1688.⁴ Never did a majority more ruthlessly use its power; twice at least a member was expelled the House for aspersing the complete credibility of Titus Oates, and the excellent Pepys went to the Tower under a charge of Popery. During the agitation of 'Petitioners' and 'Abhorrrers', this tyranny rose to its climax. Abhorrence was styled 'to betray the liberty of the subject, and contributes to the design of subverting the ancient legal constitution of this Kingdom'.⁵ The Commons expelled a member for this 'crime against known law', as the Speaker had the audacity to call it. They sent their sergeant, the famous 'Take him, Topham', careering all over England to arrest delinquents, even those not members of their House. They impeached judges on general charges like 'favouring Papists', imprisoned grand juries for loyal addresses, and prepared, like their less cautious successors of 1709, to prosecute clergymen for foolish sermons.

¹ Fitzherbert papers, loc. cit.; Wood, *Life and Times*, ii 516; *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1680-1, 165; Christie, ii, App. cxi.

² Fleming papers, 176.

³ The bill was rejected by Charles on 30 Nov., Burnet having revealed to him the Opposition's plans; Clarke and Foxcroft, *Life of Burnet* (1907), 156.

⁴ Grey, vii. 142, 250; Ranke, iv. 67.

⁵ Grey, vii. 53, 315, 371; *Parl. Hist.* iv. 1174.

By the spring of 1681 their constitutional plans and their unconstitutional language had proceeded much further. Demands for the removal of Halifax, the Hydes, and Seymour were coupled with a refusal to pass supply till Exclusion were conceded. The address of the 30th December 1680 tacked to the Exclusion Bill an Association; a general proscription of Tories was implied in the demand that places in Army, Navy, and local government should be reserved for men of 'known affection' to the Protestant religion, and the rigours of Parliament were to fall on any bankers who advanced credit to the Crown. A majority of a Lords' committee approved Essex's scheme, that the 'associators', who were to safeguard the succession, should be entrusted during Charles's life with certain 'cautionary towns': that Hull should be the English La Rochelle was a natural thought to sons of the men of '41 or to the associates of Ruvigny. The Commons at Oxford resolved to print their votes; 'the weight of England', said Cowper, 'is the people.' The parrot cry^m of the Tories, that '41 is come again', seemed to be verified, and the ideas which Danby jotted down just after his fall were terribly reminiscent: 'securing the arms of all who have been officials in the late Rebellion', 'a Parliament to be called to some other place; the King to reside out of London'.¹ On both sides men spoke freely of civil war; York professed himself ready, Colonel Birch threatened once more to buckle on his armour, Halifax did not exclude bloodshed from his calculations.

And not only did weapons and battle-cries breathe of 1641, but the haggard ghosts of that Revolution seemed to have risen again. Algernon Sidney twice offered his high and seigneurial republicanism to the Parliamentary electors. The militant names of a generation before—Hampden, Waller, Ingoldsby, Fleetwood, and Hutchinson—again appeared in the Commons. When Monmouth visited Oxford in September 1680, the freedom of the city, as some solace for the University's neglect, was bestowed at the house of Colonel Unton Croke, 'so famous in the West for the blood of Mr. Penruddock and his friends'. It was in the tones of a seer that the aged Bishop Morley delated 'Mr. Oliver Cromwell, the

¹ Add. MSS. 28042, ff. 19-20.

eldest son of Richard, son of Oliver, the usurper and murderer of his master', for the oddly un-Puritan offence of hunting on a fast-day.¹

Indeed, by this time it was too late for the Whigs to draw back, and the plans of their leaders were those of desperate men. The royal progresses of Monmouth and his touching for the King's evil, the trained intimidation practised by the London mob, Shaftesbury's open threat to treat Ormonde as another Strafford, and Russell's hint that the Duke, who was but one man, should die rather than the People—even by the end of 1680 such portents were driving moderates into the Royalist camp. Finally, in 1682-3 came disclosures of an assassination plot, officered by ex-Cromwellians and by London citizens, and of an organization for rebellion planned by the responsible heads of the 'mutineers', Monmouth, Essex, Sidney, Russell, and Trenchard: this at last stamped the waverers, broke the Whig party, and consecrated the reaction.

Two important elements may here be distinguished.

i. The violence of the Shaftesbury-Monmouth wing brought over to the Crown's side a powerful reinforcement of moderates, who had done all in their power to break the Danby Government. Sir William Coventry and his political disciples, the great Halifax, Sir Thomas Thynne (later the Tory Lord Weymouth, whom we shall meet again), Littleton, Danby's old enemy at the Admiralty, the great lights of the old 'country' school—Garroway, Vaughan, Lee, and Meres²—joined hands, to defeat Exclusion and Monmouth, with the Musgraves, the Finches, and the Hydes. The future was rudely to buffet this coalition; some, like Clarges, were to join the Tories in King William's time, others to act with the constitutional Whigs of 1688, a few, like Halifax, to plough a rather lonely and delicately trimmed furrow of their own. But such alliances necessarily influenced the course of the Tory party; the great fascination and intellectual superiority of Halifax, for example, stamped themselves alike on Lord Keeper Guilford in the Cabinet of 1683-4 and between 1685 and 1688 on the second Earl of Nottingham. In a more mellow tone towards Protestant

¹ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1680-1, 31, 217.

² Ormonde papers, vi. 5; Grev viii 227.

Dissent, in a more watchful outlook for the national liberties, a new orientation of Tory principle will be found in the next decade. Not the least, then, of Shaftesbury's many negative achievements was this, that he drove the right wing of the Whigs into coalition with the left of the Tories.¹

2. On the other hand, this torrent of action and reaction for the time being unbalanced common Tory opinion, and gave power in the King's counsels to the extreme right, headed by the Duke of York. He alone had never wavered: from the first the royal Cassandra predicted evil from the King's wilting in the storm. Appalled at the appointment of the new Privy Council of April 1679 and that 'so many loyal and worthy men should so absolutely be laid aside',² he preached to Orange with painful reiteration that the 'Presbyterians design nothing less than the ruin of the monarchy and our family. . . . For if His Majesty does not entirely submit to them and become less than a Duke of Venice', rebellion must follow.³ The King must realize 'if he parts with any more of his power that he is gone. He has yet the fleet, the garrisons, his guards, Ireland and Scotland, firm to him, so that if he will yet stand by himself he may yet be a king.'⁴ From his exile at Brussels and at Edinburgh he daily pressed for drastic action; his own return he demanded as a guarantee of stability in future, 'or else the old Cavalier and truly loyal men will hardly think His Majesty will be in earnest'.⁵ He is amazed to see the lessons of history no better digested: 'the very same faults Lord Arlington committed, and the same fearful steps he trod, have been followed by all those who have succeeded him'.⁶ As to those who tampered with Exclusion, 'Godolphin and all the rotten sheep', and 'the men of expedients', their tameness shocked him. Lord Halifax's 'timorous' scruples as to the summons of Parliament, and his zeal for a French war, made him an unfit adviser for a monarchy. For himself, he was ready to face the possibility of civil war—from his letters,

¹ See Appendix I for a list of 128 members who voted against Exclusion in 1679.

² To Dartmouth, 8 May (Dartmouth papers).

³ To Orange, 29 May (Savile Foljambe papers).

⁴ To Orange, 8 June (*ibid.*).

⁵ To Dartmouth, 25 Dec. 1679 (Dartmouth papers).

⁶ To the same, 16 Jan. 1680 (*ibid.*).

indeed, one feels inclined to say with a light heart.¹ Resisting as he did repeated efforts to make him return to the Church of England, or even merely to attend her services,² the Duke flattered himself that 'the truly loyal' would swallow this obstacle, though the clear-sighted men in his entourage saw that, if accepted for the moment, it must in the long run prove his ruin.³ But in 1682 this was still remote. Fervid Tories turned to the Duke as one who had never blushed in the worst days. 'The wrack of the Crown in the King your Father's time', wrote Ormonde, 'is fresh in the memory of many of us; and the rocks and shelves he was lost upon (tho' they were hid to him) are so very visible to us, that if we avoid them not, we shall perish rather derided than pitied.'⁴

These two influences in party development—the working alliance with the Trimmers and the high Tory reaction which York personified—were to cross and interplay throughout the next ten years: meanwhile, for a full understanding both of these workaday politics and the development of party-principle, we must examine the Tory attitude to the problem of Exclusion.

As early as the 9th November 1678, in accordance with the Cabinet's agreed policy,⁵ the King's speech had promised ready approval for bills to 'make you safe in the reign of my successor, so they tend not to impeach the right of succession, nor the descent of the Crown in the true line, and so as they restrain not my power, nor just rights of any Protestant successor'.⁶ In his remarkable speech of the 22nd, Seymour developed the theme, and outlined the course which he and many like him were to follow. As to Exclusion, 'it is not your interest to make the heir of the Crown desperate', or 'entail a war on posterity'. But, 'I would not scruple to

¹ Ibid., pp. 35-73, *passim*, Banillon to Louis XIV, 31 Oct. 1680 (Dalrymple).

² One effort was made in early March 1679, and a second very serious one 11 Sept. 1681 (Dalrymple; Dartmouth papers, 67).

³ 'Sooner or later we must be all undone': Col. John Churchill to Legge, 12 Sept. 1681.

⁴ To York, 27 May 1681 (Carte, II, App. 108).

⁵ See Danby's conversation with Reresby of the 7th November (Reresby, 149).

⁶ *Parl. Hist.* IV. 1035; Ormonde papers, IV. 467.

take from him dependencies in Church or State, and power to dispose of the public revenue or the militia. I would not scruple to make a law, that upon the demise of the King the parliament then sitting or, if there be none, that the last parliament, shall meet again and continue for a time certain.' ¹ This speech made a considerable impression, and, though the furious contest over Danby's impeachment momentarily checked the good results anticipated,² the next formal offer, which was pronounced in the Lord Chancellor's speech of the 30th April 1679 and approved by the four most influential men of the new Privy Council (Halifax, Essex, Sunderland, and Temple), merely elaborated Seymour's idea. In the event of a Papist succeeding to the throne he was not to control any ecclesiastical preferment, and the legislature was to be vested with full authority over the Privy Council, judges, lord-lieutenants and their deputies, naval officers, and justices of the peace. The Parliament then sitting was to continue, or the old Parliament to be called, as Seymour had suggested, and proposals were invited for any additional provisos, consistent with not 'defeating the right of succession itself'. But in spite of support given to the speech in principle by some men most influential in the Commons—the two Coventries, Littleton, Capel, and Vaughan—a large majority refused to see anything in these expedients but 'binding Samson with withes',³ or to discuss any solution but Exclusion.

In the long interval of Parliament between June 1679 and October 1680 these notions of Limitation were constantly discussed in moderate circles,⁴ but, meanwhile, the torrent had carried away all but the most steadfast, and only measures of a far more drastic character could possibly stem it. Essex and his brother Capel, Sunderland and Godolphin, the Duchess of Portsmouth and Sir William Temple, Burnet and Tillotson, all came to accept Exclusion as inevitable: the Sunderlands and Henry Sidney were trying to persuade Orange that he would gain by Exclusion and lose by Limitation, and this

¹ Grey, vi. 265

² Ormonde papers, iv. 479.

³ Hampden's speech, 11 May. For the scheme and debates, see Grey, vii. 158 et seq.; Ranke, iv. 80; Burnet, ii. 213.

⁴ Southwell mentions Littleton and Lord Holles as particularly active.

powerful advocacy was from the end of November 1680 added to the Opposition. By the end of the next month the Prince himself seems to have been virtually convinced that the King must give way.¹ The Lord Chancellor Finch was wobbling. From a very different, though a more obtuse angle, the Duke of York was condemning all expedients.

The King's inaction in this crisis was masterly and methodical: he would advance no more expedients himself, generally wait upon events, but at the same time insist on his readiness to consider any suggestions from others, which were consistent with preserving the legal succession. Halifax's courage and eloquence came to his aid, and the Exclusion Bill sent up to the Lords on the 15th November was rejected by them, late the same night,² by a majority of 33. On the 16th they began the consideration of alternative expedients, and the bill read for the first time on the 29th (though it lapsed with the session) showed the lengths to which a moderate majority proposed to go. The Parliament existing at the King's demise was to continue sitting for six months thereafter, or, if not sitting, was automatically to reassemble. No Popish successor could exercise ecclesiastical preferment. The Duke of York was to vacate his seat in Parliament and resign all his offices; if he came to the Crown, he was to lose his prerogative of veto and should be 'disabled from disposing of any offices, civil, ecclesiastical, or military, from raising any forces by sea or land within England or Ireland without consent of both Houses of Parliament'.³

Such proposals never received, nor ever could have, any consideration from this fanatic House of Commons, but the Tory minority views were represented in some able speeches. Seymour, upon whom a characteristically insolent phrase⁴ soon drew an attempted impeachment, put some suggestive points against Exclusion. The Protestantism of the Duke's children could, he argued, surely be used as a safeguard. Again, 'the

¹ Orange to Sir L. Jenkins, 30 Nov. 1680; Sidney to Sunderland, 28 Dec. (*Sidney Diary*).

² It struck twelve as Ailesbury sat down to dinner with Lord Conway.

³ House of Lords papers, 1678-88, 221 [Report XI].

⁴ 'I am one of those that suffer under those wind-guns in corners of being popishly affected' (Grey, vii. 407).

law proposed binds not Scotland, and it is a question whether it can bind Ireland: . . . when you seclude the Duke for religion, you make a war for religion, and that great king, who makes war for his glory, will be glad to take this as a handle for your disturbance'; finally, Exclusion could only be guaranteed by a standing army. It is unnecessary to emphasize the reality of the second and third of Seymour's arguments. The Scottish Parliament did, in fact, pass an Act (August 1681) for the unalterableness of the succession, and Louis XIV's readiness to re-light the English civil war shines on the black background of Barillon's dispatches.

Hyde pressed the root injustice of the Exclusion Bill: it would be as fatuous, he urged, as that for the indissolubility of Parliament: 'many a loyal person, out of that principle of loyalty and honesty, will stick to the Duke'.¹ The rigid Sir Leoline Jenkins raised the debate to high tablelands of principle. The deposition of kings for religion was, he said, a Popish doctrine. The bill, moreover, 'does change the very essence and being of the monarchy. Consider whether you do not reduce it to an elective monarchy. . . . I have always taken it that the Government had its original, not from the people, but from God.' Nor was it consistent with their oath of allegiance: 'when I swear allegiance, it is not only to the King, but his heirs and successors, and there can be no interregnum in our government'. 'When God gives us a king in His wrath, it is not in our power to change him: we cannot require any qualifications: we must take him as he is.'² Daniel Finch quoted a parallel, which was to become hackneyed in the next few years: had not the early Christians, he asked, obeyed Julian the Apostate? But his main points were practical politics: first, the folly of rejecting useful expedients which might bind posterity; second, that Parliament might at least nominate a Privy Council for the Popish successor; and thirdly, that the rights of the Duke's children must not be prejudiced by Exclusion. On this last difficulty other Tory speakers, such as Musgrave, dwelt further—if the bill were

¹ Grey, vii. 450.

² I have combined Jenkins's two speeches of the 4th and 11th November (Grey, vii. 419, 446, and Hist. MSS., Report XII, ix. 98).

passed, they argued, at least let Parliament name the successor; and this, it must be emphasized, was more than a mere debating point, since here lay the apple of discord between the Orange and the Monmouth Whigs. Legge, one of the Duke's intimates and a patriot of more ordinary clay, with a side glance at his seven children gloomily prophesied a republic. 'My father was twice condemned to die for asserting the right of the Crown, and I hope I shall never forsake it.'¹

But, save on the part of Seymour, there was marked lack of enthusiasm for Expedients in the Tory party, and this became still plainer in the debates of the Oxford Parliament, where by far the greater burden of the Government case was borne by men of the moderate school. This time Expedients appeared in a more striking and, historically, a more far-reaching form. The King had now promised Orange not to accept limitations upon the prerogative,² and it is conceivable that the Regency idea now put forward was chiefly devised to wean the Prince from the Exclusionists. After all, it had been mooted in debate before this,³ it had the attraction of historic precedent, and appealed to the constitutionally minded. The plan was that the Prince and Princess of Orange⁴ should as Regents take all the powers of government, leaving to James the bare title of King. If Burnet and Littleton originated it (as the former claims), Halifax and Seymour⁵ among leading politicians first approved it, and in January it was the declared Government policy.⁶ The King's speech of the 21st March, which referred pointedly to means whereby 'the administration should remain in Protestant hands', was printed and on sale in London before the session opened. The Royal voters in the Commons were ordered to give their full support,⁷ and

¹ Grey, vii. 410 et seq., viii. 274; Hist. MSS. *ut supra* (a journal compiled for Lord Worcester).

² Orange to Jenkins, 27 Dec. 1680 (Dalrymple).

³ By Sir Robert Markham, 7 Jan. 1681: 'laughed at', Grey notes.

⁴ From Hyde's letter of 29 March quoted below, it would appear (in contradiction to Resesby) that to Orange, at least, a *joint* Regency was held out. Littleton's speech bears this out.

⁵ Besides Burnet, Barillon emphasizes Seymour as one of the originators: Ranke, iv. 132. ⁶ Temple to Sidney, 20 Feb. 1681 (*Sidney Diary*).

⁷ Grey, viii. 291; Locke to Stringer, 26 March (Christie, ii, App. cxii); Hyde to Orange, 29 March (Ranke).

Orange had been informed of the proposals, at least in outline.¹ Nor did Regency stand alone: York was to be banished for life, selected prominent Papists were to be exiled, and the automatic continuance, or reassembling, of Parliament was again guaranteed. In the event of Mary's death, Anne would become Regent, and a son of James would, if a Protestant, succeed when he came of age.²

But except Littleton, who dwelt enthusiastically on the merits of his political offspring, the supporters of this solution put it forward rather as a means of avoiding civil war than as positively acceptable. The obvious difficulty of anything like diarchy was an argument as powerful now as it proved in 1689, and the debate, though conducted with unusual good temper,³ only confirmed the majority in sticking to Exclusion. The King, whom Littleton thought genuinely in earnest, had certainly advanced as far as he could—actually, it seems, to the point of inviting suggestions from Shaftesbury himself.⁴ The Earl perhaps, as others before him, hoped that, with 'greasing the wheels',⁵ Exclusion might be granted, or perhaps some combination of Exclusion with Regency. From the King's reply to him at their decisive interview on the 26th March, it seems that Shaftesbury submitted a comprehensive programme—acceptance of Monmouth, though perhaps only as Regent and not as heir to the Crown, abandonment of the Church, and the full 'Protestant' platform.

But on any version it is clear that Charles had come to the end of his patience.⁶ 'By the grace of God,' Lord Worcester represents him saying, 'I will stick to that that is law, and

¹ Jenkins to Orange, 18 January, quoted by Foxcroft from Groen Van Prinsterer, 2nd series, v. 472.

² Grey, vii. 315 et seq.; Reresby, 209; Burnet, ii. 281. The pamphlet quoted by Foxcroft (i. 290, note 5) appears to incorporate some of the actual words of Littleton's speech.

³ Ormonde papers, vi. 7.

⁴ Burnet, ii. 281. Shaftesbury had lately shown signs of willingness to reopen other avenues, e.g. to promote a bill to make void the King's marriage.

⁵ The word is Meres's, 26 March.

⁶ Barillon, 28 March (Christie); Beaufort papers, *ut supra*; Foxcroft, i. 290. Worcester's account gives some support to the story that Shaftesbury proposed to sell the Church lands—a step which Danby had long ago prophesied (Add. MSS. 28042, f. 17).

maintain the Church as it is now established, and not be of a religion that can make all things lawful, as I know Presbytery can.' As for the Church, 'I will not be for lessening it, and if I do I know I less my crown, for we must march together.' Fortified no doubt in the consciousness that, by his new secret treaty of the 22nd March with France, he was assured for three years at any rate of a decent revenue, the King had resolved 'not to be any more hector'd by the Whigs',¹ and to adopt with modifications the programme of resistance incessantly pressed upon him from Edinburgh. The Commons' insistence upon the whole bill, and nothing but the bill, no doubt toppled over the balance to their final dissolution. The progress made hereafter in this reassertion of royal authority was, it is true, far too slow for the ardent Tories,² but if never anything like so complete as the Duke and his extremists hoped, it was steady enough, and had been cautiously set on foot even before the dissolution. An examination of the ministerial balance of power, particularly as it affects the leading Tories, will make this clear.

Four different factions shared in the King's counsels after the fall of Danby: (1) The advanced Whigs, especially Shaftesbury and Essex; (2) the Courtiers, represented by Sunderland and Godolphin; (3) the Trimmers, typified by Halifax, Sir William Temple, and Littleton; (4) the Tories—Hyde (who became Earl of Rochester in November 1681), Seymour, Jenkins, Conway, Ormonde, and the two successive Lord Chancellors, Nottingham and Guilford.

The first epoch, of a Whig Ministry, was ended by the 31st January 1680; the stages were marked by the dissolution of the first Whig Parliament, the long prorogation of the second, the exile of Monmouth, and the leave given to James to exchange his exile at Brussels for a nearer jumping-off place at Holyrood. By the date mentioned, Shaftesbury had been dismissed, Essex had resigned from the Treasury, and Russell, Cavendish, and Capel from the Privy Council.

¹ Ormonde papers, vi. 131.

² Lindsey to Jenkins, 20 Aug. 1681. 'If there be any thoughts still of courting Presbytery, I believe it is a great mistake, and I presume the King has experienced it will never answer his expectation' (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1680-1, 409).

The reigning ministers in the first half of the stormy year 1680 were the three 'chits'—Hyde, Sunderland, and Godolphin. But feeling themselves unable to face unaided the growing tempest—the unauthorized return of Monmouth, the fiasco of the Meal-tub plot, the 'black box' agitation, and the humiliation of our foreign affairs—the ministers in June invited the return of Halifax, whom the harsh treatment of his friends, the favour shown to the Duke, and the long prorogation had alienated. The great Trimmer, against the advice of his intimate circle, came to terms; he would concede his co-operation for a platform of Parliamentary government, a national foreign policy, and some kind of measures against the Duke.

This bargain was struck in a meeting at Althorp during the third week of June. In the interval between that date and early November the high contracting parties again fell asunder: Sunderland and Godolphin declared for Exclusion, Halifax and Hyde for Limitations.¹ In January 1681 Sunderland, Essex, and Temple were dismissed from the Council, the first being succeeded as Secretary by Conway, the kinsman,² and on this occasion the nominee, of Seymour.

From January to June 1681 the Hyde and Seymour interest predominated, but in the latter month Halifax was once more recalled to the Cabinet, on Hyde's initiative.³

From that date an uneasy equilibrium of the Hyde and Halifax forces lasted till the end of the reign; Hyde, broadly speaking, standing for those factors in the King's vacillating policy which implied high prerogative, royal foreign policy, and the Duke's influence; Halifax, on the other hand, for Parliament and a closer understanding with Orange. The elimination of Seymour in 1682 left the two great rivals supreme, but a third, and to each of them a hostile, influence reappeared, in the return of Sunderland and Godolphin to

¹ Halifax's permanent adhesion to Limitations is put by Miss Foxcroft in early October. Is it not possible that he delayed it until he knew definitely that Orange refused to come to England (a decision made on 3 Nov.) or to have any truck at this stage with Exclusion personally? See *Sidney Diary*, ii. 106-25.

² He left his property to Seymour's son (B. M. Add. MSS. 28875, f. 261).

³ Foxcroft, i. 297, note 6.

favour: Conway was superseded by the first in January 1683, and Jenkins by the second fifteen months later.

The part taken by the Tories in these ebbings and flowings in the Cabinet has for us a special importance, since, during the suspension of Parliament, we have no other clue to the mutual relations of the various Tory groups.

On Danby there is little to be said. To save his life he would, of course, have stuck at nothing, and he was careful through Conway's mediation to renew at least civil relations with the Monmouth circle.¹ But his release was impossible till the Exclusion Parliaments were done with, and Halifax (though his personal motives might be suspect) was only taking a common-sense line when he insisted on postponing the question till 'that rock of the House of Commons' could be evaded.² York's inveterate resentment, the steady hostility of France, Rochester's fears that the released prisoner would join Halifax—these too contributed to keep Danby in the Tower until February 1684. He had some years earlier patched up his quarrel with Seymour, and on release came to friendly terms with Halifax, in whose zeal for Parliament and antipathy to France he now entirely shared. But for the remainder of this reign he played no part in politics—nursing his own ill health in retreat at Wimbledon, recommending himself to the Duchess of Portsmouth by courtly messages and curious presents of gargles for her sore throats, keeping one eye on any profitable place going a-begging.³

Seymour, on the other hand, was till 1683 never out of the limelight. The House of Commons was, indeed, not now that he once had swayed like a magician,⁴ but he was a member of the Council, and all through 1679-80 high in favour with both King and Duke. Royalist opinion recognized his great services in defeating Exclusion, he had (Barillon says) opposed sending the Duke out of England again before the meeting of the second Whig Parliament, and he gave an emphatic voice for the dissolution of January 1681 and the summons

¹ Add. MSS. 28053, f. 140.

² Lindsey papers, 423 et seq.

³ B. M. Add. MSS. *ut supra*, f. 220; *ibid.* 28049 (Feb. 1684); Lindsey papers, 439; Reresby, 275, 297.

⁴ Grey, 26 May 1679: 'Till gentlemen have more patience and order to hear me, I will trouble you no more.'

to Oxford.¹ It was in his carriage, along roads lined by royal troops, that Charles drove off to Windsor after dissolving the Oxford Parliament, and in that year his political importance reached its zenith. Conway's promotion to be Secretary was another tribute to his power, and rumour was strong of further honours for Seymour himself and his satellites Conway and Ranelagh. From February 1681 till May at least of the following year, he is found sitting on the 'Committee of Intelligence' or the 'Committee of Foreign Affairs'. It was to Seymour that York, who constantly commended him as 'a steady friend', partly owed his recall early in 1682, and by ordinary observers he was bracketed with Hyde as the Duke's creature.²

Yet there are signs that neither Seymour's robust Protestantism, nor his robust common sense, had forsaken him. Ambition and a violent temper led him into strange places, for he set a value upon himself, as Ormonde said, 'equal at least to the importance of his ability to serve the King', but he had a searching instinct of what was practical politics. Already in 1680 he had urged the Duke to return to the Church of his father, and had deprecated too precipitate a return to England; in January 1682 he was urging a spirited foreign policy and the summons of a Parliament.³ True, his fall in the following October was generally attributed to disappointment at not getting the Privy Seal, which went to Halifax, and from rumours of an earldom he dropped to something like obscurity.⁴ But from accumulated, though severally slight, indications, it seems probable there was more than mere sulkiness behind his loss of royal favour. The patriotic Tory Thynne, writing to Halifax, suggested that Sunderland and French 'vassalage' were ill substitutes for Seymour, and a few months later begged his correspondent to secure Seymour's alliance, which, indeed, was simultaneously being proffered. Some bitter

¹ Ormonde papers, iv. 568; Dartmouth papers (Report XI, App. v), 44 et seq.; Christie, ii. 387.

² Ormonde papers, vi. 59, 229; Finch papers, ii. 171. He was credited with inspiring the writing of *Absalom and Achitophel*.

³ Ormonde papers, vii. 13; James, *Life*, i. 661; Ranke, iv. 125; Christie, ii, App. cxx (for the date, see Foxcroft, i. 339 note).

⁴ Halifax's version in Reresby, 269. See also Dartmouth papers, *ut supra*, 76, 80, and Luttrell, i. 232.

remarks of Conway about 'Whigs' and 'French pensioners' (and yet 'your master will not make the less courtship to that hand which foment it all') pointed a contrast between his friends and the Popish camarilla he condemned. Guilford, we may recall, considered Seymour's fall a blow to the 'true English interest', and there is, finally, the fact that, despite his pre-eminent services, he was left out of James II's Privy Council. Such evidence must outweigh, we think, the jaundiced denunciations of Orange's agent, Henry Sidney, and the words Seymour used himself when fighting impeachment, so proud and so characteristic, may be, after all, the key to his politics: 'My family were instrumental in the Reformation, and not any have been pointed out for Popery. . . . That the Protestant religion may be preserved, I am for the preservation of the Crown.' Ormonde had expressed a hope that Seymour's ambitions would not lead him to 'put into the scale the hurt he can do'. Who could say, if that intense injured pride and that hatred of Popery were one day to make common cause? ¹

Laurence Hyde, the Chancellor's second son and now the figure-head of the Ministry, had entered on politics in 1661 while still under age, and there continued till the actual day of his death precisely half a century later. 'His infirmities', says Roger North (and Dartmouth and Burnet support him), 'were passion, in which he would swear like a cutter, and the indulging himself in wine.' But he was capable of great industry,² was an adroit courtier, and had those fixed political opinions which carry men far in a fluid party system. From his reflections on his father's prosecution, written in 1675, down to the dedications he wrote for the first edition of the great *History* in 1702-4, he clung with all his limited amount of principle to the political and religious teaching of the Church of England, and to the former in particular, and it is his due to say that the young minister of 1679 and the veteran president of the October Club of 1711 were one and the self-same man. His politics were, in short, those of Danby in

¹ Thynne to Halifax, 28 Oct. 1682 and 9 March 1683, cited by Foxcroft from the Spencer MSS.; Dartmouth papers, *ut supra*, 82, 86; North, i. 300; Ormonde papers, vii. 323; *Sidney Diary*, ii. 217; Grey, viii. 76.

² 'Up every morning at five, and at the Treasury an hour before the rest'; Southwell to Ormonde, 31 Jan. 1680.

a minor key, with this additional strain, that he was brother-in-law to the Duke and uncle of the future sovereigns. The views he took of the succession varied with the King's: if there are signs early in 1681 that he leaned towards an Orange solution,¹ by the end of the year this was laid aside or indefinitely postponed.

No more, unhappily, than Danby can he escape the charge of being party to the abominable secret diplomacy of Charles II, which between 1681 and 1684 chilled the European system and allowed Louis XIV to climb, by the acquisition of Strasbourg and Luxemburg, to the pinnacle of his power. His motives, no doubt, were mixed ones. A war policy involved a Parliament, and what would then happen to the succession? The King and Duke, moreover, were determined to remain at peace and to run no more risks. Hyde owed everything to the Duke. The triumph of anti-Gallicanism meant the predominance of Halifax. Potent reasons in their time for a seventeenth-century minister; but in that limbo we must leave him, a little lower than Danby and on a par with Churchill. As to the actual course of events, till the Duke's return from Scotland Hyde worked cordially with Halifax on one side and the Seymour group on the other: in effect head of the Treasury after Essex's resignation at the end of 1679, he appealed to Halifax to protect the Crown against the Exclusionists, and even worked with him to prevent a breach between the King and Orange, or to keep the Duke at arm's length from England. But with York's re-entry in March 1682, Hyde seems to surrender his own personality and to assist, tacitly at least, in the burking of Parliament and in refusing intervention abroad. This passive attitude, as well as his preference for 'loyalists which were such as ran about drinking and huzzaing',² was leading him into the trap that shut on him in the next reign and, even before Charles died, he was being outbid in the royal favour by Sunderland and Godolphin, who represented the supreme influence of forces above party and below constitutional government, centring in the Duchess of Portsmouth.

Three other ministers, though with diminished force, still

¹ Lingard, ix. 469; Ranke, iv. 132; *Sidney Diary*, ii. 213.

² North, i. 237.

voiced in the King's councils the old high Tory principles. Free from those secret by-ways in which Hyde moved so uneasily, Ormonde continued to hold the Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland until October 1684, remaining Lord Steward till his death nearly four years later. He had outlived his generation, but neither his usefulness nor his ideals, and the prestige of the Cavalier duke was still a lively asset to the throne. His views remained unaffected by panic and Popery, or by the need of placating Dissent. 'I will', he told Bishop Fell, 'through all dangers maintain and support the religion of the Church of England as it is this day taught, practised, and established by law, and the monarchy and Crown of England in a right and lawful succession.'¹ When the sons of those who had perished for Charles I are found deserting Charles II, there is a refreshment in repeating Ormonde's plain declaration of faith, which fifty years of action warranted and which no neglect could impair; that he would continue to act in the King's service 'with all the vigour time hath left me, and with all the faithfulness no time can alter or take from me'.² Supported by the King in 1680 against the impeachment or removal with which the Shaftesbury gang threatened him, and justified by simple facts against their iniquitous attempt to extend the Popish plot to Ireland, Ormonde could never 'be frightened to a resignation'. In May 1682 he crossed to England: by the King's request he prolonged his stay, and till his return to Ireland two years later took an active part in routine business.

His return to comparative favour was connected with the fall of his old critic Anglesey, who was forced that August to resign the Privy Seal he had held for a decade. Anglesey, the Arthur Annesley of the Commonwealth, seems in old age to have relapsed to his origins, and early in 1681 in a published criticism of Lord Castlehaven's *Memoirs* he had reflected on the Irish government of Charles I and Ormonde. He had, further, spoken for Exclusion, and was openly opposed to

¹ 20 Jan. 1679 (Ormonde papers, iv. 306).

² To the King, 22 July 1681 (Burghclere, *Life of James, First Duke of Ormonde* (1912), ii. 325, from the Carte MSS.). He says in Nov. 1679 that he has 'no part in Council—not so much as to be told whither they tend' (Ormonde papers, ii. 297).

York's supremacy and the unparliamentary régime.¹ The fall of this old Puritan allowed of a reconstruction of the Cabinet, which in the autumn of 1682 stood as follows: Radnor (our old surly acquaintance Robartes), Halifax, Rochester, Ormonde, Lord Keeper Nottingham, Godolphin, Conway, and Jenkins. With these colleagues, Ormonde assisted in the prosecution of Shaftesbury, the suppression of the conspiracy, the execution of Sidney and Russell, and the attack on the town charters. More particularly in the campaign to make the King once more, in Jeffreys's phrase, 'King of London', Ormonde with the Tory Lord Mayor Moore took the principal part. In all these tragic events he moved without compunction, without a doubt as to the facts, stirred only by a grave indignation at 'the monstrosity of the ingratitude of such a parricide'.² On the struggle for place between the Tory groups and the Trimmers, Ormonde looked with a cynicism born of unique experience in Stuart politics; 'if we have good luck we shall be all Tories', he told his son Arran, 'if we have bad, we shall be all Whigs.' But he leaned strongly towards the summons of a Parliament,³ and the last of the Cavalier ministers must be ranked, with the Trimmers he distrusted, as one of those who hated France, Popery, and government by mistresses.

Closely connected with Ormonde was Sir Leoline Jenkins, who succeeded Henry Coventry as Secretary in April 1680 and held office for four years precisely. This son of a Welsh farmer was, like his own Oxford tutor Henry Vaughan the Silurist and many others of his countrymen in this century, brought through an Oxford education to a passionate worship of the English Church. As a young man he had fought in the Civil War and had acted as an agent of the powerful Oxford circle led by Sheldon and Fell, and it is as a type of that Oxford High-church Toryism that he is best worth study. Beginning life again humbly after 1649 as a 'coach' at Oxford, and

¹ Ormonde papers, ii. 283, and vi. 423; Hist MSS., Report VII, 743; Anglesey's memorandum of April 1682 for the King, in *Parl. Hist.* iv, App. clxxiv.

² North, i. 300; *Halton Corr.* ii. 22; Carte, ii. 522 (ed. 1736); Ormonde to Arran, 7 July 1683 (Ormonde papers, vii, q.v. *passim*).

³ Ranke, iv. 158 n.

always constitutionally averse to the 'noise and the glittering of a court',¹ he slowly climbed, at first by Sheldon's patronage, through the Court of Arches and the Admiralty Court into an embassy at Nimwegen, and finally to the Secretaryship of State. Formerly Principal of Jesus College, he was burgess for the University in the three Exclusion Parliaments; pedantic, a giant of industry, 'heavy in his discourse', but of an admirable character, in politics he spoke once more the language of Clarendon, and found his hero in the Duke of Ormonde. The views he held, patent in every act and word and not least in the long speeches that exhausted the Commons, are exposed at full length in his own memoranda. The Papists, he notes, could not be conciliated without 'ruining of all'. The Dissenters do not quarrel about doctrine, but about government: they must either 'be governed with firm and steady reins', or else bought by concessions, 'but what those can be that will satisfy, God alone knows'. King Charles I, he thinks, should not have allowed his judgement to be overborne 'by mere appearance of danger and by popular tumults'. The third party in politics, the Church of England, 'have deserved much and have suffered much; they are the only people whose pretensions are founded on the law, and whose principles and form of government strengthen and support Monarchy'. As to the succession, 'it is better to suffer the greatest evil than to do the least injustice'. The remedy is to stand 'firm and resolute to the fundamental laws', to make no more concessions than justice demands, and to promote true religion. What his religion was, may be gathered from his hearty recommendation of Turner and Ken, the two future non-jurors, for early promotion.² Particularly active, like Ormonde, in managing the City of London, Jenkins also seems to have acted not only as a peace-maker between Hyde and Halifax, but as the hub of the whole moderate Parliamentary party in the Council, represented by himself, Ormonde, Guilford, and Halifax, and like the last he was one of those marked out for

¹ Southwell to Ormonde, 7 Feb. 1680 (Ormonde papers, iv); Aubrey, *Lives*, ed. Clark, ii, 7.

² Wynne, *Life of Sir Leoline Jenkins* (1724), *passim*; Burnet, ii, 257; North, i, 305; Ormonde papers, vi; Ailesbury, i, 42; Anthony Wood, *Life and Times*, iii, 162.

keen opposition from the French Court.¹ Something of virtue went out of the Government with the supersession of this long-winded, but indefatigably good, man by the silent and ubiquitous Sidney Godolphin.

Heneage Finch, now Lord Nottingham, the Chancellor, in whom the King lost, as Jenkins said, 'a very good servant and a very great man', died, after years of infirmity, in December 1682, having long ceased to influence politics. Whether from timidity, as some contemporaries thought, or from the acid and unaccountable egoism which often marked the politics of his sons, both he and they had taken something like a new departure during the Exclusion troubles—a fact of some prospective importance for party history. The Chancellor had vehemently opposed the dissolutions and prorogations of 1679–80, had supported Expedients, and then, it was said, had vacillated towards Exclusion.² His heir, Daniel Finch, was already in 1679 a declared adherent of Halifax, and was rumoured a year later to be 'run high into the popular way'.³ The Chancellor had come out strongly in the Parliament of 1681 for greater toleration towards Protestant Dissent; his heir was equally ardent for comprehension. Heneage Finch, the second son and from 1679 Solicitor-General, declined further promotion, and stuck closely to his department. Daniel went on with his work as a Commissioner of the Admiralty and a Privy Councillor, but took no visible part in high politics.⁴

Nottingham's successor, Francis North, first Lord Guilford, had only a negative influence, all of which was exerted to check the high-flyers, to trim the boat by supporting Halifax—often against Hyde, but always against Sunderland—and to support the resurrection of Parliament. The word Trimmer, his brother Roger says, was 'taken up to subdivide the Tory party', and, if so, one can only be grateful that the section

¹ Preston to Halifax, 24 March and 16 Oct. 1683 (Hist. MSS. vii. 341 et seq.); North, i. 305.

² He was absent through 'illness' at the crucial debate of 15 Nov. 1680 (Finch papers, ii. 96).

³ *Halton Corr.* i. 224; Foxcroft, i. 179 (from Spencer MSS.).

⁴ *Halton Corr.* i. 198; Grey, viii. 201; Burnet, ii. 279; Christie, ii. App. cxiii.

which went with Sunderland and Jeffreys was numerically a fragment. The mass of the Tories were sincerely constitutionalists, and not courtiers, but even so one must resist the temptation of identifying the politics of the Halifax¹ school with those of the Norths or of Jenkins. All moderate men could, and did, agree upon the issues which afflicted the three last years of Charles II, and join in opposition to despotism, to Popery, and to France. But these were only the circumstantial accidents of coalition: essentially, the two groups, Tories and Trimmers, set out from different principles, and marched towards different goals.

While the leaders of the various Tory wings thus jostled, joined hands, or separated in the political fog which Charles II created about him, the rank and file moved on simpler and harsher lines. The flood of anti-Popery panic in 1678 had carried off their feet the great mass of natural Royalists, and when, as it ebbed, they felt firm ground again, they found their opponents in power, themselves ejected from offices or commissions, and the City of London massed in a rival cohort against the King's government.

From these perils the mistakes of the Shaftesbury Whigs and the King's dexterity saved them, and they issued from the storm embittered, but perceptibly hardened as a distinct party. A party press had been organized, party meetings took place to choose candidates,² party favours—'little red ribbons in their hats'³—blossomed in every county from London to Nottingham. Furious meetings burned Monmouth's 'black box' or Shaftesbury's 'Association', and party clubs like 'the loyal Society' rose to defend 'the best constituted government of Church and State in the world, under the best of princes'.⁴

From the end of the Oxford Parliament the Cavalier spirit rose from its dust again. Anthony Wood's jaundice seems to disappear as he writes of the 'bonny youths' of the University, who, 'mad with joy' at the King's arrival, 'forced all that

¹ Though even moderate Whigs counted him in 1682 as a Tory (Rutland papers, ii. 75).

² e.g. in Sussex (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1680-1, 473).

³ Foxcroft, i. 300 n.; Luttrell, i. 111.

⁴ Add. MSS. 28051, f. 189.

passed by to carouse on their knees a health to their beloved Charles'. On the outrages committed by Leopold Finch, later a Warden of All Souls, and his boon companions, upon the Whig dowager Lady Lovelace, sober history draws a veil. Touching for the evil rose to huge proportions, and 3,535 of his subjects received the healing touch from Charles II on twenty-four days in the last half of 1682. The Press teemed with pamphlets and execrable poetry :

Under five hundred Kings three Kingdoms groan,
Go, Finch, dissolve them, Charles is on the throne,
And by the grace of God will reign alone.

To such strains, and at exorbitant length, ascended the Muse of Topsham, Devon, and many more.¹ Weekly, the *Observer*, *Herulitus Ridens*, and *The Loyal Protestant Intelligencer* vented invective against the last two Parliaments and the Dissenters ; even the Duke shared in the reborn popularity of the Crown :

The glory of the British line,
Old Jimmy's come again.

In the week before Shaftesbury's trial Dryden issued *Absalom and Achitophel*, and a year later his play, *The Duke of Guise*, rubbed in the moral. As the epilogue compendiously put it :

Our play's a parallel : the Holy League
Begot our Covenant ; Guisards got the Whig.

The passions whose embers still shed a feeble glow over these songs, plays, and pamphlets were only too real in politics, reviving in even more bitter form those which Clarendon had set himself to extinguish, in days when the Cavalier Parliament was young. An orgy of fulsome adulation to the throne, of drinking, and of persecution, broke over the right wing : ' In their cups ', writes Burnet, ' the old valour and the swaggerings of the Cavalier seemed to be revived.' The dying fires of religious persecution flamed up fiercely. Elizabeth's legislation, which in 1680 the cooler heads of the party had been ready to repeal, was now evoked, and Baxter was once more imprisoned under the Five Mile Act. Addresses to the Crown from boroughs and Grand Juries, from apprentices,

¹ Alfred Morrison papers, Report IX, 457 ; Wood, ii. 524 et seq.

watermen, and Jamaica planters, showed, if not their genuine feelings, at least the sentiments which Tory ruling classes thought appropriate for these occasions. Cirencester hopes 'that your Majesty's most gracious inclinations may in due time meet with a temperate, sober, religious, and loyal House of Commons, that may carefully shun the footsteps of that fatal assembly in '40'. The war-like county of Cornwall vows, 'what we tell your Majesty in black character we shall be ready to confirm in a red'. The justices of Seymour's Devon begged the King 'never to trust this generation of men more, whose religion had its birth in rebellion and is as inconsistent with monarchy as light with darkness'. And so on, through miles of weariness, where notoriously Whig boroughs profess that they blush for their sins, and counties soon to welcome Monmouth or William declare their loathing of Exclusion. Yet in this verbiage, half spontaneous and half forced, lies the evidence of that last wonderful fervour for the Stuart kingship, as representing the cause of order against anarchy. The misery of the last four years was concluded to be the natural outcome of toleration: 'these are your right true Protestant dissenters who play the devil for God's sake, who would murder their king, out of a point of tender conscience, to avoid the effusion of blood: whom mercy, indulgence, and repeated kindness cannot oblige: whom miracles of Providence cannot convert: whom reason and the interest of the nation cannot convince; who grow wild with conscience and stark mad with toleration'.¹

Tory enthusiasm for the King was all the greater, in that tactically he had shown himself a magnificent leader. 'I will stick by you and my old friends', he told Reresby, in November 1680, 'for if I do not, I shall have nobody to stick by me.' But his old friends had heard this before, and while the storm ran high they feared the King might go the way of his father who, they thought, had by concessions lost them all. All the keener their joy, then, when resolute and continued action really followed. On all sides, from the high-minded Ormonde down to the most rabid and shabby foxhunter, there was a cry

¹ J. Nalson, *The Countermine* (4th ed.), 1684-5; Oldmixon, *History of Addresses*.

that the sickle must be put in, and the full harvest reaped: 'tis now come to a Civil war', one wrote to Jenkins, 'not with the sword, but law, and if the King cannot make the judges speak for him, he will be beaten out of the field.' By the end of 1681 the decision of no quarter for Whigs was taken at Court: 'not one man of them shall be employed either in the Navy or in any branch of the revenue, and even Whitehall will be purged of all the Whiggish party.'¹ The discovery of the Rye House plot in 1683 stiffened this resolution, and directly assisted the dangerous operation of dislodging the Whigs from the borough councils, the commission of the Peace, and the militia; how complete a monopoly of local administration the Tories now won was amply shown four years later by King James's herculean efforts to reverse it.

By 1685 death, exile, swingeing fines, or petty persecution had overtaken every prominent member of the Shaftesbury party, and reaction had gone at a pace which made Ormonde, Evelyn, and all Tories of moderation shake their heads. The King presumably meant at some future date to allow the meeting of a Parliament, though he would make certain it should be of a favourable temper, but there were pessimists who thought that Parliament had gone for ever. A new and servile school of prerogative lawyers burned incense which would have nauseated Clarendon, and Jeffreys publicly rebuked bld-fashioned members of the Bar for their exploded constitutional prejudices.

For the full flower of this furious fanaticism, of which many were so soon to repent in dust and ashes, we may look finally to the University of Oxford, from which fearful Whig parents were now withholding their hopeful sons for fear of perversion. A single instance of its Tory tyranny is enough. In September 1683 a Fellow of Lincoln College was expelled the University for 'Whiggism'—among the articles delated against him, by his colleagues, being one that 'he commended to some of his pupils Milton as an excellent book and an antidote against Sir Robert Filmer, whom he calls too high a Tory'.² In 1684

¹ Anon. to Jenkins, *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1680-1, 660; Longford to Ormonde, 24 Dec. 1681 (Ormonde papers, vi. 274).

² Wood, *loc. cit.*, iii. 70.

a greater man was driven from this Eden, for the King, Visitor of Christ Church, bade his college expel John Locke.

And now, in this St. Martin's summer of the high Tory feeling, at that psychological moment of decadence when pundits codify the passions for which warriors have fought, the University issued to the world a solemn symbol of its faith; the date, the 21st July 1683, was a fitting one, for it was the day of Lord Russell's execution. Selecting a long list of propositions,¹ historical, theological, and moral, from the writings of their opponents, they condemned them, one and all, as 'false, seditious, and impious, . . . and destructive of all government in Church and State'. Four of the twenty-seven articles on this Index will show its trend.

(1) 'All Civil authority is derived originally from the people. (2) There is a mutual contract, tacit or express, between the prince and his subjects, and that if he perform not his duty they are discharged from theirs. (4) The sovereignty of England is in the three estates—King, Lords, and Commons. The King has but a co-ordinate power and may be overruled by the other two. (10) Possession and strength give a right to govern, and success in a cause or enterprise proclaims it to be lawful and just.' Lastly, the anathema runs, 'we command and strictly enjoin all and singular, the readers, tutors, catechists and others, to whom the care and trust of instruction of youth is committed, that they diligently instruct and ground their scholars in that most necessary doctrine which, in a manner, is the badge and character of the Church of England, of submitting to every ordinance of man, for the Lord's sake, whether it be to the King as supreme or unto Governors as unto those that are sent by him, . . . teaching that this submission and obedience is to be clear, absolute, and without exception of any state or order of men'.

Much about the same time old Bishop Morley, soon to die, sent by Lord Dartmouth a message to the Duke of York 'that if ever he depended upon the doctrine of non-resistance, he would find himself deceived'. Time was to justify the bishop in due course against his University, but the impression of the

¹ The whole in Kenyon papers, 163.

moment was better expressed by the King's acknowledgement in the official narrative of the Rye House plot, 'of the delightful sense' he had of the constancy of the 'Old Loyal Party', whom he 'looks on as the great pillars and supporters of his throne. By them therefore His Majesty declares, he will always stand, and then he is sure by God's grace he can never fall'. Only the slightest reproach to those Royalists, who had 'well approved their loyalty to his Glorious Father in the last age of rebellion', but had 'very much staggered in this', suggested that this last spasm of loyalty did protest too much.¹

'And thus the nation was delivered over on the death of King Charles "à la sottise de son frère".'²

¹ 'A true account of the horrid conspiracy', &c. (1685).

² 'An expression used by King Charles on many occasions' (Bolingbroke, *Works*, II. 67 n.).

VIII

JAMES II AND THE REVOLUTION, 1685-8

THE four years' reaction, closing with the death of Charles II, had obscured the real crux of politics, that no logical process could reconcile the Tory political theory with their constitutional sense or their religious convictions. The rule of Charles's successor was destined to strip off the intercepting veils of enthusiasm, and to leave this inconsistency naked, repulsive, and challenging.

But in February 1685 only the rare diviners of politics, the bland ambition of Halifax or the tireless scrutiny of Churchill, penetrated the glamour of a new reign still warm with loyal devotion. The Tory masses, who between the fall of Danby and the flight of Shaftesbury wandered far in the by-ways of Limitations or Exclusion, had since 1682 been flocking back to the King's high-road, along which James indomitably beckoned them. Like Louis XIV, they turned with growing appreciation to the 'firmness' of one who had never faltered, whose belief had been unwavering that any concessions meant ruin, and who had said even in the darkest days that the Crown must stick to the 'old Cavalier and truly loyal' party. His zeal for his own religion was known and dreaded, but loyalists hoped that the last fifteen years had taught him the feelings of his people, and that he would be content with some moderate relaxation of the penal laws.

His first words as King redoubled their fervour. 'I have', he declared to the Council within a quarter of an hour of his brother's death, 'been reported to be a man for arbitrary power, but that is not the only story that has been made of me; I shall make it my endeavour to preserve this government both in Church and State as it is now by law established. I know the principles of the Church of England are for

Monarchy, and the members of it have showed themselves good and loyal subjects ; therefore I shall always take care to defend and support it.' At Rochester's request the King signed for publication a copy of this declaration, which Finch drew up from memory, and though, in later years, he accused the Solicitor-General of exaggerating his meaning, the immediate effect was great—for, whatever else he might be, James was held to be a man of his word.¹ On the following day Sancroft, and such bishops as were in London, underlined this pledge : it was the Church's ' holy boast ', they told him, ' that she hath been always loyal to her kings, even in the greatest trials ', and they would treasure up in their hearts ' that admirable declaration '. The proclamation announcing an early summons of Parliament, the punishment meted out to Oates, Dangerfield, and Baxter, the knighthood given to L'Estrange, and the King's zeal in touching for the evil—at all these the Tories hugged, yet more closely, to their bosom the comforting belief that at last they had a sovereign who was a true Cavalier.

The King's first Ministry sharply reversed the final rearrangements made by Charles in the previous summer ; instead of Rochester, it was now Halifax who was ' kicked upstairs ' to be Lord President, while Rochester became Lord Treasurer and his brother Clarendon Privy Seal. The Cabinet inner circle was made up of Rochester, Sunderland, who remained as Secretary, and Godolphin, who moved from the Treasury to be chamberlain to the Queen. Both the latter ministers had been Exclusionists, but both had shown inclusive readiness to swallow any professions, and both seemed to the trained eye of Louis XIV to be apt instruments for despotism.

Here, in fact, lay the future rift in the Government, for Sunderland from the first received the secret confidences of both kings in a measure denied to Rochester, the titular leader.²

The choice of Rochester as head of the Ministry was, indeed, not merely a compliment to the Tories, or a reward for long service, or the natural effect of his near relationship to the

¹ James, *Life*, ii. 4 ; Barillon, 19 Feb. (Fox, App. xvi) ; Reresby, 315.

² Barillon (Fox, App. xxv, lxiv, cv).

Crown, but must be taken as part and parcel of James's first phase of policy—one most repugnant to the ardent Catholics—to win liberty of conscience for his co-religionists through the agency of the Established Church. This, he explained to Barillon, must be a gradual process, but he looked on the Dissenters as republicans, whereas many Anglicans seemed to him unconscious Catholics, who might be won without much difficulty to the true faith.¹

To push through such a policy assumed, as a first step, an agreeable House of Commons—and the whole government influence was used at the elections to secure the return of members 'of approved loyalty and affection'. Little opposition need be feared in close preserves like the dockyard towns or the new-modelled corporations, and least of all in Cornwall, where the 'wheedling' of Lord Bath returned many courtiers, or 'foreigners' as Bishop Trelawny called them. But the energies of the Royalist magnates and a good deal of spontaneous enthusiasm to the tune of 'No Black Box, No Bill of Exclusion, no Association', swept the polls in more unexpected places. Bedfordshire returned no Russell, even Cheshire (Monmouth's chief centre) sent up Royalists, and in a House including over 350 new members there were only some forty of whom James found himself unable to approve.²

'Such a landed parliament was never seen', says Ailesbury, nor, he might have added, since 1661 one so exuberantly loyal. Before the session began, some 250 members attended a meeting at the Fountain tavern, Strand; there they agreed to proposals put forward for granting the King for life the revenues enjoyed by his brother, approved the nomination of Jeffreys's friend Trevor as Speaker, as against Meres, the candidate of Guilford and the moderates, and selected Christopher Musgrave, who had been specially ardent for the King's revenue, as chairman of the committee of privileges.³ The speech from the throne, on the 22nd May, solemnly renewed the pledges given in February to the Council, but proceeded to impugn

¹ *Ibid.*, xxxii; Lingard, x, App., Note A.

² Bodl. Tanner MSS. 28. f. 102; Burnet, iii. 16; Evelyn, 22 May 1685; Rutland papers, ii. 86; *Clarendon Corr.* i. 183; Foxcroft, i. 445, note 1; Finch papers, ii. 189.

³ Ailesbury, i. 100; Bramston, 197; Burnet, iii. 39.

the 'popular argument', that frequent Parliaments would be best secured by doling out periodical supplies; 'this', James said crisply, 'would be a very improper method to take with me'. The powder, as it were, of his speech was a demand of the revenues for life—the jam, an announcement that the Whig rebel Argyll had landed in the Highlands.

The 'loud shouts' greeting each blunt period showed that, fired by the appeal to their patriotism, a large majority would meet the King's pledges more than half-way. Both this and subsequent demands for supply were conceded without grumbling; against Argyll and Monmouth they offered their lives and fortunes; the bill brought forward in the Commons for preservation of the royal person recalled the enthusiasm of 1661 and, in spite of Maynard's experienced warnings, fixed enormous penalties of disfranchisement and incapacity on all who, by writing, printing, or speaking, attacked the King or the established government.

All this, as James graciously told them, was the 'natural effect' of their being 'monarchical and Church of England men', but even in this formal session it was plain enough that their loyalty had stated limits. Seymour, still the outstanding Tory commoner in England, moved to delay supply; the majority hissed his speech, which was chiefly concerned with West-country elections damaging his own 'interest', but, though unconcerted and unseconded, it left its impression, for it voiced an uneasiness at the back of the average member's mind. If Parliament, he argued, were vitiated by forced elections, the only security against Popery and arbitrary rule disappeared; was there not already talk of repealing the Test and Habeas Corpus? In the same week, a group led by Sir John Lowther and including the loyal Willoughbys, moved for a committee to consider the elections; it was crowded out, but only to make room for the far more burning question of religion.¹ A unanimous report from the Committee of Religion suggested a petition to the Crown for the enforcement of the laws against all Dissenters whatsoever, and only extreme pressure on bishops, members, and placemen managed to quash

¹ Reresby, 324; Barillon (Fox, App. lxxxix); Lingard, x. 140; Bramston; Ailesbury, Lonsdale, *Memoirs*, 5; Burnet.

it. Even so, the Speaker's reiterations in presenting the revenue bill ('our excuse', the Tory Bramston noted, 'for the haste we made, before we had done anything for security of the Protestant religion, liberty, and property'), were in effect a protest: 'we bring not with it any bill for the preservation or security of our Religion, which is dearer to us than our lives, in that we acquiesce, entirely rely, and rest wholly satisfied, in your Majesty's gracious and sacred word, repeated declaration, and assurance'.¹

Numerous signs indicated that neither the King's policy nor his choice of ministers satisfied the Tory-Protestant Commons. One motion, introduced not (it was thought) without the support of Rochester and Halifax, proposed to dismiss from office all who had supported Exclusion.² A bill to reverse Lord Stafford's attainder made slow progress; the Commons would never, good observers thought, pass its preamble, which condemned the whole Popish plot as an imposture. A question from Lowther revealed a wish in some Parliamentary circles to challenge the King's relations with France.³

The inevitable storm, of which these things were distant mutterings, was for the time being conjured away by Monmouth's invasion. In itself this rebellion was far less the rehearsal of 1688 than a last flash from the 'good old cause' of 1642. Those who were to be the men of 1688 were still loyal to the Crown. Orange sent the British troops in his service back to the King's assistance. No Whig magnate joined the invader; Lumley, one of the famous 'seven' in 1688, now led the Sussex militia against him. The stuff and brains of the rebellion were supplied by Cromwellian veterans, in Wildman and Rumbold, by survivors of Shaftesbury's pretorians in Goodenough and Fergusson, by adventurers like Buyse or Howard of Escrick, and by fiery Puritans of Taunton and Lyme. The phenomena of the Civil War reappeared. Once more rebels stabled their horses in cathedrals, once more Tory gentry raised troops of horse, again Oxford undergraduates improvised corps of volunteers, Peter Mews, no longer a captain but Bishop of Winchester, again took the field.

¹ *Parl. Hist.* iv. 1359; Bramston, 202.

² Barillon, lxxi, xcii.

³ Barillon, cvi; Ranke, iv. 216, quoting Barillon's letter of 10 June.

Sedgemoor gave the King a long respite from external anxiety, but the only use made of it was to drive on more rapidly towards despotism, and by the autumn he had cut himself adrift from the Cavalier Parliament, the only solid basis (had he known it) of his throne. The execrable doings of Jeffreys and Kirke in the West revolted the most fanatical Tory; 'the country looks, as one passes, already like a shambles', wrote Charles Lyttleton from Taunton.¹ The cruel panic against the Dissenters, which brought Cornish, an ex-Sheriff of London, to the block for an unproved share in the Rye House plot, and relegated Baxter again to prison, might leave the Commons cold, but the murderous execution of Alice Lisle and the high-handed arrest of scores of loyal Whig gentry touched their class feeling and their political sense.² Deeper still was the fear of the standing army, now raised by James to twenty thousand men; deepest of all, the growing horror of Popery. The King had welcomed the rising as an opportunity of employing Catholics on equal terms with Protestants, and by early June had taken his first open steps. He hoped to meet Parliament with accomplished facts, which would smooth the way for legislation:³ Dumbarton and Gordon were given command of the forces in Scotland; the Catholics of Ireland were being armed; in England many received commissions.

And this was one branch only of a general campaign, which made all Royalists despair. Even in March he had ordered Sancroft and Compton to silence anti-Catholic preaching, and at the same time had placed a new and sinister interpretation upon his earlier pledges; his protection of the Church, he said, must be conditional on his wishes being respected.⁴ His insistence on attending mass in state embarrassed the Tory ministers: Ormonde refused to go beyond the ante-chamber, Rochester salved his flabbier conscience by a week-end in the country. In September Leyburn arrived as bishop *in partibus infidelium*, and in November D'Adda as papal nuncio. The

¹ *Halton Corr.* ii. 60; cf. Alesbury, i. 121.

² Portland, iii. 385.

³ Barillon to Louis XIV, 16 July (Fox).

⁴ *Ibid.*, 2/12 March (Lingard, x, App., Note A).

same month saw London filled with Huguenot refugees, fleeing the wrath of the King's great ally.

All this was not unconnected with a change in the balance of the Ministry. Lord Keeper Guilford, whom James had once commended as 'bold, as well as very loyal', died early in September, and Jeffreys, whose bloody circuit in the West had earned royal commendation, reigned in his stead.¹ The dismissal of Halifax in October from the Presidency and the Council was a more resounding blow, and implied a breach with all enlightened conservatives. At the Council meetings in the summer he had spoken with great plainness in defence of the Test and Habeas Corpus, and Rochester's efforts failed to postpone the ministerial crisis till after the autumn session.² The Tories proper were restless. 'Men that wear red coats, that have leapt hedge and ditch in everything else, . . . swear they will never give up these bills'; Nottingham, Bishop Compton, Danby, and Heneage Finch—all these, Halifax declared, were now in deadly earnest against the Court.³

Rochester's position, as the special representative in the Government of the Church established, was fast becoming impossible. Between him and Sunderland there was a deep gulf fixed. By his old relations with the Duchess of Portland, Sunderland had a prior claim on the good opinion of Louis XIV, and he was ready to go a very considerable way in James's Catholic designs. Both ministers, and Godolphin too, were cognizant of the secret money treaties with France, but yet with a difference. Rochester was playing the part of a meaner Danby, and Barillon recognized that neither he nor Godolphin would ever entirely forsake their well-established relations with Orange, or cut themselves off from any chance of co-operation with Parliament. And in the last resort Rochester's Anglicanism, even though tempered by a hunger for the loaves and fishes, was political reality. Certainly as early as July he was replaced in the King's confidence by Sunderland, and was

¹ James to Orange, 18 Dec. 1682 and 10 Sept. 1685 (Dalrymple).

² Barillon (Fox, cxxii); cf. James's lament that Trenchard escaped him through Habeas Corpus (Dalrymple, 15 June 1685).

³ Halifax to Chesterfield (Foxcroft, i. 455, citing *Letters of the Second Earl of Chesterfield*, October 1685).

henceforth little consulted except on technical or routine business.¹

In this gloom opened, on the 9th November, the last session of this last Royalist Parliament. The King's speech surpassed the darkest expectations. Not merely did he demand large supply to maintain 'a good force of well-disciplined troops', but he announced his determination to retain the Catholic officers already commissioned. A 'great dejection of countenance' and a long silence in the Commons recalled the days of Coke and Eliot; led by Jennings and Clarges, they rejected Secretary Middleton's motion for an immediate vote of thanks, and adjourned for three days to concert their resistance.²

At the sitting of the 12th November opposition, obviously prepared, broke out on the popular ground of championing the militia against a standing army. Jennings spoke again with great applause, Clarges, Ashburnham, Trumbull, and Twisden voiced every section of the moderates, ~~Seymour~~, following the traditional Tory policy, declared a standing army, inconsistent with the national safety; 'all the profit and security of this nation is in our ships, and had there been the least ship in the Channel', Monmouth could not have landed. Rejecting a motion, by 225 to 156, to give supply for the additional forces, the House resolved to couple their grant with a bill for reformation of the militia. The next day they carried the offensive farther, the division being more significant from the abstention, or the hostility, of many members in royal pay. By 183 to 182 (Jennings and Clarges tellers for the majority), Middleton's proposal for immediate supply was finally refused, and it was resolved to take on the morrow the paragraph in the royal speech dealing with religion. It was noted that even the Solicitor-General opposed the Secretary's efforts to burke the debate, and that prominent placemen, like Musgrave, Goodrick, and Stephen Fox, had voted with the majority.³ The debate of the next morning, the 14th, was less fevered, perhaps through fears of dissolution, and the speeches showed 'great tenderness and deference to the King', but the

¹ Barillon (Fox), lix-cxliii *passim*; Ailesbury, i. 104, 121; Burnet, iii. 123.

² Bramston, 210.

³ ——— to John Ellis, 14 Nov. (B. M. Add. MSS. 28875, f. 426).

address, as finally adopted on the 16th, was firm as ever on the main issue. It emphasized the illegality of the dispensing power, promised a bill to indemnify the existing Catholic officers, and asked his Majesty to remove the apprehensions of his faithful subjects. The same evening, the House proceeded to determine the amount of their supply. The ministers, backed this time by Musgrave and Meres (and rumours were flying of money passed to mellow opposition), asked £1,200,000; Jennings, to the legitimate indignation of Sir Winston Churchill, moved for £200,000. A resolution to give £400,000 was beaten by a very narrow majority, and a compromise of £700,000 adopted, by 212 to 170. The revelations of the army's lawlessness and plundering kept the debate at a high temperature, but there was still a bare chance left that the King would secure an unconditional grant.

Silence in the face of opposition was, however, never one of James's virtues, and his reply to the address was fatally decisive. Speaking with 'great warmth', he said that he had not expected such an address from such a House of Commons, but that he would still be steady to all his promises. The reading of this speech on the 18th produced the usual long silence of embarrassed loyalty, but they proceeded to take a Militia Bill in committee, and resolved to resume it on the 21st. Their real feelings only flared up, and then by chance, in the evening. The young Whig tribune, Wharton, moved to consider the King's reply on the 20th; the Tory Coke of Melbourne, in seconding, observed, 'I suppose we are all Englishmen and not to be frightened with a few high words'. For this he was sent to the Tower, and the motion dropped; but it was 'generally liked', says Reresby, and Seymour and Clarges had supported it.

The Lords, moreover, showed in the King's own presence the distance now dividing him from his natural supporters. Devonshire's motion to take the royal speech into consideration was supported not merely by Mordaunt and by Halifax, but by Tory Councillors like Nottingham and Bridgewater—and, most of all, in a speech of extreme significance from Danby's old protégé, Bishop Compton, highest of Tories and once tutor to the Princesses Mary and Anne. The bishop

'spoke long, calmly, with great respect and deference to his Majesty, yet very full and home'; speaking in the name of all his brethren—'at which they all rose up'—he declared the Test Act the only and the necessary dyke against the flood of Popery. On the next day, the 20th November, James prorogued Parliament—never to meet it again. A 'hard matter', as L'Estrange lamented, 'to make a people that have been used to license and riot believe the necessary prerogatives of an imperial prince to be less than tyranny'.¹

The last events of the old year showed that James was set upon his fatal road. Sunderland, who almost at the same time began to receive a pension from Louis XIV, was given Halifax's Presidency, in addition to the seals. The Bishop of London was struck off the Council. The first of many purges, which were to sweep from the Crown its best supporters, began with the officials and officers who had offended by their votes in Parliament; Willoughby and three other Berties were in the forefront of this ever-recruited army of martyrs.² For popular opinion, we may look to the by-election at Bristol, where the town clerk, though nominated by the bishop, the Lord Chancellor, and the Duke of Beaufort, dare not appear in person, and mobs thrashed his rare supporters; all this, as 'a sort of revenge for ill-treatment by my Lord Chancellor and the soldiers, and as if it were high time for Protestants of all sorts to be friends'.³

To follow the succeeding measures of the King, which gradually drove the whole nation, if not to attack his government, at least (in Halifax's words) 'to sit still and let it be undone', were to rewrite the history of the reign; we need record only the alienation of Tory opinion, which ran on parallel, if slower-moving, lines.

It was not till after the New Year of 1687 that James finally abandoned the scheme of alliance with the Tory Churchmen, and, until that point was reached, Parliament was not dissolved

¹ Bramston, 213-17; Reresby, 344-8; Luttrell, i. 364; Barillon to Louis XIV, 16/26 Nov. (Fox); Bonnet (Ranke); *Parl. Hist.*; Foxcroft, i. 458; L'Estrange to Charlett, Jan. 1686 (Bodl. Ballard MSS. xi. 94).

² 'They have cleared the army of our whole family,' writes Charles Bertie, 17 Dec. (Rutland papers, ii. 97); see also Luttrell, i. 367, and Reresby, 348.

³ Southwell to Ormonde, 19 Dec. (Ormonde papers, vii. 404).

but continually prorogued. For the present the Hydes kept their places, but they were powerless, their advice was not taken, and their love (or need) of well-paid appointments exploited. Rochester had, after Sedgemoor, begged the King to admit no more Catholic officers, and still maintained that, with a little bribery and some show of moderation, Parliament might be conciliated. But the combination of the Queen, Father Petre, and the whole French and Catholic interest was much too strong for him, and his fall, though postponed, merely waited on the King's convenience.¹

The desperate folly of James's proceedings lay radically in this, that with a little effort he could have secured every reasonable liberty a Catholic could desire. 'The old Catholic families—Bellasis, Gorings, and others who had bled for the Crown on a dozen fields, those at whom Barillon jeered as 'bons Anglais'—asked only a gradual amelioration of the penal code; they were in despair at the uncompromising speeches of November, for their hope of permanent security depended on maintaining decent terms with Orange, the prospective master of the throne. The nuncio D'Adda, the King's first confessor the Capuchin Mansuete, Cardinal Howard, the Pope himself—all disliked France and the Jesuits, and all counselled moderation. Rochester, it is pretty clear, would have assisted them, Halifax had spoken of compromise, even the Commons had thrown out a feeler in the direction of conditional dispensation.²

As it was—obsessed by his own obstinacy, by Sunderland's resolution to outstrip his rivals, and by the advice of Louis XIV—James pressed forward. Not content with passing pardons for his Catholic officers, he fell back on the prerogative ways of his father, referred the validity of the dispensing power to extra-judicial opinions from the Bench, and replaced dissentient judges by others more plastic. He hoped, it seems, that decisions, given in due process of law, would make a future

¹ *Clarendon Corr.* ii. 118; Reresby, 349; Barillon, 11 March and 17 Jan. For Clarendon's dire need of money, see his correspondence with Rochester.

² Barillon, 2/12 Nov. 1685 (Fox); Mazure, ii. 72, 126 (Bonrepaux's reports); Ailesbury, i. 126, 152; *Ellis Corr.* i. 47, 155; Halifax in *The Trimmer*: debate of 14 Nov. 1685; Egmont papers, ii. 168; D'Adda, cited by Macaulay and F. Croft

session more amenable to reason, and at the same time allow him to face the country with an established phalanx of Catholic officials.¹ In the test case of Sir Edward Hales, the 'new very young' Chief Justice Herbert prepared for himself a death in exile by defending the dispensing power, and by proclaiming once more that impeccably legal, but unconstitutional, doctrine of an inalienable prerogative, which in harsher form had fifty years earlier been the ruin of Chief Justice Finch.

In virtue of this decision, the Council received into its ranks the Catholic peers—Bellasis, Arundell of Wardour, Powis, and Dover. In May the Solicitor-General Finch was dismissed; he had taken legal objection to the appointment of Obadiah Walker (the 'old Ave-Maria' of Oxford street boys) to be Master of University College. His elder brother, Nottingham, had already distinguished himself by hostility to Jeffreys,² and was henceforth in open opposition. In July 1686, in defiance of the Act of 1661, a new court of High Commission was created, with almost universal powers over ecclesiastical law, discipline, and morals. Before the year closed Compton was suspended from the active duties of his bishopric, and Sancroft from attendance at the Council. A royal letter of March had warned preachers to avoid controversy, and only the archbishops' resistance stopped the suppression of Sunday afternoon catechizing, then the kernel of the Anglican system.³ James not only struck down the Church's leaders, choked its liberties, and attacked its liturgy, but outraged its every prejudice by wanton aggression. In the army's summer quarters on Hounslow Heath, where he spent much of his time, Dumbarton showed a Catholic hospitality out of all proportion to his own income, and the mass was openly celebrated. The private chapel at St. James's, served by the Benedictines, was not enough; James built a second at Whitehall. The Franciscans had a settlement in Lincoln's Inn Fields, the Carmelites another in the City, while the

¹ D'Adda, Vignola, and Barillon: Ranke, iv. 288, 291.

² Weymouth to (?), 30 Jan. 1686 (B. M. Add. MSS. 28569).

³ Ranke, iv. 294 (citing Bonnet); the English, Halifax said, 'generally place their religion in the pulpit, as the papists do theirs upon the altar' (to Chesterfield, 20 July 1686, Foxcroft, i. 467).

Jesuits ran a chapel and a flourishing school in the Savoy.¹ In December, under a dispensation overriding almost as many statutes as it contained clauses, the Catholic John Massey (one day to die as confessor to the Blue nuns at Paris) was named Dean of Christ Church.

If the Tories looked beyond England, they only saw Popery triumphant. In Scotland the Hydes' connexion, Queensberry, had lost the treasurership; two brothers and converts, Perth and Melford, were Chancellor and Secretary; the Catholic Duke of Gordon held Edinburgh Castle. As for Ireland, the Lord-Lieutenant Clarendon had been handcuffed from the start by the independent army command given to Tyrconnel,² who used it remorselessly to weed out Protestants, whether officers or rank and file. Tyrconnel was, moreover, directing a Catholic association, whose aims were the clean sweep and a reversal of the Settlement laws; indeed—unknown to James, to Sunderland, or to Barillon—he was discussing with Louis XIV the independence of Ireland.³ The Lord-Lieutenant's nominations to sheriffdoms were sharply criticized from London as 'Protestant', 'Whiggish', or Cromwellian, and as early as March 1686 Sunderland announced that the King had 'for a great while thought it absolutely necessary for his service to make alterations in Ireland, both in the civil government and the army'. The policy was acted on without delay—with the natural effect, that the never-extinguished hell-fires of 1641 slowly flared up into flame; the old proprietors forbade render of rents to Protestants, the priesthood any payment of tithe to ministers of the Church established. The wheel was, indeed, come full circle when old Ormonde, whose life spanned the whole creation of the English interest, could write, 'I had rather live and die in Carolina than in Ireland'.⁴

Clarendon, whose family worries had in other respects weakened his powers of resistance, had, nevertheless, laid down for himself a rule of conduct which was not despicable

¹ James, *Life*, ii. 79; Lingard, x. 216 et seq. (quoting Barillon); Gutch, *Collectanea Curiosa*, i. 294; Halifax, *ut supra*.

² This division of command had been planned by Sunderland even in 1684, when Rochester was appointed as Lord-Lieutenant (Trumbull MSS., All Souls College, Oxford).

³ Mazure, ii. 287.

⁴ *Clarendon Corr.* i. 284, 293, 534; ii. 27; Ormonde papers, vii. 483.

when considered in the light of his political principles, and his close relation to the Crown—'of not suffering myself to be provoked, till it be declared that a man of my principles is not longer fit to be in the government'. If he was to stay, 'it must be upon the English principle of the excellent Church of England',¹ and this genuine adherence to the Church attaches a political importance, and some pathos, to the correspondence of the two brothers, who every day felt flashing nearer the inevitable Damoclean sword. When Rochester's name appeared in the Ecclesiastical Commission, Clarendon begged him not to be prevailed upon 'to hurt the best Church in the world'. But his fears were unfounded. Rochester had opposed both the creation of the commission and its condemnation of Compton, and, powerful though his interest remained—supported as it was by Ormonde and Dartmouth, by Middleton and Preston, by the nuncio D'Adda and the Spanish ambassador Ronquillo—he was marked down for destruction. The Queen imputed to him, apparently without foundation, the favour shown to James's witty and Protestant mistress, Catharine Sedley, now created Countess of Dorchester: Sunderland and Father Petre vowed it would never be possible to carry repeal of the Test, so long as the King's first minister championed the Church interest. By the end of November James had screwed himself up to a decision. Rochester's last interview on the 19th December—even though the King 'wept almost all the time'—did not shake it, and theological conferences had not moved the Treasurer. On the 5th January 1687 the staff was therefore taken from him. On the 1st Clarendon had been recalled; 'I do every day bless God', he had written to his brother before the event, 'for the grace and courage He has given you to persevere in the right, and to tread the steps my father went before us.'²

The fall of the Hydes reverberated from London to every Tory house in England, and died away at Paris in an echo of applause; it marked, thought Barillon, the definite victory of the 'Catholic cabal'. Public opinion realized that 'many

¹ *Clar. Corr.* i. 474, ii. 128.

² Mazure, ii. 148, 180 (quoting Barillon); Lingard, x. 197, 223; *Clar. Corr.* ii. 88, 117, 132.

more depending interests' must follow their leaders into the wilderness. The King hoped that lesser fry would be terrified into submission; to give this expected majority time to mature, he postponed the meeting of Parliament from February till April.¹ Even in November a Committee of Council had begun to add Catholics to the commission of the peace, and in February 1687 a royal letter of Indulgence for the Catholics of Scotland cast a long shadow over the Border.

For nearly two months James 'closeted' leading members of both Houses, who held place under the Crown, and a shower of dismissals showed the Tories' solidarity. Rochester lost the Wardrobe, Clarendon the Privy Seal, Newport ceased to be Treasurer, and Maynard Comptroller, of the Household; Lumley's regiment was taken away. The removals of March ranged from Arthur Herbert, Vice-Admiral of England, favourite of this reign and Lord Torrington of another, down to private members holding a cornetcy of horse, or an office in the Customs.² The pillars of London Toryism—Moore, the stout Lord Mayor of 1681, and Rich the Chamberlain—lost their gown or their office. This 'telling of noses' reached to the provinces, where judges on circuit plumped the fatal question to cautious members, who were avoiding London.³

By the middle of March the King's optimism,⁴ though not his purpose, was sufficiently shaken to make him prorogue Parliament again until November, but the same day he announced in Council his plan to give liberty of conscience to all his subjects. The issue, on the 4th April, of the first Declaration of Indulgence consummated the breach with the Church of England.

For the rest of this year James pursued, with the same blinded obstinacy, a new method to achieve the old object; to create, that is, a new political *bloc* out of Catholics, Dissenters, and apostate Tories. Long hesitating between a continuance of his efforts to remould opinion in the existing

¹ Barillon (Mazure, II. 181); *Ellis Corr.* i. 223.

² *Ibid.*, 237, 259, &c.; Luttrell, i. 396.

³ Bramston, 267; Reresby, 370.

⁴ In February he still professed that he had a 'very good prospect of being able to carry it in both houses' (to Beaufort, 12 Feb. 1687; H. MSS. Comm., Beaufort papers, 90).

Parliament and the dangerous plunge of a new one, he was soon persuaded by the never-ceasing stream of resignations and dismissals. The old anti-Exclusionist aldermen of the City continued to resign; a regiment was taken from Worcester, heir to a mighty loyalist house; Christopher Musgrave, most fanatical of Tories, who two years earlier had been trading in poor wretches convicted at the 'Bloody' Assizes, was dismissed from the Ordnance; the Duke of Somerset, who refused to attend D'Adda's public reception, lost thereby a post in the Bedchamber, a Lord-Lieutenancy, and a regiment. Ormonde was spared for his long service, but the last year of his life was plagued by ludicrous attempts upon his religious convictions.

By this time, too, the King was in the thick of the affair of Magdalen College; he had also failed to convince Orange that a relaxation of tests would be to his advantage; and the nuncio himself insisted that Catholic liberties, to be safe, must acquire Parliamentary sanction. On the 4th July, therefore, James dissolved Parliament, and in the next six months took drastic measures to break the resistance of the Church party. A Board of Regulators purged the corporations. In the counties Lord-Lieutenants were ordered to frame lists of Dissenters suitable for commissions of the militia, or the peace. They were to ask every justice of the peace to pledge himself, (1) if elected to Parliament, to assist in taking off the penal laws and the Test, (2) to contribute to the election of members so disposed, and (3) to live in peace with his neighbours of all persuasions. The greatest Royalist magnates led an almost national refusal to 'pre-engage'; Oxford lost the lieutenancy of Essex, Derby of Lancashire, Northampton of Warwick, Scarsdale of Derby, and Winchelsea of Kent. All over England the gentry who formed the backbone of the royal cause, and 'the jolly genteel citizens' who had suppressed the fanatics in the boroughs, were displaced for a few reluctant Catholics, Dissenters, 'mechanics', and the flotsam of the Whig partisans.

Resistance was so widespread, and the replies so stereotyped, that some organization clearly directed them. In Devon Edward Seymour and forty-eight other magistrates refused to commit themselves on the first question, 'till it be debated in Parliament, how the religion by law established may be

otherwise secured'; John Lowther and Daniel Fleming arranged almost identical answers for Cumberland and Westmorland. In Dorset, out of thirty-three magistrates named, twenty-six refused outright to answer. In Gloucestershire, Beaufort reported eighteen refusals, three doubtful, seventeen absent, and eighteen (eleven of them Catholics) consenting. In Buckinghamshire, a great Dissenting centre, the majority was two to one against. In Leicestershire there were six only, it seems, willing to swallow all three questions. And it was the most ardent Royalists who led the opposition. In Norfolk Sir Jacob Astley 'cannot by any means consent to the repealing of the Test'. In Stafford Sir Walter Bagot refuses 'unless there might be an equivalent'. In Worcestershire John Pakington cannot abandon safeguards for the Protestant religion, 'till I am convinced that it is now in less danger than when the laws were enacted, or some better security shall be proposed'. In Nottinghamshire the Duke of Newcastle could only recommend four Catholics as magistrates, and was happy to add, 'as for Dissenters in this county, there is no gentlemen but such as go to Church and hear Common prayer'. When such reports reached the King from the sons of the Cavaliers, it was dubiously consoling to hear that, if John Trenchard were pardoned, he would certainly be elected at Taunton—from Bedford that 'Mr. Bunyan, pastor to the dissenting congregation in this town', was pledged to support repeal—or from Buckinghamshire that a Hampden, an Ingoldsby, and a Throckmorton could safely be added to the commission.¹

This 'damnable project', as the Royalist Ailesbury calls it, sealed the alienation of the Tories from the Crown. When in Essex the Bramstons were displaced by Petres, Barringtons, and Mildmays, when in London Moore or Pritchard gave way to Pilkingtons and Papillons, when the Stanleys, the Berties, and the Finches went into opposition, a revolution had occurred in English party politics.

The King's autumn progress in the West and Midlands brought into high relief this policy, and the fruits of it. His graciousness to the Dissenters was not more marked than the

¹ Bodl. Rawlinson MSS. A. 139 *passim*; Ailesbury, 1. 162; Beaufort papers, 91; Bramston, 301, 307; Lonsdale, *Memoirs*, 17.

disgust of the Tories. Sermons from Penn were, politically, less significant than Seymour's refusal to attend his Court at Bath¹—still less than the scene in Oxford, on the 4th September, when the King ('in a transport of amazing fury'²) threatened the Fellows of Magdalen, that they should feel the weight of the righteous anger of a king. The 'Church of England loyalty', with which James taunted them, had turned at last; 'the Church of England men', he said bitterly to the Vice-Chancellor, 'were his only enemies'.³

They were, indeed, not only his enemies, but the most dangerous of them—for they were the friends he had driven from him. What had become of all the solemn pledges for the Church's safety—lavished even in the Declaration of Indulgence? The ejection of Hough, incontestably the lawfully elected President of Magdalen, was a final blow to that comforting doctrine of 'the word of a king', and in the hot, crowded Oxford High Street, patrolled by anxious wheedling Bishop Cartwright and his troops of horse, were packed the issues dividing the Tories from their King, as though by a flaming sword—statutes against dispensing and High Commission, rights of property against arbitrary decrees, the liberty of the Church and corporate bodies against despotic lawlessness. Barillon in November began to scent armed resistance; a wiser man might have felt the wind of revolution even earlier, in the 'tumultuous, seditious, and insolent hum', which greeted Hough's formal protest.⁴

And this ill wind blew with a fiercer gust after the 23rd December, for that day it was announced that the Queen was pregnant. James determined to put Mary and her child in such a position that, in the event of a minority, there should be nothing to fear from the 'faction of the Prince of Orange'.⁵ The rash scheme proposed by the more exultant Catholics, of calling a new Parliament in the early spring, was postponed; it was agreed, as a safer alternative, to push on the entire

¹ Portland papers, iii. 404

² Bonrepaux (Mazure, ii. 291). The King touched for the evil in the Cathedral choir, but heard mass in a little chapel belonging to Dean Massey, 'formerly the Dean's wood-house': Bodl. Rawlinson MSS. (Letters), 91, f. 54.

³ Bodl. Ballard MSS. 21, f. 12.

⁴ Brannston, 284 et seq.; Mazure, ii. 300 (citing Barillon).

⁵ Barillon to M^r Feb 1688 (Bodl. MSS. 11. 113)

remodelling of the corporations, to give the new (and carefully selected) sheriffs a chance of exploring the electoral ground, and to appeal to the country, specially to the Dissenters, who were unaccountably backward, in a new Declaration.

To this policy he held for nine months longer, and the prevalent rumours of a new approach to the Tories appear to be entirely groundless.¹ One and the same programme is indicated by the division of England among four vicars-apostolic in January 1688, by the issue of the second Indulgence in April, and by the appointment of Sir Harry Vane's son and Colonel Titus to the Council in July. That Tory stalwart, Christopher Musgrave, in August ironically complained that his 'rustic head' made him unable to comprehend Father Petre's supremacy, and it was not till September that the King, too late, turned back to the loyalists.

Too late, because an organized conspiracy against him had by then been in existence for more than a year, and in it one section of the Tories was engaged past redemption.

Three incidents crowned the opposition of the constitutional Tories: the affair of Magdalen College, to which allusion has been made, the case of the Charterhouse, and the resistance of the seven bishops. From the last date, June 1688, it moved faster and more resolutely—finally coalescing with an unconstitutional opposition, to which we must in due course return.

The Charterhouse case, as finally presented at midsummer 1687, was that the King, by dispensation under the Great Seal, ordered the trustees to admit a Roman Catholic as a pensioner. Headed, it seems, by Ormonde, they refused; the other signatories were Sancroft, Danby, Halifax, and Compton. It was the last public act of Ormonde's life, and his last recorded conversation expressed his wish to fight the dispensing power to the end. He died on the 21st July 1688, *felix opportunitate mortis* if ever man was, in that he did not see his master's son again an exile and a pensioner.

But even his dying ears must have heard whispers of the mortal blow dealt by the Church of his obedience against the Crown he had served. It was on the 4th May that an Order

¹ Halifax to Orange, 12 April (Foxcroft, i. 496); Ailesbury.

in Council, gazetted only on the 7th, ordered the second Declaration of Indulgence to be read on two consecutive Sundays in every church in the kingdom. On the afternoon of the 12th, after dinner at Lambeth, a small conclave considered the case—Sancroft, Compton, White of Peterborough, Turner of Ely, Clarendon, and Tenison, vicar of St. Martin's. Either way, the issue was the greatest yet put before their body. To refuse, directly conflicted with the Church's traditional obedience. It might confirm Protestant Dissenters in their bitter views of Anglican intolerance. It might simply ruin the leaders without securing the cause.

At this crisis the logic and resolution of this Lambeth conference were alike memorable. The King, they argued, could do no wrong, but his ministers could, and had; refusal of obedience to his servants' illegality was no resistance to the King—a thesis, it should be noted, which, by separating the King and the law, abandoned the citadel of the old Cavalier legal position. At their trial Finch put the new doctrine perfectly plainly: 'in all the small knowledge of the laws that I could attain to, I could never yet hear or learn, that the constitution of this government in England was otherwise than thus, that the whole legislative power is in the King, Lords, and Commons.'¹

Their fears as to the Dissenters' attitude were, in part, removed by the request received from many London ministers that they should stand fast. For over a year now the great Protestant bodies had, in fact, been drawing closer to each other, and even before the present crisis the archbishop, impressed by the need for union, had a committee working upon Prayer-Book revision, with a view to meeting moderate Dissenters on points of 'indifferency'.²

As to the expediency of resistance, some of the best heads in England (Halifax for one) advised against it, but the Lambeth conclave felt that to publish the Declaration would make the whole Church an accomplice to an illegality thrice

¹ Clarendon, *Diary*, 12 May; D'Oyley, *Sancroft*, i. 258; Kennett, iii. 482; Mazure, ii. 442.

² Archbishop Wake's account at Sacheverell's trial in 1710 (D'Oyley, i. 326). In July there were, apparently, conferences with leading dissenting ministers (*Ellis Corr.* ii. 63).

to an untrammelled despotism and obtaining an alliance against France,¹ threw James back upon the Popish camarilla. Above all, in a series of meetings at Shrewsbury's house, Dykvelt reopened direct contact between Orange and the English leaders—a contact maintained by Zulestein's 'diplomatic' visits during the succeeding year.

The letters, however, which Dykvelt carried home showed that the Tories, at least, had no concerted plan. Both Hydes were non-committal, and Rochester lamented his want of power. Lord Churchill, whose wife was all-powerful with the Princess Anne, declaimed at large upon her Protestant staunchness (which indeed the French envoy had vainly assaulted with Catholic tracts), and, of course, upon his own. Nottingham abounded in like laudable generalities. Only Danby went farther. Between him and the King there could be no real truce; his unabated² Tory zeal could expect no employment under this Gallic and Catholic dispensation, and he looked with unconcealed longing for the new era. From the first, he seems to have pushed on faster than the caution of Halifax (the appointed mediator with Dykvelt) could approve. He had tried in the previous summer to go abroad, but the King refused him leave,³ and his chief lament was this lack of personal contact; it obliged him, he said, in deference to Halifax, not to tell Dykvelt several things which he could wish the Prince were informed of.

In September 1687 the situation was still essentially unchanged. Halifax was impressing on Orange that wisdom lay in giving James enough rope, and with Halifax went Nottingham, who said that no packed Parliament need be feared, for the time being. Danby still deplored the imperfect understanding on both sides of the water, 'in relation to such future events as may probably happen', but had received from Zulestein answers he was 'glad to hear'—on matters unexplained, which probably referred to the interests of Mary or the Church's security. Particular pains were, certainly, taken this autumn to reassure the Anglicans; Sancroft hailed

¹ Mazure, ii. 251.

² In the election of 1685: 'I hope my Lord Chief Justice knows me too well to believe I shall promote any Whig's interest' (Lindsey papers, 446).

³ Hist. MSS. Comm. v. 186.

a kind letter from Mary as 'a dawn of light from the Eastern shore', and Compton applauded the Prince's 'wise resolutions'.¹ The establishment of such confidence between the forward party of the Churchmen and the Orange interest was, in fact, a necessary preliminary to all that followed, for if there is little evidence that the former, as yet, dreamed of active resistance, the Magdalen College affair had so exacerbated their feelings, that any new or comparable irritation would certainly end their passive obedience.

By the end of March 1688 Danby, at least, was clear that only resistance could save the nation, and the reasons supporting his view were solid, tangible, and numerous. A House of Commons packed by selected sheriffs and manipulated corporations, a House of Lords swamped with new creations,² an army watered with Irish Catholics, the Church silenced and dragooned—what Oliver had once done, could it not be done again? Catholic circles at Brussels were whispering, as had Barillon three years before, that the King would bring Anne's husband, Prince George, to accept the faith, and would then pass over Mary's claims in their favour.³ These arguments, fully detailed in the letter of invitation to Orange in June, were—apart from the birth of the Prince of Wales—just as valid in March as three months later, and though Halifax slighted them and built on the feud now growing between the Jesuit wing and Sunderland,⁴ the party of action would wait no longer; in April they sent Edward Russell to the Hague, to 'put the Prince to explain himself what he intended to do'. From that cold mount of vision, wherefrom William watched the signs and the seasons, the answer came that, if invited by some of the 'most valued' in the nation, 'in their own name and in the name of others who trusted them', he could be ready by the end of September. To this point, then, had matters come, before the prosecution of the seven bishops at the end of May, or the Prince of Wales's birth on the 10th June.

¹ Dalrymple, *passim*; Gutch, i. 299.

² Rumours of this had been perennial since 1686: Adda's news of Oct. 1686, in Foxcroft, i. 501 n.; Bonrepaux in 1687 (Mazure, ii. 273); Dartmouth's note on Burnet, iii. 262; Bodl. Ballard MSS. 21, f. 18, of May 1688.

³ P. R. O. Roman Transcripts (Nuncio of Flanders); for the rumour in 1685, Klopp, iii. 19.

⁴ 12 April; Foxcroft, i. 495.

By the end of May three Tory leaders were won to the cause of invasion—Danby, Lumley, and (through Danby's agency) Bishop Compton. Admiral Herbert was at the same time asked to Holland, which must have implied acceptance. On the advice of Danby and Compton, Nottingham was now trusted with the secret. On the 18th June he was apparently in full accord, but by the 30th he had recanted; 'his heart fails and he will go no farther—he saith 'tis scruples of conscience', wrote Sidney, but the backslider had at least sworn to bury his knowledge in his heart. The savage ability of General Kirke was the next gain to the cause; then General Trelawny, important since he could arrange the neutrality, at least, of his brother the bishop, whom we saw but just now so indignantly repelling the charge of disloyalty. Churchill could answer for the Prince and Princess of Denmark, and his singular naval brother George Churchill, and his brother-in-law Colonel Godfrey, were presumably enlisted at the same time. A string of Tory adhesions came in during the summer and autumn; Charles II's son Grafton, the new Duke of Ormonde, Bath, Worcester, Sir John Lowther, and Bishop Lloyd of St. Asaph—these were a few of the 'many thousands' who, we learn from Burnet, knew and kept the secret.¹

Rumours of these vast underground movements had, by the close of August, reached the upper air; Orange manifestoes were already in circulation, and a sudden recall of officers of the Plymouth garrison from London leave was a first small symptom that Government was at last awaking from its torpid optimism.² Till September, however, the royal policy—and this alone would determine the slower-moving Tories—showed no sign of fundamental change. The Ecclesiastical Commission began to collect names of clergy who had refused to read the Indulgence. James dismissed two judges who had voted for acquitting the bishops, while the survivors, as they proceeded on circuit, invited the Grand Juries' assistance against a persecuting Church. An attempt to foist Jeffreys on the University

¹ Burnet; Ralph; Ailesbury; Lonsdale's *Memoirs*.

² *Ellys Corr.* ii, 142; *Halton Corr.* ii 90. On the 27th August, Paris information to Rome predicted the invasion for November; P. R. O. Roman Transcripts.

of Oxford as its Chancellor, in succession to Ormonde, was foiled only by the unprecedented rapidity of Convocation in electing Ormonde's grandson.¹ The decision taken in Council, on the 24th August, to call a Parliament in November was due to a confident belief that both Houses could be packed, and the nomination, as late as the 8th September, of an Anabaptist fanatic as next Lord Mayor, proved that the King was still trusting to his anti-Anglican coalition.²

But, about the middle of that month, James—urged by the moderate section, Godolphin, Middleton, Dartmouth, and the now fast-retreating Sunderland—at last changed his tack. The most blindly loyal were wavering; even Ailesbury was only diverted from 'laying down' by the King's assurance that the Dutch might any day be landing. Introduction of Irish Catholics into Berwick's regiment had nearly caused a mutiny at Portsmouth, the whole garrison was in disorder, and the men deserting, while pictures of the officers cashiered for their opposition sold as quickly on London stalls as those of the seven bishops. The Catholic Admiral Strickland had disorganized the fleet by trying to celebrate Mass on his flagship. Bishop Sprat, that trusty weathercock, had thrown up his seat on the Ecclesiastical Commission. And, finally, even James's incredible incredulity was, by the 20th September, shaken at the accumulated evidence of the Dutch preparations.

His proclamation of the 21st was the first step in an inch-by-inch retreat, in which the King was far too hesitating and slow to galvanize the loyalty he had outraged, far too late to overtake Time, the galloping horseman. The proclamation itself did, in fact, promise to exclude Catholics from the Commons, but threatened the very security it offered by another obscure suggestion that part of the penal laws might be abolished. The writs for a Parliament had hardly issued before, on the 28th, they were recalled, on the ground of the threatened invasion. 'All was naught', said the profane Jeffreys, 'the Virgin Mary was to do all.'

Even when the process of retraction began in earnest, it could not undo the losses of two years. To restore the old

¹ Helped by the good offices of Rochester (Clarendon, *Diary*).

² Luttrell; Barillon's news in Mazure; Ailesbury; Burnet.

lord-lieutenants was the one essential preliminary, but it was not till the 15th October, for instance, that the great potentate Derby again took over Cheshire and Lancashire—and then only to find that the Whig Delamere's tenure had set an irresistible Orange tide running, on which by the 1st November he himself, not too unwillingly, was whirled away. The justices of the peace imitated their betters; those of Essex refused to re-engage under the Catholic Petre, and the deputy lieutenants of Derby required an attestation from the indignant Secretary Preston, that he had taken the oaths according to law. The general reluctance of the Tory gentry showed they agreed with old John Bramston, in thinking 'one kick of the breech enough for a gentleman'.

Still, some definite steps were taken to regain them. Rochester was summoned from Newmarket, and Seymour had a private audience; Nottingham kissed hands; even Danby received an olive-branch, which for sufficiently good reasons he left to wither unanswered. A beginning was made with re-Protestantizing the commission of the peace; London recovered its charter, as did many other corporations.¹ Much was hoped for from the bishops. Compton's suspension was removed, Mews, Turner, and five or six others were given a series of interviews. But the King's language at these conclaves was still as vague as human language can be, and Turner, the prelate most devoted to the Crown, saw that more expedition they must have or 'the trap will be fallen upon us ere we are aware'. At a meeting on the 3rd October Sancroft and his suffragans spoke with displeasing candour. They were grieved, their memorial said, 'to have come so far, and to have done so little'. They asked that local government should be put into hands legally qualified, that the High Commission be annulled, that the dispensing power against law should cease and that it be 'finally settled' by Parliament, that the Fellows of Magdalen be restored, the vicars-apostolic inhibited, and writs issued, 'with all convenient speed', for a Parliament, 'in which the Church of England may be secured according

¹ Clarendon, 22-7 Sept.; Luttrell; Reresby; Ailesbury; Kenyon papers, 199; Graham papers (Report VII), 412; Lothian papers; Bramston, 325; Ranke, iv. 423.

to the Acts of Uniformity, provision being made for a due liberty of conscience'.

One part only of this admirable programme, the summons of Parliament, could have effectually reassured the nation; partial reaction, as in the restoration ordered at Magdalen or the suspension of the High Commission, availed nothing, between general distrust on one side and spasms of hesitancy on the other. This distrust was so great that the warmest Tories dreaded nothing more at this moment than an attempt on the King's part to isolate the bishops. He had abandoned at the end of September a proposal, once half accepted, for a meeting of all peers in London, and had turned instead to these quiet conferences with the Church. Evelyn begged Sancroft to be on his guard—Anne warned Clarendon that the bishops would only expose themselves to misconstruction.¹

From this they were saved by the fatal hiatus between the 3rd October, the date of the last of these meetings, and the 31st, when the King next summoned them in a body—a gap explained only too clearly by the sequence of events at Whitehall and the Hague. At the one end, the Catholic faction never ceased to urge the danger of further concession, above all of a Parliament; from the other, the States-General's last dispatches in effect rejected the half-hearted schemes of alliance which James had put forward in September, and stipulated that internal reform in England must precede any understanding. Meanwhile, Louis XIV was profuse in offers of assistance, and Dartmouth rather rashly vouched for the efficiency of the English navy; 'your statesmen may take a nap and recover, the women sleep in their beds, and the cattle I think need not be drove from the shore'. On the 25th October the King was aware that a storm had temporarily put the Dutch fleet out of action, and the dismissal of Sunderland next day showed that, swept by one of his recurrent fits of optimism, he had hardened his heart.² Clarendon thought that Anne could still have induced her father to listen to 'his faithful old friends', but in fact, failing a thorough change of

¹ Gutch, 414; Clarendon, 22 Sept.—12 Oct.; Ranke, iv. 423.

² Mazure, iii. 99 et seq.; Citters's reports in Ranke, iv; Dartmouth to the King, 24 Oct. (Report XI, v. 261).

policy, the constitutional Tories could not have co-operated. Clarendon himself had already, like Nottingham, refused to sit in Council with Catholics, and Sancroft had politely evaded a suggestion, that the bishops should publicly declare abhorrence of the Dutch invasion.

On the 31st October the Prince's Declaration came into the King's hands; not merely did it rehearse the national grievances, ridicule the legitimacy of the Prince of Wales, and appeal to a free Parliament, but asserted that William had been called to England 'by divers of the Lords both Spiritual and Temporal'. James, falling back on the weapon tried before, asked for a declaration of 'abhorrence' of the invasion from the bishops, but Compton, White, and Sprat stiffened the wavering archbishop to a final decision, to do nothing without the temporal peers. On the 6th November, the day after Orange had landed, these four saw the King; they advised him, if he would not call a Parliament, to summon the Peers, and left him in great displeasure. For, from his point of view, even the Tory peers were hopeless; those he had interviewed, including Halifax, Nottingham, and Weymouth, had refused to touch 'abhorrence'.¹

Still all was not lost, even now; Orange's long halt at Exeter between the 8th and the 21st November, and the hesitation of Tories in the provinces, gave the moderates yet another chance. But now there came full into the light the decomposing effects of the previous three years on Tory unanimity. After the news of the Prince's landing reached London on the 6th, all sections were, it is true, agreed on a Parliament as the only salvation; Halifax and Nottingham on one side, the Hydes on the other, with the bishops of St. Asaph and Peterborough as intermediaries, in this were at one with Preston and the moderates at Court. But ten precious days were lost, and the effect of this programme destroyed, by a sharp difference between the two wings. A group strong in political weight—Halifax, Nottingham,

¹ Clarendon, 23 Sept., 31 Oct., and 2 and 5 Nov.; D'Oyley, i. 376; Foxcroft, ii. 9, note 2; Gutch, 425 et seq. Other Tory peers mentioned, as refusing to 'abhor', are Pembroke (Mazure) and Abingdon and Burlington (Hist. MSS. Comm. Report XII, vii. 218).

Weymouth, Pembroke, and a few more—refused to sign a joint petition for a Parliament; some would not work with any who, as Rochester, had connived at illegalities like the Ecclesiastical Commission—‘to join with the other Lords’, wrote Nottingham, ‘might be construed an obstacle to the reformation which is necessary to establish the peace of the kingdom’—while others, like Oxford, honestly thought a Parliament at this moment out of the question.¹

Ultimately, then, the petition, presented on the night of the 16th, was signed by eight leaders of the right—Sancroft, the two Hydes, Burlington, the Bishops of Ely, Peterborough, St. Asaph, and Rochester; by two moderates, Newport and Paget; by Dorset, Clare, Chandos, Ossulston, and Anglesey, who leaned if anything to the left; by Grafton and Ormonde, who were within the week to join the invader; by the Archbishop of York, who had won promotion by flight from Exeter, and by the Bishop of Oxford, who had earned his by reading the Declaration of Indulgence. What this ill-assorted and suspect alliance asked was, however, reasonable enough; the calling at once of a Parliament, ‘regular and free in all its circumstances’, and the opening in the meantime of negotiations, for ‘preventing the effusion of Christian blood’. The King’s acrid reply was the crowning proof of his folly. He would, he declared, summon a Parliament immediately the Prince had left the realm, which he had invaded ‘against all the laws of God and man’, but he would treat with no invader in a state of war; as for the bishops, they would be better engaged in teaching the people their duty, than in fomenting rebellion or ‘giving rules for government’. So another of the Sibylline books was vilely cast away.²

James left London on the 17th November to join his army in Wiltshire, and on the 26th he was back at Whitehall; nine days had been enough to lower that haughty defiance. The negotiations, which the right had asked him to inaugurate, must now be accepted at the invader’s discretion. The trickle

¹ *History of the Desertion*; Nottingham to Hatton, 15 Nov. (B. M. Add. MSS. 29594, f. 131); Bramston, 335; Preston to Dartmouth, 17 Nov. (Report VII, 348); Ranke, iv. 475 n.

² Clarendon, 6–17 Nov.; *Hatton Corr.* ii. 103; *Life of James*, ii. 212; *The Desertion*; Mazure.

of desertion, begun on the 14th by Clarendon's unbalanced heir Cornbury, had become a raging torrent. The two pillars of the royal cause, the army and the country gentlemen, were slipping irretrievably away.¹ Yet ancient fabrics like divinely protected monarchy do not fall in a day, and the great mass of Tories, who in November and early December declared for Orange, had no wish to make him King. A sense of self-preservation, and an instinct that only William could accomplish the desired reforms, moved most of those who signed the Association. Even extremer politicians like Danby had not yet burned their boats, and the majority were ready, though with some trepidation, to work with the Whig magnates for the peaceful Parliamentary accommodation pictured in the Prince's declaration.² We may test these conclusions by examining the three scenes of action, in the West, the North, and London.

The Prince's progress in the West was, for the first fortnight, halting and dubious. The local gentry stood aloof, in many cases passing on William's letters to them unopened to Whitehall. What determined them seems to have been the entire listlessness of the Government, and the fast-swelling tide of desertion from the royal army. Between the 12th and the 16th November there arrived at Exeter, Colchester and Cornbury, Churchill's kinsman Godfrey, and that Colonel Beaumont who had been cashiered for refusing to flood his regiment with Irishmen. More important still was the coming of Lord Abingdon, a high Tory magnate, at this time in close touch with Danby.³ On the 18th a knot of Western members of Parliament came in—and best of all, Seymour, their redoubtable leader. His decision it was, which brought about the signing of the Association, 'to stick firm to this cause and to one another, until our religion, laws, and liberties are so far secured to us in a free Parliament, that we shall be no more in danger of falling under Popery and slavery'; a pronouncement, it should be noticed, in no way involving a change of

¹ Feversham's report on the state of the army, in Hoffman's dispatch of 6 Dec. (Klopp).

² Graham papers (Report VII); *Ellis Corr.* ii. 288; Denbigh papers (Report VII), 226 a; Leeds papers, 30.

dynasty. That he was left as Governor of Exeter, when William advanced into Wiltshire, appealed probably as much as anything to Seymour's sense of what was fitting on this great occasion.

Meanwhile, more recruits came in, and these of the highest political class. First, Churchill and Grafton, then Prince George, Ormonde, and Drumlanrig; Bath seized Plymouth; on the 26th Trelawny and most of his officers arrived. Tenders were now forthcoming from more unlikely quarters; the scape-grace Warden of All Souls, Leopold Finch, brought offers from the heads of Oxford colleges, and Byng came with guarantees from the well-inclined captains of the fleet—taking back in return a flattering letter to the anxious Dartmouth. 'Villany upon villany', cried Secretary Middleton to Secretary Preston.¹

While thus the South cracked under the very feet of Government, far away in Yorkshire a Tory leader was taking his tit-for-tat with James Stuart. Danby had reached the North by the 25th September; simultaneously Bishop Compton was visiting 'his sisters in Yorkshire', and Devonshire was organizing the Midlands.² The old Treasurer hoped that Orange might land in the Humber, and never was his masculine decision better shown than in dealing with the welter of changed plans, jealousies, and timidity which marked the northern revolution. True, he was lucky in the men to be circumvented, for a school-boy could have gulled the pettish and convivial Newcastle, who was in charge of the West Riding, or worthy Sir John Reresby, the Governor of York. Moreover, each step of the Government, positive or negative, was a positive assistance to the rebels. The orders to embody the militia gave an excellent opening for the cry 'a free Parliament and the Protestant religion', which would enlist all but courtiers and Catholics. The foolish omission of the county moderates from the revised commission of the peace (as late as November) stultified all Reresby's innocent appeals for union. The executive arm, too, was weakening, and Lumley moved about Northumber-

¹ *The Desertion*; Graham papers; Denbigh papers; *Hutton Corr.* ii. 106
Burnet; Byng's narrative in 'Memoirs relating to Lord Torrington' (Camden
Soc. 1889).

² Leeds papers, 25; *Ellis Corr.* ii. 224.

land with impunity, weeks after the issue of orders for his arrest.¹

Planned originally for an earlier date, on the assumption that Orange would land in the North, the seizure of York finally came off on the 22nd November, under cover of a meeting of the local gentry. The militia appeared in the county capital without orders, and 'their confounded ring-leaders had the impudence' to propose a free Parliament.² Newcastle sulkily deserted his post, Reresby was put under arrest, while Danby, Willoughby, and their confederates captured the city. On the 28th Scarborough fell, and on the 3rd December the garrison of Hull turned against Langdale and his Catholic officers. But even here the troops did not declare for the invader so freely as Danby had hoped, in many places the gentry 'only looked on', and an honourable indecision ran through the Tory masses. 'Lord Willoughby', we hear from Reresby, 'said it was the first time any Bertie was ever engaged against the Crown, and it was his trouble—but there was a necessity either to part with our religion and properties, or do it'. In Lancashire the dilemma was put even more plainly; the Catholic Molyneux took up arms to cover reinforcements expected from Tyrconnel, the Whig Delamere declared for a free Parliament, and the loyal Derby had to make his choice between them.³ In Cumberland and Westmorland hereditary feuds embittered differences of policy; Musgraves and Fletchers posed as 'the only loyal men and the upholders of the Church'—as for Lowther, 'God damn him for a Whig', he had 'signed ill things'. To the naïve disappointment of Danby's lieutenant, Sir Henry Goodrick, Carlisle surrendered to Christopher Musgrave on the 15th December.⁴

The precise attitude of Danby himself in this turbulent month hardly emerges from the haze of altercation and doubt that hung over the North. William's landing in Devonshire, and his apparently studied neglect of letters, had plainly

¹ Reresby to Preston, 5 Nov. (Graham papers), and to Danby, 14 Nov. (B. M. Add. MSS. 28053, Leeds-Godolphin papers). ² Leeds papers, 26.

³ Reresby; Lindsey papers, 449 et seq.; Kenyon papers, 201; Mazure iii. 216.

⁴ Lonsdale papers, 97; Leeds papers, 27.

irritated Danby, who in conversation professed to dislike the prospect of a decisive victory for either army. In any event, he hoped still to play a part worthy of his ambition, and asked of Orange extraordinary powers as Lieutenant-General over five northern shires, with a right of commissioning troops and raising taxes.¹

Meanwhile, as arranged between himself and Devonshire, the Midlands had risen at Nottingham on the 22nd November. Their proclamation, headed by the Whig Cavendish, was far more advanced than the York version; let not Protestants be 'hugbeared with the opprobrious term of rebels', resistance to a tyrant, 'that made his will the law', was not rebellion but 'a necessary defence', the King's last concessions were doled out 'as plums are to children'. But the conclusion was framed to rally both parties; 'we think ourselves bound in conscience to rest on no security, that shall not be approved by a freely elected Parliament'. The Tories and Trimmers, Scarsdale, Northampton, Chesterfield, and Justinian Isham, were among those joining this movement, which was crowned on the 2nd December by the arrival of Princess Anne under escort of Bishop Compton, once more in buff-coat and armour.² Far away in the middle West and the East, declarations for Parliament by the Dukes of Beaufort and Norfolk completed the circle of Tory defection.

But the real decision must come from the heart of political England, the rich country reaching between London and Salisbury, where the vast earthworks raised by Celtic and Saxon warriors looked down on the two protagonists, father and son-in-law, now contesting their inheritance. The pupil of Turenne, the once hardy sailor that James had been, snapped under the load of desertion, of fears for wife and son, of remembrance of his father's fate, of exhaustion and illness, and, within five days of his return from the West to London on the 26th November, he was resolved on flight. On the 1st December he renewed the orders, once before given to

¹ Lindsey papers, 447 et seq.; Reresby.

² *The Desertion*; *Hatton Corr.*; Dalrymple; Graham papers; Luttrell. Chesterfield was with the other lords at Leicester on the 10th December but refused to declare till after Christmas; see his printed letters, p. 334, and cf. Foxcroft, ii. 14 n.

Dartmouth and once cancelled, for taking the infant prince to France ; his own purpose was almost openly avowed, and Godolphin, Middleton, Preston vainly joined with Bellasis and Halifax in efforts to dissuade him.¹

But those not admitted to full knowledge of this design had not yet abandoned hopes of accommodation, and the meeting of peers called by the King, on the 27th November, showed what in conservative opinion was the minimum of concession. Rochester defended the petition of the 16th, asked a Parliament as the only remedy, though a doubtful one, and recommended negotiations. Jeffreys and Godolphin followed in the same sense, and some ministers said plainly that the army could not be depended on. James's resentment of Clarendon's speech comes out in his memoirs ; his ' indiscreet and seditious railing ' concluded with the disagreeable truth, that negotiations were inevitable, ' the people now do say that the King is run away with his army, we are left defenceless, and must therefore side with the prevailing party '. We have no record of what the nine bishops present contributed, except that Sancroft spoke ' home and plain '. Halifax and Nottingham outlined the concessions, which they thought must precede the meeting of Parliament—security for the Prince's adherents, an amnesty, a clean separation from France, and dismissal of Roman Catholics.² Within the next three days James agreed to a meeting of Parliament on the 15th January, which should be open to Orange's followers, issued a general pardon, and appointed Halifax, Nottingham, and Godolphin as peace commissioners to the Prince.

But all this was but on the face of the waters ; privately, he was determined to fly this ungrateful country. Father Petre had gone already, and in his rooms at Whitehall Jeffreys was installed with the potent great seal, the loss of which was to stop all the wheels of government. Two of the peace commissioners at least, Halifax and Nottingham, plainly believed it all too late ; both refused to accept Cabinet office, and (if

¹ Barillon (Mazure) ; Dalrymple.

² Clarendon ; Ailesbury ; *Halton Corr.* ii. 113 ; *James's Life*, ii. 239 ; Bodl. Rawlinson MSS. (Letters), 109 ; Macaulay, citing Citters ; Bramston, 337.

Burnet can be trusted) showed by their conduct at Hungerford, the Prince's head-quarters, their dislike of a rôle which they represented as 'put on them by their enemies'. London opinion steadily hardened that accommodation was impossible, and in the amazing story of the peace negotiations the Whig triumph is seen to be as assured as the sequence of night and day.¹

To this our best witness is Clarendon who, mainly to judge the chances of peace, now went on the 3rd December to the Orange quarters at Salisbury, and journeyed with that army till the 12th. From the Prince himself, and from Bentinck, the assurances he received were highly correct, but the English Whigs were more explicit. Burnet, naturally, was indiscretion itself; a Parliament was impossible, 'the sword is drawn, there is a supposititious child', and the ugly noise he made with his mouth, when a prayer for the King was given out in Salisbury Cathedral, startled even a congregation now becoming hardened to portents of revolution. Abingdon, who had ridden the bloodless march from Exeter, held out gloomy prospects to Clarendon; 'he feared we should be disappointed in our expectations, for he did not like things at all'. Delamere and Stamford, decked with the rich laurels of the North, arrived to stir the sluggish South, and a strong Whig section in London impressed on Orange, and on Halifax, that the City only waited his approach to rise, and that no talk of limitations, or regency, could be tolerated.² The King's commissioners could hardly be expected to resist such an atmosphere, and it is probably true that only James's first flight was needed to tilt them over.³

The terms of the armistice offered, through them, to the King were, superficially, reasonable enough, as it was clearly the Orange game to humour moderate feeling till James made the irretrievable blunder, which in him might be reckoned on

¹ Besides the above, Luttrell; Barillon (Mazure); D'Adda (Foxcroft); Burnet to Herbert, 9 Dec. (Foxcroft, 'Supplement'); Lindsey papers, 452; cf. Nottingham's letter of 1 Dec. in *Halton Corr.*; 'in all probability this will have no effect.'

² Sir Robert Howard to Orange, 2 Dec. (Dalrymple) (for identification of this letter, see Foxcroft, ii. 20, note 3); Denbigh papers; Clarendon.

³ Note at end of chapter.

with some confidence, but they included putting the Tower, Tilbury, and Portsmouth into hands the Prince could approve, and pay for his army from English revenues till the meeting of a 'free' Parliament. The general signing of the Association, by all who joined him, lent further significance to these arrangements, which on the most conservative interpretation implied a system of guarantees.

Such a system was not to be needed, for on the 11th December the King's first flight clinched the resolution of his enemies, decided the doubtful, and loaded his true friends with black despair.

Not merely the fact, but the manner of it, was fatal; he had destroyed the writs for Parliament, bidden Feversham disband the army, and ordered Dartmouth to sail with his remaining loyal ships to take their orders from Tyrconnel. So far as lay in his power, the King, its appointed guardian, had dissolved English society. The mob in London rose to loot Catholic chapels. Night and day became terrible. Bonfires of panelling from the Franciscan Church in Lincoln's Inn Fields and of manuscripts from the library of the unoffending Spanish ambassador Ronquillo, panic rumours of Papist Irish armies, the King reported to be dead or dying, Reading and Birmingham in flames, the streets of Dartford running in blood, householders in the City ordered by the rabble to illuminate—such were the signs of an England descending to anarchy—'no King in Israel nor any face of government left us'. One wheel after another in the national economy was running down, halting, ceasing to revolve: at Portsmouth soldiers and dockyard hands had stopped work for lack of pay, and broken companies of Kirke's or Oglethorpe's regiments were seizing free quarter in Buckinghamshire hamlets.¹ Three different political centres were calling for the allegiance of this distracted and wounded England—the Prince's army, now (on the 13th) at Henley, the Peers in London, and James at a Faversham inn; distracted and unhappy England would inevitably turn to the strongest arm.

For us it is important to watch the forward march of the

¹ *Ellis Corr.*, Lindsey papers; Ailesbury; Portland papers, lii. 420 et seq.; Beaufort papers, 92; Denbigh papers, 228; Bodl. Carte MSS. 79 (Wharton papers).

Tories under the pressure of events, and we could hardly find a better instance than in Dartmouth, the royal commander at sea and loyalist of James's personal friends. The name of his flagship at Spithead, *Resolution*, was surely chosen by Clio in satiric mood. For a month past he had swung at anchor between loyalty to the King and feeling for his country. He had seriously hoped to meet and beat the Dutch fleet, but on the other hand he refused to convoy the Prince of Wales to France; 'the most I can apprehend', he bluntly wrote, 'Your Majesty may be jealous of, is his being brought up in the religion of the Church of England, and that ought (for His Royal Highness's sake especially) to be the prayers of every loyal honest subject'. When the invasion had become reality, he begged James to negotiate, and later, under pressure, headed an address from the fleet welcoming the summons of a Parliament. The fatality of James's flight filled him with horror: 'O God, what could make our master desert his kingdoms and his friends!' His son-in-law Philip Musgrave warned him from London not to throw away the fleet, as Feversham had the army, but actually Dartmouth had, spontaneously, resolved to offer it to the Prince and the Peers for the national safety. But still, specially after hearing of the King's enforced halt, he hoped on for a compromise, and told Rochester 'we must put all our hands (as becomes honest loyal Church of England men) to the re-establishing him in the government, and resettlement of our holy religion, laws, and properties'.¹

As Dartmouth's case showed, even the loyalist must at this moment think first of their country, and the Peers' emergency meeting at the Guildhall on the 11th December was, numerically, still dominated by men prepared to save James in his own despite. Of the thirty-nine present, the two archbishops and four of their suffragans (Ely, Peterborough, Rochester, and Winchester), Craven, Rochester, Ailesbury, Weymouth, Mulgrave, North, and Thanet, formed at least a solid nucleus of non-Orange opinion. Their orders to Feversham to move his men out of London, and to Dartmouth to disarm his Papist officers were, of course, urgent for the keeping of peace,

¹ Dartmouth papers, Report XI, v. *passim*; *ibid.*, XV, i. 69; Graham papers, 416.

but their declaration to the Prince marked a great advance for the high Tories. Drafted originally (by Rochester, Weymouth, the Bishops of Rochester and Ely) in terms rather more favourable to James, but in its final form signed unanimously,¹ it set forth their application to Orange who, 'with so great kindness to these kingdoms', had undertaken to rescue them 'from the imminent dangers of Popery and Slavery'; they would, it continued, assist him in calling a free Parliament, 'wherein our laws, our liberties, and properties may be secured, the Church of England in particular, with a due liberty to Protestant dissenters'—where, too, the Protestant cause in the world should be supported, not merely to the advantage of Europe, but to the 'happiness of the established government in these kingdoms'. Finally, 'if there be anything more to be performed by us for promoting his Highness's generous intentions for the public good, we shall be ready to do it as occasion requires'.

Strong though the declaration was against James's system, it was equally emphatic in its guarded assumption of Orange's 'generous intentions', and so long as the King remained in England the high Tory signatories would never desert him. The news of his forced detention at Faversham, his return to London on the 16th, and some signs of popular sympathy, roused their flickering energy to a last flame. Schemes like those of 1680 for limitations were once more in the air; the Bishop of Ely suggested that James should surrender for his life all powers of war and peace, besides his patronage ecclesiastical and civil.² Feversham, Ailesbury, and others went to rescue him from the Kentish mob. If Sancroft had withdrawn from the Peers' provisional government, Halifax and Nottingham had joined it, and Royalist circles fondly thought both were still faithful.³ Notions of resistance even now gleamed in a few ardent minds; Ailesbury begged James to march on Nottingham, or make his way to Scotland, and once at least James himself thought of flinging his fortunes into the dubious arms of Danby.⁴ Even on the 22nd the Peers were conservative

¹ *The Desertion*; Halifax's notes in Foxcroft; Ailesbury.

² Lloyd of St. Asaph to Orange, 17 Dec. (Dalrymple).

³ Lindsey papers, 10 Dec.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 451-3. Ailesbury's account of Charles Bertie's offer from the army

enough to pass a resolution asking the King's concurrence in the calling of a new Parliament.

But there was nothing left to conserve, for what, as Rochester bitterly asked after the final crash, 'what can the most loyal and dutiful body in the world do, without a head?' The King's first flight had in fact settled the matter, and William had made up his mind. At Exeter, if we may take Burnet's publications there composed as evidence of the 'official' view, there was still no intention of seizing the crown, but by the 18th the line taken in the Prince's council at Windsor was, Nottingham tells us, 'the King's going away is a cession of his right to the crown'. Lloyd, even two days earlier, was preaching the same doctrine to the indignant Clarendon.¹ The Prince's high-handed arrest of the royal envoy Faversham, his attempts to prevent James's return to London, the menacing pressure put on him to leave it again, the ominous acquiescence given to his choice of Rochester as a haven of refuge—these and other things showed a mind decided. The waverers, too, seem to have wavered no longer: if they did, the King's actions during his brief reappearance may well have been with many the last straw. The wild scenes at Faversham, the anarchy of London, had taught nothing to this closed and stubborn mind; in Council he openly blamed the Peers, who had saved from bloodshed the capital he had deserted, he celebrated mass, wished to issue a pardon for Hales, and was closeted with his Catholic advisers.² On the 16th his Council was only attended by officials, including Godolphin. The same day Halifax went to Windsor, Beaufort and Rochester (the latter vainly) made their court, and Chandos, who had sat with the Peers on the 15th, was with the Prince two days later. Meanwhile, at Rochester there was the King, anxious to keep his promise to his wife that he would follow her to France, and convinced that his father's fate waited for him also, if he stayed. If he ever had serious

is obviously coloured. Bertie wrote to Danby (*ibid.*, 11 Dec., misdated 10th) that the King had 'once' sent him a message for Danby, 'but I think providence has luckily prevented it'.

¹ Rochester to Dartmouth, 25 Dec.; Clarke and Foxcroft, *Burnet*, 253; *Hulton Corr.* ii. 127; Dalrymple.

² Mulgrave, *Works*, ii. xx (1729); Bramston; Ailesbury.

hopes that he might be safe with the bishops, they vanished with the despondent answers he received from Sancroft and Mews. Iron will at Windsor and obstinate stone at Rochester—against these two unyielding forces, some last weak efforts of Clarendon, the Bishop of Ely, and Winchelsea, to stop the final flight, broke and perished like surf.¹

Thus the old cause was ruined by King James's 'furious hasty driving', and it was one of the highest of Tories who gave the most real appreciation of all the event must mean; 'it is now all over', wrote Francis Gwynn: 'neither he nor his (if the child be so) are like ever to set foot here again'.

Christmas Day dawned on England in deep snow, while the fallen King was stepping ashore at Ambletense.²

NOTE A

Miss Foxcroft has, with great learning, endeavoured to prove (1) the falsehood of the stories that Halifax and Godolphin frightened the King away by alleging danger to his person; (2) that Halifax, at least, acted in entire good faith in the negotiations—a legitimate sense of injury thus accounting for his very decided line against James later.

It is plain that the two questions can be separated, and the first is in a sense academic, since James had resolved on flight (see Barillon and Ailesbury) before hearing the result of the negotiations. As to the second, we may observe: (1) the gloomy prognostications of Halifax before setting out. (2) His apparent agreement with Sir Robert Howard as to the folly of 'accommodation', on the 30th November. (3) Clarendon's evidence of the close contact between Halifax and Burnet, which was maintained later (Lindsey papers, 456). (4) Burnet's explicit account that he spoke to Halifax with the Prince's permission; Halifax's question: 'What if he had a mind to go away?'—was based, if Barillon can be trusted, on information gleaned from James himself. (5) The definite, though apparently unsupported, statement in an Exeter newsletter, that Halifax's sons had joined the Prince; Bodl. Rawlinson MSS. Letters, 109, f. 115.

¹ Reresby, 434; James, *Life*, ii 272; Clarendon; *The Desertion*; Burnet, iii. 346 n.

² Bramston, 343; Dartmouth papers, iii (25 Dec.), Bodl. Rawlinson MSS. (Letters), 48.

As to Godolphin, his conversation with Feversham, retailed by Barillon (Mazure), scarcely seems to me to warrant the construction that Miss Foxcroft has placed upon it—that he ‘severely blamed’ the King’s flight. He merely said, he thought that the Prince would have carried out the armistice terms, if James had not fled; but at the same time he declined to advise a return from Faversham to London. Indeed, according to Dartmouth (*note on Burnet*, iii. 345), he counselled withdrawal, and, in the Peers’ meeting on the 24th December, it was Godolphin who advised them not to hear the King’s letter to Middleton—which he had seen (Clarendon).

IX

THE CONVENTION AND THE TORY REACTION, 1689-90

BETWEEN 1327 and 1688, for nine English sovereigns who reigned continuously and died in their beds, our chronicles record the forced exile of three kings, the public execution of a fourth, and the foul murder of another four. Yet the continuity of our history has become national tradition, and to posterity the grateful feature about the Revolution of 1688 has ever been that it accomplished a change in dynasty, in government, and indeed in society almost without bloodshed, that it preserved, in happy contrast to the revolutions of the Continent, most of the essential and permanent aspects in English public life. A Dymoke still rode as King's champion for William and Mary, as his forebears had for the Stuarts; the Villiers lived on in their hereditary position as royal favourites; chief ministers of the *ancien régime*—Halifax and Danby, Sunderland and Godolphin—served the usurper; Henry Guy continued, as Secretary to the Treasury, to apply the secret service money as in the two previous reigns.

Yet this absence of proscription did not mean any lack of revolution, and the change in the Tory party, in particular, was so great as to destroy its inner coherence. This coherence had received a fatal blow when the Tories of the North and Midlands had raised the militia for a free Parliament, and when those of the West had signed the Association at Exeter. If, as they later protested, they had taken up arms merely to secure the objects set forth in William's declaration, if they had meant to act only as children who would redeem a peccant father from the error of his ways, then, politically, they had acted as children indeed, and this sort of *apologia* incurred the natural scorn of their opponents. The bishops, who had refused to express abhorrence of the invasion, now had to

suffer its consequences ; did they imagine, the merciless jeering voices asked, that the Prince ' whose presence was of so great necessity on the Continent, could be imposed upon to come over to England in the heart of winter, amidst a thousand dangers, and at a vast charge, and that merely to fasten, foresooth, a tottering pillar or two in the Cathedral of Canterbury ? ' ¹

This process of disillusionment, which we must now examine, was a sharp and trying one. Even before the King's second flight the Whig magnates had begun to dismiss their troops,² and, after it, every action of the interregnum proved that the Prince viewed the struggle as closed. Receiving in the early morning of Sunday the 23rd December the expected news of James's sailing from Rochester for France, he the same day issued a summons for the meeting of all available members of Charles's Parliaments—by that limitation alone declaring against any truck with James—and at the same time ordered the French ambassador to leave the country, thus virtually implicating his supporters in war with France. By proclamation he had already dispersed the units of the old royal army to quarters outside London and, before the Convention met, the regimental commands were taken from declared loyalists like the Fenwicks and the Oglethorpes.

Indeed, no historical ' legend ' is more devoid of foundation than that of the rigid and quixotic inaccessibility of Orange during the interregnum. To those, like Clarendon, merely seeking place or office he was, it is true, not often at home, but the public opinion which counted in politics he moulded with deft and potent touch. St. James's was thronged long before the New Year ; the Prince immediately put himself, through the Churchills, *en rapport* with the Princess Anne, with Irish opinion through John Temple, and in long whispered interviews lobbied every politician who could adapt himself to a changed world. On the 30th December he told Halifax that he would not stay in England if James were restored, nor would he be Regent. Before the 22nd January, the day of the Convention's meeting, Burnet published ' by authority '

¹ *A Modest Enquiry into the cause of the Present Disasters in England* (1690).

² Cowper papers, II 345.

an inspired manifesto, arguing that the throne was vacant; a proclamation against 'scandalous and seditious books' reinforced this press campaign; and in the first six days of February Orange sent for the inner circle of politicians, to tell them definitely that he would be neither regent nor prince-consort.¹

The Tory in the street, who yet knew nothing of these weighty declarations, was already sickened by a hundred signs of the new order. Some, like Evelyn, had seen the old King embarking on his last voyage down the Thames, the Dutch guards in row-boats on either side. Thousands saw the same shabby, blue-coated foreigners mounting guard at St. James's, instead of the English troops now marooned at Chelmsford or St. Albans. All had read of the traitor Churchill, and Londoners had seen, perhaps, his wife taking the Princess Anne to the play-house, decked in Orange ribbons. It was not for such things, Lindsey and Scarsdale muttered, that they had taken up arms. All the searching sentimental forces which move a high-spirited people—and especially the appointed guardians of its honour and its conscience, the army and the Church—set in train the Royalist reaction.

Unhappily, there was not the remotest semblance of unity in the conservative ranks; confidence in one another was shattered, and in lieu of one rational programme they put forward three, of which two were impossible and all were inconsistent.

The first, for a restoration of James, never long commanded any supporters of weight. The exiled Court might feed on the news, purveyed by its optimistic London correspondents, that a substantial party, led by Nottingham and the bishops, was working to this end,² but all the evidence points to the conclusion that, if the scheme were ever seriously entertained, it was soon dropped by all those at the heart of politics. At the Peers' all-day meeting on Christmas Eve, they declined to proceed with a proposal to read a letter which the King had

¹ Ralph; Burnet; Clarendon; *The Desertion*; Foxcroft, ii 203; Clarke and Foxcroft, 261; Continuation of Mackintosh's *History of England* (Lardner's Encyclopaedia), vii. 265.

² D'Adda, in Continuation of Mackintosh.

sent to Middleton, when they received from Godolphin an assurance that it contained, as indeed was the case, nothing in the shape of real security. Nottingham and others did, indeed, try to save the legal face of the Constitution, by a motion that members for the promised Parliament should be elected on the writs James had already issued (for some had not been recalled), such members subsequently to take steps for the election of the balance. When the Commons and the City Council met, on the Prince's summons, on Boxing Day, another attempt to neutralize the Orange plan was made by Sir Robert Sawyer, who had held the Attorney-Generalship since 1681, had lost it for opposition to the dispensing power, and who, as Pembroke's father-in-law and a man of sense, commanded much influence. He now proposed to give the Prince a fixed title and a limited tenure of office as Administrator. But both these efforts failed, and Nottingham himself helped to draft the Peers' address to the Prince, which asked him to take over the administration, civil, military, and financial, and to call a Convention for the 22nd January, where the laws and constitutions might be established 'upon such sure and legal foundations, that they may not be in danger of being again subverted'.¹ Half-heartedly, but not wholly blindly, the mass of Tories were gradually adopting the position taken by the most famous high Tory *apologia*—that the King's flight was 'voluntary, unforced, and criminal', and that 'we did not dispossess our Prince, but he deserted us'.²

By the 10th January, the body of the bishops were resolved, largely for the sake of union among themselves, to drop the project of restoration, and to concentrate on Regency, and by the 22nd at latest Sancroft himself had decided in that sense. Nor did the Convention's debates give the least encouragement to the restoration party; one obscure voice only, that of Lord Fanshawe, was raised for further negotiation with James, while the pillars of the right—the Hydes, Bishop Turner, Heneage Finch, and Sawyer—made it plain, that for them restoration was dead and buried. The furious press campaign conducted by the Jacobites, and led by the eloquent Sherlock, Master of

¹ Burnet, Clarendon, Ralph; Foxcroft, II. 59 (Halifax's notes).

² Bohun, *History of the Desertion*.

the Temple, failed, then, entirely in its immediate object—though time was to show, not least to the versatile Master himself, the strength in some of the arguments now employed to confute Burnet and the Orange apologists. Would the Prince, they asked, a man of honour, give the lie to his own Declaration? Would the Princess wear a crown, torn from a father driven by force out of his own palace? ‘Churchmen’, said Sherlock, ‘are very glad to get rid of Popery, but they will not be contented to part with their Church into the bargain’; only Dutch troops could maintain usurpation, and then both ‘the men of conscience and the men of discontent’ will invite the King home again. Was not the moral of this revolution, asked another, to ‘cancel all the merits of our fathers, overthrow the ground and consequence of their most exemplary loyalty to King Charles the first and second, render their death the death of fools?’¹

Sharply though Tories might feel the sting of such logic, as immediately practical politics it was futile, and they turned to two other solutions—a Regency, or the settlement of the throne on the Princess of Orange; the essential weakness of their position was that, as the debates of Christmas Eve had already shown, there was no chance of agreement between the partisans of these alternatives. Regency reached its Waterloo on the 29th January, when it was rejected in the Lords by 51 votes to 49. The absence of Sancroft, Mulgrave, and Churchill was enough in itself to turn the day. The minority included many Tory shades; the Archbishop of York and eleven bishops; the two Hydes; Nottingham and Weymouth, the old associates of Halifax; Godolphin, Craven, Feversham, and other servants of the late King; Ailesbury, Dartmouth, and other future Jacobites; Scarsdale, who had taken up arms for William in the Midlands, and Abingdon, who had joined him in the West. In the Commons their leaders were Clarges, Musgrave, and Heneage Finch, and it was in concert with Nottingham that the first moved, though unsuccessfully, the adjournment of the Commons’ debates to

¹ *Reflections upon our Late and Present Proceedings in England, A Letter to a Member of the Convention, A Lord's Speech without doors to the Lords, upon the Present Condition of the Government; &c.*

give the more conservative peers the first and, as it was hoped, the decisive voice ; failing that, they trusted to wearing down the majority by long debate into accepting Regency as the line of least resistance.¹

Much scorn, notably by Macaulay, has been poured, and with some apparent injustice, on the Regency idea. After all, the debates of 1680-1 had familiarized it to all politicians, it was the specific remedy then put forward by Halifax and the Orange school, and might still as a real, though illogical, compromise, unite men of several sections. The driving force now behind it was the Church, and the principles put forward were not for a quarter of a century to lose their political importance. Sancroft, in spite of his supporters' pleadings, had refused to take a part in the Government since Orange had arrived at Windsor, and had let the Prince know that he could not even seem to approve of his proceedings. He had summoned all his suffragans to London, and in repeated meetings at Lambeth during the first half of January, in which Ken and Turner bore the labouring oar, they drafted the grounds of their resistance. Turner's advice was to draw up some propositions, 'as if they were directed against the bold wild discourse and apparent designs of our common-wealth-men', arguing against deposition or 'breaking any one link in the royal chain'; to present these to Orange, and then, if this failed, as he feared it would, to act openly at the Convention.²

Whether this particular representation ever reached the Prince's hands we do not know, but we have from Sancroft's pen some arguments which were widely circulated in Tory circles.³ He dismissed as impossible the hypothesis that society was dissolved, or reverted to a state of nature ; a conquest (and then 'the question of right had been out of doors') was contrary to the facts before them, 'since it is referred to the Convention to consider how to restore the ancient government, and to settle it legally'. Mary's claim must presuppose either the deposition of her father, which was illegal, or his abdica-

¹ Bodl. Ballard MSS. 45, f. 25 ; Clarendon ; Grey.

² Turner to Sancroft, 11 Jan. (Bodl. Tanner MSS. xxviii. 227).

³ Printed in D'Oyley, 1 414 ; a copy in B. M. Add. (North) MSS. 32520.

tion. But 'by the common law of England, which is to judge between the King and his people in all cases that can happen, the King and people, that is, the mutual ties of protection and subjection, cannot be separated or dissolved by any human mean whatsoever, much less by the King's act alone'. For, 'if once the style of the government be altered, how just a claim have any strong combinations to refuse obedience, or, if they can, even to assume the governing power? For they may say, *Jacobus Rex* I know, but who are you?' Not only, then, would Regency be the sole legal and lasting remedy, but the only just one, and 'after all, it is a great truth that the mind and opinion of every individual person is an ingredient into the happiness or ruin of a government'. None who had taken the oaths of allegiance to King James, his heirs and successors, could honestly swear to the usurper; 'all those sacred ties' could only be salved by a government that could speak in the King's name. It was, thus, in the name of conscience and union, that the Regency party presented this programme; 'that which comprehends most', said Finch, anticipating the memorable maxim of Thiers, 'will be most secure'.

But when every Channel packet brought word of French preparations for war, or copies of James's vague fulminations, the mass of Englishmen, even of the conservatively minded, refused to accept Regency's tepid solution. Moreover, a large and influential section of the Tories had all along set their hearts on putting Mary on the throne, and after the 29th January they were reinforced by a considerable number of the defeated Regency school. Even on the 24th December, a body of peers, led by North, Paget, and Bishop Compton, had proposed to declare Mary Queen, on the assumption that James was demised, and to issue writs for a Parliament legally summoned in her name.¹ The scruples of the Regency men had joined the Orange Whigs in defeating this at the outset, but as all idea of transacting with James wore away, more and more Tories turned to Mary as their hope; her accession alone could salve the conscience of the Churchman, silence the

¹ Clarendon, 24 Dec.; Burnet to Herbert, 25 Dec., in Foxcroft, *Supplement*; Papal Transcripts, P. R. O. (Inghilterra Nunziatura, 30 Jan.).

objections of the lawyer, save hereditary right, and break the schemes of the republicans. A leader of real driving power might still carry this solution, and here the standpoint of Danby became of the first importance.

Summoned by Orange (at last) on the 12th December, he had not hurried, and only reached London on the 26th, to find the King gone for good. To the bishops he kept an attitude of reserve, and it is not till January that we find outward proof of his action. There are signs that he would have declared at once for the joint rule of William and Mary,¹ if the Prince would have come up to his terms, but disappointed in this, jealous of the preponderance of Halifax, and (most of all, we suspect) increasingly conscious that Mary was the only corner-stone on which to rebuild Tory unity, by the time of the Convention's opening he had declared himself, and at the crisis of the debates sent word to the Princess, who was still detained in Holland, that he could, if she so desired, set her alone on the throne of her fathers. The Commons' vote of the 28th January, that the throne was vacant, brought this issue sharply to the forefront, and when on the following day the Regency scheme was narrowly defeated in the Lords by a coalition of pro-Mary Tories with the Whigs, the way was clear. Already, in the Commons, Clarges had protested against the Commonwealth theory of deposition. Musgrave had argued that Scotland might in these circumstances choose a different king. Sawyer had made the perennial Tory point, that, if the choice were fallen to the people indeed, it could not logically be confined to the forty-shilling freeholders, but was the right of the nation at large.² On the 31st, though Danby by this time was aware of Orange's views, the Lords voted by 52 to 47 that the throne was not vacant; the Convention was at

¹ Burnet says so, in his original memoirs, and cf. Reresby, 1 Feb.; on the other hand, Compton, Danby's regular associate before and after this, was steadily for Mary's claim. Little credence, we think, need be attached to Halifax's note, that Danby only forsook Regency at the eleventh hour.

² Sawyer's rôle in the Convention is somewhat obscure. Macaulay's authority for classing him with Danby's school is not given. Some contemporaries mention him as one of those who would restore the King (Bodl. Rawlinson MSS. D. 1079), and, though ultimately (Grey, ix. 73) he joined the party for Mary, all his permanent connexions were with the High Church section: the meetings of the extreme bishops later in the year to consider the oaths took place at his house (Ranke, iv. 568).

a deadlock, and it remained to be seen whether the conservative forces were strong enough to carry the compromise, which would make Mary sole sovereign.

Into the long and tortuous conferences of this fated week we happily need not enter, nor scrutinize the significance given to the blessed word 'abdication' by Bracton, by Grotius, or by Calvin. Our emphasis must, rather, be laid on the immense Tory rally which the direct issue of vacancy caused. Only two or three had divided in the Commons against the original resolution of the 28th January, but on the 5th February 151 (against a majority of 282) voted to agree with the Lords' amendment. In this list were many, like Cornbury and Justinian Isham, who had appeared in arms for the invader; honoured moderates like Ralph Verney; all Danby's friends and kinsmen; a brother of Godolphin and a son of Halifax. They were joined by those who had originally voted for Regency—by Finch, Clarges, and Musgrave. The first moves of Seymour remain obscure, but he had at least never ceased to attack the idea of vacancy, and now swelled the division with a number of those he delighted to call his 'West Saxons'.¹

Old men, who had helped the restoration of Charles II, on this division voted side by side with the future lieutenants of Bolingbroke. It was the last time that the bishops were to set in motion a protest for the old cause, but, if their opposition had begun on the main point of Regency, it was soon stretched to embrace everything which kept the Tories in existence as a separate interest.

For the last great conference on the 6th February made it plain that the warmest advocates of Regency were now ready to transact on the basis of Mary's title. Even the Bishop of Ely, after fumbling with Regency for two-thirds of his speech, sat down admitting that the Lords would not refuse 'abdication', if it was restricted to James and not extended to his heirs; the Church, one of Arthur Charlett's correspondents wrote, 'can no more understand abdicate in this case than

¹ Reresby; Clarendon; Ralph; Ailesbury. Mazure (in. 322), citing no authority, makes Seymour one of the few who declared on the 28th January for a restoration of James upon conditions. For the list of the Tory minority, see Appendix II; it is printed in the Somers Tracts, and cf. Bodl. Rawlinson MSS. D. 1079, f. 23.

believe Transubstantiation in another'.¹ Clarendon, Rochester, and Pembroke agreed with Bishop Turner. Nottingham was even more explicit. Begging the conference to assume that, as to King James, the throne was admittedly vacant, and assenting that an Act of Parliament could materially bar the throne to James's children, he yet denied a legal power either in King or Convention to disinherit the legal successor, and entreated them in significant terms to make a settlement, which would meet half-way those who believed in hereditary monarchy. 'I must confess any government is better than none, but I earnestly desire we may enjoy our ancient constitution.'

Here and there, however, we may detect signs that these high-sounding rehearsals of the Tory case were in fact a prelude to surrender, and the same evening, by 65 to 45, the Lords voted to agree with the Commons' resolution. Stern pressure from the Court, the expressed wish of Mary herself, place-hunting, a dangerous ferment in London, depression in the provinces and closed markets, a genuine feeling, as the loyal Lord Thanet put it to Clarendon, of 'the absolute necessity of having a government', even an assurance, as they heard William's asthmatic cough, that he could never outlive Mary—such were the mixed motives which drove the Tories from their third and last line of defences. Patriotism and servility both swelled the majority. Bishop Crewe, who had sat on the Ecclesiastical Commission, and Mulgrave, who had swallowed Popery, voted now for the vacancy; Godolphin was too busy that day at the Treasury to appear; Nottingham kept away Weymouth, and others of his friends, with warnings against civil war; Churchill abstained. Danby obeyed the declared wishes of the Prince and Princess, and though unable to convert all his usual clientèle, he himself supported the last motion in this drama, that William and Mary be declared King and Queen.²

Thus ended the first round of the Revolution struggle, apparently in a shattering defeat for Tory convictions. On

¹ Bodl Ballard MSS 45, f. 46

² Dalrymple; Clarendon; Dartmouth's note on Burnet, iii. 404; P. iii. 421; Bodl Ballard MSS. 45, f. 27; Eachard; Mazure, iii. 357; the list of 38 protesting peers in Ralph, ii. 51 n.

the 13th February, in the Banqueting-hall, the Crown, once in that place struck off the head of Charles I and now from that of his son, was offered to William and Mary; the same day, that impassive Prince bade two Whig lawyers attend him next morning, to consider 'how this present convention may best be turned into a Parliament'.¹

The year which elapsed before the dissolution of the Convention, on the 6th February 1690, was one in which the State and Government of England lived, as it were, from hand to mouth. The army was mutinous. The fleet proved incompetent to guard the seas between France and rebellious Ireland. King James kept his parliament in Dublin, and at the year's end was still master of everything outside Ulster. Scotland was dourly making a new constitution in Church and State. In England the Revolution was turning sour and rancid. The Bill of Rights was belied, in spirit and letter, by the existence of a large army and by the suspension of Habeas Corpus. The payment of £600,000 to the Dutch for the costs of the invasion was, Tory taxpayers murmured, the silver for which the Judas courtiers had sold their master. The Whigs were eaten up with unsatisfied rancour, and intent only on avenging the innocent blood of 1683. The Tories were torn in two by the oaths controversy, riddled by Jacobitism, and beckoned, by those whom they revered as their spiritual leaders, down a hopeless vista of conspiracy. Everywhere arrests, searching of houses, seizure of arms and horses, scurrilous libels, deep drinkings by black-coats and red-coats to 'the old gentleman', armed and unaccountable horsemen riding in the Marches, in Lancashire, and the Borders. It is not the least curious passage in the history of English conservatism to watch rising out of this chaos the Tory reaction of 1690-3.

For this result, much was unquestionably due to the personal policy of the new sovereigns. The Queen's influence, severely limited though it was by her own oriental ideal of a wife's position and her adoration of a masterful and faithless husband, was still sometimes positive, and always thrown into the conservative scale. The lantern about her feet, in a world which troubled her, was the Church of England; Compton had been

¹ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1689-90, p. 1.

her tutor, Ken her chaplain, and Burnet's fast-developing liberalism was unable altogether to uproot this early teaching. Her memoirs suggest that, left to herself, she would have favoured a regency, and she viewed her bitter quarrel with Anne 'as a punishment upon us for the irregularity by us committed upon the revolution'.¹ The struggle—the hideous fear of personal combat—between father and husband agonized a sensitive heart, and the one thing she found unforgivable in politicians was disloyalty to William, or disrespect to James. As time passed by, and with it the first bitterness of the Revolution, she grew to lean more on her uncle Rochester, a pillar of the Church in politics.

As for the King, he was from the first clear that he had not come to England 'to establish a commonwealth', and he never ceased to overrate the strength of the extreme Whigs and republicans. No British sovereign ever so prized the royal prerogatives as did the Liberator, whose favoured ministers were silent automata, prepared to take his orders and to do the work of the State, without thought of party or inherited prejudice. Hence his immediate resolution to employ Godolphin,² hence the fatted calf prepared so early in the reign for the prodigal Sunderland, hence the political influence of men really outside party, like Henry Sidney or Portland. To the last day of his reign William was ready to experiment with ministries of any complexion, provided they would co-operate in the real object of his life, the breaking of the French; but if the Tories would loyally accept him as their king, he was convinced that they were the natural supporters of the throne.³

In 1689, however, elementary sense dictated the formation of a Ministry of all such talents as could be induced to serve. The Government should be of both parties, since both had shared in the Revolution, and on these principles William allotted the offices. The Treasury, for which Danby had hoped, was put into commission—Godolphin flanking four hot Whigs in Mordaunt, Delamere, Capel, and Hampden. Two

¹ Doeberner, *Memoirs of Mary* (1886), 11 and 45; Plumptre, *Ken*.

² 'Said if hee had a mind to keep Ld. Godolphin in, who should hinder him?' Halifax's *Journal*.

³ Mary, *Memoirs*, 1693.

Tories, Torrington and Lowther, found themselves at the Admiralty, cheek by jowl with Lee of the old 'country' party and a miscellaneous collection of Whigs. Danby, as Lord President, matched Halifax, the Privy Seal. The Household, with Devonshire as Lord Steward and Thomas Wharton Comptroller, was predominantly Whig, but if Shrewsbury had one Secretaryship, Nottingham had the other, and the same partitioning principle ran through the Customs, the Ordnance, and the lord-lieutenancies. But, from the point of view of binding the Tories to the Revolution settlement, the choice of Danby and of Nottingham was fundamental.

Danby, almost alone of the elder statesmen, had burned his boats, and, unlike Halifax, Godolphin, or Shrewsbury, he never touched Jacobite conspiracy; all his life, he boasted in the last year of it to the Electress Sophia, he had been 'a constant asserter' of the religion and laws of England.¹ In other respects he was still unchanged. Though under sixty, ill health had given him the dead-white face of extreme old age and, in fact, all through 1689 made him 'much fitter for retirement than business'.² But 'the white Marquis' of Carmarthen, as we must now call him (he became so in this April), was sustained by passions more vital than was his frail body—by a boundless ambition, by an oriental longing to advance his very unattractive family, and by an immortal hatred for his rivals. And, knowing the depth of his claims upon the new Government, he had not hesitated to pitch them high. The Treasurership was denied him, a Secretaryship of State he refused, but he became Lord President, a Marquis, Governor of Hull, and Lord-Lieutenant of the West Riding; his brother-in-law Lindsey was Lord Great Chamberlain and Lord-Lieutenant of Lincoln; Abingdon, of Oxfordshire; Willoughby, Chancellor of the Duchy—in short, so long as he was in office, the Berties and the Osbornes were comfortable enough. These things, which much to the King's annoyance he claimed 'as

¹ B. M. Add. MSS. 28054, ff. 213-17 (Leeds-Godolphin papers)

² Danby to Nottingham, 17 Sept. 1689; Finch papers, ii. 247. 'Since the King came in, no man could apply himself with more industry, with that tender constitution of his, being eight hours together in the day in business': Lowther, in the Commons, 14 May 1690 (Grey). In February 1689 Reresby thought he was too ill to go on.

his right', had always been the very stuff of the marquis's political system; when on the verge of final dismissal in 1699, the highest ground on which he advanced a plea, for continuing a sinecure in his brother, was that 'he hath been a thorough voter always for the court'. Small wonder that Mary, though grateful for his help, styled him 'of a temper I can never like'—his easy morals and his low ideals of the Church probably contributing to her dislike. The scruples of the non-juring bishops, who themselves had helped to make the Revolution, he frankly despised, and he was wont to think 'the folly of clergymen' the bane of politics. He had, indeed, told William that he was prejudicing his Government by encouraging Presbytery, and that he would 'serve him in everything but against the Church', but by the Church he meant the Tory cause. While this seemed in danger, Carmarthen's friends steadily obstructed the Government in the Commons, and in May he himself in a furious speech, which 'damned the whole Popish plot', led the Lords' opposition to the reversal of Titus Oates's sentence, drawing thereby upon himself the volume of Whig resentment. More than all, his ancient and hereditary feud with Halifax, a thousandfold multiplied since their duels in the Convention, coloured his political outlook. Halifax, by his indecent proposal to make William sole sovereign, had won the new King's confidence, but the 'Trimmer' politics on which they congratulated each other were not for men of Carmarthen's type. For he was a patriot of the secondary strata, who can only serve loyally when their policy is in the ascendant, and, though he never embarked in conspiracy, he neglected all but essential business so long as Halifax was in favour, and openly showed his discontent through the summer of 1689.¹

A more strict virtue exhales from Daniel Finch, second Earl of Nottingham, who from this time onwards played a part of singular importance, and twice turned the current of national history. His father, the worthy Chancellor of Danby's Ministry, had watched carefully over the upbringing of his heir, and placed him first under Busby (his own old master) at Westminster, and then at Oxford at the feet of Richard Allestree,

¹ Reresby, 440 et seq.; *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1690-1; Halifax's *Journals*; Rutland papers, II. 125; Lonsdale papers, 113; Mary, *Memoirs*.

that pattern of saintly Churchmanship. Two injunctions he had laid on his son: always to obey and reverence the Church, and never to become that thing of horror, a man about town.¹ He was, one may say, fully rewarded. Daniel Finch grew up to be in his generation the chief prop of the Church, whose virtues he was held to personify, even in the possession of twenty-one children. Nor could anybody be less like a man about town than 'Dismal'—a grave man, with more than the usual sententious eloquence of his family, of giant industry, and old-fashioned clothes. Not that he was either a misanthrope, or a romantic. He adored his first wife Essex Rich (a marriage which made him the uncle of the future Bolingbroke), was the head of a harmonious band of able brothers, made good friends, and, like all his peers, enjoyed hunting, as he showed by doing so on a most critical day of the Convention. He had not the scruples of many High-churchmen about Church lands, which he shrewdly observed were usually a cheaper article, and in youth had engaged in commercial ventures in Bermuda, even to sending gallons of brandy there to smooth the path of his agents.² But in public life he was a man not exactly of tangents, but of corners; he consorted with his fellows, but his volubility was self-centred and did not react to common opinion. A little weighted, perhaps, by his own rectitude and always a pessimist, he was certainly apt to make moral and political indignation coincide; he liked office, but was an indigestible colleague.

This angular and upright character had already shown itself before the Revolution. He had disliked Danby's method of government, but had voted against Exclusion; he had championed the Church, but by 1680 was already a convert to religious comprehension. He had stuck quietly to work as a Commissioner of the Admiralty and a Privy Councillor during the Royalist reaction, but in James's reign had never come to the Board, and ranked, despite his high prerogative views, among the Opposition. We have seen him in the first part of the Revolution acting with the middle group of peers—Halifax, Weymouth, Burlington, and Pembroke—and noted his

¹ Finch papers, 1, *passim*.

² B. M. Eserton MSS. 2650 (Barrington papers)

opposition to the advanced Orange school. Now, at the age of forty-one, he stepped to the front of the stage.

King William, in conversation with Halifax on the 30th December, emphatically termed Nottingham 'an honest man', and in fact the line of his policy was straight and consistent. He had undertaken the duty of negotiator between King and Prince, but without any hope of success; indeed, it is impossible to miss in his letters a conviction that Orange from the first meant to be king.¹ When Halifax split the middle party by joining the Prince at Windsor, Nottingham did not follow him. He refused to sign the Association at the meeting of peers on the 22nd December, and on the 24th he, with Pembroke, stoutly opposed the motion to crown Mary and urged, though unsuccessfully, that only the King's writs could legalize the Convention. There is no sign of his presence in the consultations of the Regency peers at Lambeth, but it was the Regency scheme to which he pinned his outward colours, and here his motive was, it would seem, less religious than constitutional scruple. From the first, he admitted that his religion allowed him to obey a king *de facto*; on his view, legality was one thing and *de facto* obedience quite another, and he roundly condemned those who had taken the Association and then boggled at the oaths. What he was principally concerned for was to minimize the break in constitutional order. All the emphasis of his conference speeches was laid, as we have seen, not upon Regency, but on the impossibility of a vacancy in the succession, and it was in that cause that he entered his protest against the Lords' final vote of agreement with the Commons.

Now this was on the 7th February, but on the 14th Nottingham's name appeared in the new list of Privy Councillors, and on the 7th March, after some delay caused apparently by attempts to induce him to take the lower dignity of First Commissioner of the Great Seal, he was gazetted as Secretary of State.² Halifax had recommended him, but on the approaches

¹ To Hatton, 1 Dec.: 'In all probability, this [the negotiation] will have no effect, the affairs of the Prince being such as will admit little delay, especially since the King of France's troops have already advanced to Boisleduc and burnt 12 villages thereabouts.'

² His own wish, apparently, was simply to be a Commissioner of the

to the King we find no direct light. Putting together, however, Nottingham's candid *de facto* position, his hint in the last conference, the triumph (to which we shall return) of his views on the oaths of allegiance, and his pains to keep his friends away from the last vote on vacancy—one can hardly avoid the conclusion that something like a bargain was struck before the end of the Convention. If so, on the Earl's part it was an honest one; though he would endeavour to persuade the Tories to be true to the *de facto* Government, he openly warned William that, in 'many steps yet to be made', he must 'oppose that which would be pretended to be for his service'. His view of the Revolution never budged, and reappeared in the last act of William's life, the Act abjuring King James, of March 1702, against which he headed a protest. Such an oath, he then said, 'can be no bond of union'; such distinctions were against 'the terms of our submission to his Majesty, and upon which his Majesty was pleased to accept the crown'.¹ This was the *Contrat Social* according to Daniel Finch.

But, whatever the process, the effect of Nottingham's inclusion in the new Government was vital, for he was a living pledge to the Churchmen that their scruples would be humoured and their obedience accepted. 'I reckon', says Burnet in his original version of 1691, 'that I do not exceed the severe rules of history, when I say that Nottingham's being in the Ministry, together with the effects that it had, first preserved the Church and then the Crown.'²

Except Danby and Nottingham, none of the recognized Tory chieftains were given office; Clarendon was notoriously discontented, the King thought Rochester a rogue, Middleton and Preston could not expect mercy. But there was one omission too striking for us to pass over. What had become of the author of the Association, the chief Anglican commoner,³ Edward Seymour? We left him in November accepting from William the governorship of Exeter, but when next we meet

Treasury (Halifax). We note that in the first week of March at latest he was preparing heads of a comprehension bill (Finch papers, ii. 194).

¹ Rogers, *Protests*, 24 Feb. 1702

² Finch papers, ii, *passim*; Burnet, iii. 362, iv. 4; Foxcroft, *Supplement to Burnet*, 290, 314; Reresby; Clarendon; Luttrell; *Hatton Corr.*

³ Ronquillo, 8/18 March (Macaulay).

him in debate, or private conversation, it is as a determined enemy of the new settlement. Disappointed ambitions had, no doubt, something to do with it, and he may have hoped, as contemporaries thought, to be Speaker of the Convention, but his feelings were expressed so early, and so consistently maintained, that we may allow some credit for public motives. The Prince, he was saying on the 1st January, was breaking his Declaration and ruining the Church. A mediation between King and Prince, he argued later, 'possibly it was the best thing' the three Hungerford commissioners ever did. In the Convention he made his protest against vacancy, and deprecated undue hurry over the Bill of Rights; 'what care I for what is done abroad, if we must be slaves in England?' This insular and edged nationality, which was his peculiar attribute, seemingly determined his attitude now. While he maintained that England and Holland were naturally enemies, and raved at the suspension of Habeas Corpus, he was still as emphatic as ever against Popery. If all his sympathies were with the older England, he yet put her above a dynasty; not only did he take the oaths, but he was never a Jacobite.¹

To prevent the diffusion of Jacobitism was, plainly, the task of the moment for those Tories who had thrown in their lot with the new Government. They were prepared to be loyal to William and Mary, but it must be on terms which would not publicly humiliate the Tory view of the Constitution. The King was too tolerant of Dissenters; they must wean him to support the Church. There were 'some Sidneys, Harbords, &c., about him', who tried to make him think 'the faction are everything in this kingdom';² the Tories must undeceive him.

The first step in this programme was taken on the 6th February, the same day that the Lords surrendered their objection as to the vacancy of the throne. Nottingham moved to draw up new oaths of allegiance and supremacy: few, he thought, would take the old ones to a new king. Danby seconded him: 'they had resolved to make them King and

¹ Bonnet (Ranke, iv. 491, note); Clarendon, 1 Jan.; Reresby, 1 Feb.; Grey, ix, *passim*; Echard; Ralph; as against the charges of Jacobitism brought by Ailesbury and Dartmouth, see Macpherson, i. 424.

² Bodl. Ballard MSS. 45, f. 41.

Queen upon this crisis of affairs, yet no man would affirm they were rightfully so by the Constitution'. The oaths, as now recast, amply satisfied the *de facto* school, were passed at once, in spite of Halifax's objections, and incorporated in the Declaration of Right.¹ But by what authority were they to be enforced? The Tories' main objection hitherto had been to the legality of the Convention: Nottingham and Pembroke had made this a mainstay of their argument, and Sawyer, like many others, thought that its meeting could only last a few weeks.² Only the issue of writs by a legal king for a new and regularly elected Parliament could, the conservatives argued, fulfil the Prince's declaration, validate the grant of supplies, and legalize our foreign alliances. Clarges suggested that the oaths might be taken by members, meanwhile, under a royal ordinance, but he and Seymour begged the Government to have no more legislation in the Convention; incidentally, of course, a new election would almost certainly have largely reinforced the present Tory minority. But on this they had to yield: the bill legalizing the Convention as a proper Parliament, and embodying a proviso that members of both Houses should take the oaths by the 1st March, received the royal assent on the 22nd February, and for some weeks after this a number of Tory members went into secession, long absenting themselves from Parliament.

Here, then, with the new monarchy's first piece of legislation begins also the Non-juror controversy. But the matter of the oaths, which would clearly have to be demanded of all office-holders, was linked up with four others: the Sacramental Test, the Coronation Oath, toleration for Protestant Dissenters, and a Comprehension Bill. Taken together, they made up the dual domestic problem of 1689: were Churchmen to be enabled to serve King William in Church and State, and if so, were they to maintain their privileged position in both? Was the Revolution to renew the Restoration fabric, or to destroy it?

¹ The new oath of allegiance simply ran: 'I do sincerely promise and swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to their Majesties King William and Queen Mary, so help me God.' On the debate, see Clarendon; Bodl. Ballard MSS. 45. f. 27; Foxcroft, ii. 55.

² Sawyer to (?), 8 Jan. (Bodl. Tanner MSS. 28. f. 223). Mulgrave called its continuance a constitutional outrage (B. M. Add. MSS. 27382).

Here was untold material for bargaining: the aim of Carmarthen and Nottingham was to bring their party to make essential concessions, but when that was done, to rally them strongly to the Crown on the new basis. Something of the old top-heavy deck furniture must be thrown overboard, but the body of the Tory ship might still be brought safely to port.

To some measures in favour of Protestant Dissent the Church was absolutely pledged since the crisis of 1688, and it was in full concurrence with the bishops,¹ including some of the future Non-jurors, that Nottingham in the first week of March introduced in the Lords bills for Comprehension and Toleration. Almost simultaneously, two separate bills for new oaths of allegiance were introduced in the two Houses: a Whig bill of extreme severity in the Commons, and a milder measure in the Lords, which would have left the Crown a discretionary power of enforcing the oaths upon the clergy. On the 16th William, without discussion apparently with any of his Cabinet, but merely advised by some Whig officials like Richard Hampden, put forward a solution of his own, which made confusion more confounded. Formally inviting Parliament to repeal the Test Act so far as it affected Protestants, he let it be understood that, on this condition, he would waive the oaths for the clergy.²

This projected bargain was put forward without Nottingham's connivance, seriously prejudiced the chances for his Comprehension Bill, mortified the great Whig leaders, and caused a fierce outburst of Tory fanaticism. The Test was their chief bulwark, and were they 'to barter and break the Church to save a few Churchmen'?³ Toleration they were pledged to, and the general application of oaths, which the Commons had just taken themselves, could hardly be resisted, but they were determined to keep the Church in her position of superiority. And if all Churchmen clung to the Test, a large majority loathed the notion of Comprehension to be enforced by Parliament. 'That a Parliament should reform our liturgy,' wrote one of Charles Bertie's clerical correspondents, 'expunge

¹ He held six meetings with them at their desire: Bodl. Ballard MSS. 45, f. 48.

² Burnet, iv. 13; Bodl. Ballard MSS. 45, f. 52; Ralph, ii. 67; Grey.

³ Bodl. Rawlinson MSS., Letters, 98, f. 93 (Bishop Turner's papers).

creeds, tell us what we must not believe and what we must, without advising with a Convocation, or with ecclesiastical men in ecclesiastical affairs'—was not this to brand themselves as a merely Parliamentary Church, or a State department, and to justify all the taunts of their 'old adversaries at Rome?'¹

On the 25th March the Commons agreed, by a majority of 39, to insert in the Coronation Oath words binding the sovereign to preserve the Church of England, 'as by law established'. In both Houses resolutions against the Test were evaded, while a clause in the Comprehension Bill, to dispense with obligatory kneeling at the Sacrament, was got through the Lords only by the narrowest of majorities.² Demonstrations in force were attempted upon the King. On the 9th April a meeting of one hundred and sixty Tory members at the Devil Tavern, Fleet Street, resolved to address him to protect the Church, and this, we hear, was 'done with his own consent, I suppose at the motion of the Earl of Nottingham'. The same day the Commons resolved on the appointment of a committee to draw up an address of thanks for William's Declaration in the Church's favour; the committee included Musgrave, Finch, and Clarges—who were all bound by close ties to Nottingham—leading official Whigs, like Somers and Treby, and a group of the middle party—Garroway, Temple, and Lee. Reported to the House on the 13th, the Address was agreed to, apparently without a division, sent up to the Lords for concurrence, and on the 19th presented to the King. Besides containing promises to proceed forthwith in 'easing' Protestant Dissenters, the Address asked for a speedy summons of Convocation, and plainly told his Majesty that the best way of 'securing the hearts' of his subjects was by continuing his care for the Church, 'whose constitution is best suited to the support of this monarchy'.

The following facts should be noted: (1) This committee's

¹ Leeds papers, Report XI, vii. 32.

² Devonshire and Shrewsbury, we know, absented themselves when the Test question was up in the Lords, and a good contemporary authority (Ballard MSS. 45, f. 58) says that Devonshire, Danby, and Nottingham opposed the dispensation just mentioned. If true of the last, he was abandoning his own bill.

composition. (2) The fact that, the very day its report was adopted, the House amended the Lords' Oaths Bill, and made it compulsory on clergy as well as laity. (3) That in the ensuing debate on the 20th the Church leaders, Musgrave and Clarges, were silent. (4) That one of Carmarthen's particular henchmen, Goodrick, spoke clearly for compulsory oaths. (5) That the Commons had, simultaneously, in front of them the Comprehension Bill, which was objected to equally by Dissenters¹ and High-churchmen, and that the proposed reference to Convocation meant shelving the whole question. (6) That the Whigs were singularly conservative on the Test question, and that they also stifled a bill which would have repealed the Corporation Act.

In short, it seems clear that there was an understanding between the two front benches; Toleration was to pass and the Oaths to be enforced on the clergy, but Comprehension was to be dropped, and the political Tests maintained. Up to this point, then—and the Toleration Act received royal assent on the 24th May—the Tories may fairly claim to have held their own.

But if, by July or August, William's mind was slowly turning towards the idea of building on a Tory foundation, this was mostly due to the Whigs' blunders. They had counted on a clean sweep of their enemies; instead, they saw high up in office Halifax who had attacked the Charters and broken the Exclusion Bill, Carmarthen whom they had impeached, Godolphin and Nottingham who had voted for Regency—everywhere, they felt, 'Toryism is now in the ascendant',² and at every point therefore they contested William's policy of healing and settling. Not merely did they attack the King's ministers, but they obstructed his revenues, and refused to give him a grant for life. He, meanwhile, was only anxious to concentrate their attention on France and Ireland, while they

¹ Burnet; Resesby; Ballard MSS. 39, f. 57. The views of extreme Whig politicians may be judged from a later letter of John Hampden: 'I have really laid aside all thoughts of comprehension, ever since I saw plainly that the design of some who drove it was only to destroy obliquely, and by a side wind, what has been gained, at a favourable time, in the Act of Toleration, which they durst not directly attempt to overthrow': 27 May 1693, B. M. Stowe MSS. 747, f. 16.

² Edward to Robert Hauley, 26 March (P. iii).

were debating who had murdered Lord Essex, or prosecuted Sir Thomas Armstrong. A speedy Bill of Indemnity was for his purposes essential, but his plea of the spring stood disregarded, and as summer passed and they reassembled for the autumn session, the cry for blood and eviction grew louder and more insistent. Instead of a brief list of excepted persons, the Whig majority in the Commons had compiled a portentous catalogue of crimes, under any one of which persons might be 'excepted' at discretion. This was in May, and in January 1690 they were no further advanced. In July 1689 they were considering an address, asking William to remove Halifax and Carmarthen; in December young John Hampden was mouth-ing against 'the three men who came to Hungerford'; a week only before their final prorogation they expelled Sawyer for his share in prosecuting Armstrong in 1684. On the 19th December they passed a bill continuing the revenue for one year and no longer; on the 2nd January they introduced the famous Sacheverell clause into a bill restoring the corporations forfeited in the two previous reigns, with the effect of disfranchising for seven years all who had in any way assisted thereat. The aim was clear enough: to hold up the King, by stopping the revenue and postponing indemnity, till they had got the Tory ministers dismissed, and to win for themselves sole possession of power by paralysing the Tory vote for seven years.¹

Signs were not lacking that moderate 'country' opinion was sickening of this crusade and inclined to agree with Lowther (who was becoming highly influential at Court), 'we have got the government settled, I would punish for the future, and pardon all that is past', and elementary patriotism called for national union when James II, with French officers, was holding a parliament in his capital at Dublin. But the Whig leaders—Capels, Harbords, and Whartons—were resolved upon getting their way, and could count on a large vote in the Convention.² In this balanced state of parties, the King's decision must

¹ Clarges, 14 Dec., Grey, ix. 483; Critters (Macaulay), 10 Jan.

² Lee's speech, Grey, ix. 323, and Smith's defence of Sawyer, *ibid.*, 525; Lowther, *ibid.*, 319; Halifax, *Journals* (Foxcroft); 'the act of Indemnity is called for almost every day', R. Hampden to Wharton, 15 June 1689 (Bodl. Carte MSS. 79).

largely depend on the degree of real co-operation which could be obtained from the Tories, and in August the clergy had been called upon to take the oaths—the acid test of Tory acceptance of the Revolution.

Deep though were the feelings aroused, bitter as they continued for a generation, profound though this controversy's effects on political thought, from the Government's point of view the immediate results were better than might have been expected. It was true that Sancroft, six bishops, and four hundred clergy, including some of the Church's finest characters, refused the oaths, and that under the shadow of this blow the Convocation, which had been summoned to deal with Comprehension, proved obdurate and was prorogued at Christmas, with nothing but protests to show. Yet the *de facto* sentiment had made great headway. Among the laity many felt, with the aged Bramston, that though those who had called in William could never be justified, William himself was, and that though allegiance might be due to James if he ever returned, still in the meantime government was necessary, and obedience likewise. And thousands believed that though they might doubt the rightfulness of William's title, they must on many grounds accept it as legal. He had, said Edmund Bohun (later Nottingham's press censor), 'the right of a conqueror, and the right of a lawful successor too; and though his own personal right of succession is more remote, that of his lady is immediate—and by it he claims, to our great good and his immortal honour'.¹ This, though hardly orthodox, or even truthful, reasoning sufficed for many anxious fathers of families, who might well argue that the brand of passive obedience to the powers that be, which had been good enough for the primitive Christians, was good enough for them.

Meanwhile King William, who was resolved to keep his full prerogative, was impressed through a dozen channels with the loyalty of the Church party, which, if once secured of indemnity, would give him his revenues and uphold the rights of the Crown. Such was the continual song of Nottingham,

¹ *Non-resistance or Passive Obedience noway Concerned in the Controversies Now Depending*. Cf. Bramston, 355, and *Letters of Humphrey Prideaux* (Cam. Soc., 1875), 157.

who brought him all the whisperings of the Commonwealth party he dreaded. The Tory press contrasted the Church's 'passion and reverence to Majesty' with the sourness of the Presbyterians, who loved kings, it was said, only 'as boys do their tops, to whip them'.¹ The Tories in the Commons—bitterly as they attacked, and with some reason, the chaos of administration, the neglect at sea, and the misconduct of the Irish war—embroidered the same theme with variations. Clarges, leader in every debate, was critical of abuses but deferential to the King, and both he and Musgrave disclaimed any notion of the Commons asking executive power. Trevor begged the House not to be 'hallooed off' from proper inquiry into empty attacks upon ministers. Seymour, almost echoing what William himself said privately many times to Halifax, declared, ' 'tis too well known, too bare-faced, that some are setting up for "the Keepers of the liberties of England" '. Clarges argued that William 'came in by the Church of England, their pens, sermons, and sufferings', and invited him in a dozen harangues to trust the natural friends of monarchy. By December the King, Tories thought generally, had made up his mind for a change. Shrewsbury, uneasy at the trend of events and indignant at the Commission for Prayer-book revision issued to bishops and divines without his advice being asked, had already asked leave to resign. Godolphin and Halifax were threatening the same. The King's secret Tory advisers urged a dissolution, which in fact had for some months past been discussed between Carmarthen and Nottingham. Only Shrewsbury's urgent representations stopped the King proroguing Parliament for a month from the middle of December, and he gave way in this on the clear understanding that money must be found, or he would dissolve.²

During the Christmas of 1689-90 peace and goodwill did not stop the party conflict. The bill restoring corporations had been twice read, and on the 19th December sent to a Committee; on the 23rd Parliament was prorogued, till the 30th. Nottingham took the alarm: he had pressed for a longer

¹ *The Danger of a Comprehension*, 1689.

² Grey, ix, 416 et seq.; Clarendon, 2 Dec.: Bodl. Carte MSS. 228, f. 132 (Wharton papers); Carmarthen to Nottingham, 17 Sept., Finch papers, ii; Trevor to the King (n. d.), printed by Dalrymple, Coxe, *Shrewsbury Corr.* 8-15

prorogation, on the ostensible ground that Tory members would think themselves hardly used if forced to shorten their usual Christmas holidays. On the 24th he conjectured that the Whig plan was to rush bills through in this empty season, restoring the corporations to their condition in 1660 and removing the sacramental clause out of the Test Act.¹ His instinct, or his information, was correct. On the 2nd January the Sacheverell clause was sprung on a half-empty and astonished House, and passed by 133 to 68: its promoters at the same time let the King know that, if he tried to stop it, they would hang up the Money Bills.²

It was not the way to treat William III, and his displeasure perhaps explains the unaccountable postponement of the third reading from the 4th to the 10th January. By that time Carmarthen and Rochester were aware that William was on their side. The debate on the 10th, prolonged by candle-light, was a furious one, though even then Seymour and many Tories had not yet returned from their festival. 'Popery and slavery' was the cry of Sacheverell, Maynard, and Capel; 'Better men and unspotted men', the milder version of Somers. The Tory answer was almost a threat: 'It is dangerous, now the King is going out of the kingdom, to discontent such a body of people', said Lord Falkland; 'A bill of heat, a bill of Attainder', said Carmarthen's vassal Goodrick; 'This is not the way', declared Pulteney, 'to make friends for the King nor the Government.' By 182 to 171 the clause was abandoned: 'We routed Jack Presbyter,' wrote one Tory member, 'horse and foot.'³

The brief remainder of this session only plunged the Whigs deeper into the mire. Defying the King's plain wishes, they refused to proceed with the Indemnity Bill and grafted upon it a bill of pains and penalties. On the 21st the Tories, encouraged by the visible swing of moderate opinion and discerning the divisions their motion would cause in the Whig ranks, moved to proceed in this new composite bill by naming

¹ Nottingham to Hatton, 24 Dec. 1689 (B. M. Add. MSS 29594).

² Halifax's *Journals*, loc. cit., Twelfth Day, 1690.

³ William Helyer, M.P. for Ilchester, to Charlett, 11 Jan. (Bodl. Ballard MSS. 38); he adds, 'the King gives all the encouragement that men can dare'.

particular persons who should be 'excepted'; they were beaten only by 190 to 173, and had the satisfaction of hearing some Whigs name Halifax, whom they themselves longed to see demolished.¹ On the 22nd the Whigs suffered a significant defeat: on a petition that Pilkington, the famous Exclusionist sheriff of 1682, should be given reparation from the estate of Sir Peter Rich, his Tory rival, for the monstrous damages he had been cast in for riot under the old régime, the proposal was defeated by 169 to 152.

On the 27th the King, to the Whigs' loudly voiced fury, prorogued Parliament, and on the 6th February dissolved it. Accompanied as it was by the long-threatened resignation of Halifax, the dissolution was a notable triumph for Carmarthen, to whom it was generally attributed. Some Tories had wanted it postponed till the autumn, by which time a little daylight might have been let into the Irish problem, but 'the freshness of the corporation clause in their memory' was expected to outweigh every other consideration in the minds of the electors, whom an active Tory press now took pains to familiarize with the names of those voting for the Sacheverell clause.² The Tories parted from William in high good humour. One hundred and fifty members, dining together at their regular haunt, the Devil Tavern, within a day or two of the prorogation, sent by Sir John Lowther assurances of their devotion to his service. The King's answer was gracious in the extreme, and he urged gentlemen departing for their constituencies to see to it that they returned Moderate Churchmen.³

¹ I venture to think that both Macaulay and Ralph have misinterpreted this piece of tactics. The tellers for the minority were two of the highest Tories, so it was not a Tory victory (as Ralph); on the other hand, the Whigs did not (as Macaulay) proceed on the succeeding days to name persons, but continued on their old method of categories and crimes. Peregrine Bertie's motion to name Sir W. Williams, and Lowther's support of the general motion, would alone, I think, be enough to settle the interpretation given above.

² Evelyn; William to Portland, 28 Jan./7 Feb. (Macaulay); 'A Letter to a Friend on the Dissolution of the late Parliament' (*Somers Tracts*); Fleming papers, 266; Bodl. Ballard MSS. 11; 'Some Queries concerning the Election of Members for the ensuing Parliament,' 1690 (Portland papers, 11. 444). For the corresponding Whig 'Black list', of those who had voted against vacancy of the throne (reproducing a fly-sheet circulated much earlier in the session), see App. II.

³ Grey, ix 546, Evelyn; Clarendon; Dalrymple; Burnet to Colt, 22 Feb. (Ralph).

The swing to the right was obvious. Lord Derby used with effect his great Tory influence in Lancashire. The City sent back four Tories in place of four Whigs, and Westminster two Tories unopposed. Edward Harley lost his seat in Herefordshire, the furious John Hampden was not re-elected. Sawyer was returned in triumph for the University of Cambridge. Everywhere the clergy took an active part: the Bishop of London took command in Essex, such a moderate man as Tenison declared from his pulpit for Church candidates, and parish priests led their flocks to the polls.¹

With this election, and the return of a Tory majority pledged to support King William (small and fluctuating though it was to prove), may be said to end the year of the Revolution. Monarchy *de facto* had triumphed indeed.

¹ Kenyon papers, 236, P III 444 et seq; Ranke, IV 583

III
1690-1714
Fusion and Decline

X

THE SECOND DANBY MINISTRY, 1690-4

THE history of party in this country was never more intricate than between 1690 and 1694, years which have written plain upon them the marks of a transition age. An active king was on the throne, who was determined to rule above party, to take what moderate ministers he could get from either side, and to assert all the Crown's prerogatives. The Revolution had shattered the old Tory basis, and largely destroyed the rationale of the Whigs. The first were drawn by their political reason to support the Crown, but by their sentiment to hate usurpation and Dutch wars. The Whigs, if they were to be true to their past, would be jealous of a kingly rule, but they dared not overturn the saviour of Whig society. Purely religious scruples were losing their strength and being absorbed in factious political systems, but these scruples, too, in so far as they operated at all, diverted each party from the natural course of their affections. How should a high-prerogative Tory vote, who thought the Church in danger, or what should decide a Whig between Parliamentary liberties, which were offensive to the King, and protection for Dissent, which only the King could guarantee? Moreover, the very existence of party was not yet accepted by old-fashioned and loyal 'country' politicians: their constitutional ideal was still a king ruling over a united House of Commons, and thus Sir John Lowther thought the worst consequence of the Revolution was the revival of 'the buried names of Whig and Tory'.¹

If, in addition, we remember that William III's reign saw the creation of Jacobitism, and that it was also the most corrupt period of English politics, we shall not be surprised to find one good observer dividing the new Parliament into 'Tories, Whigs, Court Whigs and Tory Whigs', to hear men of the old school speaking bitterly of 'modern Tories', or to

¹ 'Memoirs', ed. Firth, E. H. R. xxx. 1915.

discover Godolphin classed alternately as a Whig and a Tory within one year by two excellent judges.¹ What was in fact proceeding was a regrouping of parties; by 1698 we shall find this tolerably accomplished, but its first stages began with the Parliament of 1690.

The sum of the factors mentioned above involved, it will be seen, an extraordinary uncertainty in politics—comparable only to the fog in which our modern parties' pioneers groped during the middle period of George III. The Tuscan envoy, indeed, was driven back on the politics of Babel for an informative parallel.² The King, reluctant to abandon his freedom of choice and only anxious to secure ample supply, freely experimented in his selection of ministers—a government predominantly Tory in February 1690 thus changing, by gradual steps, to one almost purely Tory by March 1692, and then, by the same process reversed, changing back again, till by May 1694 it was almost entirely Whig. But the same Parliament continued throughout these vicissitudes, and the formation of Cabinets turned, therefore, not on pressure from constituencies nor even on the voice of the Commons, but rather upon a nice adjustment of many personal and sectional groups to the royal will.

It would, indeed, be true to say that in one sense the whole of England during this reign was in Opposition, since the King's method was simply to govern through those groups which would give him money for his wars at the price of reasonable concessions. The material burden cast on the country by his war policy was greater than it had ever known. The estimates for 1690-3 were annually over £4,000,000, and had increased by 1695 to more than £5,000,000. The land tax rose to 4s. in the pound, and the standing army to a strength of 90,000 men. Nor did the King's methods precisely gild the pill.³ Finally, it should be emphasized that men of both parties were

¹ P. iii. 446; *Hatton Corr.* ii. 149; Blanquard to Dykvelt, Denbigh papers 6/16 Jan. 1693; Shrewsbury to the King (Coxe), June 1694.

² Terriesi, B. M. Add. MSS. 25380, 12 May 1690: 'Non credessi che l'antica Babilonia si ritrovasse giammai nella confusione che è l'Inghilterra al presente.'

³ 'Whoever goes about to obstruct or divert your application to these matters, preferably to all others, can neither be my friend, nor the Kingdom's.' Speech of 2 November 1690.

increasingly dissatisfied with the Revolution settlement, and old-fashioned Tories like Clarges, constitutional Whigs like Paul Foley, new Tories like Bartholomew Shower, Jacobites and Non-jurors from their keener angle, all agreed in attacking the power of ministers in Parliament and the multiplication of placemen. As late as 1702 it was commonly assumed that 'Court' and 'country' were the normal divisions of politics, and that Court backing of one party at elections was so unpopular as almost to involve victory for the other.¹ Mulgrave thought the Convention ought to have looked to 'the choice, succession, and power of Parliaments': we should have had 'our annual parliaments settled, the negative voice restrained, a Committee of Lords and Commons to be the Privy Council, no officers of the King to serve in Parliament, the revenue appropriated, the eminent offices had upon good behaviour'.² The King's veto, in February 1692, of the Judges' Salaries Bill, and of the Triennial and Place Bills in 1693-4, as well as the free use of the pensioner vote throughout his reign, are further commentary on this very deep constitutional feeling, to ignore which would be to lose a vital key to party grouping.

The Ministry which in 1690 undertook the difficult task of satisfying both King and 'country' was considerably altered from the days of the Convention. Carmarthen still went on, of course, as Lord President, and Nottingham as Secretary. Lowther became first Commissioner of the Treasury, and led for the Government in the Commons: Sir John Trevor, Speaker of James II's Parliament, became Speaker in this. In November Godolphin, who had retired under the Whig attacks, came back to be head of the Treasury at William's special request³—the handy man Lowther taking the second seat there, as well as at the Admiralty. The head of the latter board from June was the sometime Regency Tory Pembroke,

¹ The Whigs, said the Venetian Mocenigo, hoped for a favourable Parliament, 'essendo per l'ordinario la campagna stata del partito contrario alla corte': 24 April/5 May 1702, P. R. O. Venetian Transcripts, cf. Hoffman, 24 Jan./4 Feb. 1701 (Klopp).

² B. M. Add. MSS. 27382; Shower, *Reasons for a new Bill of Rights*, 1692. A list of 138 Court pensioners is in Bodl. Rawlinson MSS. D. 846, drawn up in 1693-4, apparently by the Non-juror Grascome.

³ 'To the wonder of all his friends', Evelyn; 'by Mrs. Villiers' interest', P. iii. 452.

with the Whig Admiral Russell as his principal colleague. Of the official Whigs, Devonshire continued as Lord Steward and Dorset as Chamberlain, but the bitter partisans Mordaunt and Delamere were dropped from the Treasury and replaced by the veteran Stephen Fox, a Tory after Godolphin's heart, and Thomas Pelham, the moderate Whig founder of a great Whig dynasty. But the most important sequel to the dissolution, and to disputes over the Abjuration Bills in April, was the resignation in June of Shrewsbury, who was replaced from December 1690 by the King's personal friend, Henry Sidney.

In March 1692 there was a further shuffle. Pembroke took the Privy Seal, which had been in commission since Halifax's retirement, and was replaced at the Admiralty by a moderate Tory, Cornwallis. At the Treasury a rising hope of the Whigs, Charles Montague, replaced Pelham, and Seymour¹ succeeded Lowther, who moved definitely to the Admiralty. The addition of Seymour to the Cabinet, and Rochester to the Privy Council, were even more significant.

It will be seen that, though always a Coalition Ministry, its trend was very definitely in a Tory direction, and till 1692, anyhow, Carmarthen's supremacy was decided. It was Carmarthen whose advice William bade Mary follow during his own absence in Ireland, who as 'first minister' occupied State apartments in St. James's Palace, and whom even enemies like Marlborough called 'the mainstay to the present government'.²

Indeed, it is impossible to repress a feeling of admiration for the old invalid minister's achievement in propping up the settlement he had helped to make. 'I would rather perish in endeavouring to save this government than live to perish with it', he wrote to William,³ and we catch glimpses of this feverish energy in every branch of empire. With Sherlock he works to create favourable opinion in the City, and himself takes the colonelcy of a City regiment. He implores the Tory

¹ With reference to Seymour's alleged refusal to sit below Hampden (as in Macaulay's account, based apparently on Luttrell), the Secretary of State's office wrote to Colt, 'Sir Edward Seymour is well satisfied in taking his place after those, who were in the last Commission, this being the usual practice': 18 March 1692, B. M. Add. MSS. 36662.

² Macpherson, i. 237; Luttrell, ii. 137; Bonnet (Ranke, vi. 161); Dutch dispatches (Foxcroft, ii. 112); Dalrymple.

³ 20 Feb. 1691, *Cal. S. P. Dom.*

Rutland to accept a Lord-Lieutenancy, or the country's service 'must certainly otherwise fall into worse hands'. We see him hurrying to London on the news of Landen, leaving his cure at Bath, where Jacobites serenaded him with disloyal ballads. His encroaching hand is everywhere. He wishes to do everything, Mary writes. He tries, though 'very ignorant', Marlborough complains, to direct the army, down to tents and off-reckonings. He inspects the fleet at Portsmouth, badgers the Guildhall for loans, uses his son's famous racing yacht to catch conspirators on the Thames at Tilbury. His advice is always swift, bitter, pointed. Another year of misgovernment in Ireland will be the end of all things: Shrewsbury, Godolphin, Chesterfield, Pembroke, even Mulgrave—any one of these, he said, could govern Ireland, and if they failed, he would go himself. France must be dealt a stunning blow, and something tangible put in front of Parliament: attack France at Bordeaux, at Dunkirk, at Brest—year after year he urges the offensive.¹

All this energy was, simultaneously, used to consolidate his party in power. As part of the elections agreement with the King, the London Lieutenancy was to be purged of Whigs, and a list of magistrates, revised by Bishop Compton, was put in force by the Lord President: an address of thanks for these changes, carried by 185 to 136, marks the Commons' Tory majority at the opening of his Ministry. His own model of what local government should be could be seen in the carefully pruned Lieutenancy of the East Riding. He believed that to mix Whig and Tory in office was 'the most destructive method' possible, and he clearly did his best to check the balancing process which William, Sidney, and Godolphin favoured. He filled Government departments with his familiar spirits. Goodrick, his lieutenant in the Northern rising, was brought on to the Council, and Henry Guy, Secretary to the Treasury under the two last kings, reappeared as such in 1691.²

Still, though Carmarthen always had a reputation as a master

¹ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1690-3, *passim*; Carmarthen to Rutland, 4 July 1690 (Rutland papers); the same to Blathwayt, 8 Aug. 1693 (B. M. Add. MSS. 34351); Queen Mary's letters in Dalrymple; Luttrell.

² Tindal, i. 125; *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1690-1, 264.

who well rewarded good service, his unpopularity was profound. On him, as the outstanding minister, fell the load of the war, the taxes, and the arrests, and 'Yorkshire Tom', 'Tom the Tyrant', that evil relic of corrupt days, was savagely handled in a hundred songs and pamphlets. Nor did cordial relations with his colleagues lighten the load. With Nottingham he seems to have worked well at first, but in the autumn of 1691 they began to drift apart: he thought Nottingham was too friendly with his own enemies, such as Rochester and Seymour, and these recriminations were mutual. Besides the invariable distrust between those who had been open rebels in 1688 and those who had not, friendly relations could hardly be expected to last long between the old cynic and the priestly precise 'Dismal'. On some first-class political questions they took different sides: Carmarthen, for instance, championed the old East India Company, while Nottingham supported the constitutional claims of the 'adventurers'.¹

The real linchpin of this Ministry seems to have been Lowther, and this hot-tempered, genial, solid man was loyal to both leaders. Carmarthen stood godfather to one of his sons, and wrote to him for many years in cordial terms: indeed, four days before Lowther died, the old Duke of Leeds was writing a kindly letter, which never reached the hands intended. With Godolphin Lowther kept up a long correspondence on their greatest mutual interest, the breeding of race-horses, and he stood loyally by Nottingham at the height of the attacks upon him in 1692-3.² But, as leader of the House of Commons, Lowther was not so successful, partly because he drove and hectored a body which must be led, but even more because he had to deal with some personal antipathies from the past, which still dogged Carmarthen's footsteps. Nothing but this, and bitterness at not receiving office, could explain the inveterate jealousy of Seymour, lasting until his opposition was bought off early in 1692 by admission to the Cabinet. The new Parliament of 1690 had met only

¹ Reresby, 26 April 1689; Macaulay; Nottingham to Blathwayt, 18 April 1693 (B. M. Add. MSS. 24328).

² Halifax, *Journals*, loc. cit., 225; Mary to William, 7/17 July 1690, Dalrymple; Denbigh papers (Report VII), 208; Lonsdale papers, *passim*; Fleming papers, 355.

two days, when he was boasting of the Commons' power to change royal councillors. 'The Black horse' (Halifax) had been driven off the stage, let them treat 'the White horse' (Carmarthen) likewise. On the 14th May, backed by some rancorous Whigs and a few of the neo-Tories, he launched an attack in force, calling for the removal of Carmarthen, and it is remarkable that not only official and unofficial Tories but some Whigs defended the minister.¹ In February 1691 Carmarthen in a letter to William picked out Seymour as a dangerous enemy, and suggested that Lord Preston's confessions (which had inculpated Seymour, with no probability of truth) might be used to 'break the teeth not only of Sir Edward Seymour, but of that whole party'. In the November following Seymour was taking part in a concerted move, along with Halifax, Rochester, Godolphin, and (more surprising) Clarges, to overturn Carmarthen and Nottingham on the naval disasters. The President's parrty was to get his friends to ask for the confessions of Lord Preston and the disclosures of the informer Fuller, which named both Seymour and Halifax.²

As to Rochester, the King's cordial distrust mitigated his power for evil, but, unlike his brother, he had accepted the new settlement with apparent sincerity, going so far as to support actively the proposed insertion of the Hanoverians in the succession. Mary was grateful to him, since he took her part against Anne's intrigues, and as their uncle he was too great a person ever to be negligible. All available evidence goes to show that, in the next few years, he was trying to keep in his hand with those (particularly Halifax, Marlborough, and Shrewsbury) whom he thought might help him in future, and that whatever influence he had was used against Carmarthen, the hereditary enemy of his family.³

But figures so unpopular, self-seeking, and generally distrusted as Rochester and Seymour were not a real danger

¹ Grey, x. 13, 142; *Hatton Corr.* ii. 149.

² Carmarthen to the King, *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1690-1, 244; Denbigh papers, 206; Bonnet, 30 Oct./9 Nov. 1691 (Ranke); P. iii. 481.

³ For the long standing of his bad relations with Anne and Godolphin, we may probably trust Dartmouth's notes in Burnet, iii. 125 and iv. 210. See also Macpherson, i. 390; Halifax's *Journals*, 202, 219; Ralph; and Dalrymple.

either to the Ministry or to the Revolution settlement. The existence of both these last, together with the future of the Tories, depended rather on the interplay of four great political interests—the official Whigs, Jacobitism, the ‘country’ Opposition in the Commons, and the powerful group of middlemen in politics—Shrewsbury, Godolphin, Marlborough, and Sunderland.

In spite of all investigation, mist still shrouds the mutual relations of these four politicians. Yet nothing is more certain than that the fate of Ministries, the formation of parties, and at moments the safety of the whole settlement, was poised on the one or the other of these inscrutable hands. The last three had all been intimate personal servants of King James, while Shrewsbury owed his power to the affection of King William, but all four were bound to each other by older ties than these. Godolphin had for a quarter of a century been an *habitué* at Althorp, and never ceased correspondence with Sunderland, even during the latter’s exile. To Althorp was paid Shrewsbury’s last visit in 1700, before he buried himself for six years on the Continent. Marlborough’s disgrace in 1692 so much offended Godolphin that he asked leave to retire; in 1698 they were drawn still closer together by the marriage of Godolphin’s son Francis to Marlborough’s daughter, and it was at Marlborough’s house at St. Albans in 1712 that the weary Treasurer died. Shrewsbury was, in 1692, struck off the Council for supporting Marlborough, whose re-employment he never ceased to press. Each of the group could contribute powerful political friends: Shrewsbury was usually hand in glove with Wharton; Godolphin and Marlborough shared confidences with Russell.¹ Three of the four were united by a closer and more secret bond. Shrewsbury was in constant touch with the exiled Court at Saint-Germain, and both Godolphin and Marlborough betrayed political secrets, of varying value, to their old master.

As to their outlook on party, none of the four thought of it as an end in itself: ‘I cannot’, wrote Godolphin, in a biting letter to the King, ‘think it for your service to make changes

¹ *Sidney Diary*, March 1689, *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1691-2, 341, Coxe, *Marlborough*, 1. 48; Denbigh papers, 211; Dalrymple.

in the management of your revenue, to gratify party and animosity.' ¹ Their notion of party was to use both, or either, of the factions to keep themselves well above water, and to further the royal service. For this last point should not be forgotten; if they would go to any lengths to ensure their own future, three of them could at an emergency, if the national interests happened at the moment to coincide with their own, show magnificent patriotism and industry. Shrewsbury, still spitting blood and coughing, would volunteer for a naval command, or leave the hunting he loved to go back and work long hours in the 'hateful, unnatural, sedentary life' he detested. Godolphin would toil hours over tallies and bank deposits, when he might have been at Newmarket, and Marlborough, laying aside his scheming, took up William III's mantle against France. All their long careers illustrate this detachment from, or perhaps this superiority to, party connexion. Sunderland's amazing influence with William, who from 1693 very rarely accepted a minister not sponsored by this great apostate, rested on this very fact: ever 'looking out for little men to make them secretaries of State', ² his normal view of administration was one of a king ruling through obedient subordinates, and if Whigs were to be preferred, it was not upon party grounds, but simply because they would more probably serve the King without question. What matter, ran his famous drawl, 'who saarves his Majesty, so long as his Majesty is saarved?' Shrewsbury, who at the end of 1693 found 'no such a thing left in being as a party of my mind', ³ in the same year joined with the other three to fix a Whig supremacy. From this point Godolphin advanced in 1694 to advise building up a Court party independent of all others, and in 1700 he, with Sunderland and Marlborough, brought in the Tories. In 1701 Sunderland turned once more to the Whigs; from 1702 Marlborough and Godolphin ruled through the Tories and from 1706 to 1708 through the Whigs; in 1710 Shrewsbury helped in the Tories and in 1714 helped them out. But in the period immediately under review, between 1690 and 1693, all four of them were increasingly

¹ To the King, 15 June 1694, *Cal S. P. Dom*

² *V. C.* i 359.

³ To Mrs Villiers 2 Dec. 1693

hostile to Carmarthen's Ministry: now, as ever, they appeared as *dei ex machina*, magnificent, attractive, and unscrupulous—outside party development, but twisting it at every turn.

The regular Opposition facing the Ministry was threefold, and can be more accurately classified by causes than by titles. The first were the Revolution Whigs, still trying to brand the Government as one controlled by Jacobites. The second was the constitutional Opposition, half made up of Tories and half of Whigs, and the third was the Jacobites. And, on different questions, any two or even all of these might occasionally combine.

The efforts of the first, who even in the summer of 1690 were trying for another dissolution, concentrated in April of that year on bills meant to split the Government over the dynastic feud. The Duke of Bolton's bill asked the legislature to recognize William and Mary as 'rightful and lawful' sovereigns, and to declare that the Convention's acts 'were and are' good law in every sense. Carmarthen and Pembroke opposed the form of the bill, and Nottingham, with sixteen other peers,¹ signed a fierce protest, that it was 'destructive of the legal constitution of this monarchy'. But in the Commons, where a long battle had been expected, it passed with ease, smoothed perhaps by the significant support given to it by Lowther and Goodrick.²

A second attempt was made in the same month, but this time in the Commons. Wharton brought forward a bill, imposing an oath of abjuration of King James upon members of both Houses and office-holders, and giving powers to any two justices of the peace to impose the same on private persons. Passing the first reading without hitch, this was rejected on the 26th April by 192 to 165, Carmarthen's protests with the King having secured the Court vote against it. Goodrick's speech expressed candidly the *de facto* Tories' views. 'The possessor of the Crown ought to be obeyed', but the positive oath of allegiance ought to suffice: a negative oath would

¹ Including Rochester, Weymouth, and Bishops Compton and Lloyd of St. Asaph.

² *Hatton Corr.* ii. 147; Nottingham to Hatton, 5 April (B. M. Add. MSS. 29594, f. 199).

'garble the nation'. No Churchman could abjure the royal family, 'under a branch whereof we sit'. God's will might bring the oaths to King James into force again some day; 'the utmost necessity made me break my oath to King James—it was utmost necessity, and those are terrible things'.¹

The next serious move of the Whig Opposition was at the end of the year. Fired by a victory on the 11th December in stifling a Tory petition, got up in the City against the Whig Lord Mayor,² they planned, with the assistance of Halifax, to destroy Carmarthen by reviving his old impeachment. Shrewsbury had organized the attack with a group of leading commoners, amongst whom we can identify Sir Robert Howard, but the 'white elephant' evaded his enemies by an admirably stage-managed announcement of Lord Preston's Jacobite conspiracy.³

The final session, that of the winter of 1692-3, before this Carmarthen Ministry came to an end, showed even when the Whigs were nearing their triumph that the parrot-cry of Jacobitism had ceased to attract many younger Whigs. In that December a bill was rushed in for the better preservation of their Majesties' persons, subjecting those who denied their rightful title to the penalties of high treason in case of a second offence, and imposing also an oath against King James by name. Though backed by Somers and most of the Court, it was rejected by 200 to 175, an important section of young Whigs refusing to follow Wharton in his avowed purpose of a general proscription of all Tories.⁴ But the Harleys and Foleys, who had objected to endless abjuration bills, were ready enough to attack the ministers, and on the 5th December a Committee of the Whole House passed, by one vote, what amounted to a vote of censure on Nottingham for the naval miscarriages.⁵ It was such administrative questions which brought the Carmarthen Government to its close: on the

¹ Grey, 26 April; P. iii. 447; Nottingham to Hatton, loc. cit., f. 205; Burnet.

² 'The High party is much broken and discontented about this business of the City': R. Harley to his father, 16 Dec.

³ Burnet, iv. 121; P. iii. 456.

⁴ Bonnet (Ranko); Bodl. Carte MSS. 130, f. 343, and Rawlinson MSS. D. 1362; P. iii. 510.

⁵ Yard to Colt, 6/16 Dec. 1692, B. M. Add. MSS.

old-fashioned lines of Williamite against Jacobite, no compact majority against it could be found.

The Opposition during these years was, in fact, only partially, perhaps not more than one-third, composed of official or Revolution Whigs. There were, clearly, a considerable section who still looked back to the 'good old cause', who burned to make out of William another Monmouth, and who never ceased calling for the heads of those ministers who had ridden rough-shod over them between 1680 and 1685. 'Treachurous councillors', declared Delamere, had destroyed 'that great Convention' before half its work was done. 'We thought', said John Hampden, 'being for the bill of Exclusion, venturing our lives to bring this King in and setting him upon the throne in despite of those who had murdered our friends and betrayed our liberties, had been things of great merit, but we were deceived.'¹ Such men had their representatives in the Commons and even, with Wharton, in the Government, but they were distinctly a minority; for, on its purely political side, the Revolution had fully satisfied the mass of the old Whig party.

The major section of the Opposition were those members, both Whigs and Tories, who were less anxious to proscribe persons than to pursue principles. Some were Whigs who wished to push further the Revolution's constitutional objects, some were constitutional Tories who desired to limit a Dutch king. The form which their opposition took was determined by the new constitutional conditions after 1690. They faced

Government resting on a coalition of official Whigs and *de facto* Tories, and a king ruling through ministers of his own choice, who pressed the legislature by every means of suasion, fair or foul. Unable, then, in ordinary circumstances to dislodge the Executive by their votes, the Opposition tried to circumscribe it with legislative committees. Deeply distrustful of the influence wielded in their counsels by placemen, whom they could not control, they aimed at separating executive and legislature by clearly defined lines, at drawing these lines

¹ 'A Dialogue between a Lord Lieutenant and one of his Deputies'; Hampden to Sir E. Harley, 28 March 1691 (P. iii).

aggressively in the legislature's favour, and at isolating a puppet king in company with a weak executive, which could be held individually and legally responsible to Parliament.

This constitutional programme was, for a brief season, realized in the Act of Settlement of 1701, and we may still judge of its tendencies by considering the government of the United States of America. There, under a rigid constitution, legislative committees dispute executive power with ministers, whom the legislature cannot legally remove, and a theoretically entire separation of the branches of government has to be tempered by unofficial expedients: thus, the President's ministers to a certain extent settle the session's business in advance with selected leaders of Congress, just as Danby would concert supply in unofficial discussion with Clarges and Heneage Finch.¹ But in America the supreme executive works on party lines, which are parallel to, if not always coincident with, those on which the legislature itself is chosen, and a Republican President will normally follow within a year or two a Republican Congress. Under William III, on the contrary, the co-ordination of the two powers was far less automatic, for the King was wholly independent of party. But, in essence, the parallel holds good: the criterion of party strength in England between 1690 and 1701 was not nearly so much the composition of the Cabinet, as that of the Committees of Accounts, the Committee on Irish forfeitures, and of all the several bodies by which the Commons tried to make their will prevail—just as in America the powerful House Committees, who dispute the predominance of the President's Cabinet, are the truest index to party distribution in Congress.

So much of preface seems necessary to explain the setting in which the new fusion of English parties came about in this decade.

To most men of that day the radical division still seemed, as formerly in King Charles's time, to be that between the 'country' and the 'Court'. But this line crossed and zig-zagged with that of Whig and Tory, and the development of really great import after the Revolution is the creation of a new

¹ *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1690-1, 211.

Toryism, founded on a coalition between a section of the Tories and a section of the Whigs. The origin of this fusion came simply from working together in many temporary alliances, its achievement must clearly be a slow growth, and it had not come about by 1694.

The abuses or dangers, of which the new Opposition complained, were enormous or misapplied taxes, diversion of expenditure to continental armies—thus starving the Navy, our proper weapon—the corrupt influence of placemen, the suspension of Habeas Corpus, the ruin of trade, and these topics were dinned in by a shower of pamphlets coming equally from Tory, Whig, and Jacobite quarters.¹ In May 1690 the Whig Paul Foley demanded the written responsibility of Privy Councillors, and repeated this demand in November 1692. Attacks on the estimates and on land armies were led in 1690 by Clarges and Seymour. The two old Tories, Seymour and Musgrave, a new Tory, Harcourt, and an 'old' Whig, Birch, led the opposition to the suspension of Habeas Corpus. In November 1691 Clarges asked, 'Is there no end of giving?' and with Foley, Seymour, and Musgrave refused to accept blindly the estimates for men and money introduced by Lowther. The Whig Sedley exclaimed, 'The country is poor, the nation is naked, the courtiers hug themselves in furs, and the honest country gentleman is half starved.' In November 1692 Clarges and Musgrave combined with the Whigs Harley, Foley, and Mordaunt to attack the Dutch generals. Clarges touched upon the conduct of the war: 'We endeavour to make a secure barrier for Holland and we neglect our fleet, which is the barrier of an island.' Harley echoed him: 'The sea is our security, which, if we do not guard, we are but prisoners.'² Clarges, Foley, and Harley, once more, protested against any proposal to pledge supplies in advance. The same three members, supported by Finch and Musgrave, drove on a bill to amend trials for treason.³

But it is the prolonged agitation, from 1692 to the end of

¹ Ralph gives valuable illustration of this

² Grey, x. 142 et seq.; Bonnet (Ranke, vi. 169, 184); R. Price to Duke of Beaufort, Bodl. Carte MSS. 130, ff. 326 et seq.; Klopp, v. 211.

³ Bodl. Rawlinson MSS. D. 1362; Grey, x. 285.

1695, over the Place and Triennial Bills, which best illustrates both this new amalgamation and the conditions then governing party development. The Place Bill introduced into the Commons in December 1692 was not retrospective in effect, and therefore passed the Commons easily without, apparently, any division. A Whig, Sir Edward Hussey, sponsored it, Harley and Foley, we know, supported it, and though no details have come down to us, we may conjecture, from subsequent bills of this character, that the usual Clarges wing supported on this occasion a Whig majority. Lowther's criticism on this bill in the Commons anticipated the violent opposition in the Lords from the Court, which used extraordinary pressure to defeat it. Carmarthen, perhaps scenting the Commons' determination, abstained, but a strong Tory group—Nottingham emphatically, Rochester, Pembroke, and many bishops, together with courtiers like Godolphin and Sunderland—opposed the bill, which was lost by two or three votes. The minority included Tories and Jacobites such as Weymouth, Ailesbury, or Scarsdale, some ardent Whigs of the Delamere school, Halifax, a law to himself, and the great rebel Marlborough, with Prince George in his tow.¹

The next time that the Place Bill came up was in November 1693, after the fall of Nottingham and the definite entrance of Somers, Trenchard, Montague, and Russell into the Cabinet. Yet the change of ministers had not diminished the Commons' ardour, and the same sort of coalition as before was behind it. Among its Tory supporters we find Clarges, Bromley, and Musgrave, and among the Whigs Harley, Foley, Winnington, and Howe. Their fury at William using his veto drove them to extreme measures, culminating in threats of a tack and representations that William should listen to the advice of his Parliament, and 'not to the secret advice of particular persons'. Three Tory ministers opposed the bill in the Commons—Seymour in its first stages, Lowther and Temple on the last violent protest.²

At the third and the last effort to pass the Place Bill, in

¹ Burnet; P 111; Bonnet (Ranke); Denbigh papers, 212.

² Grey, x. 338 et seq.; Bonnet (Ranke); B M. Dutch Dispatches (Secret), O. O. Add. MSS. 17677.

February 1695, it was defeated by 175 to 142—Harley and Howe acting as tellers for the minority. As the Ministry was now almost entirely Whig, and as a purely Whiggish amendment, to make those who had held place in the last two reigns henceforth incapable of office, was rejected, we may presume that the usual Tory section supported Harley.¹

We turn now to the Triennial Bill. Introduced in the first instance by Shrewsbury in January 1693, it was supported by Carmarthen (to the King's great annoyance), by Pembroke and the bulk of the ministers, and passed the Lords with ease. In the Commons we find it supported by the Tories Clarges and Musgrave, by the Whigs Harley, Foley, Howe, and Pelham, besides the strictly official Whigs such as Wharton, Trenchard, and Russell. It was opposed by the Tory ministers, Lowther, Temple, and Seymour, by rank-and-file Tories like Dolben, Tredenham, and Finch, and by some old-fashioned Whigs like Charles Sedley. It passed the first reading by 210 to 132, and the third, when the King's hostility had been given time to tell, by 200 to 161. The old school of Tories attacked it as a direct encroachment upon the prerogative.²

William's vetoing of this bill—the passage of which had been hailed with bonfires in London—was taken as a rebuff to the Whig cause, but by the end of 1693 they were more in a position to assert themselves. Avoiding the intricate history of the two Triennial Bills introduced this year, we need only note that both were originated by Whigs and both were defeated in the Commons. The Tory peers who opposed them included Nottingham, Abingdon, Mulgrave, and most of the bishops, and in the Commons, Seymour and the younger Godolphin; the minority included Harley, Foley, Winnington, and Musgrave.³ In December 1694 Shrewsbury was at the head of the Administration, and in these circumstances the Triennial Bill at last became law; he had in this matter worn down the royal displeasure, and made it the condition on which he accepted office. Harley introduced it in the Commons; in

¹ Lexington papers, 18 Dec 1694; Bonnet (Ranke).

² Grey; Bonnet; Bodl. Carte MSS. 79, ff 475 et seq.

³ Denbigh papers, 216; Grey. The famous 'Hush Money' pamphlet (State Tracts, II) openly accuses Carmarthen, Seymour, and Guy of buying a majority in the Commons against the bill.

spite of some official Whig opposition, the obligatory date of dissolution for the existing Parliament was postponed by mutual arrangement till November 1696, and the constitutional objections of Nottingham, who came to London specially to oppose, did not avail against its general popularity.¹

From this analysis of three years' constitutional agitation it is patent, in spite of the piecemeal character of our information, that there existed in this Parliament the nucleus of a new 'country' party, formed of two wings—one by origin Tory (Clarges, Musgrave, Granville), the other by origin Whig (Harley, Harcourt, Foley, and Howe); that this nucleus usually hung together, distinct alike from old high-prerogative Tories and from ministerial Whigs; that each wing was prepared to compromise—the Whigs to give up attacks on the Church and Abjuration tests, the Tories to revise their notions of prerogative monarchy. What shape would this new combination take in future? Could it preserve its own existence, or would it be compelled to merge in one of the older parties? That was to be the vital point in the next stage of Tory history: its decision depended on which element ultimately got the supremacy—the raucous, destructive forces which looked back towards Jacobitism, or the more liberal elements of this new 'country' school.

The import of this coalition did not escape contemporaries. 'Your great Paul Foley', says a Whig pamphlet of early 1693, 'turns cadet and carries arms under the general of the West Saxons';² the two Harleys, father and son, are engineers under the lieutenant of the Ordnance,³ and bomb any bill which he hath once resolved to reduce to ashes, though it were for Recognition, or anything else that is most necessary to our security.'⁴ And the Whigs of 1714 dated this coalition back to the two years after the Revolution, when the Harleys, Foleys, Pelhams, Winningtons, and Harcourts 'quitted the Whig party, in which they had been bred, and fell in with the Tory'. The 'old' Whigs, as they preferred to be called,

¹ *Halton Corr.* ii 198, Burnet; Dutch Dispatches (Secret), O O. 20/30 Nov., 11/21 Dec., 13/23 Dec., Bonnet (Ranke, vi. 255 et seq.).

² Seymour.

³ Musgrave.

⁴ 'A Dialogue between Whig and Tory' (State Tracts), written, apparently, before Nottingham's fall.

or new Tories, as we may call them, of Harley's school defended their changed outlook by the argument which many have used, since their day, in like cases: 'I have never changed party', declared Jack Howe; 'if others have left me, let them answer for it.'¹

The bridge-head in this important coalition was, we believe, that 'suppressed' and prosaic figure in English history, Sir Thomas Clarges—sometime correspondent of Henry Cromwell, a chief agent in the Restoration for his brother-in-law Monk, and in Charles II's reign a solid member of the country party. In the Exclusion controversy he had been a loyal follower of Halifax and, whether affected by advancing age or by his large interests as a London landlord, steadily grew more conservative. At the Revolution he sent his son to join Orange at Exeter, but threw himself strongly on the Regency side, voted against 'vacancy', and was in the inner counsels of Nottingham.² His immense Parliamentary experience, dating from 1656, and his eminent gifts of compromise gave him great ascendancy in debate, while his intimacy with Clarendon, Abingdon, Tenison, and every section of Churchmen assured to him the Tories' confidence. Recognized from 1690 as the avowed leader of the Tory commoners, he from the first tried to associate his party with the 'country' cause—attacking large armies, preaching economy, backing Triennial and Place Bills.³ Always hostile to Danby and making little apparent effort to defend Nottingham, Clarges withstood all attempts made to wean him to the Court, and earned the especially bitter comments of the Dutch and Allied agents.⁴

Allied to the 'country' Whigs in constant attacks on the

¹ 'The False Steps of the Ministry after the Revolution', 1714 (Somers Tracts); Grey, x. 378.

² Grey, ix. 459; Clarendon, 23 Jan. 1689; Halifax's *Journals*, loc. cit., 242.

³ 'Le plus vieux routier dans les affaires du Parlement': Bonnet; 'Sir Thomas Clarges and that side are like to carry all before them': T. Foley to E. Harley, 5 April 1690; 'Le fameux M. Clarges', Bonnet, Nov. 1691. An anonymous memorandum in King William's Chest ranks him, along with Seymour, Lee, Garroway, and others, among 'commoners eminent in Parliament, useful men, but not to be trusted', *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1689-90, 384.

⁴ 'Qui a toujours été contraire', Blanquard, Denbigh papers, 209, 214; 'un des plus chagrins', Bonnet; 'lequel sous prétexte du bien public s'oppose souvent aux intérêts de la cour', *L'Hermitage*, Dutch Dispatches (Secret), O. O., 23 April 1694.

Court's policy, and that, be it noted, under a Tory administration, Clarges early came into especially close connexion with Robert Harley, his junior colleague on the Committee of Public Accounts, in whose health and achievements he clearly took almost a fatherly interest. Year by year we see growing the cordial correspondence between the two regency Tories, Clarges and Musgrave, and Harley who had voted for the Sacheverell clause, and through Harley new links were being forged with others of his group, like the ex-Exclusionists, Foley and Winnington. By 1691 the two old Tories had got in these Whig circles 'the character of commonwealth men',¹ and the cordial working union was established which laid the foundations of something greater. This venerable Clarges died in October 1695, while a general election was raging in which his political alliances were beginning to bear their first fruits. This dull-souled man—ever asking for further details, wrangling with Russell over sailing orders or the weather gauge, moralizing from Charles I and Van Tromp to an exasperated younger generation—still had in him much of the stuff of vital British liberties.

The two sorts of opposition we have thus outlined (with a third, the Jacobites, we deal later) were ultimately too strong for the Carmarthen Ministry, but that Ministry's transmutation into the Whig Junto of 1694 was accomplished (as was King William's way) only very gradually, and in slow accord to a sequence of national misfortunes. The naval and military disasters of 1692-3 destroyed public confidence in the Administration: the Commons had, as we have seen, begun by Place Bills and Triennial Bills to attack the citadel of royal influence: money could only painfully be got under such discordant management; the 'kind of war declared'² between Nottingham and Russell paralysed the naval arm. Annually, acute anxiety as to the passing of essential war taxes darkens the Dutch envoys' dispatches or the memoranda of Godolphin, and expressions of the general wish for a reduction in our military commitments, or even for a speedy peace, had escaped from some of the Tory rank and file. Open Jacobite

¹ Edward to Sir E. Harley, 23 Dec.

² Vind to Colt 12/22 Dec. 1692, *ibid.* 111, 112.

conspiracies and the bitterness centring round the Non-jurors shook the morale of loyalist Tories, and exposed the whole party to obloquy.

Watching such portents, William began to retrace his road. The position of Nottingham was the greatest of his embarrassments, but, despite the concentration of the whole Whig party against the Secretary in the winter of 1692-3 (including even ministerial colleagues like Devonshire),¹ the King refused as yet to part with a minister whose loyalty was unquestionable, who was *persona grata* to the Queen and himself,² and who, on all matters affecting his prerogative, like Place and Triennial Bills, had stoutly resisted the radical stream. But in the feuds of the Admiralty nearly the whole House of Commons had taken Russell's side, even moderate Tories like the Solicitor-General Trevor;³ in addition, the action of Edmund Bohun, the press licenser of Nottingham's appointment, in passing the pamphlet *King William and Mary Conquerors*, which preached the very *de facto* doctrine of which the Secretary was accused, reinforced the charge that Nottingham, by the very fact of holding such opinions, was unfitted to serve the Crown. The effect of these controversies was natural: Nottingham steadily drew nearer to his old high Tory affiliations,⁴ while the King was reluctantly drawn in the opposite direction. While, then, the Queen might very well be *en évidence* at one of the annual christenings in Nottingham's family, William had to recognize the necessity of disarming the Opposition, and his first idea was to persuade Nottingham to accept the Great Seal which he had refused in 1689. In this he failed, and the Whigs had to be content with the appointment of Trenchard, once a partisan of Monmouth, as co-Secretary and the elevation of Somers to the Lord Keepership—Speaker Trevor thereby dropping his commissionership of the Seals.⁵

¹ Yard to Colt, 9/19 Dec.

² Mary, *Letters*, ed. Doeberner.

³ Denbigh papers, 211. Somers wished to make Trevor Attorney this year (Yard to Colt, 31 March/10 April).

⁴ In June 1692, Speaker Trevor being dangerously ill, we find Nottingham in collaboration with Rochester pressing Musgrave on the King as a substitute (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1691-2, 333); in December he got Rochester to take Lord Hatton's proxy (*Add. MSS.* 29594, f. 264).

⁵ 'If Trevor continuë, he is good natured', Musgrave to R. Harley, 8 April.

On the other hand, the retention of Nottingham involved Russell's resignation from the Admiralty.

But the Tory admirals, Killigrew and Delaval, appointed in Russell's place,¹ gave as the firstfruits of their management the loss of the Smyrna convoy in July, and by that time more powerful influences were undermining the Ministry.

The great middlemen were again acting in concert. Shrewsbury since the supremacy of Carmarthen, and Marlborough since his own disgrace, were in open opposition, while Godolphin had never ceased to cavil against the 'First minister'. They were now reinforced by a greater tactician than them all in Sunderland, who had returned to England in 1690, had kissed hands at Kensington in May of that year,² and since then had lived unostentatiously at Althorp with an occasional appearance in the House of Lords. One such occasion had been his vote in the January of 1693 for the rejection of the Place Bill, and the ministerial changes of the spring had been commonly put down to his influence. By June he was hard at work in London, testing various political combinations, and that veteran intriguer, Sir Robert Howard, was instrumental in bringing Somers and Wharton to recognize the value of Sunderland's assistance. 'He will be the man this winter', wrote one subordinate minister, 'and it's like the change will be not only of men, but of measures.'³ Indeed, a few days before these words were penned, there took place at Althorp in the latter part of August a memorable meeting of these 'great statesmen'—including (besides the host) Shrewsbury, Godolphin, Marlborough, Russell, Devonshire, and Wharton. The Duke of Somerset was simultaneously receiving Seymour, Rochester, and Ranelagh at Petworth, but the rival 'congress' of Althorp did far more than afford mere material for the gossips.⁴ On the 24th August the Princess Anne, so long

¹ Decided in Cabinet during January. Yard to Coll, 24 Jan./3 Feb. 1692-3.

² Luttrell, Terries's report of 20/30 May (B. M. Florentine transcripts, Add. MSS. 25380).

³ Johnstone, Secretary for Scotland, to Annandale, 31 Aug. (Hope Johnstone papers); Portland papers, iii. 528; Howard to Wharton, 27 July (Bodl. Carte MSS. 233, f. 221).

⁴ Rutland papers, ii. 148, Portland, iii. 542; Luttrell, iii. 168.

estranged, paid a formal visit of reconciliation to her sister, we doubt not as part of the compact.¹

On the 6th November, the day *before* the meeting of Parliament and within a week of William's return from Flanders, Lord Nottingham was dismissed and Russell restored to the direction of the Admiralty.² Even earlier, the King had pressed Shrewsbury to accept the seals, and this, after incessant badgering and inexplicable reluctance, was achieved in March 1694. In that April Seymour was dismissed from the Treasury, to turn once more a 'grumbletonian',³ and his pet aversion, Charles Montague, became Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Junto was complete. 'If we lose the King a second time,' wrote the Whig Lord Capel from Ireland, 'I think I may say our friends are bunglers in politics as well as in Court behaviour.'⁴ In August, one of the greatest of Tory commoners, Sir Richard Temple, was dismissed from the commission of the Customs. His zeal at the Revolution, his known loyalty to Carmarthen, his firm stand for the royal prerogative during the Triennial Bill, all this availed nothing against the adverse recommendation of Shrewsbury, Godolphin, Somers, and Trenchard.⁵

Thus in the summer of 1694 only Carmarthen (since April Duke of Leeds) and Sir John Lowther survived of the Tory Ministry so laboriously erected, and their turn was soon to come. Carmarthen's equivocal attitude over the Place and Triennial Bills was characteristic of his later and more timid days. Conscious of his unpopularity and carefully nursing his health by early bed hours, he limited his energies to retaining office and salary, and securing jobs for his relations, and concentrated upon his darling object of founding a great territorial house. From the spring of this year he was a cipher in the

¹ Luttrell, *loc. cit.*; *Halton Corr.* ii. 195.

² Macaulay's order of events is here misleading. See, besides authorities in previous note, Cox, *Shrewsbury Corr.* 19 et seq.

³ Lexington papers, 21 Nov. 1694.

⁴ To Vernon, 14 March (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1694-5).

⁵ Denbigh papers, 204; Bonnet, *loc. cit.*, 187, 237; *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1694-5, 179 et seq. The party motive comes out in L'Hermitage's dispatch of 7/17 Aug. (O. O. Secret): 'Un Tory fort zélé pour son party, qui dans la dernière séance du Parlement a harangué d'une manière fort différente de ce qu'il avoit fait au commencement.'

Cabinet ; he sat regularly, but merely balanced arguments and refused to commit himself. He spent the summer in a long northern tour, and by staying at no less than eighteen country houses showed that he had no intention of abandoning politics.¹ In the spring session he had supported the new Ministry's foundation of the Bank, on the ground that necessity left no option, and this Wellingtonian position, that the King's service must be carried on, was maintained down to February 1695, when we find him stoutly championing the Junto against Nottingham's wholesale indictment.²

That very month the mine was sprung which blew him and the remaining relics of the Tories out of office. On the 16th Henry Guy, the Tory Secretary to the Treasury, was sent to the Tower for accepting a bribe from an army agent. On the 7th March the Commons appointed a committee, including Foley as chairman, and Pelham of the Centre, in addition to many pure Whigs, to investigate the accounts of the City of London and of the East India Company. On the 12th they found Speaker Trevor guilty of bribery, and on the 16th he was expelled the House. By the end of April a joint committee of Lords and Commons had extracted information which, to say the least, threw grave doubts on the pecuniary integrity of Leeds and Seymour, and on the 29th Wharton carried up to the Lords articles of impeachment against the Lord President. On the 3rd May Parliament was prorogued, and the charges dropped, not to be officially revived.

Positive proof was not forthcoming whether against Leeds or Seymour, and it may be there is something in what Burnet says, that the matter dropped by common consent, for 'it was believed too many of all sides were concerned in it'. The two suspects certainly faced the attack with undiminished scorn and venom. 'If it had not been for him,' the old Duke told the Commons, 'they had not been sitting there', and he had appealed to the Church party for help against this Whig conspiracy.³ Seymour's analysis, for Leeds's edification, of the

¹ Lonsdale papers, 105 ; Rutland, ii. 153 ; Coxe, *Shrewsbury*, 66.

² Bonnet, *loc. cit.*, 269.

³ 'His Grace hath brought the Church into his quarrel and hopes—as the

charges against them both was certainly *ben trovato*; it was, he said, 'a formed design begun and carried on by Mr. Montague and Mr. Wharton, by menacing and threatening some, and encouraging others with rewards and places'; and 'had the reformers of the times succeeded, it would have been hard to have imagin'd where their Fury would have stopped: none that were truly loyal but must have been either removed or disgraced to make room for the Saynts, that their virtues might have shone with greater lustre'.¹

Seymour had a tougher body than the Duke, and his resiliency soon carried him up again, but the President was henceforth an extinct volcano. His enemies were innumerable, and he had given them their chance.² The King, though unwillingly, forbade him to attend the Council, from this date he was left out of the Lord Justices, and though he kept the office, and still more the emoluments, of Lord President till May 1699, the great 'Tom Tyrant' had fallen, and this time for good. Lowther, his loyal supporter, strong in the wealth of what he rather egregiously used to speak of in the House as his 'cottage', in other words his princely house and rent-roll in the North, was not so anxious to continue. His key as Vice-Chamberlain and his Lord-Lieutenancy were surrendered in the spring of 1694, and, though he continued in Admiralty and Council to give loyal service for another two sessions, his absences from London grew steadily longer and in January 1696 he laid down all his places.³ So ended the first Tory Ministry of King William, and the year 1695 marks the nadir of Tory prosperity in this reign.

Before pursuing further the course of their struggle with the Whigs and the stages in their revival, we must revert to what, after all, darkens the whole story from the Revolution onwards,

butchers do at the bear garden by their dogs—that he shall break his fall upon their backs. But I fancy they will be wiser than to concern themselves in the misfortunes of falling ministers': Anon. to Newcastle, 3 May, Portland papers, ii.

¹ 12 May, B. M. Add MSS. 28053, f. 341.

² 'The contest betwixt him and the other party is so high that one of them must to pot': Arbuthnot to Charlett, 14 May (Bodl. Ballard MSS. 24, cited by Aitken, *Arbuthnot*, 12).

³ Luttrell, iii. 270, 336, and iv. 8; Fleming papers, 334 et seq.; Bonnet, loc. cit., 243; Lonsdale papers.

and explains only too completely the *débâcle* of 1714; to that right wing of Toryism, in which the whole pre-Revolutionary sentiment survived. Jacobitism, the extreme expression of such sentiment, hung like a millstone round the neck of the Tory cause. In England, indeed, its open manifestations, and its thick-and-thin supporters, were always limited. No English leaders of the front rank had accompanied James to Ireland, and Scots like Melford and Middleton, Catholics like Powis and Dover, or the dregs of the Church in Bishop Cartwright, had no claim to represent an English party. No leading politician refused the oaths but Clarendon. No non-juring bishop engaged in conspiracy but Turner. The men who headed the assassination plot were fanatics and broken desperadoes—Barclay, once a man of Dundee's, the Frenchman De la Rue, the Catholics Knightley and Rookwood, and the inevitable Irish. The root cause for the sparse character of English Jacobitism, and the real obstacle to a Stuart restoration, was the fear of France, and English patriotism kept many a Jacobite sword in its scabbard. It was James Graham, the confidant of James's last letter from Rochester, who told Nottingham that, considering 'the quarrel now lies between England and France', he would tell what he knew of the French plans.¹ Nor does it appear that, so far as the general body of extreme Tories was concerned, King William's throne was ever, during the war, seriously endangered. The best possible tribute to the Non-jurors' general loyalty was the complaint of Lord Melford, James's secretary, in 1701, 'that the true Church of England party' had so long been silent,² and, after all, few of William's ministers were so loyal as the four principal Tories, Danby and Nottingham (both of whom James excepted from pardon), Rochester, and Seymour.

The truth of this does not, however, minimize the influence of Jacobitism in Tory history. A party cannot bear unmoved the reproaches of old companions in arms, and some of the best instincts in party life drew the Tories of this reign near to those thousands of their old friends, now Jacobites or Non-jurors, whose insistent appeals or silent disdain cut them to

¹ Finch papers, ii. 360, Terriesi, 8/18 April 1690 (B. M. Add. MSS. 25380).

² Melford's letter, Feb. 1701 (C. J.).

the heart. Nor could any frontier be drawn between loyal and disloyal, for Jacobitism divided brother against brother. John Ellis, Under-Secretary of State to King William, had one brother secretary to King James and another a Catholic bishop. Of the great Sir Bevil Grenville's sons, Denis, late Dean of Durham, was half starving at Saint-Germain, while his elder brother Lord Bath had 'sullied the hitherto stainless loyalty of the house of Grenville by joining the usurper'.¹ Contact from the centre to the right of the Tory party thus ran without a break. If Ailesbury went to Saint-Germain, surely his kinsman Seymour might take the opportunity of sending his duty to the King? If Weymouth took the oaths, he was, on the other hand, the lord bountiful of the Non-jurors, and undoubtedly cognisant of Jacobite conspiracy. Weymouth's friend Nottingham, again, was an entirely loyal minister of state, but he was subsidizing Lloyd, the deprived Bishop of Norwich,² and Lloyd was in daily touch with those who, in their turn, were trafficking with France. At two removes Toryism thus passed from loyalty to conspiracy. The loyal were loyal indeed, but in their hearts were many regrets and some unextinguished hopes. In dozens of homes, empty places and smuggled letters would every day remind them of a miserable son loitering on the Boulevards, of a daughter cloistered at Douai, of friends whose hungry idealism reproached their own comfortable apostasy, or of refugees barely kept alive by papal alms.³

And, as ever, it was the bravest and most sincere who had taken the plunge. The bitterest scorn of such men was reserved for the doctrine of conquest, which preached obedience to whatever powers there be. The pamphlets licensed by Nottingham must, they declared, appal the imagination of a free-born people: 'the old musty statute books', the charters of English liberty, might, it seemed, be thrown into the fire as waste paper, but Englishmen would 'choose not to be, rather than to be slaves'.⁴ But the stream of apostasy, thought these

¹ 'The Remains of Dean Granville' (Surtees Soc.), cited by Overton, *The Non-Jurors*, 164.

² B. M. Add. MSS. 29584, f. 107.

³ Berwick to the Pope, 1699 (P. R. O. Roman Transcripts, Miscell. 163).

⁴ 'Great Britain's just Complaint.'

idealists, rose to its height in 1691, when Sherlock took the oaths and with them the Deanery of St. Paul's. Only two years earlier the outstanding champion of Restoration, he had now, on the strength of Overall's Convocation Book, recanted all his opinions, and in his *Case of Allegiance* demolished the doctrine of indefeasible obedience, which in 1689 he had taught by precept and example. A tornado of pamphlets descended upon him, and more upon his 'Eve', the wife who was supposed to have tempted him. 'Egeria', they hinted, 'appeared to you upon the banks of the Boyne, and inspired you with new and freer notions.'¹

As contrasted with such time-servers, the Tories looked with grief and reverence at the fathers of their Church, all dethroned, some of them wanderers on the face of the earth, but holding fast to the faith. 'What I have done', said Sancroft on his death-bed, 'I have done in the integrity of my heart, indeed in the great integrity of my heart.' What he had done in February 1692 was to delegate all his powers to Lloyd of Norwich; what Lloyd did in February 1694 was to consecrate Hickes and Wagstaffe as bishops, thereby perpetuating for half a century a schism in the Church of England. In this fatal step they went beyond much non-juring opinion: Bishops Ken and Frampton took no part in it,² and we shall find in Anne's reign a steady drift, especially among the laity, towards the Church established. But politically the Non-jurors' influence was portentous, and constantly dragged their old party back to the causes lost. In London their religious services continued throughout the period, and in Holborn, in Broad Street, or on College Hill, the faithful might receive from Hickes, Laurence, or Jeremy Collier the sacraments of the Church untainted. At Oxford and Cambridge it was the same, and from Shottesbrooke in Berkshire, the Mecca of the cause, Dodwell and Hearne, Ken and Leslie, diffused that blend of saintliness and learning which gave this remnant all its fragrance and half its power. Up and down in England, till his death in 1700, wandered Bishop Turner, that uneasy

¹ 'A Vindication of some among ourselves', cited by Ralph, ii. 270, note.

² As early as the summer of 1689, Turner notes that Ken is 'warping from us', Bodl. Tanner MSS. 29; for the sequel. see *Plumtree*.

conspirator, still wielding the influence always conceded to holiness misdirected. Non-jurors and Jacobites did not, it is true, by any manner of means always coincide, but together they formed one stream of legitimist tradition, in which they baptized many of a new generation. What a past and what a future rises to the eye, when we find, at the end of Anne's reign, that veteran Jacobite plotter, Lady Oglethorpe, arranging through Hickes that her Eton son shall go to Oxford, to be under the eye of Thomas Turner, President of Corpus and brother of the bishop.¹

But the most serious of all aspects of Non-jurism was this, that it was fuel to the raging fiery cry of 'the Church in danger'. Already the Act of Toleration was considered as its undoing. Comprehension and attacks on the Test Act had been staved off with difficulty. In Scotland episcopacy had been rabbled, insulted, and was now finally abolished. This was the foretaste of what they might expect in England, if the whole Whig programme were carried through. The increase of scepticism and decay of church-going, testified to by Burnet and the whole literature of the day, came in Churchmen's opinion from the favour shown to Presbyterians or, as Jacobites reasoned, from the national apostasy. All the world had read the death-bed confession of Bishop Lake, with its strictures on those who took the oaths: he 'considered that the day of death and of judgement are as certain as the 1st August and the 1st February, and acted accordingly'. How would the conforming Erastian clergy answer for their sins in leading astray the souls committed to their charge? Let them lay their hands on their hearts, and ask whether they really believed the Protestant religion to have been a motive of the Revolution—a religion exemplified, it seemed, in lives like that led by Mr. Comptroller Wharton! By latitudinarianism and by their doctrine of conquest, by violating the most sacred oaths, Tillotson and Stillingfleet, Burnet and Lloyd of St. Asaph, had done more to shake the faith than all the infidelity of Hobbes. Meanwhile, the argument continued, how was the Church treated? The Apostolic succession was broken, bishops were

¹ Bodl. Rawlinson MSS. (Letters), 92, f. 609, Jan. 1714. For the bishop's wanderings incognito, see *ibid.*, 98, *passim*.

thrust upon churches by an infidel government, 'everywhere our friends are shifted out apace'.¹

In actual fact, the Church as they had known it—supreme, authoritarian, exclusive—was really 'in danger', and politics until 1710 are heated by all the passions of a privileged caste, which suddenly realizes it is fighting for its life. In a community not yet severed by many generations from Catholic tradition, at a time when great noblemen would still kneel for a bishop's blessing, when sermons were a chief subject of conversation and the main channel of public opinion, the danger can be imagined of inflaming the priesthood. As years passed on, the struggle rose to higher and bleaker grounds of principle, for from the close of 1689 Convocation was not allowed to meet till 1701, and the controversy changed from arguing the grounds of political allegiance to analysing the character of the Church Catholic. A torrent of anti-Erastian feeling rose at the Universities and in the provinces; the Church, declared a famous exponent of it, 'is a society instituted in order to a supernatural end, and as such must have an inherent power in it of governing itself'.² In a generation of great learning the most profound scholars were among the Non-jurors, and a High-church revival was assisted by the labours of antiquaries and liturgists, who traced from the primitive Christian model their notion of ideal relations between Church and State.

While the Church was thus smouldering, political Toryism fed upon grievances which were rank enough without the Jacobites envenoming them. It was bitter to see men who had canvassed for Shaftesbury, or fought under Monmouth—to see Capel, Harbord, or Trenchard—high in office; how much worse to know that Titus Oates was honourably pensioned from the public moneys, or that Aaron Smith, once attorney to Stephen College, had in his new capacity of Public Prosecutor exorbitant power over the lives of all who passed the uncertain frontiers of the conspiracy law. Moreover, the

¹ Leslie, *Querela Temporum*: 'A Defence of the profession which John, late Lord Bishop of Chichester, made upon his death-bed' (1690). See also *Letters of Humphrey Prideaux, passim*; Evelyn; Bramston; and the whole catena of Jacobite and Church pamphlets in the Somers Tracts.

² Atterbury, *Letter to a Convocation Man*.

times were hard, and conspiracy had much to nourish it. Steenkirk, Landen, Beachy Head, and the Smyrna fleet; taxes, even the hated excise, which hit the smaller country gentry; Dutch favourites, Dutch guards, Dutch generals, a Dutch policy—everything Dutch—creeping in like the plagues of Egypt; English blood poured out like water in Flanders; corruption in victualling, corruption in pay-sheets, corruption in Parliament, corruption in the Council; Habeas Corpus suspended, standing armies, monstrous treason trials, perjury and informers—from these bitter growths of the glorious Revolution the Jacobite press weekly distilled its poison.¹

Such grievances smoothed the path of those conspiracies which, up to 1696, kept English politics in a condition of tremulous uncertainty. An atmosphere of evil mystery hangs over these middle years. There are midnight meetings in Bird-Cage Walk, ex-officers of the Guards holding rendezvous in Convent Garden, deep drinkings at 'the George' in Piccadilly, cabalistic limps and squeezing of oranges in half the inns round St. James's. Off Dymchurch Flat government cutters are beating up to intercept the owling boat, which brings brandy and spies from Ambleteuse or Boulogne. Watch is being kept on the Sussex coast for 'a pock-marked man, black-visaged, wears his own hair'; peers of England are hidden in the neighbouring farms, waiting on the tide; your neighbour in the coach may be a Jesuit, a government informer, or an assassin. Oxford professors are employed by Lord Nottingham to decipher 'invisible' letters, and as the lemon-juice comes out in the heat or the cipher numbers yield their secret, another noble head may be shaking on its shoulders, or another home blasted and disgraced. As the clouds gathered over the *de facto* Government, as the wonderful tidings percolated to Saint-Germain that Marlborough was remorseful, or that Halifax had budged, the Jacobites in London grew bolder and more insolent. They thronged the coffee-houses and haunted the lobby, cocked their hats in the Queen's face, and boasted of what the spring would bring: one of them fastened a legend on the gate of Whitehall itself:

¹ *The Price of Abdication; The Dear Bargain; People of England's Grievances*; and many others.

Molly, do not cry,
Daddy will be here presently.¹

Nightly you might hear their rousing chorus :

For we shall see the King again,
Not as he was on Salisbury Plain,
But with a far more faithful train.²

And when the conspirator paid the penalty, a Tory might buy next day a fly-sheet giving the last words of Mr. Ashton, the Queen's servant, that he died in the principles of the Church of England, once much esteemed but now 'unhappily exploded', or learn that Collier with other non-juring priests had, in face of the crowds jostling the scaffold, given the absolution of the true Church to men branded by the State as vile assassins.

Often the secret motives of party leaders, unknown at the time to the rank and file, make plain the inner meaning of political combinations, and the content of Jacobitism and its meaning for later Tory development would be minimized, if one did not give a thought to the Jacobite side of two men, whom up to 1696 every pure Tory detested—to Marlborough the 'Judas', and to Sidney Godolphin. That each personally had made his peace with Saint-Germain is well known, and the real causes of Marlborough's disgrace in 1692-3 were discerned by contemporaries,³ but Jacobites believed that his machinations were really directed in favour of the Princess Anne,⁴ and it is the place of the heiress to the throne in the Jacobite plan that merits our attention. As early as December 1691 Marlborough had persuaded her to make peace with her father, and throughout the next decade he and Godolphin were holding out pledges of her favourable action; though after Mary's death these protestations became cold and formal, even in 1702 the exiled court still counted on their good offices. The precise grounds for this optimism need not detain us, and there is much to make us believe that these great men would

¹ H. North to Sancroft, 2 April 1693 (Bodl. Tanner MSS 25).

² Trumbull's MS. memoir, All Souls College.

³ See the passage, composed in September 1693, in Burnet's original memoirs; Foxcroft, *Supplement*, 373.

⁴ Denbigh papers, 220 (misdated).

not risk themselves for a falling cause : it is, for instance, odd that Marlborough, Godolphin, and Shrewsbury were large subscribers to the Bank of England.¹ But Jacobites hoped, even years later, that Anne was ready to occupy the throne merely as a caretaker, and when we find that she has received letters from her brother or that Marlborough and Harley have sent messages to Saint-Germain or Lorraine, it is well to remember that, behind the party combinations, the official debates, and the division lists of this period, one is always stumbling on the question which haunted all Tory leaders—who or what is to come after ?

¹ Macpherson, *passim* ; L'Hermitage, 2 July 1694.

XI

IN OPPOSITION TO THE JUNTO, 1694-8

THIS anxiety took on a sharper edge, when in December 1694 one of the few frail tendrils binding the new Toryism to the Crown snapped with the death of Queen Mary. The direct results of this event were, ultimately, to bring the triumvirate—Anne, Marlborough, and Godolphin—into closer harmony with average Tory feeling, but, immediately, to weaken the King's hold on the *de facto* school and to give the final impetus to Nottingham's departure into open opposition.

In his speech of the 25th January 1695, in which for the first time he 'entirely took off the mask',¹ he touched on two matters then on the lips of all his party. The first was the Lancashire trials of the previous summer, whereby Secretary Trenchard's keen nose for a Jacobite had involved the Government in 'a mystery of villanous perjury scarce to be imagined'.² The grounds for prosecution had been slight, the pressure for conviction monstrous even in that age. The storms of laughter and shouting in the court, which the chief informer, Lunt, caused by frequently mistaking one prisoner for another, finally discredited the case, and though there was enough truth in the alleged conspiracy to stultify Tory attempts in both Houses to attack the Ministry thereon, and enough suborning of evidence on either side to leave the moralities evenly balanced, men knew now what ultra-Whig administration might mean, in the hands of an Aaron Smith or a Trenchard. In Lancashire and Cheshire, the heart of the Catholic north, it produced a flaming indignation to see the Leghs, the Cholmondeleys, the Molyneuxes, and the Townleys arrested by Dutch soldiers, on the evidence of ex-highwaymen and *agents provocateurs*.³

¹ Bonnet, loc. cit., 269; cf. Luttrell and Burnet.

² Harley to his father, 13 Nov. 1694.

³ Kenyon papers, 292 et seq.; Cheetham Society (1853), L'Hermitage, 13/23 Nov.; Vernon to Blathwayt, 30 Oct. (B. M. Egerton MSS. 920); Ralph.

The second question was that concerning the Bank of England, established in the previous April, against which the whole conservative voice of England kept up a perpetual clamour. Partisans were, with good reason, convinced that as a Government instrument the Bank would go far to save the whole revolutionary settlement, while the country gentlemen detested an agency which would raise the fortunes of moneyed men and depress, as they alleged, the market for land. For months they played with the rival notion of a Land Bank, and this in the summer of 1695 was still being pressed by the Harley interest.

On the whole, however, the session of 1694-5 from a party point of view was outwardly unexciting. On most burning questions of the day the different sections agreed to compromise. Foley took the lead in offering two and a half millions for the army.¹ The passage of the Triennial Act gave real satisfaction, and in investigating the corruptions of placemen, or of the East India Company, men of all parties had combined. It would be a disaster, the good Prussian resident Bonnet thought, to dissolve a Parliament which was so obliging in the essentials.

Yet this was the very advice which Shrewsbury, Sunderland, and Somers tendered to the King before he left England on the 12th May for the seat of war. Tolerably satisfactory though the existing House of Commons might be from a Whig point of view, it had its dangers, and Wharton had long urged dissolution.² For one thing, the Foley-Harley group was getting too strong for the Whig managers. Negotiations conducted during the autumn of 1694 through Shrewsbury and Godolphin, like some earlier offers from Sunderland, had failed to shake their resolution (we should judge especially on the Place Bill, and the necessity of peace), or loosen their coherence:³ 'I cannot find any great hopes of amendment', wrote Harley to his father, 'only "to get men in", as they call it.' In March 1695 the group carried their nominee to

¹ Bonnet, 4/14 Dec. (Ranke).

² Shrewsbury to the King, 26 July/5 Aug., to Sunderland, 17/27 Aug. (Coxe); Bonnet, 11/21 Dec. 1694.

³ Portland papers, iii, 529, 560; Bath papers, i, 51.

succeed the venal Speaker Trevor ; by 179 to 146 the Commons rejected the Government candidate, Sir Thomas Littleton, named by Wharton, and elected Foley, who was proposed by Musgrave and seconded by Granville and Boyle. He received, it should be said, a solid Worcestershire and Herefordshire vote, irrespective of party.¹

Moreover, the Government, generally speaking, was in bad need of a fillip. Wharton was asking to be made Secretary, Trenchard was dying, Shrewsbury's eyes and nerves were giving trouble. The King, too, was anxious to avoid a revival of the East India Company scandal, and thought dissolution the best way of doing so. He would want large supplies from the next Parliament, and the Whigs, it was rumoured, were ready to meet him in carrying a general excise.² The fall of Namur in the first week of September settled the question. William, thereupon, authorized ministers to announce his intention of calling a new Parliament, and on the 10th October, the very night he arrived at Kensington, the dissolution was proclaimed which brought on the 'Jingo' election of 1695.

The King, who for three weeks showed himself to an unwontedly large circle of electors in his progress to Newmarket, Althorp, Welbeck, and Shrewsbury's Cotswold villa, pronounced, in his next speech from the throne, his 'entire satisfaction' with the elections. There had been some resounding triumphs. The City returned four Whigs in place of four Tories. Westminster unseated two Tories, and elected Montague and Stephen Fox, despite generous gifts of roast beef to the freeholders from the Duke of Leeds. Seymour was beaten at Exeter and driven to get elected at Totnes, which nestles at the gates of his property, Berry Pomeroy. Oxford University filled the gap left by Clarges's death with the new and Whiggish Secretary of State, Trumbull, while Lord Nottingham's candidate was beaten at Cambridge. In Cumberland and Westmorland the old *entente* between Lowther and Musgrave broke down, since the first required a pledge from Sir Christopher that he would vote for any supplies that might be asked for the war.

¹ *Parl. Hist.* v. 908 ; Vernon to Lexington, 15 March.

² Stepney to Lexington, 13/23 Feb. 1695. *American*

Yet the transition state of parties, and the fact that the official Whigs could not control the whole 'country' vote, was exemplified by the Cirencester election, where the 'old Whig', Jack How, in spite of all Wharton's electioneering, was returned by a majority largely composed of Dissenters.¹ Indeed, the Government's self-congratulations, as for that matter the reflections of modern historians, upon the 'Whig' character of the new Parliament, seem to lack substance, for while something like a third of the House were new members, and many of them specifically pledged to support the war, all this did not necessarily coincide with official Whig principles, and within two years this House of Commons was voting by considerable majorities for the disbandment of the army.

But the most striking proof to the contrary lies in a division of the 1st February 1696, the day on which took place a ballot to elect Commissioners of the Public Accounts. In the constitutional conditions of the day this body was, as already explained, of first-rate importance, and both Government and Opposition had proposed lists of candidates to be voted for *en bloc*. The successful list, and the votes given for them, were as follows :

(1) Robert Harley	243
(2) Paul Foley (Speaker)	238
(3) Henry Boyle	228
(4) John Granville	227
(5) William Bromley	200
(6) Francis Gwynn	188
(7) Sir Thomas Dyke	185

Three weeks later the Assassination plot burst on a horrified England, and among the ninety-three in the Commons who then refused to sign the 'Association' to protect William's life were the last four of these new commissioners. The list, in fact, represents the incipient coalition between the Foley-Harley and the pure Tory groups, which, under the leadership of Bromley respectively, combined, between 1710 and 1714, in the last Ministry of Queen Anne. It is to the

¹ Portland papers, iii. 569 et seq. ; Luttrell, iii. 538 ; Fleming papers, 337 ; Bagot papers [Report X. iv], 331 ; Montagu House papers, 246 ; *Memoirs of the Guise Family* (Camden Soc.), 164

risc and the full significance of this understanding that we must now turn.¹

The fiercest of all Whig pamphlets in this generation underscored the leader of the new coalition. 'Is not Robin Harley', it asked, 'a ringleader in this Tory party? Is not his brother Edward a leading member? Does not he attend all ordinances, and as constantly every week-day frequent the services of the Church (for his is a Church party) in St. Stephen's Chapel, as he does the Conventicle every Lord's Day?'² This was what, in Whig eyes, constituted the crowning iniquity—that the men who were giving to the Tories a new lease of life were Whig apostates.

'Heavy Paul Foley', the leader till his premature death in November 1699, had been a member since the first Exclusion Parliament. His father, the greatest iron-master of his time and a man deeply respected far outside his native Worcestershire, had bequeathed to his second son an ample fortune, a tradition of moderate Presbyterianism, and a highly independent spirit. The son had been an Exclusionist, had suffered imprisonment during James II's anti-dissenting period, and appeared in the Convention as an advanced Whig: since that time he had served on committees of 'reprisals' against the Tories of 1681, voted for the Sacheverell clause, and attacked the ministers as pensioners of France. But from 1690 onwards we have seen him change, and noted this 'morose and wilful' man (as Burnet calls him) in the van of every assault on both Carmarthen's and Shrewsbury's administrations. The mere label of 'Whig' did not satisfy him; some politicians, he wrote at the end of 1692, 'on pretence to please by change of faces design to fix the foreign interest more completely'. Of this Dutch interest he was always suspicious, and he demanded British officers—'men of estates, to subdue the enemy, and not make a trade of the war'. His constitutional views were far in advance of official Whigdom; to persuade the King to use his veto was, he said, 'one of the greatest crimes the Minister can be guilty of', and he had planned to tack the Triennial to a Money Bill. His profound knowledge

¹ Kenyon papers, 399. The non-Associator and rabid Tory, Peter Shakerly, speaks of it as 'our' list.

² *Jura Populi Anglicani* (1701).

of the law, his high character, and a solid clan of relations on the back benches established his influence in Parliament, but the grave and rather melancholy view of life bred by his deep Puritanism had, as its counterpart, a certain lack of political suppleness, and by 1695 he was being passed in importance, as he himself generously recognized, by Robert Harley, whose first wife had been Foley's niece Elizabeth.¹

Harley, in whose life we shall henceforward see incarnate the complexities then attending the Tory party's evolution, came from an older class than his kinsman, and could more easily find sympathies with the country gentlemen, whom he was destined to lead. The Harleys, long settled at Brampton Bryan in Herefordshire, had all been cultivated, full of acquaintance, and enterprising. The grandfather, Sir Robert, had corresponded with Donne, Ussher, and George Herbert, as his son Sir Edward was the friend of Baxter, of Marvell, and Sir Robert Moray. By blood and alliances they were connected with the Veres, the Wallops, the Wallers, the Crofts, and the Conways, and this, together with eminent service in the Parliamentary armies, had built up a political influence of great solidity. In temper they were always moderate. Sir Robert had voted in 1648 for accommodation with the King, Sir Edward was impeached by the army leaders and under a cloud throughout the Commonwealth. After the Restoration, Edward Harley seated himself, in the Convention and the Cavalier Parliament, with those sober Puritans who had done so much to achieve it, gave his steady votes for religious toleration and all 'country' interests, but would have no truck with the Shaftesbury faction.²

It is in this atmosphere, full of piety, of unusually deep family affections, and of public spirit, that in 1671 we first come across 'Robin', then 'an extremely lazy' little boy of

¹ R. Price to Duke of Beaufort, 26 Nov. 1698 (Bodl. Carte MSS. 130); Foley to Sir Edward Harley, 4 Oct. 1692 (Portland papers, iii, q.v. *passim*); Grey, x. 263, 368, 382. Five Foleys and two Harleys sat in the Parliament of 1695.

² It is not clear from his son Edward's 'Memoir of the Harley family' (Portland papers, v) whether Sir Edward Harley voted for the Exclusion Bills; but the absence of his name from a list of the minority in 1679 (see App. I), and his language to his wife respecting the Bill of 1681, make it probable that he approved them.

ten.¹ The family were church-goers, but attended Baxter's congregation when in London; they kept up, in speech and cast of mind, the Puritans' reverence, or at least their acknowledgment, for the daily Providences which brought the people of God and their children safely through spells of imprisonment, epidemics of small-pox, or even through teething and journeys by coach. Vestiges of the little Robin, not unimportant, meet us at every stage of the minister's life. His first thought was always his family, and at the height of his fame his son's marriage to the Newcastle heiress was plainly more grateful to him than the continuance of his Cabinet. An elderly female cousin, his most candid admirer, even then found him unchanged by all his greatness—he was 'still the same cousin Robin Harley'—while the vast Harley correspondence gives us one of those pictures of family happiness, the unbreakable trust and affection for the big man of the clan, which has more than once sheltered the fierce public life of our ministers.

As for the laziness so deplored by his mother, if it helps to explain the fact that, like many another Secretary of State, he never learned to speak French,² it was more certainly part of that admirable composure under savage attack, and that sweetness of temper, which made Swift at the crisis of all their lives prefer the fallen Oxford to the rising sun of Bolingbroke, even though he judged the former most guilty as a minister. This proverbial good nature, conceded even by Bolingbroke in all their feuds, and a circle of friendships embracing all camps, sweetened the bitterness of politics and probably saved him from attainder in 1715. In spite of all his Puritan training, some of his earliest friends were gay men of the world, like the lovable Henry Boyle, and his fair treatment of opponents, as in the assistance given to Marlborough over building Blenheim, is in welcome contrast to his contemporaries. His faults, then, were not those of inhumanity, and a certain softness of temper may explain his weakness of hard drinking, which was matter of gossip as early as 1691. But somewhere there was a hard core in his mind, which enabled him to face

¹ Lady Harley to her husband, P. iii. 319.

² L'Hermitage, 30 May 1704 (B. M. Dutch Dispatches, Secret, W W W).

death, whether from an assassin or in lingering illness, with a memorable courage, contrasting oddly with the timid duplicity commonly assigned to him as a public man. He had, again, some of the steady and humdrum virtues of his class. No beauty is known to have dazzled him, no Lady Castlemaine had made his young fortunes. Two women only seem to have entered his public life—Lady Orkney, the squinting but great-hearted and eloquent mistress of King William, and Abigail Masham, the red-nosed, dogged favourite of Queen Anne.

His tastes were quiet and even in his conviviality he hated lavish dinners, his private life was decent, and, when he was Lord Treasurer, fashionable ladies laughed at his second wife as 'an old housekeeper', who 'knew no lord but the Lord Jehovah'. That which founded his most lasting fame, his love of books and learned men, had begun early, and as a young widower, living in the Temple in 1693, he was already amassing the manuscripts which live on as the Harleian collection. When Speaker or Secretary of State, a Saxon charter would distract his attention from party management, and only his friends' objurgations could drag him from his bowling alley at Brampton Bryan, to take coach (not horse) for the autumn meetings of Parliament.¹

The Puritan cadence of his youth hung long about him. He speaks of his father's high position and reputation, as 'beautiful providences'; for his own election to Parliament, he proposes 'to wait on our gracious Father who doth all in the best time and way'; in the hurly-burly of Cabinet appointments in 1700 he writes to his father, his most constant correspondent, 'I pray God direct and keep a poor worm sensible of his weakness.'

Publicly, he followed the same road as Foley. In the election of 1690 his correspondence was with the hottest Whigs of the West Country, and his election petition that year was backed by the great managers Wharton and Russell.² But in 1691 his tone begins to change; he becomes increasingly intimate

¹ Harley to his father, 13 June 1691; Lady Strafford to her husband, 1711-12 (Wentworth papers), Gwynn to Harley, 20 April 1693 (B. M. Add. MSS. 4253).

² Portland, iii. 451; *ibid.*, viii. 27.

with (to use Roger North's phrase) 'the bell-wethers' of the new Tory Opposition, Clarges and Musgrave, and in 1692 with the bitterest of Tories, Francis Gwynn of Ford Abbey, who had been the client of the Hydes and was in every Whig 'black list' for half a century. With these and others, both of Whig and Tory stock—with Howe, Winnington, and Harcourt, with Granville, or even with Seymour—we have seen his constant association between 1691 and 1694. In the summer and autumn of 1695, some of this group formed a political club, 'the Thirty', who lightened the session's labours by meeting for cards and 'a small matter to relish the wine', usually at Lindsey House, close by Palace Yard.¹ By this time the party chiefs had long tried to enlist the alliance of both Foley and Harley. Sunderland and Shrewsbury had tried and failed; Halifax² had made more welcome advances, and might, had he lived, have found a new wagon whereto he might hitch his brilliant star.

And now, by the opening of this new Parliament, the veteran leaders of the 'country' interest for nearly thirty years—Clarges, Garroway, Lee, and Sacheverell—had been removed by death, and Harley was the figure to which turned all eyes, of the hitherto unproclaimed coalition; 'all things stand still till he comes', wrote the loyal Foley. For a man who had 'very ordinary qualities',³ it was an extraordinary position to have reached in five years of politics, and under the age of forty. It had not been done by oratory, or by the dazzling presence, which made old squires blindly follow Bolingbroke or a hundred placemen bow to the Great Commoner. In person Harley was small and insignificant, his voice hard and dry. His way with the House, Swift tells us later, was 'few words and strong reasons', and something must be put down to the gift he shared with Shaftesbury, a power of knowing the individual motive next every politician's heart. Moreover, up to 1695, his record commanded respect from its signal consistency. From great measures like the Place Bill down to details of New England charters, he had not swerved from

¹ Alesbury, i. 359. He names the two Seymours, Finch, Howe, Harcourt, Musgrave, and John Grey as members.

² Portland papers, iii, June-Oct. 1693.

³ Lord Macaulay [v. 2405, ed. Firth].

the old, moderate, 'country' principles, which looked on Courts and executive power with a jealous eye.

By the close of the century the real task of his life, the fusion of the Church and the 'country' parties, was to be (to all appearances) nearly accomplished, and Tory party phraseology in the last half of the reign is some index to the evolution in process. The 'country' we hear of from Lancashire in December 1695, the 'country party' of Evelyn in December 1699, 'the Church party' in Harcourt's words of December 1700, 'the country or Church party' of February 1701, 'the Church (or country) party' Craggs mentions in February 1702¹—all are one and the same. In political grouping much may depend upon a bracket or a suffix, but for working purposes the two factions, 'Church' and 'country', were now united. To take one instance alone: in 1689 the Pakingtons were leading the Churchmen of Worcestershire against the Foleys; at the election of 1700 the two were hand in hand.²

The brief session of 1695-6 (22 November-27 April) provides much evidence as to Harley's conduct of opposition, and proves the strength of his coalition even in this 'Whig' Parliament. The Court did not venture to oppose Foley's re-election as Speaker,³ and the opening debates upon the royal review of the war, and its finances, showed up the majority as decidedly critical patriots. True, Howe's motion for speedy peace was not supported,⁴ and a movement led by Seymour, Finch, and Musgrave to reduce the army by 25,000 men was easily beaten in committee, but the supplies given for the services, though over £4,500,000, were nearly half a million less than the Government asked. The appalling condition of the currency dominated the first part of this session, and here it would be impossible to disentangle party lines, but the Opposition naturally took advantage of the popular panic, fought every move suggested by Montague, good or bad, and on his most

¹ Kenyon papers, 386, 31 Dec. 1695; Portland, ii. 179; Bodl. Rawlinson MSS. D. 37, f. 166; B. M. Add. MSS. 22851, f. 121.

² Bodl. Ballard MSS. 35, f. 53; Portland, iii. 639.

³ 'The Court, seeing a great disposition in many to continue Mr. Foley, would not raise a heat by opposing him': Burnet's original Memoirs, written in February 1696 (Foxcroft).

⁴ Macaulay, quoting L'Hermitage, 2/13 Dec.

fruitful proposal to fix the value of the guinea at 22s. drove the Government majority down to thirty-one. More noteworthy was their success over the Treasons Trials Bill, which by insisting on two lawful witnesses, and other safeguards, promised to put an end to the cruellest disgrace of the century. Twice before it had been introduced, and twice been beaten by the Lords—each time on their insistence that the whole peerage, and not merely the Lord Steward's panel, should be entitled to attend a peer's trial for treason. Once again this old device of the Court to defeat the bill—for such it plainly was¹—reappeared, but this time the Commons, by 192 to 150, agreed to the amendment and defeated the wreckers.

The legislation most congenial to the Tories generally must have been the bill, carried through the Commons by a majority of 23, fixing a property qualification for knights of the shire at £500 a year in land, and that for a burgess at £200; here was a question which gave full scope for their growing hatred of moneyed men and stock-jobbers. This bill, after passing both Houses, was ultimately vetoed, but this was on the 10th April, when the country was blazing with loyalty at the discovery of the Assassination plot; an attempt to make capital out of the veto was, in these circumstances, quite impossible, and the division of 219 to 70 showed that the moderates refused on this point to follow the fanatics of their right wing. But the idea of a landed qualification for members became, from this time, part of the Tory stock-in-trade; they viewed it, in Howe's words, as 'the first step to a good parliament', and never desisted, till they finally carried it in 1711.²

On another question, the most delicate that could be raised between an English legislature and a foreign ruler, the session had threatened, before the plot was known, to close in an open breach between King and Parliament. A knot of Tory gentlemen in Wales petitioned the Commons to take into consideration the huge grant of land which William, in the past year, had given to his confidant Portland. The King's gifts to his

¹ Nottingham to Hatton, 22 Dec. 1694 (B. M. Add. MSS. 29595); Burnet, iv. 290.

² C. J.; L'Hermitage (Macaulay); Vernon to Shrewsbury, 28 Nov. 1696 (*Vernon Corr.*).

favourite recalled in lavishness those of Edward II, and in this instance made over to him the whole of the old lordships of Yale, Bromfield, and Denbigh. By a unanimous resolution the Commons asked William to revoke them, and this he was compelled to do, though with an ill grace shown not only in his stiff reply but in rapid grants to Portland of scattered manors nearly equivalent in value. The case for the petitioners was put with great venom, and with a considerable mixture of midnight oil, in a famous speech from Robert Price, one of Harley's Worcestershire neighbours, which was widely reported and in 1702 reached the dignity of a reprint; its scornful allusions to a 'Prince of Wales' and 'a Dutch colony' concentrated all the rancour which his party nourished against the aliens.¹

Rather earlier in the session, roused by the privileges given to the Scottish East India Company and alarmed at the stagnancy of commerce, the Commons had resolved to set up a Council of Trade, to be named by Parliament; the King, as might be imagined, was indignant at this renewed attempt to make him a 'Doge', and ordered his ministers to oppose the bill to the last. The Whigs thought that, while obeying the King, they might simultaneously damage the Tories, and offered a clause that the commissioners appointed should take an oath that William was 'rightful and lawful' king, and should abjure King James's title. This was rejected,² and the Tories, in Burnet's opinion, would probably have carried the bill in both Houses, had not a bomb-shell fallen, which blew it and all lesser matters into the air, and threatened to destroy the hitherto successful Tory coalition.

On Monday the 24th February the King, who had for ten days known the essential facts, announced to Parliament the discovery of a plot to assassinate him, on his way home from hunting in Richmond Park. The Whig managers saw that fortune had restored to their hands, with sharpened edge, the weapon which had failed them a week earlier; there and

¹ Ralph, ii, 618 et seq.; 'Gloria Cambriae' (*Somers Tracts*). I see no reason to doubt (with Macaulay and Klopp) whether Price really made this speech; e.g. 'one Mr. Price made a very learned speech against his Lordship and, as Mr. Shakerley told me, left nothing unsaid' (Kenyon papers, 21 Jan. 1696).

² By 195 to 188.

then¹ a form of 'association' was submitted, professing that William was the 'rightful and lawful King of these realms', and vowing, in case of his violent death, to revenge the same. The House ordered that a call-over should be taken the next morning to subscribe this Association.

All those scruples which Carnarthen and Nottingham had stifled in 1689, and which Harley had so long agreed to humour, at once broke out again. Musgrave said expressly it was a contradiction of many resolutions of the House, others declared they could take it only in the sense of the Oaths Act of 1689, and in a furious debate Finch and Scymour supported them.² In the Lords Nottingham, pardonably dwelling on his own faithful service, refused to stultify his past conception of the *de facto* monarchy. Rochester tried to inflame things, but old Leeds's verbal dexterity once more came to the rescue; instead of declaring William 'rightful and lawful' King, let it be resolved that he, and he alone, had 'the right by law'. The difference, if finely shaded, was a perfectly intelligible one, and at least it satisfied the Tory peers. But the body of those who refused, voluntarily, to sign the Association was considerable, and included the staunchest leaders of the right. Of the fifteen peers we need only distinguish Nottingham, Chesterfield, and Scarsdale, but among the ninety-three recalcitrant commoners were Scymour, Musgrave, Finch, Francis Gwynn, Granville, Bromley, Harcourt, and Mansell—five future Tory ministers, and all those who were the closest associates of the Foley-Harley group.³

But the worst was yet to come. March and April passed in a sickening series of trials and executions, and the passion of Whig London rose high. Non-jurors were among the conspirators, and Non-jurors, as Collier showed, were ready to absolve their brethren at Tyburn: were not, Whig London

¹ Macaulay suggests that Sir Rowland Gwynne, the 'honest country gentleman' who made the motion, did not foresee the consequences of his action. One may refer to his own earlier description of Gwynne (see *C. J.*, 1 April 1689) as 'one of the strongest Whigs in the House', and to the fact that only a week earlier abjuration had been under discussion.

² Bonnet (*Ranke*, v 121 n.); Bodl. Ballard MSS. 21, f. 101; 'passed and opposed with more heat and fire I ever saw there before', J. Verney to Hatton, 5 March (*Hatton Corr.*).

³ Printed in Oldmixon: see also Bodl. Carte MSS. 130, f. 362.

growled, all Non-jurors or non-Associators simply Jacobite traitors? In such an atmosphere it was that a bill went through the legislature for the better security of the King's person, but its title did less than justice to its design, which was simply to set up a Whig Test Act. All holders of place and office, and all future Members of Parliament, were to sign the Association, and the penalties attached to convicted papists were to be set upon Non-jurors. This act, 'of pernicious consequence to the public', as Nottingham deemed it, promised to be far more pernicious to the Tories; it would, indeed, as one of their members said, 'be very difficult for anybody to live in England and not comply'.¹

The Junto had a good case, and were resolved to use it to the full; now was the time, Capel wrote to Shrewsbury, to 'leave trimming and trust none but who are faithful to this cause'. With the King's approval, they determined to strike hard while the iron was hot, and, among other things, to finish the purge of the justices' bench begun by Somers in 1694. Before April was over, the Lord-Lieutenants were ordered to report the names of those who had refused the voluntary association, previous to the passing of the Act; and the oath (we must emphasize) was not again to be tendered to such persons. The test, then, was to be, not who obeyed the law but who had anticipated it, and all over England commissions of the Peace and the militia were purged of those Tories who had hesitated till the Association became statutory. The judges were employed on the same errand, and the violent factions, which the Government of 1690-4 had tried to subdue, now made a bear-garden of every assize and grand jury.²

The Tories' feelings under this new proscription were bitter in the extreme. From the first, a minority in the Commons had viewed the Association as a 'trick' and as un-Parliamentary, Seymour had nearly been committed for abusing it

¹ Nottingham to Hatton, 7-14 April (B. M. Add. MSS. 29595, ff. 106-10); J. Verney to Rutland, 4 April (Rutland papers, 11).

² Montague House papers, 11. 312, Bohun, *Diary*, 121; Privy Council to Duke of Newcastle, 30 April (Portland, 11); Shrewsbury to deputy lieutenants of Worcestershire, 14 May (*Cal. S. P. Dom.*); Shrewsbury to the King, 5/15 June (Coxe); Devonshire assizes proceedings in Fitzherbert papers, 38 et seq. (Report XIII).

in the House, and others had held out against it 'as the only way to put a stop to a proceeding of that sort, which was without precedent'.¹ But to refuse the oaths was to invite destruction, and Harley, with Musgrave's valuable co-operation, threw all his energy into persuading his friends to avoid the net spread for their feet. On the 28th April he addressed to Bromley, the rising young leader of the Churchmen, a letter of capital importance—one, moreover, in itself enough to show the extent of their party fusion. The Whig plan, he said, had been to move addresses for further removals in the Ministry (Leeds, Godolphin, and Sunderland being no doubt in question); the plan had failed, and there was still room left for 'moderate councils'. But the Junto might still try to use the Association for their party purposes, and on the Tories' general attitude to it depended, in his opinion, the serious danger of a penal dissolution, to be followed by a raging Whig election. He need not trouble Bromley with all the 'stuff' worthy men were reasoning about oaths and their sanctity: he knew their 'just resentments', but 'I am sure you will sacrifice more than that to preserving the whole, and keeping the nation from the power of a party, who can have no strength but what is given them by such a refusal. Therefore I hope we shall be preserved by you from having stripes by scourges cut out of our own skins.'² His advice prevailed. The large majority of Tory gentry signed the Association, though this did not in all cases save them from dismissal. Far and wide they complained that the best blood of England was being proscribed, on the strength of a libel in the *Postboy* or delation from a jealous neighbour, to make room for apothecaries and tradesmen;³ already they had seen in March the firstfruits of this 'voluntary' association in Nottingham's dismissal from the Council. So it was that the moderate Somers drove the last wedge between King William and the loyalist Tories of the *de facto* school.

One other ground of Tory irritation this summer was the

¹ *Hatton Corr.* II 221, Gwynn to Harley, 11 May (Portland, III); W. Lowther to T. Kirk, 4 April (B M Stowe MSS 747)

² Harley to Bromley, 28 April (Portland, III).

³ *Letters of Humphrey Prideaux*, 166; Kenyon papers, 411.

treatment meted out to their favourite financial panacea, the Land Bank. The bill to establish it had been clogged with hard conditions and the opposition to it was, no doubt, largely factious, as Foley and Harley complained,¹ but it is plain that the vested moneyed interests, led by the Bank of England, were too powerful to be beaten. For Foley and Harley, who had been its particular sponsors, the Land Bank's collapse was a bad loss of prestige. But if their financial policy was unsuccessful, their patriotism was not doubted, and the grave financial crisis of this summer and autumn dwarfed mere party faction. Between November 1696 and February 1697 an income tax and a poll tax were added to existing burdens, over five millions were once more voted for the services, another five given to pay off arrears, and the Bank of England's monopoly extended to 1710.

At this New Year of 1696-7, which saw Parliament give such ample supply, we reach the climax of the Whig Junto's supremacy. Formally, this supremacy continued till the next general election of December 1698, but two new questions clouded the politics of 1697 which mark for our purpose the turn of the tide. The first of these was the Junto's break with the great 'undertakers', Shrewsbury, Sunderland, and Godolphin, which came as the aftermath of the Fenwick confessions; the second was the peace of Ryswick, and the consequent votes for disbanding the army.

Sir John Fenwick, most virulent of Jacobites, had been arrested in Romney Marsh in June 1696, but week after week his trial was postponed, until in September it began to be common talk in London that he had confessed, and in confessing had inculpated two of the Cabinet. He had, indeed, point-blank accused Godolphin, Shrewsbury, Russell, and Marlborough of treasonable correspondence with Saint-Germain, and his story had the displeasing quality of a very remarkable accuracy. To the Whigs' horror, Shrewsbury promptly offered his own resignation, and proceeded to suggest the same for all the ministers similarly involved: he then left his colleagues,

¹ Godolphin to the King, 29 May 1696 (*Cal. S. P. Dom*); Vernon to Shrewsbury, 10 Nov 1696 (*V. C.*); cf. the complaints of Edward Harley, Portland papers, v. 645, and Ranke's remarks, v. 125.

pleading a bad hunting fall, and locked himself up in the Cotswolds.¹ If the Whigs resented his non-appearance, they detested much more the notion of his resignation, which must inevitably mean the fall of Russell, and possibly that of the Ministry as a whole. And how were they to meet Parliament? For weeks they hoped to bury the charges in obscurity, but by the end of October had reluctantly agreed to face the music. One difficulty especially beset them. How was a distinction to be drawn, in Whig interests, if the Commons insisted on full investigation, between the distrusted Godolphin and the valued Russell and Shrewsbury? Here was an occasion for a display of their political skill, and never was their party cohesion, never their adroitness, shown to better advantage.

By supreme management, and this the Whigs rather improbably attributed to Sunderland,² Godolphin was persuaded to offer his resignation: the charge of Jacobitism always had a disturbing effect on his equanimity, but, in point of fact, the Fenwick business was actually only the last item in a long account running up between himself and the Junto. His open wish for peace, his aversion to their purely party appointments, his neutral attitude over the Land Bank, his critical views on Montague's pet projects of recoinage and the Bank, the close touch he kept up with old Tory friends—all this must have alienated him from Wharton and Somers. The hapless Shrewsbury envied him: 'I think my Lord Godolphin is much in the right', he told Wharton, 'I wish I were well in his condition.'³ In any case, this resignation removed the main Whig objection to proceeding with Fenwick's confessions, which their majority in the Commons could now, with an easy mind, vote to be 'false, scandalous, and a contrivance to undermine the Government'. Leave was the same day (the 6th November) given by 179 votes to 61 to bring in a bill of attainder against Fenwick.

¹ Montagu House papers, ii. 393; Shrewsbury to the King, 18/28 Oct. (Coxe); Somers to Shrewsbury, 19/29 Oct. (*ibid.*); Shrewsbury to Wharton, 30 Oct. (Bodl. Carte MSS. 233, f. 27 a).

² Somers to Shrewsbury, 27 Oct./6 Nov. (Coxe). Monmouth was also exceedingly active in this, *Vernon Corr.* i. 24.

³ Elliott, *Godolphin*, 194; *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1694-5, *passim*; Portland, iii. 567; Luttrell, iii. 513, 566; Shrewsbury to Wharton, 1 Nov. 1696 (Bodl. Carte MSS. 233).

Whether or no to avoid prolonging a question which might endanger some of their own friends, the Tory leaders appear not to have opposed this airy dismissal of Fenwick's charges; the King, we should notice, had sent for Harley, who sat silent in the debate and probably gave the cue to his followers.¹ But, if it was best to leave this mystery unprobed, it was a good fighting ground to attack the bill of attainder, and from the first division on the subject Harley, with his lieutenants Harcourt and Boyle, joined Musgrave and Seymour in opposing it. The iniquity of such retrospective legislation shook Whig party allegiance, and the bill passed its third reading in the Commons by the poor margin of 33 votes, which in the Lords was reduced to 7. In each House the regular Opposition was reinforced by moderate Whigs, and even by placemen; Trevor, the Attorney-General, and Pelham, a lord of the Treasury, joined the Tories in the Commons, while the Lords' minority included Devonshire, Pembroke, Dorset, Godolphin, and Somerset, in addition to the pure Tories Nottingham, Rochester, and Weymouth.²

The Tories, in short, had not only the best of the argument and the law, but reaped the full reward of a successful party move. The cohesion of the Whig government was gone for ever. Sunderland, their essential intermediary with the King, and thus (in Burnet's words) the recognized head of the 'administration', was alienated. The details are obscure, as always in the life of this restless maker of cabinets, but the causes are clear enough: he grudged power to any ministers not in his control, had become restive at the Whigs' growing independence, and had long known, he told Shrewsbury ironically, that he was 'entirely insignificant'.³ Even in the year before, he had backed the projected Council of Trade and had been behind the scenes in the Land Bank agitation, and now the last mysterious phase of the Fenwick affair, conducted under the eccentric auspices of Lord Monmouth, resolved itself

¹ Is not Harley almost certainly the mysterious 'friend', to whose skill Henry Guy assured Shrewsbury this happy result was 'all owing'? (Montagu House papers, ii. 421); he and Foley had been sent for by William on the 13th October.

² Coxe; Burnet; *Parl. Hist.*; *Vernon Corr.*

³ Sunderland to Shrewsbury, 19/29 July, 1696 (Coxe); Burnet, iv. 308, 379.

into a faction fight between Sunderland and the Junto. They were convinced that he was aiming at their ruin, and hoped to persuade Shrewsbury that he, too, was a destined victim.¹

Viewed from this angle, the struggle for the time being resulted in a compromise; if Somers and Russell got peerages, if Montague succeeded Godolphin as First Lord of the Treasury, if both Wharton brothers got new places, Sunderland became Lord Chamberlain in April 1697 and was appointed a Lord Justice. But the rift was much too deep thus to be papered over. The uncrowned king at Althorp opposed many of the Junto's further proposals, objected to Wharton's claim to be next Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, and even defended the Duke of Leeds; they, in their turn, continued to foment suspicion between him and Shrewsbury.² This was the Achilles' heel of the Ministry, for Shrewsbury, as the only good-tempered person in this odd collection, and as the necessary link between the Whigs and the great 'undertakers', amongst whom he alone had some genuine Whig principles, was the one man indispensable.

During the whole of 1697 he hardly stirred from his fastnesses at Eyford or Grafton, a target for the recriminations of all parties to the controversy. Though in April he consented to defer resignation till the Government was more firmly settled, he had become a nervous wreck, and his failure to reconcile the Whigs with Sunderland preyed upon him. Once more, in September, he proffered resignation, and once more entreaties from both William and the Whigs restrained him. But, from this date, his spring for work and action seemed to be destroyed; he was racked by gout, his eyes began to fail, and his letters breathe a hypochondriacal despair; 'it may not be unreasonable to ask oneself the question', was his plaint at the age of thirty-eight, 'what one does in a world where there is so much pain, and so little pleasure'.³

Events in the autumn followed thick and fast. On the

¹ Note the extraordinary efforts made by Sunderland (and the King) to shield Lord Monmouth; Sunderland's anxiety to move Shrewsbury up to the presidency of the Council; Wharton's efforts to humour Monmouth.

² Shrewsbury to Somers, 14/24 April (Hardwicke S. P.); Somers to Shrewsbury, 29 May (Montagu House papers); Sunderland to Shrewsbury, 3/13 June; Orford to Shrewsbury, 10/20 June (Coxe).

³ Shrewsbury to the King, 8/18 Sept. (*ibid.*); to Wharton, 16 July 1698

21st September peace was signed at Ryswick between Great Britain and France. On the 30th November, three days before Parliament met, Shrewsbury fled from London to Eyford. On the 1st December Trumbull resigned his secretaryship, and was succeeded by Shrewsbury's pedestrian under-strapper, Vernon ; as the Whigs had hoped for Wharton, they were correspondingly discontented. Two days later came the opening of Parliament, and on this faction-ridden, weakened Cabinet broke the furious demand for the disbandment of the army. Before the debates reached their climax,¹ Sunderland had determined on retirement. Members of both parties attacked him in the Commons, and he saw that the Whigs meant to throw him overboard. He preferred to leave the ship in his own way : it might yet prove a case of Wharton 'dropping the pilot'. On the 26th he left office. A variety of metaphors explained the singleness of his hatred : 'one cannot breathe without air', he told Harley ; 'there was no rack', he said to Vernon, 'like to what he suffered, by being ground as he had been, between Lord Monmouth and Lord Wharton'. Godolphin's retreat and Shrewsbury's abdication had already half stripped the Government, and Sunderland's retirement, Harley thought, would 'leave the managers very naked'.² Now was the Opposition's chance to expose this tattered Cabinet.

On the 21st October Foley had sent urgently to Harley to come to London, which the army question had already put into a ferment. Whig party unity was fast becoming a memory. Somers had stated the ministerial case for a standing army in one pamphlet, young Trenchard had replied for the anti-military 'old Whigs' in another. Foley was called into the King's consultations, and both he and Harley hoped, it would seem, that Sunderland would retain office ; in return for his assistance with the King, they were probably ready to take a more moderate line on the army question than their usual Parliamentary allies could approve.³ Tory private members

(Bodl. Carte MSS. 233). The Venetian envoys noted the strain cast on him by a total blindness in one eye : *Relazione* of July 1696, P. R. O. transcripts.

¹ Sunderland to Harley, 3 Dec. (Portland, iii) ; Vernon to Shrewsbury, 27 Dec./6 Jan (Coxe). ² To his father, 1 Jan. 1698.

³ Foley to Harley, 21 Oct. ; Harley to his father, 27 and 30 Nov. ; Sunderland to Harley, 3 Dec. (Portland papers) ; *State Tracts*, II.

were moved to high hopes, and one felt impelled to versify a dialogue between Foley and a royal intermediary :

If the King to my Bank and me will be hearty,
And to some other projects which I can advance,
Then I will come over, both I and my party,
And (I conceive) we can stop the ambition of France.¹

But, whatever his possible relation to the King, in a Committee of the Whole House on the 10th December Harley, 'by a great majority',² carried a proposal to reduce the forces back to their level at the end of 1680 ; a Whig attempt, the next day, to recommit was beaten by 185 to 148. On the 8th January 1698, encouraged by Sunderland's fall, ministers made a surprise effort to reopen the question ; after eight hours' debate, in which many independent Whigs turned against them, they were beaten by twenty-four votes—the net result being that the army was to be reduced to approximately 10,000 men.

Apart from this outstanding question, the Whig party majority in the Commons still held good. The attempt of the Sunderland group to ruin their leaders had roused a fighting spirit, which was carefully nursed throughout the session by meetings at the Whig Rose Club,³ and they were magnificently led by Montague. He and Wharton determined to carry war into the enemy's country, and to make the return of Sunderland and his creatures impossible. One of them, the wealthy banker Duncombe, now owner of Buckingham's Helmsley, was struck down in January on a charge of fraud ; if Henry Guy continued his 'under part', threatened Montague, he might be 'still blasted and sent after Duncombe'. Wharton must be secretary, Portland must be superseded as 'the minister' by the younger royal favourite Albemarle, 'a fair lady' (Mrs. Villiers) was ready to assist. Shrewsbury's return was essential ; if he wished it, they would put up with Sunderland, but it must be only in a subordinate rôle and on specific conditions, such as a secretary's place for Wharton. 'Were this settled', Montague wrote to Shrewsbury, 'the agreement should be that we would have but one common interest, the same friends and the same enemies', and the King's displeasure should be

¹ In the hand of Anthony Hammond : Bodl. Rawlinson MSS. D. 174.

² Carte MSS. 130, f. 274.

³ *Vernon Corr.* ii. 258 ; Portland, iii. 595.

promptly shown to all 'who have been, underhand, fostered and nursed up to supplant us'.¹

In this campaign, pressed on with the greater energy since in a few months the current Parliament must lapse under the Triennial Act, the Whig extremists committed two capital blunders. In their resolution to crush the enemy, they went too far and offended the moderates. Granted that Duncombe's prosecution was justified, a bill of pains and penalties to confiscate two-thirds of his property was an outrage. It was, like Fenwick's attainder, *ex post facto*, it was ridiculously disproportionate to the crime, and it usurped for a small party majority the judicial function. It was a new and unwholesome precedent, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should on the eve of a general election hold out prospects of reducing taxes by legislative confiscation. It was small wonder that the Lords, though only by a single vote, threw out the bill.

Nor, in the affair of the East India Company, were the Whig leaders any better advised. Distracted between the new monopoly given to the old Company in 1693 and Parliament's decision of 1694, that all English subjects had a right of trading to the East, our Indian trade had fallen into a condition of anarchy. It was, indeed, one of those occasions when rapid contradictions in our Imperial policy create an imbroglio from which there can be no really equitable exit. But equity was not the object of the Junta. Instead of using the opportunity to fuse the old and new interests, Montague now proposed to set up a new Company in return for a loan of two million pounds at 8 per cent., gave the old Company three years' notice to wind up its affairs, and sent up the scheme to the Lords in the shape of a Money Bill. Even Whig partisans² thought too much rigour had been shown, and it passed, the Lords only by seventeen votes—in the list of protesting peers being the name of Godolphin.

Besides this injudicious factiousness, the Whig managers made another and, in their permanent interests, a much graver mistake. William III was not a man who could be driven, as later they managed for a season to drive Queen Anne, and of

¹ Montague to Shrewsbury, 1/11 Feb. 1698 (Coxe).

² Burnet, iv. 382.

this men who knew him better had long warned them. Shrewsbury expressly told Montague that the one thing necessary was to avoid impressing the King with the idea that they would have no truck with Sunderland ('which is a loss he will esteem irreparable'), or the doing of anything to confirm the belief 'that the Whigs have a natural sourness that makes them not to be lived with'. They disdained such moderation, and in a conference with the King at Newmarket in April, in which Shrewsbury was induced to take a hand, they refused to modify their ultimatum that Wharton, and no other, should be Secretary. William's anger was marked by a refusal to discuss further ministerial arrangements before he left England in July, and by his absence from the country, in a time of peace, till December; until then he refused to meet the new Parliament. He had, moreover, already been trying to get Lowther, now Lord Lonsdale, back to his service, had brought Marlborough into the Cabinet in June, and was prepared to break with the Whigs, if there was any hope of an alternative Ministry.¹

Of this possibility the general election of July and August 1698 gave a further inkling. By Somers's own confession the people were 'tired out with taxes', and showed 'a strange spirit', Vernon naïvely said, 'of distinguishing between the Court and country party'.² Wharton's candidates failed in nearly every case, even in part in his own highly preserved Buckinghamshire. The two ministers Montague and Vernon had a tight contest before getting in at Westminster; in the City, though three Whigs were elected, the fourth member was Sir John Fleet, chairman of the much-attacked old East India Company. Seymour regained his old seat at Exeter, and brought in with him an advanced and bitter Tory in Bartholomew Shower. The 'New Country Party'³ drove everywhere a hot campaign against courtiers, taxes, placemen, and standing armies. Though many new men were elected, the general impression was strong that the Whigs had suffered a check, and that the new Commons would need very delicate handling.

¹ Shrewsbury to Montague, 22 Jan/1 Feb, Somers to Shrewsbury, 25 Oct./4 Nov. (Coxe), Vernon to Shrewsbury, 21 June (*Vernon Corr.*); Portland to Lonsdale, Dec. 1697-April 1698 (Lonsdale papers).

² Somers to the King, 28 Aug (Ralph), Vernon to Shrewsbury, 2 Aug. (V. C.).

³ So called in a Whig election placard (Portland, viii. 54).

XII

WILLIAM III AND ROBERT HARLEY,

1698-1702

At the beginning of the period which was to restore the Tories to office a certain coolness is visible in their ranks, and the main reason seems to have been that Foley and Harley had not yet wholly severed their old Whiggish connexions. During the elections they had shown themselves ready to come to a friendly understanding with the Whigs as to the representation of Worcestershire and Herefordshire, and both were intimate with Vernon, the new Secretary of State; Foley, in particular, had backed the Court in matters of supply, had repudiated the idea of tacking the army bill, and had done his best to protect Shrewsbury. Now, as the natural doom of moderation under a party system, he was unsupported by most Tories for re-election as Speaker.¹ The facts in this matter, characteristic of the Tory Coalition's middle phase, are obscure enough, but may probably be interpreted as follows. By October two candidates for the Speaker's chair were in the field—Sir Thomas Littleton, a commissioner of the Treasury, who in the last session had done the Court yeoman service, and that eminent ex-Speaker, Edward Seymour. In November a pamphlet of extreme violence attacked both of them, specially stigmatizing Seymour as an 'old prostitute of the exploded Pension Parliament of Charles II's reign'—the periods of whose life 'may be marked out by the bargains he has made'. In the moderate circles, which this pamphlet voiced, men spoke naturally both of Foley and of Harley as candidates, but the person on whom the majority of the party pitched was John Granville, one of their best lieutenants, but by his connexions certainly nearer than they to average Tory feeling. But Seymour, who was at the moment curiously friendly with Montague, seems from some jealousy or resent-

¹ Coxe, *Shrewsbury*, 539 et seq.; *V. C.* ii. 118, 152, 221.

ment to have queered the pitch, and it is not surprising that Littleton's nomination was carried by 242 to 135.¹

But such disunion, though it delayed a Tory administration, could not postpone the break-up of the Junto. In the first week of December the King at last accepted Shrewsbury's resignation, and Montague, even before this and without his colleagues' knowledge, had taken a step which was generally interpreted as sounding the retreat. Sir Robert Howard, Dryden's brother-in-law and enemy, and Buckingham's friend, had at last been parted by death from his comfortable sinecure as Auditor of the Exchequer, and now it was promptly transferred by Montague, with the consent of his easy Treasury subordinates, to his brother Christopher, obviously to be kept warm for a more illustrious refugee. Nor did Littleton's election mean, as the King had hoped, any plain sailing in the Commons. The feeling against a standing army was much too strong to be tampered with, and the measures taken to evade the past year's vote for disbandment had roused legitimate indignation. Instead of 10,000 only, the number of troops still retained on the English establishment was in fact half as much again, and even now the Court hoped to secure 10,000, in addition to the Dutch guards.

They were quickly undeceived. On the 17th December the Commons agreed that the forces in England should consist of native-born subjects only, not to exceed 7,000 in number—the third reading finally passing on the 19th January 1699 by the triumphant figure of 221 to 154. Harley was throughout the leader; Musgrave, Pakington, and Harcourt supported him, and despite Montague's best exertions solid Whigs like Hartington and Onslow joined hands with the Opposition. All William's pathetic efforts to keep his Guards, even his threat to leave this ungrateful country for good, were useless, and the last address of the Commons was in effect a reproach, that he had violated his original Declaration of 1688, which had promised to send away all foreign forces. This offensive allusion passed the Commons on the 20th March by six votes.

¹ Edward to Sir E. Harley, 29 Oct.; Price to Beaufort, 26 Nov. (Bodl. Carte MSS. 130); Aglionby to Prior, 5 Dec. (Bath papers, iii); Somers to Shrewsbury, 15 Dec. (Coxe); 'Considerations upon the choice of a Speaker' (*State Tracts*); Cowper papers [Report XII], ii. 380.

No sign could be more significant of the state of public opinion,¹ which in this matter was nearly unanimous, and genuinely viewed wholesale disbandment as the only means to balance the budget; 'there is no medium I think but disbanding the army', wrote Harley, 'or keeping it up, shutting up the Exchequer, and governing by sword and edicts'.

From this point, week by week, the Ministry's weakness grew more obvious. On the 29th March the Commons presented an address on the corruption and inefficiency of the Admiralty, declaring in one clause that Orford's accumulation of offices as First Lord and Treasurer was 'inconsistent with the service'; only some 'unfortunate behaviour in some of our friends', said Harley, lost by four votes (164 to 160) a direct demand for the admiral's removal.² On the 19th April a clause was attached to the Money Bill, appointing commissioners to take an account of the lands forfeited to the Crown in Ireland—that burning question, so long suppressed, which was soon destined to explode with enormous damage to the Government. Lastly, as a foil to the standing army, the Commons sent up a bill 'making the militia of this kingdom more useful'.

From the first day of the session Somers had despaired—'there is at present', he said, 'no face of government'—and by Easter 1699 this jarring mass of atoms was out of all control. May proved the decisive season; the high-Tory courtier Jersey was appointed Secretary in place of Shrewsbury, Leeds was at length removed from the Presidency of the Council, but was succeeded by a second Tory in 'Long Tom' Pembroke—the latter's Privy Seal going to a third in the person of the veteran Lonsdale. Portland, jealous of Albemarle, had resigned his Court appointments, and was publicly sulking. On the 15th Orford finally upset the Whig coach by a sudden and unconcerted resignation. A new and discordant Admiralty Board, was patched up, headed by the cipher Bridge-

¹ C. J.; *Hatton Corr.* ii. 238; Hoffmann's dispatch, 16 Jan. (Gaedeke, *Die Pol. Oesterreichs in der Spanischen Erbfolgefrage*); Coxe, op. cit., 572 et seq.; Portland, iii. 600. 'The country' will not budge—Bodl. Tanner MSS. 22, f. 4.

² Harley to his father, 28 March (Portland, iii). This makes unlikely Coxe's assertion that Harley withdrew before the division; see the materials for Harley's speeches on this matter in Portland, viii. 58, and the previous preparation for this attack by Foley and himself in December (V. C. ii. 238).

water, Speaker Littleton, and Orford's professional rival, Rook. At the Treasury the moderate Whig Pelham, who had several times opposed the Government, was replaced by Sunderland's nominee Tankerville (once known in Monmouth's circle under the tarnished name of Grey of Wark), while the experienced Whig partisan John Smith became Chancellor of the Exchequer. But if the King expected that this queer mosaic of personal servants and time-worn politicians would meet Tory expectations he was grossly mistaken. Only a new dissolution, and this Somers was credited with preventing, could have cleared the air.¹

This summer of 1699 passed in anxious palaver between the Cabinet-makers. Shrewsbury betook himself again to Althorp, with dim hopes of reconciling its regal owner with the Junto, but a more frequent guest of Sunderland's was old Henry Guy, who was trying to construct a rival Ministry on a basis of Sunderland, Shrewsbury, and the Harley-Foley following.² In October Shrewsbury did in fact accept the title of Lord Chamberlain, but this was solely under the King's constant, never-relaxing pressure, and he was even now talking of leaving England for his health. In the same month Montague threw up his commissionership of the Treasury, without waiting to meet the next inevitable attack from the Commons.

On the 16th November William met his Parliament; three days earlier Paul Foley had died in Herefordshire, and Harley, his load now 'heavier since the loss of so good a friend',³ stood the outstanding commoner of his party, at the opening of the most critical session of his life. We are now to see him plunged into two years of furious party fighting, and before that it may be well to review his ideas, his sincerity, and his objective, as at this date they appear to us.

He had certainly cut his connexion with the Junto; we have already seen him leading the crusade for army disbandment and noted his efforts to get Orford dismissed. All attempts to buy his neutrality, by office or sinecure, had failed; only

¹ Anon. to Annandale, 15 Aug. (Hope-Johnstone papers, 110).

² Sunderland to Shrewsbury, 29 May/8 June (Coxe), and following months, Guy to Harley, 9 Sept. et seq. (Portland, iii).

³ To his father, 11 Jan. 1700.

lately he had refused the Auditorship of the Exchequer, which was pressed upon him before Montague took it. His confidence that he could form an administration on his own lines seems to have been complete; Henry Guy kept him in touch with the powerful channel of Sunderland, and he was friendly with Mrs. Villiers, whose nerves he was soothing about the effect of resuming Irish forfeitures. But to represent him at this stage in his life (or at any other for that matter) as a mere self-seeking politician would be a travesty. His chequered course henceforward as a party man is not entirely to his discredit, for his inconstancy was rooted in something like principle. He disbelieved in the whole scheme of party, and would not frame a rigid programme; 'wisdom in public affairs was not', he told Swift much later, 'what is commonly believed, the forming of schemes with remote views, but the making use of such incidents as happen.' Within the bounds of certain constitutional principles (and these, we shall try to show, formed a sober background to all his actions) he left a vast space for improvisation. Distant objectives, new sweeping platforms, elaborate combinations—he had none of these prepared or thought out in advance. If to this empirical view of politics we add an habitual caution and procrastination, 'an obstinate love of secrecy', and a passion to advance his family, the charge of duplicity henceforward so freely levelled against him becomes more intelligible. But, beyond all this, he was merely an uncommon example of a common type, not attractive but an invaluable national asset in transition times, of men who are perfectly and passionately contented with the scheme of things as they are. To him 1688 was really 'finality'. To protect that settlement he would check the Tories, educate them out of Jacobitism, and capture their followers from Hydes and Seymours; for the same reason, to save that settlement from abuse, he would resist with all his forces what he viewed as King William's campaign against the ancient constitution. In 1699 the second task was the need of the moment, and the inner tenor of his life at this time is the best testimony to his sincerely conservative purpose.¹

¹ Fragment of autobiography by Harley, written at the Crown Inn, Faringdon, 25 Sept. 1707 (Portland, 1v), Swift to Archbishop Kins, 12 July 1711.

On this we get some light from the notes which in July 1699 he extracted for himself from the unpublished manuscript of Burnet's history.

'Men go away with vast grants the pillage of the country ; . . . Whigs desire power and use it the worse in the world' ; against 'this faction', he noted half a dozen breaches, in letter and spirit, of Orange's original Declaration. His correspondence with his father during this session again takes on a sombre, Puritanic tone. The day before Captain Kidd's piratic patent came in question, he invokes the blessing of God on the Commons' proceedings, 'for the glory of His name and the good of this poor nation, which is devoured by its inhabitants'. In March 'all their arts are used towards ruining all'. On the Lords' amendments to the Irish Forfeitures Bill, he exclaims on 'the consequence to the nation and the very constitution' ; on the bill passing, upon 'the wonderfulness of the rescue, . . . so many minute things were ordered by the hand of God to come between us and ruin'.¹

In this year, then, his public and private attitude appears to be sincere and uniform, expressing a conservatism really felt, above mere faction.

Even before the main battle began, two skirmishes of the recess had put more heart into Harley's party. In June Duncombe was acquitted by the court of King's Bench of Montague's charges against him in the previous session, and was promptly elected sheriff of London for the next year. A few months later the economist Charles Davenant² brought out his *Discourse of Grants and Resumptions* ; his object, he said, was 'to prepare the town to give the report of our Irish Commissioners a kind reception', and to do this by showing 'what our ancestors have done to such as, being ministers, have presumed to pass grants to themselves of the Crown revenue'. Under the thin historic mantle of Flambard, Gaveston, and John de Montaigu ('a little insolent fellow'), the author held up Somers, Portland, and Charles Montague to the public wrath.

The Tories' resolution to take a vigorous offensive was shown

¹ To Sir Edward Hailey, 5 December 1699-13 April 1700 (Portland, iii) : Foxcroft, 'Supplement'.

² Davenant to T. Coke, 1 July 1699 (Cowper papers, ii).

on the session's first day. The King's long speech (16th November) had ended with the hint that he was persuaded 'you are come together with purposes on your part suitable to those on mine'—therefore 'let us act with confidence in one another'. After debates in which Musgrave, Seymour, and Howe took the lead, the Commons retorted with an address, which complained it was their greatest misfortune that any 'distrust hath been raised of our duty and affections to your sacred Majesty and your people', and asking, as a proof of his confidence, that 'you would be pleased to show marks of your high displeasure towards all such persons who have, or shall presume to misrepresent', the proceedings of Parliament.¹ Fortunately for the Tories, some of the 'persons' they had in view had, three years before this, committed an error of judgement which threw them into the enemy's hands, and the first wash of a long storm was marked on the 1st December by a move for papers in the affair of Captain Kidd.

This picturesque ruffian had been furnished in 1695 with a commission to destroy pirates—the prime mover in which had been Lord Bellamont, Governor of New York and for some years back a protégé of Shrewsbury. Money for this enterprise had been raised from a syndicate headed by Shrewsbury, Somers, Orford, and Henry Sidney (now Lord Romney), in whose favour the King (unknown to the departmental officials) signed a Treasury warrant, giving them the proceeds of Kidd's prizes. Thus highly accredited by three Cabinet Ministers, the good ship *The Adventure Galley* sailed away, to be heard of again in 1697–8 as destroying the East India Company's trade from the Red Sea to the Malabar coast.²

In their prime object the Opposition could not yet succeed. A proposal of Harley and Seymour for an immediate vote of censure on the Lord Chancellor was rejected, and a resolution moved in committee on the 6th December, that the grant of letters patent had been dishonourable to the King, contrary to law, and destructive of trade, was beaten by 189 to 133. Other incidents at the opening of the session showed that, had

¹ C. J., 28 Nov., 1 Dec.; Bonnet (Ranke, v. 202).

² Ralph, ii. 831; Shrewsbury to the King, 15/25 Aug. (Coxe); Livingston to Shrewsbury, 20 Sept. 1696 (Montagu House papers, ii).

the Whigs been firmly led, they might even now have got through their difficulties; the first large batch of election petitions went in their favour, and on the 13th December they decisively beat a resolution to remove Bishop Burnet from his place as preceptor to the Duke of Gloucester—the debate merely dwindling down to the usual fireworks from Pakington and Harcourt.¹

But two days later the majority report of the commissioners who had been appointed in April to review Irish forfeitures was laid on the table, and the question of Irish land, which had been slowly smouldering since 1690 and which was to embarrass Whig governments till Mr. Gladstone's hey-day, made its first serious entry in the English House of Commons. The King had originally promised to make no final disposal of these lands without consulting Parliament, but he had since proceeded to make large grants to his soldiers of several nationalities and his favourites of either sex. One Parliament after another had complained in vain, and the Commons had already, in February 1698, passed a resolution to resume all grants made since February 1689. The report, which now brought this question to a head, showed that the King had been defrauded right and left by his subordinates; it revealed, further, large grants to Portland, Albemarle, Ruigny, and Lady Orkney, and alleged that, even taking these grants into account, there should still be lands available for the public use to the value of over £1,600,000. The notorious division between the four Tory and the three Whig commissioners had launched the report in an atmosphere of recrimination, and Montague, whose character did not shine in tight corners, damaged both the Government and himself by retailing confidential information as to Lady Orkney's grant.

The Commons on the 16th January 1700 resolved that the four majority commissioners had acquitted themselves with 'courage' (that being aimed at the King) and 'integrity', and on the 18th rejected a motion moved at the King's instance, and against his ministers' advice, that one-third of the forfeitures should be reserved for his disposal; the same day they determined that, in advising these grants, the

¹ C. J., 1-13 Dec.; Hope-Johnstone papers, 114.

Ministry had laid heavy taxes on the people and 'highly failed in the performance of their trust and duty'. During all these votes the Whigs sat supine, or even voted against the Court; 'I do not see', wrote Vernon, 'how they can ever rise again.'¹ At this stage in the proceedings, it seems the King offered to dismiss Somers, if he was guaranteed £200,000 out of the forfeitures, but Harley refused to listen, and indeed the Tories might well hope to achieve all their objects without paying such a ransom for them.² Nor is it probable that any leader, however moderate, could now have reined in the majority; to the King's hint, that 'just and effectual ways' for reducing the national burden lay in other directions, they merely replied on the 26th February that whoever advised such an answer had done his utmost to create misunderstanding between King and people. Consideration of the Forfeitures Bill was long delayed by measures attacking Somers's appointments to the commission of the peace, or dealing with placemen and royal grants, and stuck still longer on the immense personal interests vested in Irish land. But the pause did not bring more moderation. In the form in which it finally emerged from the Commons on the 2nd April, the bill vested all Crown property in Ireland—as existing in 1685 or since accrued—in the hands of thirteen trustees; these were named in the bill, and included all four of the majority report commissioners. And the bill was, in the second place, 'tacked' to the land tax.

The next ten days in London passed in excitement like that of May 1641 or November 1680. On the 6th April the Lords, vehemently pressed by Wharton and Portland, who were supported by ministerialists of both parties in Lonsdale, Pembroke, and Tenison, made some minor amendments. On the 8th these were rejected by the Commons, who at the same time ordered to be printed the commissioners' report, together with all leading votes and addresses on the subject from 1690 to the present spring. The same day they voted that procuring or passing exorbitant grants to his own benefit by a Privy Councillor was a high crime and misdemeanour, and Seymour attacked Somers—'that Hobbist'—as the original of all their

¹ To Shrewsbury, 18 Jan. (V. C. ii. 413).

² Harley's autobiographical fragment, *loc. cit.*; borne out by V. C. iii. 8.

wocs. Tuesday the 9th and the morning of Wednesday the 10th passed in vain conferences. Members on their way to Westminster had to struggle through huge crowds. The Opposition leaders in the Commons attacked the Dutchmen, who were bringing England to ruin. Threats of attainder against Portland and Albemarle and rumours of immediate dissolution ran through the lobbies on Tuesday evening; advised by a message from friends at Court, Harley persuaded the House to adjourn. On Wednesday they sat with locked doors, the keys on the table. Yet another conference failed. The Commons began to discuss *seriatim* the names of the Privy Council; 'there was not a man in the House, who did not think the nation ruined.' Harley opened a debate on the dark prospect before them. If supply failed, credit must fall, and with credit the army also. 'It was time', he said, 'to think of England'; that might be the last time they would sit there. Let the House show that they were 'not quite insensible'.¹ He moved that the army be disbanded as contrary to the Bill of Rights, and recommended the Commons to bethink themselves of other measures. Even Seymour and Howe spoke gravely and soberly, in tones reminiscent of troubled days.

At last word came that the Lords had given way; Jersey and Albemarle had persuaded William of the dangers of rejection—Sunderland, Marlborough, and Burnet threw their weight into the same scale. But even now the firebrands in the Commons were not contented with their victory. Proceeding to read over the Privy Council, they came to the name of Somers, and Harcourt and Leveson-Gower moved for impeachment: Musgrave would have reduced the motion to one for permanent removal from the King's counsels. But the moderates rallied again, and the motion was rejected by a majority of sixty-one—one intimate friend of Harley, Boyle, acting as a teller for the majority, and another, Gwynn, for the minority. The day's work closed with resolving on an address to the King, that no foreigner except Prince George be admitted to his Councils. The candles had long been lighted

¹ V. C. iii. 20; Anon. to Torrington, 11 April (B. M. Add. MSS. 28053, f. 402).

when the Commons dispersed; the next morning, without any speech, William prorogued Parliament.¹ 'Upon the main', wrote Matthew Prior, 'we have life for six months longer, and *alors comme alors*.'

Even to the man in the street it was plain that some change must come about in the Government; one observer thought 'my Lord Duke of Leeds, Rochester, Sunderland, Godolphin, and that party come into play again'.² High Tories were confident that William must fall into their scheme. On the 14th Seymour, after dining with the King, congratulated him on 'his great deliverance'. The King was good enough to say, 'I hope we shall be better friends in future'; Seymour, we are told, 'answered like a prince, "Sir, I make no doubt of it."' The old Tory commoner had grasped the situation; on the 27th the Great Seal was taken from Somers, and a new summer opened of ardent and curious Cabinet-making.

The last great Whig minister had fallen. Lonsdale was ailing at Bath—to die in July—Shrewsbury was ill, and Portland was disgruntled. Sunderland, as usual, had half a dozen inconsistent schemes in hand, and seems to have thought that the Whigs' defeat would make them more malleable, and ready to return upon his conditions. He was mistaken. For one moment Shrewsbury, on his persuasion, actually accepted the Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland, but within the next fortnight he recanted, and from May to August dragged himself to Woburn, to Winchendon, or to Boughton, to explore the possibilities of patching up again with the Junto. Very slowly, and only by dint of repeated rebuffs, was William brought to see that dismissal of the Whig leaders meant a breach with their followers, and the arrangements made by the time he left for Holland on the 4th July were still incomplete and non-committal. Jersey took Shrewsbury's place as Lord Chamberlain; to Harley's despair his favourite candidate for office, the Attorney-General Thomas Trevor, refused the Great Seal, which was given finally to an obscure Tory lawyer, Sergeant Wright. All else was seemingly left in the air, and even

¹ C. J., 9-11 April; Burnet; B. M. Add. MSS 28053 *ut supra*; Cox, *Shrewsbury*, 608 et seq.; Portland papers, iii; Ralph, ii, 850.

² Anon. to Charlett, 30 April (Bodl. Ballard MSS. 10).

in October the uninformed could see no plan of a Government.¹

In reality, it is tolerably plain that the King had, since the end of June, more or less pledged himself to the Tories, provided that they could guarantee a stable Ministry and a reasonable policy. Harley had one interview after another, the last on the 1st July, and even then it was common talk that Godolphin was destined for the Treasury and Rochester for Ireland. The latter's irascible temper at one time threatened to wreck the combination, but by early September these two ministers were working harmoniously with Harley and had, in the background, the friendly influence of Sunderland. That month Godolphin was definitely offered the Treasury.²

The new ministers entered on a hard inheritance. The peace of Europe, which had so long vacillated with the miserable health of Charles II of Spain, was shaking like an aspen now that he was really dying, and the signature in February of the second Partition treaty had only postponed the quarrel over the estate of this 'sick man' of seventeenth-century Europe. In July Anne's last child, the Duke of Gloucester—his games with his boy soldiers all over—quitted this mortal life, in which man had destined him to play the high part of English heir-apparent. Already it was realized that a settlement with the Hanoverians must be included in the government programme, and that something in the nature of constitutional guarantees might form part of it.³ The question of a dissolution was in every one's mind, for the meeting of Parliament had been postponed till the 24th October, and when the King returned from Holland, on the 18th, nothing had been openly settled. But a dissolution of Parliament and a meeting of Convocation were, without much doubt, implied in the King's bargain with the Tories. Both the pundits of the party, Musgrave and Seymour, and the fighting ranks like Davenant were demanding it; 'partitions and successions are too great to be begun in the fag end of a parliament', wrote Seymour, and, as this

¹ 'For God's sake let somebody or other be ordained to rule us, for at present your Godolphins and Montagues equally deny that they have anything to do with us'. Prior to Jersey, 14 Oct. (Bath papers), cf. Burnet, iv. 446.

² Jersey to Prior, 17 Sept. (Bath papers).

³ Guy to Harley, 31 Aug. (Portland, iii).

House must in any case expire legally during 1701, there was every motive to get a new mandate.¹ In early November the appointment of Tankerville to be Privy Seal in place of the dead Lonsdale, and of the staunch Tory, Charles Hedges, to be Secretary of State *vice* Jersey, marked the successful accommodation of the claims for office between the Tories and Sunderland. In the first week of December Rochester and Godolphin took their seats in the Cabinet, the announcement of their appointments to Ireland and the Treasury followed, and on the 19th Parliament was dissolved, and a new one summoned for the 6th February 1701.

Though Harley had been principal negotiator in all these arrangements, contrary to the expectation and desire of many of his supporters he was given no high office.² For two years rumour had been busy with his name, and some mystery clings to his immediate objective. In spite of his forwardness over the army dispute and Irish forfeitures, he had never shown intransigence on essentially national matters like supply, and good Tory partisans had murmured at this 'Presbyterian rogue' for declining to support a prosecution of Montague. Moreover, so long as Shrewsbury's re-entry upon politics was possible, Harley had never lost touch with him. He and his friends still on occasion ostentatiously defied all party rules: while Boyle had been prominent in defending Somers, Harley publicly disclaimed association with the Duke of Leeds, and the line he took in conversation at this time with a Whig bureaucrat like Vernon was determined but entirely detached. The King, he said, ought long ago to have changed his ministers; his business 'must miscarry, while blasted men had the conduct of it, whose avarice and oppressions could never be borne'.³ At present there was no government; the King must seize this opportunity for a complete change, or 'a reformation would be wrought in a more disagreeable manner'.

Resolved, then, that it must be a Tory administration, but

Musgrave, 12 Aug., 4 and 7 Nov.; Davenant, 19 Sept.; Scymour, 8 Nov.; Weymouth, 15 Nov.—to Harley-Hoffman, 14 Dec. (Gaedeke).

² Brydges to Coke, 26 May (Cowper papers); Scymour to Harley, *ul supra*.
V C. ii, *passim*.

still making Sunderland the linchpin of his scheme, and not yet entirely trusted by Tory backwoodsmen, Harley took the important post of Speaker—at this date still a ministerial office—but with a growing element about it of neutrality which well suited his genius and his game. The King assisted by ordering Littleton to stand down, and Seymour waived his prior claims on the Chair. At this turning point of his life he lost his best friend and correspondent, who had kept him anchored to the old honourable ideals of the 'country' school; Sir Edward Harley had long been sinking and died on the 9th December, and this to the new Speaker, 'so tender a son and so good natured',¹ was the darkest cloud on his rising fortune.

Something like three thousand candidates appeared in the field at the hard-fought elections of December-January, 1700-1. The Whigs poured out satires against the East India Company and Duncombe, against the 'Jacobites' Hammond and Seymour, and recalled the stanza, 'prophetically made above twenty years since', of the three 'Chits', 'Sunderland, Godolphin, Lory', now once more ruling this unhappily conservative country. With the general result Harley professed himself satisfied. True, the Whigs carried the City and Westminster, but all the leading Tories were returned, and it was thought that the one hundred and fifty new members would probably go with the tide, which was still swinging against the Junto.²

In the first speech from the throne to his new Parliament William declared it 'absolutely necessary' to make further provision for the succession, and this matter, already settled in principle by the party leaders, almost monopolized the first half of the session. On the 1st March the whole House went into Committee; on the 12th emerged those resolutions which formed the basis of the Act of Settlement. The party significance of this great constitutional measure, for which Harley was the first to move,³ was that it represented the constant programme of the 'country' party since the Revolution.

¹ Godolphin to Harley, 14 Dec. 1700 (Portland, iv).

² Portland, viii. 62; *ibid.*, iv. 14; Bonnet, 18 Jan. (Noorden).

³ Burnet, iv. 498.

Here were stipulated the exclusive powers of the Privy Council, and that legal responsibility of its individual members, which Poley had demanded in the Parliaments of 1690-1; here was that time-honoured Whig claim, that no pardon should bar an impeachment; here the extinguished Place Bills of 1692-4 were represented, by a clause forbidding placemen to be members; here was the provision for security of the Judges in status and salary, which had been attempted in the bill once vetoed, and once rejected, in 1691-2.¹ Other clauses defined the very grievances which caused William's unpopularity. No future sovereign after this Act could, as in 1689, rush the country into war for the defence of foreign territories, could leave England for months in time of peace, or employ foreigners in the Privy Council. Harley, it was said by his friends, had taken charge of these clauses in order to stifle far more extreme proposals,² but they represent well enough the feelings he had put in his cloudy way in a memorable letter to Weymouth during the preceding November: 'there is a spirit which will maintain the ancient government of England in Church and State, and will not neglect those opportunities which are like to be presented, for asserting that which is so necessary to our preservation, without being bewitched by any false lights of liberty.'³

Apart from the Act's constitutional significance, the Tory majority's attitude towards the succession itself deserves consideration, for what was done now was to bind some of them thirteen years later, against all their predilections. The Duke of Gloucester's death had been a severe blow, and particularly to 'the triumvirate' who 'built upon that foundation' of Anne and her heirs. But the mass of Tories were anxious to have a successor settled, if only to secure him 'before he be seasoned with principles destructive of the true English interest',⁴ and there is no reason to doubt that their leaders meant from the first to accept the Hanoverian succession—to

¹ Yard to Colt, 20/30 Dec. 1692 (B. M. Add. MSS. 34096)

² Burnet, iv. 498, notes of Speaker Onslow and Lord Hardwicke.

³ 5 Nov. 1700 (Portland, iii).

⁴ Chesterfield to Coke, 3 Aug. 1700 (Cowper papers, ii. 402; *ibid.*, 409). Marlborough, Godolphin, and Rochester are no doubt the 'triumvirate' alluded to.

which, moreover, William, after an interview in October with the Electress Sophia, had at length determined to adhere. Some of the Whigs leaned more towards a second marriage for William, but that great man, we may believe, knew his life's limitations better than they, and had perhaps a purer patriotism than their's for the country he had won. There is, at least, much evidence that one of the factors inducing him to accept a Tory government had been that party's downright acceptance of the Hanoverian solution. From Henry Guy's cipher correspondence it is clear that Harley was settled in this direction, and that Rochester inclined his weight with the Princess Anne into that scale, while to the Tories' singular freedom at this time from Jacobite tendencies we have both Whig and foreign testimony.¹ No Tory opposition, then, to the Act of Settlement can be traced, in spite of other furious controversies delaying its progress, and the insertion of the Electress Sophia's name was brought forward as a non-party measure, with a Tory mover and a Whig seconder;² the bill finally passed the Commons *nemine contradicente* on the 14th May, and on the 12th June became law of the land.

Far different was it with the acute crisis in foreign affairs. Charles II of Spain, who though so young had been so often dying, on the 1st November 1700 died in earnest, and the disposal of those great territories, which diplomats had so leisurely carved up on paper, was suddenly set before them to be accepted at the sword's point. By two successive Partition treaties William, in concert with Louis XIV, had tried to avert the ordeal. That of September 1698 had been negotiated by the King, Portland, and Heinsius; Somers put the Great Seal to a blank commission, the Whig ministers had been informed of the accomplished fact, and then only in outline. That of February 1700 was signed by Portland and Jersey. But neither treaty had been communicated to Parliament.

Postponing, for the moment, all consideration of the national and party passion evoked when these unconstitutional proceed-

¹ Portland, iii 625 et seq; Onslow's note on Burnet, iv 497; *Clarendon Corr.* ii 459; Klopp, ix. 423.

² Verney to Hatton, 11 March (B M Add. MSS 29568)

ings were shown up, we must examine this Tory Parliament's attitude to the merits of the situation, as now represented by the second treaty (since the first had speedily been made obsolete by the death of the Electoral Prince of Bavaria), and as defined by the events following the death of Charles of Spain. For their notions as to the origin and proper scope of the great war that followed must, at this stage, be kept distinct from their attacks on the method and authorship of the treaties, though incontestably their passions on the second question finally coloured their views on the whole matter.

The second Partition treaty, the terms of which leaked out in England by June 1700, had assigned Spain, the Indies, and the Netherlands to an Austrian Archduke, the Milanese to the Duke of Lorraine, and Lorraine, Naples, Sicily, the Tuscan ports, and Guipuscoa to France; it was signed, moreover, against strong protest both from Spain and the Empire. From the very first English conservative opinion disliked it,¹ and more particularly the large mercantile class trading to the Mediterranean, which, it was alleged, would under these terms become simply a French lake. It was argued, further, that the treaty would make war a certainty, for the Emperor would fight rather than see the French in Italy, and the Spaniards die rather than accept partition; on this view, the ministers' crowning iniquity had been to promise to France possession of territories which would more than outweigh all our gains from the last war. When, therefore, it became known in early November that the King of Spain had by his will bequeathed the whole Spanish monarchy to Philip, second son of the Dauphin—on condition that it should never be united with the French crown—and when, a fortnight later, news came that Louis XIV had accepted this will and disowned partition, a sigh of relief rose from the conservative and war-weary people of England. 'Better than we could expect' was Harley's comment, and the King himself did not conceal from Heinsius that, in the present state of English public opinion, he could do nothing.²

¹ Sir William Trumbull to Harley, 18 June (Portland, iii).

² Harley to Weymouth, 5 Nov.; cf. Poulett to Harley, 30 Nov., and Bonnet's evidence (Ranke, v. 239 n.).

All the more noteworthy is the swift change in Tory feeling by the time of William's death. That feeling was at the outset entirely hostile to the very notion of another war. Dryden, earlier this year, had put it into verse :

Enough for Europe has our Albion fought ;
Let us enjoy the peace our blood has bought.

The Tories did not care of what family was the new King of Spain, provided that the interests of Spain and France were (as they confidently anticipated would be the case under the will) kept apart, and that English trade did not suffer. From a diplomatic point of view the arguments might, reasonably, be considered nicely balanced ; was it more probable that Spanish national feeling would absorb a Bourbon king without accepting French hegemony, or that it would accept an Austrian Archduke and resign Italy to France ?

But, even before the new Parliament met, Louis XIV's actions rudely jostled the optimism of advocates for accepting the will, for not only were there rumoured threatening moves against British trade with the Indies, but in the first week of February 1701 French troops, armed with a Spanish mandate, bivouacked in the whole Dutch Barrier from Luxemburg to Ostend. The Commons' first resolution of the 14th February was vague and non-committal ; they would stand by His Majesty and take effectual measures, for ' the interest and safety of England, the preservation of the Protestant religion, and the Peace of Europe ', but even the last watery phrase was only retained by eighteen votes against a Tory protest. On the 20th they resolved, without a division, to ask the King to enter into negotiations for these specified purposes with the United Provinces and ' other potentates ', and gave assurances that they would support the treaty made with the States-General in 1677, which bound this country to assist Holland with 10,000 men, if she were attacked. To this point even the most ardent Tories had come round, and Howe's objection seems to have been isolated ; ' I never saw so great a spirit in the House of Commons ', wrote Vernon, ' and such a resolution to preserve Holland as well as England ', and the King. in

receiving the address, spoke graciously to Musgrave and Seymour.¹

The use made by William of the negotiations thus authorized—the demands upon France for some compensation for the Emperor, for English garrisons in Ostend and Nieuport, and for a Dutch barrier—does not seem to have impressed the Commons favourably, and their resolution of the 21st March marked no advance. They thanked him for his intention to communicate the results of his diplomacy, but by 193 to 187 they refused to give thanks for ‘his care of these nations and the Peace of Europe’; indeed, they tacked to their address a vote of censure on the Partition treaty, thus implicitly condemning any project of fighting on behalf of the Hapsburgs. By the 9th May they had moved a little forward: they resolved, unanimously, to assist William ‘to support his Allies in maintaining the liberties of Europe’; Seymour, who since Harley’s promotion to the Chair seems to have led the Commons in this session, could no longer carry them with him in his objections to the Imperial alliance. By the 12th June the Commons’ language was unmistakable; they promised support for ‘those alliances his Majesty shall think fit to make in conjunction with the Emperor, and the States-General’, for preserving European liberties, the ‘prosperity and peace of England, and for reducing the exorbitant power of France’. Finally, at the session’s close on the 24th June, Harley, who had long been trying to keep his party’s foreign policy in decent step with the King’s, in presenting the session’s bills for the Crown’s approval, referred (by previous Cabinet arrangement with William) to the alternatives before the country, as ‘a lasting peace’ or ‘a necessary war’.²

Marking the dates of these events and making due allowance for the growing clamour in England for war, it still seems true to say that, if the Tory ministers and Commons wanted peace, ~~they did not want it with dishonour.~~ After all, the full design of insisting upon the Spanish throne for the Austrians had not

¹ Vernon to Manchester, 20 Feb. (Ralph); Ranke, v. 250; Bodl. Rawlinson MSS. D. 37, f. 166.

² Bonnet (Noorden, i. 140); Hoffman’s dispatch, 20 Feb./4 March (Klopp).

yet matured. Both the Dutch and William himself had recognized Philip V as King, and even in October, when war was inevitable, Godolphin wrote grimly that 'the Dutch do not seem so fervent for it as our addressors'.¹ The Tory plea for the postponement, though not necessarily the avoidance, of war was put by Seymour in debate at the prorogation, but less suspect evidence perhaps comes from the following letter, written in November by an average Tory politician.²

'Indeed I take the state of the question—peace or war—to be very much altered since last sessions. We have now very potent alliances formed abroad, we had then none, the Treaty of Partition having broke those we had. We had then very great effects at sea and in Spain; our merchants since have been so prudent as to bring home or transmit to other parts, those they had there: and this to so inestimable a value, that it now appears what an incredible loss we should have had, had we declared (when the town would almost have forced us to it) last winter.' He adds that 'then we must have been principals, had we declared first without alliances; now we shall bear but our share'.

It is needless to pursue the point farther during King William's reign. The Grand Alliance, signed on the 7th September, was negotiated by Marlborough in close touch with Godolphin, and it was Edward Seymour who, on the 11th January following, moved that in our treaties an article be inserted for no peace with France, till reparation was made for their acknowledgement of 'the pretended Prince of Wales'. The violence of party faction, which clouded the King's last year of life, did not then rise out of Parliament's attitude on foreign affairs; long before the flood of Whig addresses for war, the Commons had put themselves in line with the Dutch, and by the middle of the summer of 1701 had given the King *carte blanche* to make his alliances.

In view of this, the partisan fury shown in the impeachment of Somers, Orford, and Halifax is at first surprising, but much must be attributed to the Tories' resentment at the purport of the Partition treaties, and the autocratic

¹ To Harley, 21 Oct. (Portland, iv).

² J. Brydges to T. Coke 8 Nov. (Cotton MSS.)

methods employed in making them ; still more, to the Whigs' new frenzied efforts to recover power, by branding their enemies as Jacobites and tools of France. The business of impeachment came, moreover, only as the climax to many other matters inflaming party feeling—to a long series of angry election petitions, to an inquiry initiated by Seymour into the new East India Company's wholesale buying of boroughs, to the expulsion from the House of leading Whig financiers like Heathcote and Furniss, and to the knotty examination of Captain Kidd. In investigating the treaties, the Lords had, in fact, taken the initiative, and Nottingham was chairman of their committee ; in a protest he, Rochester, Leeds, Devonshire, and twenty-three others implicitly invited the Commons to assist them. Even so, the impeachments were voted in the Commons by very narrow majorities—of 10 against Somers, of 45 against Orford, and of 50 against Halifax. Whether they were begun with the Tory managers' approval may be doubted ; Harley, we know, for one was opposed to them,¹ and the plain fact seems to be that, from the date of the Kentish Petition, the back-benchers in the Commons got entirely out of hand. Among ardent supporters of impeachment we can distinguish Seymour, Musgrave, Gwynn, and Finch of the old 'high-flyers', Bromley, Davenant, and Hammond of the younger, St. John, Harcourt, and Granville of the right centre. We catch glimpses of the extremists joyfully putting 'Robin's nose to the grindstone',² and the feeling by the session's close is shown by the seven Commissioners of Accounts named in June, who included four of the most bitter fanatics in Shower, Davenant, Howe, and Hammond.

A still wider issue between parties was opened by the Whig manipulation of public opinion. For, behind the famous Kentish Petition presented to the Commons on the 8th May, which implied that they were ungrateful to the King and remiss in helping his allies, and more especially behind the swarm of Whig addresses throughout the summer calling for a new Parliament, good observers discerned the skilled touch

¹ Portland, v. 646.

² Hammond to Coke, 7 June (Cowper papers).

of the Whig managers and the influence of Somers, whose nominees still manned the lieutenancies and the commission of the peace. On the 15th May Defoe's 'Legion' letter purported to threaten the Commons in the name of the People of England, and this was the herald of a whole literature, which in the next few months lifted the controversy to a higher and more bitter plane.¹ For, going beyond mere assertions of the right of petitioning, this literature appealed to William as the people's King, affirmed that the Commons were but delegates of the sovereign people, and depicted the Lords as natural guardians of English liberties. The twin corner-stones of the Whig party edifice—the democratic doctrine of the Commonwealth and the oligarchs' supremacy in practice—were thus again revealed, and though we need not ask how far the Whig Parliaments of the next century fulfilled this teaching, its influence upon the electorate of 1701 we are shortly to see.

For that was the burning question in the last months of this wild year: a change of ministers and a new Parliament, or not? At the prorogation on the 24th June the two Houses were not on speaking terms. The Lords had challenged the names of the Commons' Commissioners of Accounts. When they dismissed all four impeachments, a very strong minority recorded a protest—including the three ministers, Rochester, Marlborough, and Godolphin, and the powerful figures of Nottingham, Somerset, and Bishop Compton; the Commons voted their action to be a denial of justice. Yet the King long hesitated, and well he might. The Tories had, indeed, severely provoked him. Apart from the impeachments and their slow approach to his foreign policy, they had docked his civil list² of £100,000 (the exact total of sums formerly given to Catherine of Braganza, Mary of Modena, and the Duke of Gloucester), and had applied it to the public services; the Whigs, better courtiers, had opposed this economy. On the other hand, the Tories had after much pressure given him nearly all his estimates. Godolphin, who had long been of opinion that the

¹ Bonnet (Ranke, v. 263 n.); *History of the Kentish Petition*; *Original Power of the Collective Body of the People of England examined*; *Jura Populi Anglicani*, &c.

² Ellis to Stepney, 6 May (B. M. Add. MSS. 7074) Raleigh ii. 246

English army needed strengthening,¹ and Marlborough, who was engaged now in making the Grand Alliance, had met him more than half-way, and they carried with them the neutrality at least of one who might always be a dangerous embarrassment—the heiress to the throne. Rochester, on the contrary, was a maddening influence, for nothing satisfied his party appetite; one demand followed hard upon another, whether a new lieutenancy for London, or a remodelling of the committee which advised William in Church appointments.² But he was restrained a good deal by Harley, whose vote, the King must have known, would always be cast for moderation. And, with his past experience of Orford and Wharton, William might well feel as Harley did later, that ‘anything the ensuing Parliament will or can do might have been justly expected from the last, and this continual altering of men and measures will make the minds of people so irritated and uncertain as to reduce the nation to the state its enemies would wish’.³ Godolphin used all his influence in favour of no change. He was at the moment engaged with Halifax and Harley in burying the tomahawk between the two East India Companies, and was prepared to advise an Act of grace at the opening of the next session to bury the impeachments. Through Marlborough he submitted to the King a memorandum, which stressed the supplies given in the last session, pledged his party to give still more in the next, and asked for an early summons of Parliament. He had indeed substantial facts on his side, for the most rabid Tory extremists were now in earnest for a French war.⁴

Meanwhile, the versatile Sunderland, to the very end William’s confidant, was simultaneously pressing every imaginable argument against the Tories, and advised William to ask counsel of Somers, ‘the life, the soul, and the spirit of his party’. This last great politician flattered the Cabinet-maker to the top of his bent, stipulated that Sunderland himself

¹ Lonsdale Papers, 112.

² Ellis to Stepney, 27 June, loc. cit.; Brydges to Coke, 14 Aug. (Cowper papers).

³ Burnet, iv. 536, William Paterson to Harley, 22 Nov. (Portland, iv).

⁴ The King to Sunderland, 1 Sept. (Hardwicke S. P.); Godolphin to Harley, 4 Sept.–21 Oct. (Portland, iv); Godolphin to Marlborough, 9 Sept. (Coxe, *Marlborough*, i); Hammond to Coke, 11 Oct. (Cowper papers)

must be the pivot of a new Ministry, and pledged the support of the whole Whig party, on the condition that there was a new Parliament. Fortune favoured the ex-Chancellor with a potent argument, for, even as he wrote, news came that King James had died at Saint-Germain, and that Louis acknowledged the Pretender as King. England was hot with anti-Jacobite and patriotic feeling; the King, Somers insinuated, must seize this heaven-sent opportunity, and dissolve this house of Jacobites. Incidentally, he expressed the hope that something might be done towards renewing the Association, and making full use of it.¹

His arguments, together with the growing war fever in England, and the advice of Heinsius and the other Allies, tilted the balance; 'the Emperor and Holland', wrote one Tory later, 'were the occasion of our dissolution'.² Still, when the King landed on the 4th November, he was not quite decided. His first step was to ask a guarantee from his Tory ministers against a revival of the constitutional feud between Lords and Commons, over the impeachments; failing to get this, on the 11th he dissolved Parliament.³ To the average Tory the dissolution came as a rude shock,⁴ and it made all the bitterer the pamphlet war which had already raged the whole summer with unprecedented fury.

The Whigs dispersed all over England a 'Black List' of one hundred and sixty-seven Tories as particularly obnoxious, forty-six of whom, it was afterwards noted, lost their seats.⁵ They labelled with special opprobrium the three 'Pousineers'—that is, Davenant, Hammond, and Tredenham, who had unhappily been detected enjoying supper at 'The Blue Posts'

¹ Correspondence between the King, Sunderland, and Somers, Sept.-Nov. (Hardwicke S. P.). It will be seen that I do not share Professor W. T. Moigan's opinion (*English Political Parties and Leaders in the Reign of Queen Anne*, 327, note 3, Yale University Press, 1920) that Somers was 'too simple-minded to succeed in eighteenth-century politics'.

² Ranke; Roos to Rutland, 13 Nov. (Rutland papers); and many others.

³ Burnet; Hoffman, 25 Nov. (Klopp).

⁴ 'A surprising thing to most men, even to those that wished it': Ellis to Stepney, 11 Nov. (loc. cit.); cf. Portland, viii. 92.

⁵ 'One unanimous Club of members of the late Parliament . . . that met at the Vine Tavern in Longacre, who ought to be opposed in the ensuing elections': Bodl. Rawlinson MSS. D. 918. *Somers Treats in 2. Black*

with M. Poussin, the French chargé d'affaires. In point of fact, Davenant's relations with France were so far friendly that, later on, Torcy thought of getting him to supply news from England during the war, but Davenant, who knew his own value as a journalist, asked too high terms.¹ The Whig pamphlets depicted Godolphin as 'Lord Sly', and Marlborough as the Judas preparing a second betrayal. 'A la santé de M. Jack Howe'—was not that the favourite toast at Paris? And who were this faction, they asked, to claim the name of Tories and loyalists? 'It will hardly seem odder to see Sir Edward Seymour bring in a bill to prevent bribery, or Mr. J. Howe exclaim against exorbitant grants, or Sir Ch. Musgrave violent either against grants or a standing army, or to find them, who discover a plain inclination to quiet France in possession of all the Spanish dominions, quarrel at the Treaty of Partition for giving France too much, than to see them assume the name of Tories.' How can a faction, 'blended with the Foleys, Harleys, St. Johns, 'names noted for their inveteracy to the true Tory principles', be called a Tory party? Amidst all this special pleading, one Whig pamphlet appeared of singular interest; Swift, who had not yet arrived at his Church principles, painted English faction under a thin disguise of Athenian and Roman history, and adjured the Commons in 'this present lucid interval' to think of the balance of the Constitution.

The Tory press made ample, full, and virulent reply. In 'The True Picture of a Modern Whig', most famous and widely distributed of their propaganda, Davenant (whom Harley had assisted with records) makes the modern Whig compare himself with the 'old' Whigs who had turned renegades.³ 'They hated arbitrary government, we have been all along for a standing army; they desired Triennial parliaments, and that trials for treason might be better regulated; 'tis notorious that we opposed both those bills; . . . they were frugal for the

¹ Saloman, 50, note 3; Davenant's apologia in the *True Picture of a Modern Whig*, Pt. 2, 'An ill-chosen conversation, and had little of thought': Weymouth to Harley, 7 Oct. (P. iv).

² *Jura Populi Anglicani*.

³ Davenant to Harley, 26 Dec. (Portland, iv); Atterbury to Bishop Trelawny, 6 Sept. (*Atterbury Epistol. Corr.* iii [1784]).

nation, and careful how they loaded the people with taxes : we have squandered away their money as if there could be no end of England's treasure. The old Whigs would have prevented the immoderate growth of the French empire, we modern Whigs have made a Partition treaty which, unless Providence save us, may end in making the King of France universal Monarch.' The Irish grants, the Dutch interest, the Exchequer bills, the groaning taxes—all these were raked up again and flung at the Junto. The Whig *nouveau riche*, lolling in his chariot, soliloquizes as he sees old sailors and soldiers 'trudging afoot in the dirt. Poor silly rogues ! their honour forsooth led 'em to fight for England abroad, but I played a much wiser game, by joining with those who in the meantime were plundering their country at home.' The new political doctrine of the ' Legion ' school, Tory writers declared, 'laid the axe to the very root of the English constitution'. The Commons' proceedings in regard to the war and supply were reprinted ; the addresses for dissolution were labelled as 'prescribing to the King', or as an expiring effort of that malicious faction, who by their corruption and improvidence had almost ruined the nation. The knights of the shire for Cornwall were instructed by their constituents to support the King against France, but also to ask who advised the late dissolution, to press the impeachments, to examine the accounts of the last war, and to inquire whether the public debt was caused by private peculations. A dark suspicion was whispered about Tory coffee-houses, that the Whigs designed to exclude Anne from the succession and to go direct to the house of Hanover.¹

It would be a fallacy to dismiss these arguments merely as the means whereby gentlemen in Grub Street earned their bread, for Tory private correspondence was quite as bitter. We may take three samples only from the post bag which reached Governor Pitt some time this year, or next, at Fort St. George. 'They came in beggars', writes Thomas Mansell, 'and have done all they could to make all of us so, while they have got both titles and estates.' 'Those who are for the Monarchy, Church, and Trade', says Lord Delaware in July, are resolved 'to prevent the Presbyterian Rats from infesting

¹ *True Picture*, &c., Pt. 2 ; Burnet, iv. 553, Dartmouth's note.

the Government and plundering it any more.' The impeached Lords, we hear in December, are trying to 'decry our new ministry, to pamphlet the Commons', and to get a new Parliament, which may 're-establish the old gang that has brought us into debt and made themselves by the nation's ruin'.¹

The results of this election did not realize Whig hopes. It is true that Davenant, Howe, and Hammond were beaten, that Musgrave was at the bottom of the poll in Westmorland and had to seek refuge in Seymour's outpost at Totnes, and that the Whigs carried the City, but even outside the smaller county boroughs—'the rotten part of our constitution' and therefore, Burnet explains, naturally Tory—there were some notable Tory victories; as that of Coke over Hartington for Derbyshire, and another in one of the two democratic Westminster constituencies. But the clearest evidence of the now very evenly balanced state of politics will be found in the actual proceedings of the new Parliament.

The choice of a Speaker was viewed on all sides as 'a very decisive stroke',² and a strong whip issued to speed the Tory gentlemen to town. They calculated on success, but only got it by the narrowest of margins: Harley was elected by 216 votes as against 212 cast for Sir Thomas Littleton—the name of whose proposer, Lord Spencer, clearly enough indicated him as the Court candidate. Nor did the other important divisions of this brief last session of William's life indicate the sweeping Whig tide hoped for. The Tory bill for the appointment of Commissioners of Accounts was revived: the commissioners were, in fact, only actually balloted for after William's death; but even so, it was still the same House of Commons, and it is noteworthy that the seven elected were all Tories, including Bromley, St. John, and Brydges. Fourteen votes only (235 to 221)³ turned the crucial debate, which settled that the impeachments of the Junto should finally be allowed to drop. One vote only (188 to 187) decided that the new oath to abjure the pretended Prince of Wales should not be volun-

¹ Mansell, 14 April; Delaware, 4 July; H Whistler, 20 Dec. 1701—to Governor Pitt (B. M. Add. MSS. 22851).

² Godolphin to Harley, 4 Dec. 1701.

³ Bonnet and Luttrell. The list of the minority (put at 223) is reprinted in *Somers Tracts*, 4th collection, vol. iii.

tary, but should be enforced on all members, clergy, and office-holders. And it is remarkable that one of Harley's closest Tory associates, Granville, was teller for the majority.

Indeed, there is every indication that the Tories had, as they claimed,¹ still a majority of the House, and that their leaders were determined to quash the suspicion attaching to the party on the score of Jacobitism and friendship for France. The address in reply to the royal speech pledged the Commons to make good any alliances 'Your Majesty has made, or shall make, pursuant to the addresses and advice of your most dutiful and loyal Commons of the last Parliament'. Sir Charles Hedges, just deprived of the Secretary's seals, was put at the head of the committee which drew up this address, and a 'black-listed' Tory, Conyers, was (on a division) made Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House. Hedges and St. John were ordered to bring in a bill for 'the further security of His Majesty's person', and 'extinguishing the hopes of the pretended Prince of Wales'. In one division after another, the Tories succeeded in maintaining the chief points in their policy. Seymour carried a resolution that the troops now pledged by treaty to the Allies should include, and not be additional to, the seven thousand left to the King by the last disbandment; the bogey of 'land armies' was still triumphant. The petitions and addresses against the Commissioners for the Irish forfeitures were voted false and scandalous, and 'the prevailing party' were resolute to maintain the forfeitures themselves.² Thomas Culpepper, as one of those who promoted 'the scandalous, insolent, and seditious Kentish petition', was sent to Newgate, and aspersing 'the last House of Commons or any member thereof' with receiving French money was declared a 'groundless reflection', tending to 'create misunderstanding between the King and his people'.

The passage of the Abjuration Bill against the Pretender admirably illustrates both the even balance of parties, and the

¹ 'Notwithstanding all the management of the court which leans entirely to the interest of the Whigs, yet the Church (or country) party have at this time an actual majority in the House of Commons': James Craggs to Governor Pitt (B. M. Add. MSS., *ut supra*, 25 Feb. 1702).

² Bonnet, 7 Feb. (Noorden); Ellis to Stepney, 13 Feb. (B. M. Add. MSS. 7074)

Tory managers' caution in avoiding extremes. If the Whigs, as Somers had suggested, tacked on a clause to remodel the Association, even Seymour, Finch, and Musgrave, while opposing the multiplication of oaths, were now willing to adapt the Association to the changed circumstances. If the Tories would protect Anne's life by the penalties of treason, or enforce the abjuration oath 'on separate congregations', their extremists' amendment, that officials 'should not depart from the communion of the Church of England', was rejected by 203 to 139—a minority which we suggest is inexplicable, except on the hypothesis that Harley refused to sponsor such a policy.¹ Not a single ministerial peer opposed abjuration, and of the ten protestors the only man of weight was that arch-opponent of all abjurations, Nottingham, who kept the peers yawning till eight at night by his interminable objections.

Whether this atmosphere of national unity and comparative Tory moderation would have lasted, had King William lived, no one can tell. Godolphin had resigned when Parliament was dissolved and Rochester was dismissed on the 25th January, but the Cabinet changes actually made were moderate, and testify to the growing influence in the royal counsels of Marlborough, upon whom William's eagle eye, with a last flash, had lighted, as the one man fit to subordinate the English factions to the terrible necessity of saving Europe. Manchester, a very sober Whig, succeeded as Secretary to Hedges, who had been dismissed at the end of the old year 'for refusing to comply with His Majesty's pleasure in the choice of a Speaker'.² Carlisle took Godolphin's place at the Treasury; the regally independent Somers—*who had acted in the past on Anne's side in her quarrel with Mary, and had lately voted on the Commons' side in the impeachments*—became Lord President, Pembroke moving thence to the Admiralty, where the Tory Rooke was retained as his chief professional colleague. Sunderland, who had bent to accept the idea of Wharton as Secretary, was, indeed, generally supposed to be working with Somers for a full Whig restoration, but a visit of Henry Guy to Althorp makes one wonder,³ and in any case at the end of

¹ Yard to Stepney, 10 Feb. 1702; *C. J.*

² Ellis to Stepney, 30 Dec. 1701.

³ In December (Portland, iv. 29).

February the stumble of the King's horse, Sorrel, cut short these imaginings.

On the 8th March 1702 King William died, with little sign of public grief.¹ His successor was the Princess Anne, who in the previous year had been groaning to Godolphin against the cruelty of 'Mr. Caliban'. Her views, her associates, her blood relations, were known: in the heart of the Tories of the Right dawned a hope, that the 'Sunshine day', for which 'Mrs. Morley' had years earlier bidden 'Mrs. Freeman' wait in patience, had at length arrived.

¹ Mocenigo, 12/23 March, P. R. O. Venetian Transcripts.

XIII

THE MARLBOROUGH-GODOLPHIN MINISTRY

1702-5

THE causes of a party's rise, decline, and fall have rarely been so signally illustrated as in the age of Anne, when the Tories—nursed in new ways and with wonderful skill by Harley, St. John, and Swift, three men separated by polar distances from the Musgraves or the Seymours—entered into the land of promise, held it for two brief periods of three and four years, and at last were driven by the sudden sword of destiny into the wilderness, whence they were to emerge only fifty years later with changed views and a new language. Both the rise and the fall turn essentially on matters personal to the Queen, and the dominant fact of her reign is that in the long run the personality of a very ordinary woman governed politics.

The last Stuart sovereign had qualities and prejudices as marked as those of Queen Elizabeth, for whom she had something of a cult, or of Queen Victoria, like her a pattern of many English virtues. She was still young, but she had buried sixteen children, and at thirty-seven was already so lame with gout that the journey by coach or chair from her palace at St. James's to her Parliament at Westminster was an agony. The motions of her mind, her affections, and her passions were similarly slow, unwieldy, but determined, and where she gave affection or confidence it was with a lavish hand. For her husband Prince George—poor, asthmatic, 'Est-il-possible', who always 'looked as if it were dinner time'—nothing could be too good. She made him Generalissimo and Lord High Admiral, she induced the Commons to vote him a huge income of £100,000 for life if he survived her, she even suggested to her startled Allies that her consort might fittingly take the field as their captain-general.¹ Only the warmth of a heart true to old

¹ Klopp, x. 40.

friendship could palliate the vast gifts and grants to the two Marlboroughs, or explain the Queen's long-suffering with the Duchess, most intolerable of household tyrants.

Her confidence once given, it was not quickly destroyed. Three years of objugation from the Duchess hardly dislodged the Tory moderates in 1708; Godolphin's fall needed two years' spade-work by Harley and Abigail Masham, while Bolingbroke's triumph in Harley's final dismissal was so long postponed that it was rotten before he could harvest it. A constitutional obstinacy thus reinforced her limited reasoning powers, and when her fan went up to her mouth ministers knew that her mind had closed with a snap. On certain questions she resolutely refused to face reality, and above all, on the thought of who was to succeed her. Her real wishes in this matter she left, like Queen Elizabeth, to the guess-work that multiplies around Queens' death-beds, or buried in packets of papers burnt in 1714 under the curious eyes of Hanoverian agents—hardly to be extracted even now when the archives of Europe have yielded up their secrets. No proof exists that she ever encouraged her wronged brother to hope for the succession; on the contrary, it is clear that she detested Popery even more than Hanoverians; but her attitude to the legal successor was cold and barely correct, and any notion of a Hanoverian prince arriving in England plunged her into almost unbalanced excitement.

There were, then, dangerous reserves in Queen Anne, and it is a mistake to attribute the party changes of her reign too exclusively to her rival bedchamber ladies, whether to the beautiful Sarah Jennings or to the plain Abigail Masham. For in spite of ill health, vacillation, and thoroughly second-rate ability, Anne had fixed ideals on which the ablest politician shipwrecked. She would be Queen, and in the last resort ministers must learn to obey. Even to Harley, the Prime Minister nearest her ideal, to whom she signed as 'your very affectionate friend', she made this perfectly, though hardly grammatically, clear: 'You cannot wonder', she wrote, 'that I who have been so ill-used so many years should desire to keep myself from being again enslaved; and if I must always comply and not be complied with is

what I cannot submit to.' ¹ Meaning thus really to be Queen she was determined, as she never ceased to declare directly or through her servants, that she would not be the tool of a party. Of this Marlborough assured the Austrian envoy, on the last day that King William was alive. The same ultimatum was given at the end of her first year to the zealous Tory Lord-Lieutenants who wished to purge their quarter-sessions of Whig magistrates: 'She will be Queen of all her subjects', wrote her Chancellor of the Duchy, 'and would have all the parties and distinctions of former reigns ended and buried in hers.' As her quarrel developed with Godolphin, the Queen preached the same doctrine: 'All I desire is my liberty in encouraging and employing all those that concur faithfully in my service, whether they are called Whigs or Tories.' ²

All this was true, but it was conditioned by a further fact, that the Queen was devotedly attached to the Church of England and especially to its right wing. The public were presumably unaware of her offering bishoprics to Ken and Frampton, the most eminent and most moderate of surviving Non-jurors, but even the man in the street could grasp the significance of Nottingham's appointment as principal Secretary of State, and the royal speech with which she dismissed the Parliament in being on her accession fluttered every Whig dovecote. Her promised care to maintain the Act of Toleration was well enough, but what of the words that followed? 'My own principles must always keep me entirely firm to the interests and religion of the Church of England, and will incline me to countenance those who have the truest zeal to support it.' ³ The government above party, which she sincerely aspired to, rested, in short, on an antique ideal of the Church covering the whole nation, and implied a minimizing view of Nonconformity at total variance with the facts about her.

In spite, then, of all her professions to the contrary, Queen Anne was, where the Church was concerned, a partisan, and

¹ Anne to Oxford, 27 Nov. 1712 (Bath Papers, i).

² Wratishaw's dispatch, 8/19 March (Klopp); Sir J. Leveson-Gower to Rutland, 26 Dec. 1702 (Rutland papers), Anne to Godolphin, 30 Aug./10 Sept. 1706 (Coxe, *Marlborough*).

³ Plumptre, *Ken*, ii. 119; Speech of 25 May 1702, *Parl. Hist.*

it was impossible for her to escape the influence of the wild hopes and enthusiasm excited at her accession in the right wing of the Tories. The rule of the Dutch and the Saints, they rejoiced, was over; now was the moment to save the Church and to crush the Dissenter. Perhaps for the Queen there might yet be reserved a more sacred work. By some means yet undiscerned, perhaps by a kingly title for Prince George, it might one day be possible to circumvent the horror of another foreign successor; perhaps even more children might be born to the Church's Defender, and children that would survive. From the smallest rivulets and the great fountain-heads of high Tory feeling, the Queen all this year imbibed the doctrine and the part it was hoped she would maintain. 'There never was such an opportunity to save this nation as now,' wrote one of Nottingham's correspondents, 'for all the best party are so transported to have an English Queen that they will agree to all that is for her and her Kingdom's interest.'¹ It could hardly be expected that, when the very stones of Tory England cried out, the University of Oxford could be silent, and from a sermon preached this year, by a Fellow of Magdalen whom Sir John Pakington pressed Harley to appoint as Speaker's chaplain, we may gather the political programme of that loyal body. Dr. Sacheverell, taking as his text the dependence of Government upon religion, hammered in the old moral of the throne based upon the altar; heresy and schism, he argued, must necessarily result in rebellion, and comprehension of Dissenters was as damnable in the Church as naturalization of aliens to the State. He marvelled that any son of the Church should 'strike sail with a party that is such an open and avowed enemy to our communion'—he should rather hang out 'the bloody flag' of defiance. Churchmen, and especially those 'entrusted with the education of the future patriots' of England, must keep watch on those 'insidious persons who can creep to our altars', only to qualify themselves to undermine them. 'Let us steadily adhere to the good old staunch principles of

¹ Anon. to Nottingham, 10 March (B. M. Add. MSS. 29588). For the preceding paragraph, see Ranke's summary of Bonnet, and the Austrian reports in Klopp.

our Church', and then all the gates of Hell should not prevail.¹

From a higher quarter there came much the same advice, though in nobler form. For this year appeared the first volume of Clarendon's *History*, with a preface from an unknown hand, since shown to be that of his second son, Rochester. In tones of great moderation, and in places with real eloquence, the author drew the picture of the old Chancellor, the Queen's grandfather and the restorer of the Constitution in Church and State. One paragraph glanced at the 'Legion' agitation, which had threatened to ruin 'the ancient and true constitution'. A long passage maintained that the national genius pointed to the sea, and deprecated the idea of large land armies. The conclusion of the whole was that neither Whig nor Tory now had 'the game in their hands'; those who loved the true interest of the kingdom—and it 'is the plainest thing in the world'—must hold together.

Painfully time was to show to what extent the Queen could meet these great expectations, but that Tory of some sort, broad or narrow, her choice would be, was at once apparent. In spite of all his disclaimers to the Allied envoys, whom the flood of Tory appointments had frightened, Marlborough, 'the Grand Vizier', as an under-secretary called him,² was in the first weeks the outstanding influence in the royal counsels, and from the first was resolved to co-operate with Godolphin. It was this pair who, with Harley, drafted the famous royal speech of the 11th March, wherein the Queen's sweet clear voice recited a sentence as devastating for the Whigs as George III's first effort sixty years later—'I know my own heart to be entirely English.' From the history of the past two years Godolphin at least could not expect Whig sympathy, and there is little reason to represent the composition of the new Ministry as Rochester's triumph. To average Whigs the two leaders appeared to be 'entirely in the Tory interest', and Marlborough professed himself satisfied of the Tories' real inclination to carry on the war, the only public object he had

¹ Sacheverell, *A Discourse Showing the Dependence of Government upon Religion*, &c (Oxford, 1702); Portland, iv. 45.

² Ellis to Stepney, 10 March (B. M. Add. MSS. 7074).

at heart.¹ The ambition of Rochester, and the reluctance of Godolphin, to be Lord Treasurer seem to have delayed the final appointments, but as settled in May the Ministry formed an odd commentary on the Queen's independence of party. True, Somerset (after Shrewbury's refusal) was Master of the Horse, Devonshire under great pressure² continued as Lord Steward, and Harley's friend Boyle was Chancellor of the Exchequer, but these were the only breaks in the solid body of Tory ministers. Godolphin was Lord Treasurer; Rochester was Lord-Lieutenant; Nottingham and (on his insistence) Hedges, Secretaries of State; Jersey, Lord Chamberlain; Normanby (our old friend Mulgrave), Privy Seal; Pembroke, Lord President; Wright, Lord Keeper; Seymour, Comptroller; Leveson-Gower, Chancellor of the Duchy; Harcourt, Solicitor-General; and Jack Howe, a Privy Councillor. Somers, Halifax, and Orford were struck off the Council.

While the new Ministry was forming, Parliament had dealt with the two burning questions of the day: the declaration of war upon France, and a bill enabling the Queen to name Commissioners for Union with Scotland; on the 25th May the session ended, and the nation at once prepared for the general election which could not in any case legally be long postponed. This was a crisis which every Tory viewed as one 'literally *pro aris et focis*'.³ Their battle-cry was 'No moderation'. Their press agents urged that now was the time to stand out in the true Tory colours, to break the 'auxiliary body of false Churchgoers', and to make the Church, and that alone, their shibboleth. The electors were asked to reflect who had voted for a standing army, who had obstructed the commissioners for public accounts, who 'signed treaties to the dishonour of England', who delivered up the right of impeachment, and who had put fortunes in their own pockets.⁴

The Queen's speech for the Church and her clear preference

¹ Portland, iv. 34; *Memours of Sir John Guise*, 144; Burnet, v. 10. The Cabinet met for the first time on the 23rd March, and the two Secretaries were at work in their offices by the 14th April at latest; Vernon to Stepney (B. M. Add. MSS. 7070). Marlborough returned to England from Holland on the 5th April, long before the majority of offices were allotted.

² Wratislaw, 28 April (Klopp).

³ Weymouth to Nottingham, 2 June (B. M. Add. MSS. 29588).

⁴ *Somers Tracts*, 4th series iii 16 et seq.

for Church politicians had tuned the constituencies, and by the end of July Nottingham's correspondents were congratulating him upon the return of 'a Church of England Parliament'. Cornwall, said George Granville, 'never sent up an honester set of gentlemen than now, for out of the four and forty there are but two exceptionable persons'. Bishop Trelawny recalled his long services 'for the true interest of our English monarchy', and prided himself on returning eleven safe members. 'Many violent Whigs', on Harley's information, were not returned, and notably Wharton's nephew at Appleby; this triumph in the North showed, thought Weymouth, 'that the power of some great men sprang from the influence of the Government and that nothing can hurt us if we are not overpolitick.'¹ The Queen's progress to Bath after the elections seemed to crown the party victory. At Oxford the University, to whom in Convocation she pledged her 'particular regard', showed an enthusiasm never matched since the last Parliament of Charles II of happy memory, and thence by way of Jack Howe's friendly territory round Cirencester and Beaufort's at Badminton Anne reached Bath, which all through September was so packed with West-country loyalists and members that the princely Seymour himself had to sleep in a garret.²

The Parliament of 1702-5 was based, then, on a large Tory majority in the Commons, which was determined to place the Church in an unchallengeable position and to clear the Ministry of its moderate members. But the Ministry itself was from the first a coalition, and the intensity of party feelings in the next few years was destined to destroy it. By the successive disruptions of 1703-4 and 1708 Marlborough and Godolphin changed their centre of gravity first from the Right to the Centre and then from the Centre to the Left: beginning with Rochester, they continued in their most glorious period with Harley and St. John, and ended up with Somers and Wharton. Strict party principles for these two great politicians did not exist: themselves, England, the Queen—these were

¹ Charles Bertie, Granville, Denbigh, Shakerley, Trelawny, and Weymouth to Nottingham (B. M. Add. MSS. 29584 and 29588); Harley to Godolphin 9 Aug. (ibid. 28055).

² Hedges to Nottingham (ibid., 29588), Ellis to Steyne, 1 Sept. (ibid., 7074).

the pillars on which their system rested. They kept their eyes fixed upon the war ; in comparison with that—its issues, its horrors, its gains, and its glories—what (asked Marlborough) were ‘ the detested names of Whig and Tory ’ ?

On the genius of Marlborough, the assiduity of Godolphin, and the love of the Duchess, Anne felt that ‘ poor unfortunate faithful Morley ’ must depend for peace, happiness, and prosperity : ‘ We four ’, she wrote after one of their frequent threats of resignation, ‘ must never part till death mows us down with his impartial hand.’¹ And as the stars in their courses moved over Blenheim to Ramillies and to Oudenarde, the great twin brethren carried the Queen with them, while every year of a war which only Whig ardour could sustain was carrying them all three further and further from ‘ the Church of England party ’.

On three distinct questions that party, and its representatives in the Government, directly conflicted with the views of Marlborough and Godolphin. The first was the very continuance of coalition. Rochester, followed at a less angry interval by Nottingham, clamoured for widespread removals in the Commissions and the Lieutenancies, and something in this direction was effected during Marlborough’s absence on his first campaign. More ardent men complained even of Nottingham’s moderation, while the importunities of the old gang, like Musgrave, for the appointment of more Tory magistrates very early exasperated the imperturbable Godolphin. The plea that no party appointments should be made during the war did not stop the restlessness of the right wing ; ‘ most of our friends ’, Harcourt warned Harley, ‘ are growing infidels ’, and the consequences might be ‘ very mischievous ’. Only fears of a split in the party actually stopped the die-hards from opposing, even in 1702, Harley’s re-election as Speaker.²

Deeper in principle was the difference of opinion as to the character and extent of the war. Rochester had attempted to keep English intervention on the footing originally contemplated in 1701, and to restrict our part to that of an auxiliary.

¹ Anne to the Duchess, July (?) 1703 (Coxe, i. 202)

² *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1702-3, 114 ; Bagot papers, Report X, iv. 337 ; Burnet, v. 12 ; Atterbury to Trelawny, 13 June 1702, Godolphin to Harley, 17 Aug. 1703 ; Hoffman, 31 Oct. 1702 ; Harcourt to Harley, 13 March 1703.

To Nottingham King William's reign seemed 'an unhappy instance' of how England should not wage war, and he expressed perfectly candidly to Marlborough the preference which he, like all his party, felt for an attack by sea upon France and Spain, instead of the interminable and bloody stalemate of the Low Countries. 'I am biast', he wrote, 'by an opinion that we shall never have any decisive success nor be able to hold out a war against France but by making it a sea War, and such a sea War as accompanies and supports attempts on land.' Seymour openly attacked in the Commons the pure egoism of Hapsburg policy. Jersey, a few months later, almost raved to Nottingham against a proposed visit from Prince Eugene, as a 'contrivance of Count Wratislaw with his friends the Whigs to extort subsidies which I fear this Nation cannot bear, and brand those honest gentlemen that do not come freely into them with the usual reproach of their being disaffected to their country'.¹

The question of the war was only to come to a head much later, when the Blenheim laurels had been tarnished by Malplaquet, but round the third great question, that of the Church, we may group the most constant and most bitter of the Tory passions, the deepest cleavage in the Ministry, and therefore the formative agencies in this period of party history. Occasional conformity had, we have seen, already become one of the election cries of 1702, and Nottingham at least was ready to use it.² But, even apart from this agitation out of doors or from the known prejudices of the Queen, the question would certainly have been raised by the party managers in the Commons, for the Universities and the whole body of the clergy were preaching it in unison. High-minded men felt genuinely the political profanation of their holiest sacrament; 'abominable hypocrisy', 'inexcusable immorality', are the phrases of the honest Bromley.³ The Bill to suppress Occasional Conformity was introduced in November by Bromley and St. John, the first the recognized leader of the Churchmen and the other

¹ Wratislaw's and Hoffman's dispatches, 12 May 1702 and 17 Jan. 1703. Nottingham to Marlborough and to Heinsius, 2 and 30 April 1703 (*Cal. S. P. Dom.*); Jersey to Nottingham, 30 Aug. (B. M. Add. MSS. 29589).

² Dartmouth's note on Burnet, v. 49.

³ To Charlett, 22 Oct. (Bodl. Ballard MSS. 38).

the rising hope of the neo-Tory politicians. Its purport, briefly, was to impose penalties of deprivation and large money fines on all holders of place or office, in either central or local government, who, after taking the Church Sacrament, attended a dissenting place of worship. Greatly though Godolphin and the moderate ministers disliked it, they could not resist both Court and Commons, and we may conjecture that their first hope was by a speedy acceptance, or perhaps by some compromise, to damp down this theological rancour, which threatened to dash public credit and thereby to starve the war. Thus it was Harley who urged on the Treasurer and Nottingham that it was 'absolutely necessary for the security of the Government' to discover the author of the famous tract, *The Shortest Way with the Dissenters*, which, by preaching fire and sword as the only remedy, withered by its irony the Tory cause.¹ Even the Lords' Whig majority dared not oppose the principle of the bill, but by a series of wrecking amendments, one of which by reducing the money fines raised an acute constitutional point of finance, hoped to make it so unpalatable as to ensure rejection when it returned to the Commons. In this they succeeded, and a long course of conferences left the two Houses at deadlock. Seymour raised the question of a tack, and it needed all Harley's authority to prevent the House from reopening the Money Bills.

Every avenue seemed to be blocked by the rancour of the High Churchmen, everywhere we find the violent leadership of Seymour, mortally ill but invincible, and ever harking back to the hateful controversies of the last reign. Both Commons and Convocation had attacked the Whig bishops; the clergy, complained Bromley, left Church defence to be maintained by the laity.² The Commissioners of Accounts launched grave charges against Halifax and against Ranelagh, the Paymaster-General, who was useful to Godolphin in the Commons, while Seymour moved for a resumption of King William's grants. Nor did

¹ Godolphin to Nottingham (n. d.) (B. M. Add. MSS. 29589, f. 400); cf. Godolphin to Harley, 10 Nov. and 21 Jan. 1702-3 (P. iv).

² Hoffmann, 19 Dec. and 30 Jan.; Burnet, v 52, Bodl. Ballard MSS. 21, f. 29. On Seymour's leadership, cf. the Austrian reports in Klopp and those of L'Hermitage, Dutch Dispatches (Secret), B. M. Add. MSS. 17677, W. W. W., 5 Jan. 1703.

the Tories spare the moderate leaders. Musgrave and other Tory placemen led the opposition to the grant from the Post Office revenues which the Queen proposed for Marlborough, an opposition which, as Godolphin observed, came 'chiefly from those of whom I thought we had deserved better'. The Treasurer knew that Rochester's faction were moving heaven and earth to eject him; under these incessant attacks his nerves failed, and he began to talk of resignation. Cabinet government ceased to be possible when the Lord-Lieutenant blurted out its confidential secrets in debate, and it is noticeable that ministers, like Somerset, who were independent of either faction in the Cabinet, turned against Rochester. In short, breaking-point was reached, and Marlborough put out all that force he reserved for great occasions. At his instance Rochester was ordered to withdraw to his Irish government, his refusal was promptly followed by dismissal, and by the appointment of Ormonde in his stead.¹

But, apart from this one great triumph, the year 1703 was one of torment for the Centre leaders. Their correspondence heartily denounced both parties, but as yet they clung to the Tories as the less dangerous. The Whigs were moved, Godolphin thought, 'by an inveteracy of a deep root against anything that is uppermost but themselves'; for the Tories, his verdict agreed with Marlborough's, that 'almost all but some of the heads' might still be brought to reason. The 'heads' that the Duke particularly designed for removal were Nottingham, Jersey, and Seymour; as to the last he wrote, 'we are bound not to wish for any one's death', but on public grounds he clearly thought this sin would be pardoned. But the Queen refused to part with Nottingham, and Seymour, far from dying, was rejuvenating himself again at Bath, and hatching plans for the autumn session: he still felt confident in the Tory numbers, and thought the Queen could more easily create half a dozen Tory peers than offend three hundred of her Commons.²

¹ Godolphin to Harley, 12 Dec. 1702; Hoffmann, 27 Feb. 1703 (Klopp); Bonnet, 26 Jan. (Noorden); Mocenigo, 5/16 Feb., P. R. O. Venetian Transcripts.

² Godolphin to Harley, 26 Sept.; Marlborough to the Duchess (n d.), 7 Oct. (Coxe); L'Hermitage, 20 March 1703 (Noorden).

Outside England the year was one of disaster. The scandalous delays of the Dutch had wrecked all chance of successful war in the Mediterranean, while the disobedience of their generals broke Marlborough's plans for a sweeping general advance in Flanders. And meanwhile the baleful shadow of civil war once more lifted its head in Britain. Scottish national feeling, sore from a dozen stabs extending from Glencoe to Darien, burst out in the Act of Security. By this the successor to the English throne was, in effect, excluded from that of Scotland, for the alternative conditions demanded for Scottish autonomy were such as no English Ministry could have accepted without impeachment, and no spirited people without war.

With sublime contempt for these national dangers, the Tory Right once more in the autumn came to the assault. Their obstinacy was the more marked since now the Court was neutral, if not hostile. Anne had come round to the moderates' opinion: Prince George this time was not compelled to perpetuate his asthma by long night sittings in the Lords, and the last words of the royal speech of the 9th November, as drafted by Godolphin and Harley,¹ appealed significantly for union, and for the avoidance of 'heats or divisions' which could encourage 'the common enemies of our church and state'. Almost simultaneously the *litterateur* of the party, Charles Davenant, brought out his *Essays on Peace at Home and War Abroad*; the Treasurer had approved it in manuscript, and it was dedicated to the Queen. To the indignation of Tories who had once revelled in his *Modern Whig*, Davenant declared strongly against the Occasional Conformity Bill. Leave was given to bring the bill in again on the 26th November, after an all-night debate, by 173 to 130, and it passed the Commons on the 7th December by 223 to 140; it was carried up to the Lords in 'great state', attended by 200 members, and there on the 14th was rejected on the second reading by twelve votes.²

London during this fortnight was in a state of sleepless excitement; Swift declared that even Whig and Tory cats

¹ Godolphin to Harley, 12 Oct.; Hoffmann, 23 Nov.

² Davenant to Godolphin, 19 Oct. (Elliot, *Godolphin*, 257); Atterbury, iii. 135; I. Verney, M.P., to Hatton, 14 Dec. (B M Add MSS 22662).

held loud debate on the roof of his lodgings. The whole character of the Queen's government was the real issue, and the Tory Right put out every ounce of their strength. Rochester launched the second volume of his father's *History* with a dedication¹ to the Queen, impressing upon her as an incontrovertible truth that the 'Monarchy of England is not now capable of being supported but upon the principles of the Church of England'. What meant, he asked, the Dissenters' seminaries, the Calves'-head feasts, but 'an industrious propagation of the rebellious principles of the last age'? The full pressure of the Universities was behind the bill, and the post-bag of every Tory leader was choked with homilies from manor-houses and rectories. Once more Bromley moved the first reading, and St. John seconded. Seymour dismissed Davenant as a 'profligate scribbler', and the aged Musgrave wound up the debate. Sir John Pakington, hereditary *Mæcenas* of High Churchmen, warned ministers that they were doomed if 'they stand neuter in matters that nearly concern the Church of England'.² But the moderate 'triumvirate', as they soon grew to be called, Marlborough, Godolphin, and Harley, held fast together, and in their regular twice-weekly meetings concerted a policy, bold if disingenuous. To vote against the bill was, as Marlborough wrote, 'the thing in the world which my Lord Rochester would most desire to have me do'; indeed, he and Godolphin went so far as to sign the protest against its rejection. But they took every pains to stifle the measure they thus openly patronized. They had won some of the pure Tory ministers to their way of thinking. Hedges moved that the bill be shelved by a reference to Convocation: Howe (of all men) pleaded for union; Harcourt was mellowed. Godolphin dared to say in the Lords that he could have wished it had never passed the Commons, and a considerable number of placemen voted with the Whigs.³

Yet in spite of this initial success, the rest of the session until April 1704 was one unrelenting storm. Seymour walked out

¹ St. John to Harley, 16 Oct.

² L'Hermitage, 4 Dec.; Atterbury to Trelawny, 26 Nov. (*loc. cit.*); *Parl. Hist.*

³ Coxe, i. 220, Atterbury, *loc. cit.*, 141; Godolphin to Harley, 4 Nov.; L'Hermitage, 23 Nov and 28 Dec.

of one sitting rather than listen to the disgusting project of a tax upon malt. Nottingham was alleged by the Whig Lords to be shielding the Jacobite conspirator Sir John Maclean, and the Commons' reply, that by his 'steady adherence to the Church' he was deserving of the Queen's favour, was thought to have postponed an otherwise certain fall.¹ The Lords' claim to examine the prisoners in this case, their attack on the Commons' Commissioners of Public Accounts, and the great constitutional question of the Aylesbury election, were all fresh fuel to the party rancour generated by Occasional Conformity, and by their accumulated heat brought Parliamentary proceedings to a standstill.

Even more serious, Nottingham and his party constantly obstructed every branch of the war policy. If he had not objected in principle to assisting the Cevennes rebels or to winning the alliance of Savoy, he had certainly disputed every practical detail, while his friends had resisted necessary measures to raise more recruits for the Army.² Harley, it is clear, even before the session ended, was urging on his greater colleagues that Nottingham must go, and Seymour with him; from other sources we know that both malcontents were openly threatening to tack Occasional Conformity to a Money Bill in the autumn session.

But before Marlborough and Godolphin (both of whom, the Whigs invidiously noted, had championed Nottingham in the Maclean charges) had decided on their course, the Secretary signed his own death-warrant by holding an ultimatum to the head of the Queen and Treasurer: if he and his friends were to continue, he stipulated that there must be a change of plan, coalition must be ended, and, as an earnest of action, the Whig Lord Steward Devonshire and the trimming Somerset must be removed from the Council. This was before the 3rd April. That day the Queen, in closing the session, deplored the lack of 'moderation and unity' which she had 'wished and expected': on the 20th she dismissed Jersey and Seymour.

¹ Portland to Heinsius and Fagel, Jan. 1704 (Noorden); Verney to Hatton, 21 Dec. 1703 (B. M. Add. MSS. 29568); Atterbury to Trelawny, 23 Dec.

² Nottingham to Heinsius, *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1702-3, 78, Coxe, i. 227; Tindal

The same night, and again on the 1st May, Nottingham tendered his-resignation, which the Queen at first refused, but, urged on by the Tories behind him, he was determined to continue only on his own terms, and by the 18th his resignation was accepted.¹

The long measure of leniency shown to him indicated that the Queen, at least, was unwilling for too abrupt a break with the Tories, and this was borne out in the reconstruction of the Ministry. Harley, under repeated pressure from both Marlborough and Godolphin, accepted the vacant secretaryship of State; the brilliant young Tory hot-head St. John succeeded the laborious Blathwayt as Secretary at War; Mansell—another political client of Harley, a rich, convivial, and moderate Tory—replaced Seymour as Comptroller. The hand of 'Robin' was generally recognized in these changes, which were taken to mark the triumph of that moderate Toryism associated with his name. The Queen's high favour for the Centre group was characteristically indicated by her presence as godmother at the baptism of her two chief ministers' grandson, and in August, while England was in the grip of a sultry burnt-up summer, the news of Blenheim, of the capture of Gibraltar, and of Rooke's hard-won fight off Malaga came as a grateful rain.²

Never did success come more happily for a Ministry, and Blenheim may be said to have given the new coalition its first and most fruitful year. The outstanding symptom of party history during 1704-5 is the definite hardening of the division between the Harleyites and the right-wing Tories, and for a brief and not inglorious season the policy of 'moderation' which Harley had always professed, seemed to be winning an almost permanent triumph. For indeed reaction is the policy of old men, and age was telling at last on the old cavaliers. Musgrave died in July; it was fifty-four years since he had been an undergraduate under the Commonwealth, but he had

¹ Marlborough to Godolphin, 8 April; *The Other Side of the Question* (1742), 222; Godolphin to Duchess of Marlborough (n. d.) (Coxe, 1. 229); Cowper papers, iii. 35; L'Hermitage, 2 May; Luttrell.

² Vernon to Shrewsbury, 26 May (V. C.); L'Hermitage, 30 May and 1 June; Marlborough to Godolphin, 7 May (Coxe); Portland papers, v. 647; Cowper papers, iii. 47 (misdated).

kept to the end his ascendancy with the young Tories. The raucous pen of Roger L'Estrange, whom Londoners of thirty years earlier had christened 'Dog Towzer', was at length silenced by death in December. Weymouth in October followed his friend Nottingham into retirement. Seymour, having got over a fit in 1695, was now slowly dying of diabetes, but illness and age only made him more bitter, and he was still capable of hunting deer in the New Forest and Whig magistrates in Devonshire; from the hunt came even his metaphors—had he not threatened (before Blenheim) to chase Marlborough out of office like a hare? But to the new school like St. John, who was not born when Seymour was Speaker, this once alarming figure was now simply 'Sir Chuffer', a marvel but somewhat of a bore. Meanwhile, the younger Tories were beginning to be conscious of defeat: Harcourt, the Solicitor-General, was ill at ease, and was gloomily retailing to Harley funereal eulogies on Sir Christopher Musgrave. Tory constituents were worried: 'I suppose', wrote one of Thomas Coke's, 'it won't be thought proper to distaste the Church party, who I'm confident are the only fast friends the Queen has.'¹

It was, then, with a depressing sense of failure that the official Tory party approached the coming session—singularly unready to meet the imminent possibility of a general election, for which ardent Whigs were already asking as a pendant to Blenheim and which could not anyhow be postponed beyond the next spring. As October drew nearer, the impression grew that the extremists of both parties would combine to attack the Centre, and the voluble pamphleteer Humphrey Mackworth was organizing a special effort to oust Harley, the symbol of coalition, from the Speaker's chair, for which Harcourt and Bromley were each spoken of as a possible successor. 'One side', wrote Vernon, 'will not be contented with less than all, and it is not to be expected the other will bear being excluded.'²

¹ Cowper papers, iii. 53; Portland, iv. 105; Bath, i. 57; Noorden, i. 510, n. 2.

² Mis. Burnet to Duchess of Marlborough, 12 Aug. (Coxe), Defoe to Harley, 2 Nov. (Portland, iv); Spencer Compton to R. Walpole, 12 Oct. (Coxe, *Walpole*, vol. II); Cowper papers, iii. 50; Vernon to Shrewsbury, 18 Aug. and 13 Oct. (V. C.); Secretary of State's Office to Stepney, 24 Oct. (B. M. Add. MSS. 7078).

Harley and Godolphin were perfectly awake to their danger, and had already agreed in outline to a policy, which was to be executed precisely as speedily and as far as the Queen's feelings, their opponents' mistakes, and all the other factors of time and tide should allow. The incompetent Lord Keeper Wright, and the Privy Seal, the gimcrack Duke of Buckingham, were to disappear. The Duke of Newcastle—a pillar of Whig territorialism in the Midlands and of Whig hospitality in London—had been definitely won by Harley during the summer and had received a pledge of office; his rent-roll of £37,000 a year would be the making of the Coalition's election fund. Harley from the first days of the reign had urged the Treasurer to get 'some discreet writer' on Government's side, and now secured perhaps the greatest, though hardly the most discreet, pamphleteer of the age in Daniel Defoe.¹ He had rescued him from prison, kept his ever-gaping pockets supplied, and from August onwards was sending him periodically on provincial tours both to test and to correct feeling in the constituencies. In the hands of 'Robin' or of Wharton we see the whole paraphernalia of modern politics—the Press, propaganda, and information—fast being elaborated.

Defoe quickly saw that the best way to hang the Tories was to give them all the rope they asked. The Queen in her opening speech of 30th October had asked unity: would it not be well, he asked, if Occasional Conformity could be brought on again 'by trusty hands'? it would 'confound the thing itself, ruin all the confederacy, brand the Party with the scandal of opposing the Queen'.² No proof exists³ that Harley acted on this advice, and far less that the Tories' fatal decision to tack the bill was due to his insidious influence.

Godolphin at least was obviously indignant that the Queen's servants among the Tories had allowed the bill to be reintroduced,⁴ and it is tolerably certain that the Tory Right, bound by innumerable pledges at the last election and with another

¹ Harley to Newcastle 25 Sept. et seq. (Portland, ii); Coxe, *Marlborough*, i. 345; Harley to Godolphin, 12 Aug. 1702 (B. M. Add. MSS. 28055).

² Defoe to Harley, 2 Nov.

³ I cannot agree that this is implied by Marlborough's letter of 16 Dec. [Bath papers] to Harley.

⁴ Godolphin to Harley, 16 Nov (Bath, i).

in front of them, marched on their doom unimpelled by any disingenuous assistance from Harley: indeed, they acted against the express warnings of ministers like Hedges, who still sympathized with their main political views. By long concerted arrangement Bromley had called a series of party meetings at the Fountain Tavern, beginning just before the opening of the session, and on the 6th November one hundred and fifty members agreed to hang up the Land Tax till Occasional Conformity was passed. Even this would have been bad enough, and the mere revival of 'this noisy, mischief-making, party-driving, good-for-nothing bill' was a colossal error; but assured by their managers of a safe majority, the Tories resolved to go further, and to carry out Seymour's long-threatened notion of a tack.¹ Never was decision more fatal. In the crucial division of the 28th November Bromley and Seymour only got 134 on their side: among the 251 who opposed them we find Harley, St. John, Harcourt, Hedges, Hammond, Boyle, Henry Guy, Mansell, and all the wisest heads of the party.

Nor did 'the wild faction'² accept even this defeat as final. In the Lords, Rochester and Nottingham seized upon the royal assent given in the summer to the Scottish Act of Security as the means to drag down Godolphin. Attempts were made to brand ministers as Jacobites, while the first motion was made of a dangerous project we shall hear much of later, to invite the Electress Sophia, or her representative, to England. Efforts to exalt Admiral Rooke and to disparage Marlborough, to revive the attacks on Montague and on the Aylesbury men,³ to pass a Place Bill, and to deprive naturalized aliens of the franchise—on such bitter and unnourishing food the Tories fed for the rest of this session.

On the 14th March 1705 the Queen prorogued Parliament, with a sharp reproof of that 'unreasonable humour and animosity, the fatal effects of which we have so narrowly escaped in this session'; on the 1st April Newcastle displaced

¹ Bagot papers, 338; *Faults on Both Sides* (1710); Vernon to Shrewsbury, 1 Dec.

² Harley to Newcastle, 18 Nov. (Portland, ii).

³ 'Very much pestered with the Aylesburians this Christmas', H. Harcourt to Charlett, 4 Jan. 1705 (Bodl. Ballard MSS 101).

Buckingham as Privy Seal, and on the 5th Parliament was dissolved. Even by March election literature was flying 'as thick as hail'. 'The Low Church Party as they call themselves', Harley was told by one of his disgruntled supporters, 'and the dissenters of all kinds, join together in all places and have the assurance to say that they are the persons that the Government approves of and will countenance, and positively assert that when the House rises the tackers will all be displaced.'¹

Till the session ended Godolphin had concealed his intention of open war against the 'Tackers', but the threat of 'no quarter' was taken up by the Whigs months before the Treasurer and Marlborough had made it official, and the Tories went into the general election of April and May as a disunited mob.

The High Churchmen flung themselves desperately into the breach. Pakington paraded Worcester with a banner representing a falling Church and the legend 'For the Queen and the Church'. The mob at Salisbury rabbled the Duke of Somerset, and beat Bishop Burnet's candidate. At Cambridge University two Tackers defeated Godolphin's son and the venerable Newton. In the West, Francis Gwynn took the field 'as Lord Rochester's representative and Sir Edward Seymour's successor in his western Empire',² though Bishop Trelawny of Exeter acted for the Ministry; Marlborough's candidate was beaten at one of his pocket boroughs, St. Albans, and at Woodstock, the other, his Quartermaster-General, Cadogan, was only carried by the strenuous efforts of St. John, Harcourt, and the best government debaters. A list of the Tackers, 'those worthy patriots', was circulated broadcast. The 'Memorial of the Church of England', drawn up by a protégé of Rochester, declared that all efforts to secure the Church had 'been opposed and rendered ineffectual by ministers who owe their present grandeur to its protection, and who with a prevarication as shameful as their ingratitude

¹ Godolphin to the Duchess (n. d.), Marlborough to Godolphin, 14 Apr. (Coxe); Bland to Harley, 14 March (Portland, iv); Lewis to H. Davenant, 16 March (B. M. Add. MSS. 4743).

² Poulett to Harley, 2 May.

pretend to vote and speak for it themselves, while they solicit and bribe others with pensions and places to be against it'.

In the long run some seventy-five of the Tackers were re-elected—too many, Marlborough thought, to be pleasant—and the general expectation was that the Tories would have nearly half the new House of Commons. Whether the Centre group, having thus disposed of the Tories, could now hold its own against the victorious Whigs was to be the question of the future, and in that respect the elections had not been entirely hopeful. Harcourt, for instance, had failed at Abingdon before a more pronounced anti-Tacker, and the Tories openly rejoiced at the defeat of such 'sneakers'.¹ It was at least certain that the Centre had not secured an independent majority, Godolphin himself putting the figures at 190 Tories, 160 Whigs, and 100 'Queen's servants'. But up to the midsummer of 1705 the new Ministry was working harmoniously, joint arrangements had been made to fight constituencies, and a series of removals high and low testified that they meant to cut the ties with their Tory past.² The Treasurer himself took over the Lord-Lieutenancy of Cornwall from Granville: Rockingham superseded Winchilsea in Kent; Rivers replaced Guilford in Essex. One ancient link with the older Toryism was snapped by the removal of Charles Bertie, in old days Danby's *alter ego*, from the Ordnance. Rooke paid for his party's adulation of Malaga by unemployment, Cloudesley Shovell taking his place as commander of the Battle fleet. The inheritors of unfulfilled Whiggism were taking office: the young Argyll was sent as High Commissioner to Scotland, and the young Sunderland envoy to Vienna.

It was at any rate the end of an epoch. The Hanoverians were assured that 'Queen Anne is turned Whig'.³ She had exasperated the high-flying clergy by appointing the liberal Bishop Wake to Lincoln, and the high-flying hostesses by eating a liberal dinner with Lord Orford. Had the political wiseacres but seen into her heart, or her correspondence with

¹ B. M. Stowe MSS. 354.

² Marlborough to the Queen, 16/27 July (Coxe); Portland, iv, 188; Hoffmann, 2 June (Klopp).

³ R. Gwynne to Robethon, April 1705 (B. M. Stowe MSS.).

Marlborough, they would have thought differently, but, as it was, England after the past three hectic years seemed to be sinking into the tranquillity that Defoe on his canvassing tours approvingly noted for Harley as now obtaining at Tewkesbury — ‘a quiet trading drunken town, a Whig baily, and all well’.

For the vital force of the Tory future we must turn to the sick-bed of Henry St. John, who lay this autumn, much like his old party, between life and death in a fever.

XIV

THE COALITION, 1705-8

THE remaining years of Queen Anne were to be crowded, fierce, and laborious. Abroad the great war ran like lava in a wider belt of destruction: British fleets and armies were engaged in Flanders and Spain, off Minorca and on the St. Lawrence; Marlborough's missions ranged from Hanover to Vienna, and from Berlin to Charles XII of Sweden. The question of northern or southern 'fronts' divided the Cabinet, divided occasionally even Marlborough from Godolphin. The usual vendettas of rival generals became the stock-in-trade of party. The suggested terms of peace separated honest men and indulged the partisan. At home the Act of Union was carried as a war measure, against strongly resisting faction. The whole country was strained by high taxes, press-gang recruiting, and trade restrictions. Treason penetrated to Government departments. Worst of all, the future was entirely uncertain. The succession was statutory but unpopular, and another spell of foreign government was a numbing prospect. The Queen in vain drove furiously for exercise in her chaise, or visited Bath. Her infirmities increased yearly, each winter a new extension of her gout harassed diplomats and ministers, and jaded placemen reckoned languidly on the last diagnosis, or the first warning, from the Whig Doctor Garth and the Tory Doctor Arbuthnot.

The times, then, were anxious, the stakes high, and party feeling accordingly never so inflamed. Faction led to glaring inconsistency. We find in 1705-6 the Tory Right under Rochester and Nottingham pressing for the Hanoverian succession, which their supporters detested. In 1713 the Whigs, led by Somers, voted to repeal the Union, which they had done so much to create. The explanation of such paradoxes lay in each party's determination to secure the first

themselves, and for this end a Whig so generally unimpeachable as Somers had not hesitated to give assurances of friendship at Saint-Germain. 'They don't so much value in England who shall be King,' said one superior Scots observer, 'as whose King he shall be.'¹

But with what Somers or Rochester normally stood for we are familiar, and the future history of party, and of the Tories in particular, turns rather on that middle group of men who in 1705 were still pursuing the vision of a *via media*. The views of Harley, the member of that group most influential with the Tories, are on record over a long course of years. On one great dividing force in politics, the Church, we have seen that his past and his temperament made him neutral. On the succession he was believed at this time to be strongly anti-Jacobite, and he had written to one of his many collaborators in passing the Act of Union, that it was the only thing which could 'unite all of the Revolution principle'.²

As in 1702 he had urged 'conciliation' on Godolphin, so at the close of 1705 he once more restated the political programme he desired. 'The foundation is, persons or parties are to come into the Queen, and not the Queen to them'; moreover, 'if the gentlemen of England are made sensible that the Queen is the head, and not a Party, everything will be easy.' When, a year later, the crisis was getting closer, Harley's language was still the same; 'I have no obligation to any party; . . . I know no difference between a mad Whig and a mad Tory; . . . it will be very hard ever to bring the nation to submit to any other government but the Queen's. In her they will all centre.' When in 1707 the breaking-point came, Harley protested the same belief: running from one extreme to another, he said, 'renders the government like a door which turns both ways upon its hinges to let in each party as it grows triumphant'. Nor was this language merely reserved for the Prime Minister. If to Newcastle he was bitter against 'the modern Whigs' in the Government, to Tories who upbraided him with apostasy he could be equally downright. 'I have the same principles', he

¹ Saloman, 60, n. 3; Lockhart to Atholl, 15 Oct. 1705 (Atholl papers, Report XII, viii), 62.

² L'Hermitage, 30 May [Dutch Dispatches, Secret]; Harley to Carstairs, 20 July 1704 (Portland, iv).

replied to one, 'I came into the House of Commons with': he had 'honestly warned them', he had 'publicly and privately foretold them the consequences of what they were doing', he had never done anything against 'the common interest of the Church or Monarchy of England'. We shall soon find in 1710 his strenuous attempts to build yet another Coalition Government, and the ministerial programme he then drafted has the old motto, 'The Queen is the centre of power and union.'¹ And this constitutional programme went hand in hand with a conservative aversion to violent methods; all his influence, even his casting vote as Speaker, had been used to damp down the interminable disputes arising out of the Aylesbury election, and to prevent the Commons imitating the Lords in printing clamorous appeals to the public.

The full significance of this position—whether it be called that of a new party or simply non-party, yet in either case rising beyond the old divisions of Whig and Tory—was at a later date to be made eloquent by one of Harley's lieutenants, and it is high time to turn from the 'Master' to his 'faithful Harry'. In the brief Parliament of 1701-2 Henry St. John had sprung at one bound into fame. When first elected he was just twenty-two years old; within a year he stood on a par with Bromley in the Tory leadership of the Commons; at twenty-five he was Secretary at War and incomparably the best debater in the House; at thirty-two, Secretary of State and leader of the Commons. Fate dealt hardly, if justly, with him, for he fell for ever at the age of thirty-six, and lived on for exactly the same number of years again in exile, disgrace, and some shame. But that must not obscure the brilliant picture of his youth. The 'wit, capacity, beauty, quickness of apprehension' of which Swift wrote to Stella,² attracted Marlborough to him in 1703 as they did the elder Pitt nearly half a century later, and no figure so amply typifies that brilliant transition from the seventeenth to the eighteenth

¹ Harley to Godolphin, 4 Sept. 1705, 10 Sept. 1707 (Bath papers); to the same, 16 Nov. 1706 (Coxe); to Newcastle, 15 June 1706 (Portland, ii); to Sir R. Davers, 16 Oct. 1705 (Portland, iv); memorandum dated 30 Oct. 1710, in the Hardwicke S. P.

² 'What truth and sincerity he may have I know not', 3 Nov. 1711; on his oratorical ability see Bonnet 18 April 1707.

century as he, who was in the Commons of 1701 with Musgrave and Seymour, and handed on a canon of new Tory doctrine to the Pitts, to Shelburne, and so to Disraeli.

Lord Clarendon had called the St. Johns 'a mutinous family', and in the Civil Wars its leading members had come out for the Parliament. But they had fought hard on both sides, and in Queen Anne's day St. Johns of two older generations still represented the two strains in the young Harry. These were his grandfather, Sir Walter, the sober patron of broad Churchmen, and his father Henry, an empty old rake, who qualified ardent Whig politics¹ by private morals of the lowest Restoration type. From neither could the future minister gather the principles of high Tory churchmanship, and in this at least he resembled Harley. In all else the two men stood poles apart—further than Palmerston from John Russell, as far as Gladstone from Disraeli. Where Harley hesitated, St. John, the *Mercurialis* of contemporary letters, struck fast and passionately, and intellectual disparity can hardly go further than in their correspondence and speeches; Harley building up, in involved sentences, dim outlines of a substantial policy, but one clogged with a dozen reservations, St. John striking off in lucid generalizations (and far too lucid to be deep) futile expedients disguised as political wisdom. Alcibiades and Petronius were St. John's confessed models: we question whether Harley's ideals ever soared above Sir Edward Harley or the Duke of Newcastle. Harley, again, never threw off the sober character of the Puritan gentry, and his eyes were fixed on founding an illustrious fortune for his family. But St. John was childless, and could dispense with the cautions belonging to those who have given large hostages to fortune; as for his birth, seven or eight generations back the St. Johns were allied with the Tudors, and in the foreground of all his visions of a national interest he never ceased to picture 'the gentlemen', grouped round the throne as Elizabeth had filled it. In personal morals there was the same contrast. St. John, even if we discredit later embroideries, began with an entire lack of principle, while his letters when a Cabinet minister speak of women in that surfeited tone of elegant vice,

¹ Aumont's report of Aug. 1712 (Saloman, App. 3).

which Wycherley and Congreve have made familiar.¹ In relations between great English ministers moral disapproval on one side has often strained the everyday partnership of public life, and we may recall that Lady Bolingbroke asked the Harley family to give their sympathy to her, as 'a poor discarded mistress'.

Finally, though Harley was still, as we reckon it, in the prime of life, the seventeen years' difference in age between the two men seems suddenly to become acute about 1711: thenceforward, we get the impression of a deteriorating Harley and of a St. John purging himself of his grosser elements. Years of late night sittings, heavy suppers, and drinking till the early hours of morning, increasing family ambitions, all these had changed the Harley who had led the attacks on the army and the Irish forfeitures, and had been the mainstay of Godolphin's first Ministry. At fifty-three his health seemed broken, his loyalist followers thought his energy decayed,² and when he died at sixty-three he had been long an invalid. But St. John, though he continually relapses, begins to husband his great powers; his drunkenness is rarer, his vision is keener, and (unlike Harley) as he grows older his life becomes more sincere and truer to his real nature. Sir Edward Harley's son must be morally ill at ease in defending Sacheverell and humouring Ormonde, but St. John, who linked the sceptical Restoration to the formative period of the eighteenth century, found his real level as the patron of Pope and the inspirer of Pitt and Wyndham.

The St. John of 1701-3—that is, before he reached the age of twenty-five—was a hot Tory. He, it seems, moved the great resolution of the 26th February 1702 on which all Tories were united, that the Commons had not had right done them in the impeachment of the Junto Lords.³ With Bromley and Brydges, he was one of the Commissioners of Accounts who kept up the Tory feud with Montague (since 1700 Lord Halifax). He twice brought in the Occasional Conformity Bill with Bromley; he was foremost in championing the Commons

¹ 'That Love which I used to scatter with some profusion among the whole female kind': Bolingbroke to Swift, Aug. 1723.

² Lewis to Swift, 29 July 1714.

³ Yard to Stepney, 27 Feb. 1702.

against the Kentish petitioners and the Aylesbury men. Once again, later in the reign, we shall meet this young St. John—centring all his mind on one great task, 'to fill the employments of the Kingdom down to the meanest with Tories', and if that were all, his historical significance would sink to that of a Wharton or a Seymour.

But that is not all, for both the Tories' extinction in 1714 and their later revival are inseparably connected with St. John's leadership—which was directed in the first case to faction, but in the second to something better. The political teaching of these later years, of *The Patriot King* and the *Dissertation on Parties*, lies beyond our horizon. Its purport is familiar and is summarily put in Bolingbroke's self-composed epitaph, 'An enemy to no national party.' His works rejected Divine Right and the whole philosophy of the Cavaliers, proclaimed that Whig and Tory were terms as dead as Yorkist and Lancastrian, and called for a national government, in which the Crown would rest directly on the people, undistorted by faction. But was this teaching simply the sterile musing of an exile, a recantation from an adventurer eager to recover power, or a retrospective *apologia* from a defeated minister? For the history of party between 1705 and 1714 it is, we believe, a demonstrable and vital truth, that a certain thin continuity of idea runs all through St. John's political life, and that he, like Harley, expressed even in Queen Anne's reign a view differing from that of the Tory highfliers—a view which, had fortune smiled, would have created a centre party out of the Coalition, forestalled the Tory crash of 1714, and changed thereby the national history.

The outstanding fact in St. John's early career was his attachment to Harley, whose advice he persistently sought and whose lead in the larger issues of politics he more and more tended to follow. Like Harley, he had fully accepted the policy of the Act of Settlement, and until 1708 there is no cooling in the younger man's letters: 'You have been so kind', he wrote, 'in millions of instances to me, that I really look on myself as accountable to you for all my actions.'¹

¹ H. Guy to Harley, 17 Sept. 1702 (P. iv); St. John to Harley, 26 Dec. 1701 and 26 Oct. 1705 (Bath, i).

It was, we can hardly doubt, by Harley's agency that St. John was raised into the Ministry in April 1704, and brought as Secretary at War into direct touch with Marlborough, who was the second most weighty influence in his life thereafter. Upon his fervid imagination the Duke's splendid gifts exerted their last fascination, and the Marlborough support was commonly thought to be behind him. As late as 1708 well-informed public servants thought that 'Harry St. John and his gang were all entirely my Lord Duke's'. The Secretary offered to put up Marlborough's statue at Christ Church; in the bitterest days after 1711 he never, it seems, entirely abandoned hope of working with him again, and wrote, we may believe with some sincerity: 'I hope never to see again the time when I shall be obliged to embark in a separate interest from you.' To Marlborough, almost alone of his contemporaries and rivals, he paid in his later writings a princely homage.¹

It is, then, to the school of Marlborough and Harley that St. John's political ideas during Queen Anne's reign really belong. Like them, he lapsed into party faction, when only party would secure his end, but his cool and detached thinking was in another vein. In the summer of 1705 he warned Marlborough of the existence of those 'that may cease to be Tories, but can never become Whigs', and in a letter to Thomas Coke, one of his joyous companions, he unfolded the same year a remarkable picture. Will not the Tory gentlemen, he asks, 'think it reasonable to support the Queen, who has nothing to ask but what we are undone if we do not grant?' 'The real foundation of difference between the two parties is removed, and she seems to throw herself on the gentlemen of England, who had much better have her at the head of 'em than any ringleaders of fashion. Unless gentlemen can show that her administration puts the Church or the State in danger, they must own the contest to be about persons: and if it be so, can any honest man hesitate which side to take?'² To

¹ Portland papers, vii. 68; Raby to Cadogan, 10 March 1708 (Wentworth papers); Boingbroke to Marlborough, 27 March 1711 (*Corr.*). On the negotiations for reunion between the two men in 1714, see Hardwicke's note on Burnet, vi. 147, and Macpherson, ii. 532.

² To Marlborough, 27 July 1705 (Coxe); to Coke, 19 Sept. (*Corr.* papers, iii).

Marlborough, a year later, he insisted that a firm lead would rob of their power the 'restless spirits, who are foolishly imagined to be heads of a party': it is monstrous they should dare to expect that 'the Queen, crowned with success abroad, and governing without blemish at home, should court them at the expense of her own authority, and support her administration by the same shifts that a vile and profligate one can only be kept up with'.¹ St. John, indeed, whose letters to the Queen breathed the same incense as Disraeli's to Victoria, made the Crown the centre of his system: 'The power of the Crown', he wrote later, 'is low, but I must believe that a proper use of what remains will get the better of faction.'

Throughout this steady development of his ideas one other *motif* can be seen constantly gaining strength and coherence. 'The propitious day' is coming, he tells Harley in 1708, 'to lodge power where it naturally should be, with property', and to 'unite and govern the whole body of gentlemen'. 'The true, real, genuine strength of Britain', 'that broad and generous principle which only can and only ought to last', 'the natural strength of the nation'—for all this his mind runs to the Crown, the Church, and the gentry—to the ancient balance of the Constitution, freed from 'Grand Viziers', from moneyed men, and from factions. Observe, he tells Drummond, 'what a difference there is between the true strength of this nation and the fictitious one of the Whigs. How much time, how many lucky incidents, how many strains of power, how much money must go to create a majority of the latter: on the other hand, take but off the opinion that the Crown is another way inclined, and the church interest rises with redoubled force, and by its natural genuine strength.'²

Such, then, were the principles of the *via media*, professed in different ways by Harley and St. John, by Marlborough and Godolphin, before and after 1705; we must now watch these principles in conflict with the harsh actualities of that year. Two appointments of the first importance, those of Lord Chancellor and Speaker, had been left unsettled till after the

¹ 12/23 Nov. 1706 (MacKnight).

² St. John to Harley, 11 Oct. and 6 Nov. 1708 (Bath papers); to Raby, 27 April and 15 Dec. 1711; to Drummond, 10 Nov. 1710; to Lord Chancellor of Ireland, 9 March 1714 (*Corr.*).

elections: it was impossible to continue the incompetent Wright in the first, and Harley, no longer able to duplicate the work of Speaker and Secretary of State, naturally preferred the latter. The Speakership was settled without delay. Harley's name was put forward and, though the Whigs objected, it was generally thought that it could have been carried had he himself wished it: the Tory managers, on the other hand, refused to support the candidature of his friend Harcourt. Unable, then, to find a man on whom the Right and Centre could agree, in July Godolphin announced it as the Queen's wish that John Smith, the Junto's Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1698 and a Whig member of nearly thirty years' standing, should be supported by all her servants as Speaker-elect.¹ Taken as a clear heralding of a Whig scheme in the next Parliament, the news provoked a storm among the hot Tories, and was repugnant to Harley and St. John personally: indeed it was only on the eve of the session that Harley decided to support Smith's nomination and stand by the Treasurer. But in accordance with his interpretation of a national government, he stipulated that the Whigs must not be allowed to think that they had imposed the Speaker on the Court, 'but take it as a grace that they have him from the Queen's influence'. Agreeably to this sense, Harley at the opening of the session (the 25th October) threw his weight against Broml y, the official Tory candidate, and directly opposed Seymour in the debate. In a record House, Smith was elected by 248 to 205. Some fifteen Tory placemen voted against the Court, and among them George Clarke, most influential of private members and secretary to Prince George, who received the news of his dismissal then and there in the lobby, as he went to vote.²

The struggle for the Great Seal was the other preoccupation of the summer, and in this case the more furious because the Queen herself was deeply involved. Her wishes for 'a moderate Tory' were put to Godolphin with great force, and clearly

¹ St. John to Marlborough, 27 July (Coxe); Hoffmann, 11 Aug. (Klopp); Harley to Price, 14 Aug. and Peyton to Newcastle, 18 Sept. (P. 1v).

² Harley to Godolphin, 4 Sept. (Bath), Hammond to Coke, 27 Sept. (Cowper papers); Godolphin to Newcastle, 11 Oct. (P. 11); George Clarke's autobiography (Leyborne-Popham papers, 283); Klopp, xii. 1; Lewis to H. Davenant, 26 Oct. (B. M. Add. MSS. 47421).

express her view of party. 'I dread', she writes, 'the falling into the hands of either party, and the Whigs have had so many favours showed them of late that I fear a very few more will put me insensibly into their power, which is what I'm sure you would not have happen no more than I.' She knew, she adds, that her 'dear unkind friend' the Duchess was anxious for a Whig, but 'I do put an entire confidence in you, not doubting but you will do all you can to keep me out of the power of the merciless men of both parties'.¹ Her protests were vain, for Treasurer and General made it a case of confidence, and on the 11th October the Whig William Cowper became Lord Keeper.

So far the Coalition's difficulties, though deep, were not unexpected: the Tories, in the view of both Harley and St. John, had only themselves to thank—for if the Queen 'does make use of hands they do not like', she 'has been forced to it by the indiscretion of our friends'.² But they would agree with the Queen that it was a question of degree, and the chief political question, up till September 1707, was 'how long the Ministry could walk on this razor-edge between the two parties.'

Only great blunders on the part of one or other of the two extremes can explain the existence of Coalition Governments in English politics, and that the Government reconstituted in 1704 lasted to the close of 1707 was due primarily, no doubt, to the sheer futility of the Tory Right. Politically nothing more damaging could be imagined than the line taken in the Lords by Rochester, Nottingham, and Haversham (that eminent convert, formerly Thompson), or by Pakington in the Commons, during the next two sessions. Their motion that the Electress Sophia should be invited to take up her residence in England failed, chiefly through Marlborough's address, to win the gratitude of that most clear-sighted old lady: it played into the hands of the Whigs, who promptly introduced a Regency Bill, providing for the event of the Queen's death a new constitutional machinery, which was destined in 1714 to do much to ensure the smooth working of the succession: most serious of all, for the time being it definitely lost to the

¹ The Queen to Godolphin, 11 July (B. M. Add. MSS. 28070, f. 12); cf. Coxe, i. 483.

² St. John to Coke, 19 Sept., loc. cit.

Tories the favour of the Queen, with whom the bare mention, let alone the presence, of her legal successor was as utterly anathema as it had been with Queen Elizabeth. Nor was the sovereign, whose peculiar pride it was to be a model Defender of the Faith, any better pleased with the constant assertion that under her government the Church was 'in danger'. Yet this was the cry to which the ruck of the Tories gave tongue. On this Rochester, Nottingham, and Buckingham joined in chorus with the old Duke of Leeds and Bishop Compton, while in the Commons Bromley and Pakington could still whip up 160 votes for this platform. A series of sharp messages, a royal proclamation, and a biting reproof to the Lower House of Convocation showed that, up till Easter 1706 at least, Anne would resent any attempt to upset her Ministry on this ground: the speech drafted for her by Godolphin and Harley¹ to open the session had denounced these 'malicious' insinuations, promised that she would 'affectionately' support the Church, but at the same time pledged her 'inviolably' to maintain the Act of Toleration.

Closely bound up with the Church question was that of the Union with Scotland, which finally passed the English House of Commons on the 28th February 1707, by 274 votes to 116. The guarantees given to the Church of Scotland, the horrid prospect of Presbyterian members soon sitting at their side, roused Nottingham and Pakington to frenzy. The proportionate shares of taxation, the cheapening of the English peerage, the perils of free trade—every stick was seized upon, with which to lash this unpopular cause. But on no single public question were Harley's exertions so great, or his record so consistent, as on the Union, and with this forlorn anti-Unionist sniping he was entirely out of sympathy.

Apart, however, from the follies of the Right wing, there were still several positive causes which would keep the Centre group in being. The Queen's favour was so far unshaken, and success beamed on their banners. In 1706 Ramillies assured the safety of Flanders and Brabant, Eugene relieved Turin and saved Italy, and the Allied armies reached Madrid. A solid body of moderate opinion, typified by Newcastle, disliked and

¹ Godolphin to Harley, 25 Oct. 1705 (Rath.)

prevented any approaches to the Junto. Harley's relations continued to be cordial with his leaders, outwardly even with Sarah, and his friends obviously assumed him to be strongly anti-Tacker. Reunion between him and the Tory Right would be certainly as difficult as between the Junto and Godolphin, and down to the midsummer of 1707 these two ministers were still making election arrangements in common.¹ There is, moreover, no doubt that, had a free choice been possible, Marlborough, and in a lesser degree the Treasurer, would have still preferred to lean on the Tory interest, in which they had been bred. To the Whig notables both were personally hostile. The intolerable pretensions of Halifax to be given charge of the peace negotiations in 1706-7, the fierce passions of his own son-in-law, Sunderland, their attacks on his brother Admiral Churchill, Prince George's confidant—these and a long series of similar aggressions angered Marlborough. 'To tear everything to pieces, if they cannot have their own terms'—such was the Whig programme as Godolphin saw it, and Marlborough himself was disinclined to yield. 'England will take care of itself and not be ruined, because a few men are not pleased,' he told the Duchess, and his constantly expressed first preference was to stick to Harley, his second that Godolphin should resign, but surrender to the Whigs his last choice.² Another reason, more searching and elusive, drew the two ministers nearer to the Tories. They had kept up and maintained throughout the reign their old correspondence with Saint-Germain, and were unwilling to sever themselves entirely from this relic of a past, which might at any moment undergo a strange resurrection.³

But against these personal or sentimental predilections one hard fact ultimately prevailed, and this was the war. For

¹ Newcastle to Harley, 16 Nov.; Poulett to Harley, 18 Sept. 1706 (P. iv); Harley to Godolphin, 19 June 1707, *ibid.*

² Godolphin to Marlborough, 24 June/5 July 1707; Marlborough to the Duchess, 21 July and 15 Sept.; to Godolphin, 27 June (Coxe). Cf. the story Cowper tells in his 'Diary', on Harley's authority, of Marlborough's stay with Shrewsbury in the Cotswolds in 1707, and their plans to throw off 'the tyranny of the junto', and Dartmouth's note, on Burnet, v. 351.

³ Macpherson, *Original Papers*, ii, *passim*. For the story that Wharton had secured one of Godolphin's letters to the exiled Court, and used this as a Whig lever, *ibid.*, 104, and Burnet, v. 392 n.

this, in the emphatic opinion of both leaders, the Whigs could offer the only solid and dependable support. Never did they forget the carping attacks from Rochester and Nottingham in the first years of their Ministry, nor were they ever allowed to do so by the Tories' prompt seizing upon any point of criticism—whether the neglect of the sea, the opportunities lost in Spain, or the rising pressure of taxation. Towards this most critical of all matters, the attitude of the 'new Tory' ministers was, openly, correct enough. They must share in the whole Government's responsibility for the grave decision, announced in the royal speech of October 1705, to fight on for 'restoring the monarchy of Spain to the House of Austria'.

Harley throughout 1705-6 was, officially, still emphatic that this policy alone could ensure 'an honourable safe and lasting peace', and in February 1707 he rose from a sick-bed to lead the Government case, in asking indemnity for an unauthorized expenditure of over £800,000 incurred in the Spanish and Italian campaigns.¹ The majority of 255 to 105 on this division reflected a coalition of Whigs and Centre against the pure Tories, and till the end of this year at least no serious party cleavage can be ascribed to the question of peace or war.

Yet the conduct of the great war, and its duration, was bringing to the front problems which, added to the initial pacifism of the Tories, might drive a wedge between the two wings of the Coalition. The selfish attitude of the Court of Vienna, which came to a climax in March 1707 with the Treaty of Milan—the effect of which was to neutralize Italy as between France and Austria and to set two French armies free for the western front—had much earlier than that aroused the indignation of Harley and St. John. 'It is insufferable', the latter wrote, 'that England and Holland must every day take a greater burden upon them, while the House of Austria—entirely applied to secure the confiscations of Hungary and procure more—seems rather neuter than a party in the war against France.'² Nor did the friendly relations of England and Holland long continue. Marlborough's supreme diplomacy

¹ Harley to Stepney, Dec. 1706, B. M. Add. MSS. 7059; [cf. his letter to Marlborough, 4/15 Dec. 1705 (Coxe)]; Hoffmann, 8 Feb. 1707.

² St. John to Cutts, 9 Oct. 1705 (Frankland-Astley papers); Harley to Stepney, 6/17 Aug. 1706, loc. cit.

ground', and his view of the policy they must adopt in future was candid enough: they must 'have a little more commerce with some gentlemen than has been of late kept up', or in other words they must turn back to the Tories.¹

For the *volte-face* at which St. John hinted, neither Harley nor the Tories were yet prepared, but the spring and summer of 1707 did not pass without many symptoms of the growing fissure in the Government. One such arose out of its very greatest achievement, the Act of Union, to the carrying of which Harley and Harcourt had notably assisted. It had received the royal assent on the 6th March, and on the 1st May a new scale of customs duties, common to both countries, was to begin to apply. Speculators, English, Scottish, and foreign, began to accumulate vast quantities of goods in Scotland, paying only the existing lower Scottish duties, with a view to pouring them over the English frontier when the new common tariff took effect. It was at the instance of the London merchants that a bill to check these dealings was brought into the Commons, and Harley apparently only intervened at a late stage with a new clause, which would have penalized fraudulent importers without damaging the Scots. The Lords' rejection of this bill brought about, on the 8th April, a sudden prorogation of Parliament for a week: for this (though it would seem without reason) Sunderland blamed Harley, and in any case he had appeared acting in temporary co-operation with the Tories in the Commons.² Personal friends among the Tackers were already urging him to return to the fold, and moderates like Poulett assured him that, made more reasonable now by misfortune, the Right was ready 'to give any proofs of the convictions of their folly that can be derived from men of their principle'.³

And yet it would, we believe, be a mistake to antedate

¹ Mansell to Harley, 13 June 1706 (Portland, iv); Harley to Godolphin 15 Oct. (Bath, i), and 16 Nov. (Coxe); to Marlborough, 6 Sept. (ibid.); St. John to Marlborough, 12/23 Nov. (MacKnight); St. John to Graham, 3 Aug. (Bagot papers); St. John to Harley, 5 Nov. (Bath, i).

² Robert Walpole, who should have known, clearly says that the prorogation was forced by the Lords 'to give the Commons an opportunity to recant'. See also Godolphin to Harley 17 April (Bath papers); Harley to Defoe, 12 June (Portland, iv); Sunderland to the Duchess (n. d.) (Coxe, ii. 180); and Buinet.

³ 16 July 1707.

either his resolution to reunite with the Tories, or his concerting intrigues to overthrow the Ministry. For the charge that Harley's underhand attempts to upset it dated back to the autumn of 1706 we have only the precarious word of the Duchess of Marlborough; to the charge in particular that he instigated the appointment of two High-Church bishops at Chester and Exeter we have a categorical denial from both the Queen and the minister. Harley's hostility both in public and private to the pure Whig ministers certainly grew more pronounced every month,¹ but there is much ground for saying that, till the end of 1707, he would still have preferred co-operation, though on different terms, with the two great leaders. Failing to get a dissolution of Parliament—the remedy he seems to have wished for²—he spent the early autumn in trying to induce Godolphin and Marlborough to direct policy themselves, and not accept it from the Whigs, avowing that firm action could still secure a working Coalition majority.³ In all this he had the assistance of Newcastle, and the decision taken not to call the new Lord Steward, the second Duke of Devonshire, into the Cabinet, must be taken as some proof of their joint influence with the Treasurer. His correspondence and interviews with Abigail Hill (who this summer became Mrs. Masham) had begun and were known to Godolphin, but it is clear that at the opening of the winter session of 1707 all parties were in some doubt as to their next course. The Tories were hardly yet ready to pledge full support to Harley, and he during September was still negotiating with the two chief ministers. Sunderland had one scheme of action cut and dried for Marlborough, Harley was understood to have another ready for the Queen, but when, at the end of October, Parliament reassembled, the clear agreement on policy for which Godolphin had been calling was still buried under the bland generalities of ministerial correspondence.⁴

¹ Harley to Defoe, 12 June (P. iv); Godolphin to Marlborough, 24 June/5 July (Coxe).

² I cannot otherwise interpret his cloudy letter to Godolphin of 19 June (P. 4); cf. Burnet, v. 341.

³ The approaches of Marlborough to Shrewsbury (p. 392 *supra*, note 2) should, it seems, be dated in this autumn.

⁴ Bath papers, i, *passim*; Harley-Newcastle Corr. (Portland papers, ii); Bromley to Harley, 18 Sept. 1708 (P. iv); Burnet, v. 340; Coxe, iii. 204 note.

The year 1707, which had begun with the Union, had continued in April with the fateful defeat of Almanza and with threats of a new northern war from Charles XII of Sweden. The summer in the Netherlands was barren of military success, the early autumn was made angry by heavy losses at sea to French privateers, and both parties opened the session with attacks on the Admiralty's management. When the forces were so evenly balanced, the least incident might tilt Godolphin's wavering decision in one direction or the other, and it was some such accident, in addition to the very able management of Somers, which led him within two months to surrender completely to the Whigs. In the first week of December the Government lost a by-election at Leicester; a Tacker got in, and the Court Tories, Godolphin complained, had used their influence for him. Meetings between Marlborough, himself, and Harley only increased their mutual irritation. The Whigs, now reinforced by the great majority of the Scottish members, were clamouring for reprisals. The Tory Right had found a new martyr in Peterborough, who had been recalled from the Mediterranean by Sunderland in a peculiarly offensive dispatch: was the hero of Barcelona, the clubs asked, to be made a scapegoat for the foreigner Galway and the Whig Stanhope?

On the 19th December Rochester and Nottingham, in moving for a vote of thanks to Peterborough, suggested that fifteen or twenty thousand troops should be transferred from Marlborough's command to the Spanish front. A passionate speech from Marlborough turned yet another sod for the grave of Centre-Tory union, and Somers was quick to turn the situation to Whig party advantage: on the following day he carried a motion, that no peace could be honourable or safe, which left any part of the Spanish monarchy in the hands of the Bourbons.¹

Harley supported this resolution in the Commons and it seems that each party was putting pressure on the wavering Lord Treasurer. Each had criticized the Admiralty; members of each joined in forcing the Government to pass a bill for the

¹ Godolphin to Harley, 5 Dec. (P. iv and Bath, i; Coxe, ii. 379-83); Swift to King, 1 Jan. 1708; *Vernon Corr.* iii. 301, *Parl. Hist.*

abolition of the Scottish Privy Council. This situation could last no longer, and the *Duumvirs'* definite resolution to cast in their lot with the Whigs should, we think, be dated from the last week of the year. The arrest of Greg, Harley's confidential clerk, for treasonable correspondence on the 30th December offered a tempting opportunity to discredit his master. The ecclesiastical appointments of early January seem to indicate a yielding on the Queen's part to her ministers' Whig allies. In company with her two long-suspended High-Church nominations to Chester and Exeter, Sunderland's tutor Trimmell was given Norwich, while a client of Marlborough was seated in that nerve-centre of politics, the Oxford Regius Chair of Divinity.

On the 29th January 1708 the climax arrived. On that day a return, previously called for by the House of Commons¹ and now presented by St. John, appeared to show an unaccountable discrepancy between the 29,000 men voted for Spain and Portugal and the 8,000 actually present in the Peninsula at the date of Almanza. It is true that the lead in this attack was taken by the moderate Tory Hanmer, that Harley and St. John spoke in favour of the Government, and that an explanation more favourable to its case was given by the latter in the adjourned debate of the 3rd February. It is, again, a fact that the Whigs at first voted with the Tories, on the address representing this grievance, and if later they drew back, it was presumably because the Treasurer and General had at last concluded the bargain with their leaders. Whig opinion, however, professed that the Harley section had long matured this blow, as a first step in a definite scheme of action. According to this, a wedge was to be driven between Godolphin and Marlborough, Harley was to replace the former as Treasurer and to form a Government of moderate Tories—excluding Nottingham, Buckingham, and Rochester. In the event of Marlborough going out on this issue, it was rumoured that the Elector of Hanover would be put forward for the supreme command.²

¹ St. John to Harley, 14 Jan. (Bath, i). At that time anyhow the coup had not been prearranged.

² *The Other Side of the Question*, 355 [1742]; Burnet, v. 348-53; Swift to

What is at least certain is that, on the day following the Spanish revelations, Godolphin finally broke with Harley, and that the Queen was willing to drop the Treasurer if Marlborough could be retained. The plan was a bold one, and, though usually credited to Harley, seems to smack rather of St. John, who was on this occasion an intermediary between the Queen and Marlborough; it appears, moreover, to have been Harley, rather than the Queen, who first sounded the retreat. Two factors mainly decided the issue—the firm loyalty of Marlborough to Godolphin, and the refusal of the middle members of the Cabinet—Somerset and Pembroke particularly—to proceed without them at the fateful Cabinet of Sunday, the 8th February. Prince George added his timid expostulations, and, on the day following, the Queen accepted Harley's proffered resignation. The Comptroller, Mansell, resigned with him, and was followed within the next two days by the Attorney-General Harcourt and St. John, the Secretary at War.¹

So ended the Coalition Government, which had won Blenheim, Ramillies, Gibraltar, and the Act of Union. The miserable duplicity which marked its dying days, common to both Godolphin and Harley, was the necessary accompaniment of a transition constitutional system, in which the sovereign formed, and maintained, a Ministry by her own choice whether of leaders or subordinate instruments—a system in which 'the malice of a bed-chamber woman' could shake a Prime Minister and under which no Cabinet loyalty could long survive. Whether the Coalition's fall was inevitable, or whether, as Harley urged, it might have been avoided by firm and even leadership, need not be argued here. As to its immediate effect, contemporaries had few illusions. The real victory lay not with the *Duumvirs*, but with the Whigs, and especially with Somers, their leading brain.² The prophecy Harley had written for Marlborough in the previous October (though he had never sent it) was now to be fulfilled—'embracing some persons close and making others desperate' would end 'in

King, 5 Feb.; Coxe, ii 386 et seq; Addison's evidence in *Manchester, Court and Society*, i. 295; L'Hermitage and Bonnet (Noorden); the Austrian dispatches in Klopp; *V. C.* iii. 335.

¹ Note A at end of Chapter.

² Gallas's dispatch, 5 March (Klopp); Swift, *passim*.

holding a handful of sand, the harder it is squeezed, the less it is and slips through your fingers.' ¹

NOTE A

The chief contemporary and first-hand accounts of this change of Government, which I have used, are those in the Vernon Correspondence, in Swift's letter of the 12th February to King, in Luttrell, in the Marlborough and Godolphin correspondence given by Coxe, in some brief allusions by Lord Mar (in Mar and Kellie papers), and in the reports given from The Hague, Berlin, and Vienna by Noorden and Klopp. There are secondary accounts by Burnet, by Edward Harley (Portland papers, v. 647), and in the Wentworth papers. Both classes agree as to the line taken by Somerset and Pembroke. The Queen's readiness to accept the Treasurer's resignation is recorded by the Austrian reports, Swift, Mar, Raby, and by Dartmouth in his note on Burnet.

¹ Draft dated 3 Oct. 1707, and endorsed 'Never sent' (Bath, i. 185, note).

XV

RECONSTRUCTION, 1708-10

ON the day of Harley's fall the Lords' Whig majority balloted for the election of a committee to examine Greg, who was now a prisoner in Newgate : the seven chosen—Somerset, Devonshire, Bolton, Wharton, Somers, Halifax, and Townshend—might safely be trusted to press any discoverable case against the ex-Secretary. Meanwhile they hoped themselves to fill the void left by the moderates' resignation. The pro^l motions made in February were, however, few, and to the Whigs highly unsatisfactory : the moderate and jovial Henry Boyle succeeded to his friend Harley, and Robert Walpole, who took St. John's place, was not yet identified with the extremists.

But fortune favoured them, for on the 17th March, after three weeks of expectation, the Pretender sailed out of Dunkirk with a French fleet, next to be sighted on the 24th off the Firth of Forth. While Jacobites and Frenchmen drew exultant pictures of a terrified London and a national rising in Scotland,¹ a tide of loyalist feeling swept England and rallied Parliament. The Queen, furious at the style 'usurper' given to her in her brother's proclamation, announced that she must always place her chief dependence on those who had given 'repeated proofs' of their zeal for the Revolution and Protestant succession, and declared against James as 'a Popish pretender, bred up in the principles of the most arbitrary government'.

Coming fast on this crisis, the dissolution of Parliament on the 15th April could, from a Whig point of view, hardly have been better timed, and that party proceeded to the election in justifiable confidence. Simultaneously, the promotion of James Montague to be Attorney-General, of Cholmondeley to

¹ Melani to Cardinal Paolucci, March 1708, P. R. O. Roman Transcripts.

the Comptrollership, above all, of the Speaker Smith to Boyle's old place as Chancellor of the Exchequer, put them in rather better humour. By the end of May it was plain that the new House of Commons would be preponderantly Whig—the most Whig Parliament', boasted Sunderland, 'has been since the Revolution'. The Tories succeeded in getting half the representation of London, but elsewhere they lost many seats, even in their stronghold of Cornwall. They were disunited; here and there the Church party warmly backed Harleyite candidates, but there was nothing as yet like general concert between them, and far less a formal reunion.¹ For our purpose it is more important to note that St. John found it impossible to get a seat. On bad terms with his scandalous old father, he either could not or would not again contest the family borough at Wootton Bassett: private negotiations for another constituency broke down, and the Tory leaders did not seem particularly anxious to help him. 'Those whom it is my inclination and my principle to serve', he wrote bitterly, 'have left me out, and I conclude that they do not want me.' Harcourt got in again, only to be unseated on petition in the following January—the first moment, dearest Sym,' wrote St. John, 'in which I have grieved that I am not in Parliament.'² Harley therefore had to fight in the new Parliament without his best lieutenants.

Between that Parliament's meeting on the 16th November 1708 we pass through only twenty-one months to the final fall of Godolphin's Ministry on the 7th August 1710—a short span at first glance for such a revolution; and here for clearness' sake it is well to distinguish the events which disintegrated or discredited the Government from the parallel and positive steps taken by Harley to evict it.

The course of the war was in itself immensely damaging. Never was Marlborough's genius better seen than in 1708, but even the victory of Oudenarde on the 30th June, Webb's

¹ Luttrell; Burnet, T. Foley, 12 April, and G. Granville, 20 May, to Harley (Portland, iv); Sunderland to Newcastle, 27 May (B M. Lansdowne MSS. 1236, f. 242).

² St. John to Graham, 18 July (Bagot papers); to Harley, 1 May, 1708 (Bath, 1); to Harcourt, 20 Jan. 1709 (Portland, iv); see also *ibid.*, 489-91, and H. Walpole to Stanhope, 30 April (Stanhope, *op. cit.*, 443 n.).

action at Wynendael on the 27th September, the surrender of Lille on the 19th December, and Stanhope's capture of Port Mahon had no visible effect in bringing peace nearer. In 1709-10 the war turned to actual disaster. In September 1709 was fought the 'very murdering battle'¹ of Malplaquet, where the Allies lost just under 23,000 men killed and wounded, fourteen British general officers amongst them—the most dangerous effect of which was a signal recovery in French confidence and prestige. A projected invasion of France from the Rhine and Savoy broke down on the confederates' bickering, while the Spanish theatre of war was staging a much direr tragedy. At the end of 1709 the Archduke Charles was merely hanging on to a strip of Catalonia, a year later Stanhope surrendered at Brihuega, and the whole campaign's costly vicissitudes had left the Archduke precisely where he was before. St. John's cry of some time back was beginning to echo without ceasing: 'For God's sake let us be once out of Spain!'²

And if in war the last Junto Government was unfortunate, its diplomacy was atrocious. The ultimatum presented to Louis XIV in the negotiations of 1709 included, besides much subsequently secured by the Peace of Utrecht, a demand that the whole Spanish monarchy should be surrendered to the Archduke within two months, and that Louis's troops should co-operate in forcing his grandson Philip to evacuate. The mildest amendment contemplated was the immediate surrender of Spanish fortresses so vital that the end must be certain. Both to Heinsius and to Godolphin Marlborough admitted a conviction that it was impossible for France to make the Spaniards agree, but the Whig party leaders were inexorable, and at the end of August negotiations were broken off. If this was mistaken policy, the terms of the Barrier treaty with the Dutch in October were almost criminal—'the last and great sale', as St. John put it later, 'of the British interest'. If the Dutch were to receive a strong barrier, Great Britain had some right to a guarantee not only that her succession would

¹ Marlborough to the Duchess (Coxe); Harley's views on 'the late bloody battle', in his letter to Newcastle of 15 Sept. (Portland, ii).

² To Harley, 6 Nov. 1708 (Bath, i).

be saved, but that the war's essential objects should be won. But, determined to overcome Dutch objections to a continuance of war, and ready, once their party interests were secured by the succession guarantee, to sacrifice all else, the Junto insisted on concluding the treaty. Apart from the succession and the recognition of our right to Minorca, every other British objective was left in the air: Holland, on the other hand, secured twenty fortresses, making her mistress of the Low Countries, the right to close the Scheldt, and an English guarantee for her claims on upper Guelderland, Liège, Huy, and Bonn. No mention was made of the Spanish monarchy or the rasure of Dunkirk, as Marlborough had insisted; in short, the security of our Netherlands commerce, our good relations with the Empire, and our diplomatic supremacy at the general peace, were offered up to the party fears of Somers and Wharton, and the weakness of Godolphin.

Meanwhile the strain of war was telling on the country. Land tax and malt tax hit the farmers, a swarm of duties on the necessities of life, including tobacco, came home to every household, and the revenue raised by taxation in the year 1709-10 was over six millions. The call for men to replace heavy casualties induced the legislature, which feared openly to introduce conscription, to use the far worse device of the press-gang, by offering £3 to parish overseers and 20s. to constables for each able-bodied recruit.

The Government, which was thus using up the resources of the country, was torn by internal jealousies. As early as March 1708 the whole phalanx of Whigs, from the wild Sunderland to the moderate Devonshire, began to press for Somers's admission to the Cabinet; failing the presidency of the Council, he must at least have a place without portfolio. Against Somers—the incarnation of the Whig system, the chief engineer of the recent changes in her Government, the particular *bête noire* of her husband—Anne took a firm stand, the more significant in that she appreciated the frank charm of Somers as a man. In vain Godolphin and the Whig dukes plied her with interviews, in vain Marlborough begged her to forgive like a Christian; the question, she wrote, as the climax of a long and pathetic correspondence, was now simply this,

'whether I shall submit to the five tyrannizing Lords, or they to me'.¹ Sunderland went frankly into opposition; the management of Godolphin and of his father-in-law was, he declared, 'as much Tory and as much wrong as if Lord Rochester and Lord Nottingham were at the head of everything'. While freely styling his leaders Jacobites and 'a court faction', he as freely canvassed the Scottish Jacobite vote in the general elections, carried six of the sixteen Scottish peers against Government, and continued his intrigues with the Tories into the next year.² As against this, the Duke of Somerset—'the sovereign' of contemporary letters, Master of the Horse, and one of the most arrogant oligarchs even of the eighteenth century—conceived the idea that for him was reserved the task of forming a Ministry on a new foundation; he was deep with Newcastle and Devonshire, was reputed to possess the favour of the Prince Consort, and even tried to divide Wharton from the rest of the Junto.³

But the last stood united, and up to the first week of October 1708 threatened to attack the Admiralty and its titular head Prince George, or to press a separate Whig candidate for the Speakership, unless Somers and Wharton were given office: moderate Whigs were anxious lest, when Parliament met, half their party might be found intriguing with the Tories. Godolphin, having tried in vain upon the Queen his usual weapon of resignation, boggled, seemed to agree ('as his way always is in words', snarled Sunderland), and finally capitulated. The Whigs having promised to support the moderate Sir Richard Onslow, the Court candidate as Speaker, Marlborough was induced to order his meddling Tory brother, George Churchill, to leave the Admiralty, and the Queen, who was now watching her husband's death-bed, had, before he

¹ Mar to Grange, 19 Feb (Mar and Kellie papers); Devonshire to Newcastle, 26 March (Portland, ii); Swift to King, 15 April; Anne to Marlborough, Aug. n.d., 1708 (Coxe, ii, 517, q v. *passim*, and additional extracts from the Blenheim papers in Stuart Reid).

² Sunderland to Newcastle, Aug. (Ellis, *Original Letters*, 2nd series, iv) and 19 Oct. (B. M. Lansdowne MSS. 1236); to Roxburgh, June (quoted in *The Other Side of the Question*); Burnet, v. 351 n., Dartmouth papers, i. 295.

³ Manwaring to the Duchess, March or April—Marlborough to the same, 19 July (Coxe); Harley to Newcastle, 15 Sept. 1709 (Portland, ii); Hoffmann, 20 Nov. 1708.

died on the 28th October, undertaken to meet the Junto's wishes, at least in part. Her powers of resistance were, for the time being, crushed; on the 27th November Pembroke exchanged Ireland for the Admiralty, Wharton became Lord-Lieutenant, and Somers Lord President.¹ The Junto triumph was all but complete, and when the coffin holding her Prince's 'dear body' had gone down the steep and slippery steps of Kensington Palace, the Queen 'shut and bolted the door upon herself', bearing with icy correctness even the consolations of the Duchess of Marlborough.

But Anne's injured and open hatred of her Ministry was hardly needed to complete their ruin, and it is needless to follow in detail their decomposition to the close of 1709. Inch by inch, and always too late to please, Duke and Treasurer had to give way; Somers had to be quieted in April with £1,000 from the secret service money, Orford in November was brought back to the Admiralty as First Lord² by threats of resignation from Somers and Sunderland. Harassed and insecure amid this antagonism, and fearful of the Queen's growing alienation, Marlborough now made the capital blunder of his whole career, and moved in May for a grant of the Captain-Generalship for life: the refusal of the Junto to support him confirmed his impression that, at some date not far distant, they designed his downfall. It is then small wonder that, when in 1710 the real attack fell upon the Ministry, they split like rotten wood, that Sunderland was allowed to fall unaided, and that Somers and Halifax were ready to assist Harley in ejecting Godolphin.

The severity of that blow, when it descended, was due not only to the Queen's hatred and the Ministry's internal weakness: its force was redoubled since, from the moment of their triumph, the Junto, by a trait not uncommon in party history, had deepened their offensive at the same time as they narrowed their basis, and had deliberately challenged every instinct which could rouse the Tories' fighting spirit. Their bill of

¹ Lewis to Harley, 2 Oct. et seq.; Godolphin to Marlborough, 22 Oct./2 Nov. (Coxe, q v *passim*). Hoffmann, loc. cit.; Cowper to Newcastle, 4 Oct. (Portland, ii); Sunderland to Newcastle, 4 Nov. (B. M. Lansdowne MSS. loc. cit., f. 252).

² Leadam, 160 n.; Sunderland to Somers, 8 Aug. 1709, in Hardwicke S. P.

March 1709 for the naturalization of foreign Protestants excited the wrath alike of High Churchmen who clamoured for denominational tests, of wage-earners who feared unemployment, and of the country gentry who feared, with some justice as events proved, that thousands of destitute latitudinarians would fall upon the poor-rates. Whig government in the other British realms was no more happy. In Scotland the imprisonment of an episcopalian minister, for no other offence than preaching his faith, harshly lighted up the legal structure of the Whig settlement over the Border, and capped the sense of burning injustice which English Churchmen, themselves forced to give toleration to Dissenters, had long nourished. In Ireland Wharton prepared a campaign—the prelude, it was whispered, to another in England—for the repeal of the Test Act so far as it affected Protestant Dissenters, and acquiescence in this, it was plainly intimated to the furious Swift, was to be the price of the Government's yielding to the Church of Ireland the tenths and firstfruits which the Queen had restored to the Church of England.¹

This last, the original seed-plot and now the last flowering of seventeenth-century Toryism, had long since been putting forth bitter fruits. Anne's accession to the throne, and her open sympathy for the Right wing in politics, precipitated that High-Church movement first excited by the Non-jurors, and in the long wrangles over Occasional Conformity in 1702-4 'high-church' and 'low-church' became fixed as the symbol of party in both Church and State. The ecclesiastical effects of the Revolution, which the Church had perforce accepted, were now seen in their repellent and logical conclusion—in toleration of English Dissent, in a State recognition of Scottish Presbyterianism, and in State endowment (by William's *regium donum*) of Presbytery in Ireland. In pursuit of this policy the King had filled the Episcopal bench with broad Churchmen, and hence in the reign of Anne every cause most abhorrent to the rank and file of the priesthood—Occasional Conformity, Comprehension, the impeachment of Sacheverell—was backed by a majority of the bishops, whom they were in duty sworn to obey. The old political principles of the Church

¹ Swift to Kinn, 10 June 1708, *et seq.*

had hardly, even by subterfuge, endured the shock of the easy oaths enforced at the Revolution, but by the Abjuration Act of 1702, the last legislation authorized by the dying king, every minister was bound to assert the rightfulness of the reigning sovereign's title, and the absence of any right in the Pretender. Even in death King William had set his mark on the Church of England.

Faced, as later in 1833, by what they dreaded as national apostasy, the strongest section in the Church evoked the principles, the doctrines, and the personalities which formed its Catholic heritage. For the last time in England the cry of Divine Right was sent up by the Church, and taken up by the laity. The publication in 1693 of Laud's *Diary* and in 1702 of Clarendon's *History* brought before a new generation the great martyrs for 'that righteous cause of the Crown and Church' which, said Rochester in his last dedication to the Queen, 'Your Majesty will observe to have been combined against, fought with, overthrown, and in the end raised and re-established together.' Round the prosaic head of Queen Anne at her tea-table this legitimist school picked out the halo of the Lord's anointed. The sacred gift, inherited from Edward the Confessor, of touching for 'the evil' had reasonably been suspended in the Calvinist William, but it revived in the Queen, and when she touched young Samuel Johnson, some aroma of that divinity that hedges a king passed on into the rational eighteenth century. The cult of the royal Martyr was shown in furious attacks on the alleged Calves' Head Clubs or in dedication of churches to his name, and sermons which compared the sufferings of Whitehall with those of Calvary were rewarded by the fierce approval of Convocation, by Deaneries from the Queen, and by protests from Whig peers. Anne was flattered in addresses which declared her Divine Right, and the emblem of the Tory electors in 1710 was once again the oak-leaf of Boscobel. To the Restoration they were taught still to look back as what 'redeemed us from anarchy and confusion', and as 'the re-establishment of the beauty of praise in our sanctuary'.¹

¹ Atterbury's Sermon before the Queen, 29 May 1692, cited by Beeching; Evelyn, same date.

Less popular than such appeals to the emotions, but intrinsically of far deeper significance, was the reaction against the Revolution's principles in theology and politics—perhaps even against those of the Reformation itself. Increased animus against Dissent and the revival of Laudianism were naturally accompanied in Non-juror and High-Church thought by a sharp swing to the opposite extreme. A vast and able literature exalted the sacred character of the priesthood, stressed the right divine of bishops, branded the other Protestants of Europe as schismatics, and in views of marriage, Church discipline, or the sacrament looked emphatically behind the Reformation. Taking their stand on the conception of a Church-State, the new controversialists challenged the whole course of recent history. The Tories and Churchmen were not, they strenuously argued, only a 'party'; on the contrary, and as opposed to others, they were 'on the advantage ground of being established by the laws and incorporated into the government'.¹ The Toleration Act had not, Atterbury said in the speech he wrote for Sacheverell, 'altered the nature of schism'; and the 'indulgence', which had eased their bodies and estates, could not clear the Dissenters from the wrath of God.

The Erastian Whig establishment thus brought into the field the eternal question of Church and State. Convocation, which was brought back to life as we have seen in 1701, for the next ten years under the angry star of Atterbury pitched the lower clergy in an armed camp against the bishops led by Tenison and Burnet. Not content to inflame opinion by attacking 'schismatic' schools or prosecuting rationalist books, they challenged the bishops by insisting upon the Lower House's autonomous rights, and brandished the *praemunientes* clause in the face of Government. The long literary controversy between the Erastians Wake and Hoadley against Atterbury and Charles Leslie sharpened and illuminated the ultimate question. 'A canon', Wake said, 'is but as matter prepared for the royal stamp': against such naked Erastianism, the High Churchmen preached the Church divine, organic, and self-governing—the *societas perfecta*, which was founded upon a rock.

¹ Rochester; third dedication to Clarendon's *History*.

The Church, in short, whether Catholic or purely Anglican, was the ark of those causes which had made seventeenth-century Royalism. The Whig flood had covered the earth, but she still rode the deep waters, sending out no olive branch, but making herself ready for battle. In an age largely illiterate, the Church's psychological power was still formidable. In her pulpits rested a potent means of leading the people, and at every election managers of all parties canvassed the bishops for assistance. But persuasion to vote Whig was with the great mass of parish priests simply labour thrown away, and one of his archdeacons warned the active Wake that the cry of 'the Church in danger' would inevitably follow any pressure put on his clergy to support the Russells and Whartons; 'should I once set up to prescribe in matters of elections, I should only stir a nest of hornets'.¹

In December 1709 the Government, less wise than the archdeacon, themselves stirred up the hornets' nest by resolving on the impeachment of Dr. Sacheverell. Wharton was understood to be the guiding spirit, and Tories believed that the Whig scheme was to break down thereby any possible bridges between Godolphin and the Tories, and then to evict the Treasurer ignominiously.² The Doctor's famous sermon,³ preached on the text 'In perils among false brethren' before the Lord Mayor at St. Paul's, only reproduced with greater insolence the ordinary interpretation of the highflyer school. The 'odious and unjustifiable' method of the Revolution, the wrongfulness of resistance, the sin of toleration, the treachery of false friends like Volpone (Godolphin)—all this had been printed in innumerable pamphlets, and was interminably discussed in every Common-room.

But the true significance of the Sacheverell triumph was not in the least a triumph for Sacheverell's views, and the line taken by Harcourt and the Tory managers at the trial mark, as we shall see, a very different brand of Toryism. The trial was merely the match that fired the train for the Whigs'

¹ The Archdeacon of Bucks. to Bishop Wake, 29 Dec. 1707 (Ch.Ch. Wake MSS. 234).

² Auditor Harley, Portland, v. 649; Hardwicke's note on Burnet, v. 435.

³ By June 1710 printed in German, and on sale at Bergen, Dropmore papers, i.

destruction—the explosive matter for which they had themselves long before accumulated. St. Andrew's, Holborn, was the best reward the Tories ever gave to their champion, and the passions he had roused were merely harnessed to the political chariot wheels of that eminent 'occasional conformist', Robert Harley.

From the moment of his fall in February 1708 Harley's thoughts were clearly turned towards reconstruction. In this he had one invaluable asset, since the Queen had refused to dismiss his fellow conspirator, Abigail Masham, and while this determined woman retained favour, the resurrection of Harleyism was always possible. With her he never lost contact; through her brother, Colonel Hill, or her maid, or by Windsor under-gardeners, he sent injunctions of caution to the Queen, suggestions that Rochester should be humoured, or a new bishop carefully chosen. But great though Abigail's influence was, it need not be exaggerated: over and over again she lamented the Queen's refusal to be hurried, and if she was a necessary condition, she was never the ultimate factor in Harley's triumph.

That must depend upon the politicians, and here, characteristically enough, he turned first to the middle school. Shrewsbury had been offered place by Godolphin in 1702 and again near the end of 1705, but all these years he had been abroad—nursing his health, making long stays at Rome and Paris, and finally entangling himself in marriage with a dangerous widow, the Marchesa Paleotti, whose manners and diversions threw some ridicule round the last years of 'the King of Hearts'. Somers and Halifax had vainly tried to win his co-operation, and Whig disappointment or resentment showed itself in rumours that he was caballing with France for a peace, intriguing with Saint-Germain, or converted to the Roman faith.¹

Early in 1706 he returned to England to become once more that mystery-man of politics, the hermit of the Cotswolds. In the winter of 1707-8 both Harley and Marlborough had

¹ Godolphin to Shrewsbury, 5 April 1702 (Coxe, *Shrewsbury*, q.v. for letters of the Whig leaders); Marlborough to Godolphin, 15 Nov. 1705 (Coxe, *Marlborough*), Godolphin to the Queen, 15 April 1710, in Elliot's *Godolphin*.

made some approaches to him : at that date he was sceptical of reunion between the Godolphin group and the Junto, and expressed the safe opinion, that 'men of moderation should be employed'.¹ In the spring of 1708 the Junto apparently declined his wish to become Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland : in any case, it is certain that his intimacy with Harley began seriously in that May, and developed during the next eighteen months into a full understanding.² Meantime Harley kept up his old friendship with Newcastle and Poulett. With Lord Rivers, a Whig general who considered that he had been sacrificed in Spain to the Junto's favourite Galway, he cemented a firm alliance ; in fact, Rivers's nomination to be Constable of the Tower, in January 1710, was one of the first open marks of Harley's near approach to power. With the great Scottish peers, who were alienated from the Junto by their patronage of the 'Squadron' and by Sunderland's extravagances, he was quietly building up a connexion.

But, after all, the House of Commons, the source of his influence, must be the chief scene of his operations. There the Coalition was dissolved, the Whigs were enthroned, and there was no hope of immediate salvation by pressure from the Queen. There remained the Tories, the 'hot' men he had led in 1701 and whom he had left in 1704—whose *odium theologicum* he despised, whose 'Billingsgate' minds he had often derided, from whose efforts to use him for their own narrow ends he had once already broken away. But now the tables were turned. They were in a hopeless minority, and he alone could regain for them the Queen's ear : could not he build on this basis a new coalition, led by plain Robert Harley and dedicated to serve the interests of the Queen, the peace, and the succession ?

On the high Tory side, and from a very different angle, there was hardly a doubt as to the expediency of reunion. It would add to their thin front bench three leaders of great experience and debating power, in Harley, St. John, and Harcourt, and leaders, moreover, who would bring with them welcome reinforcement in Mansell, the Foleys, and another twenty or

¹ To Buckingham, 8 Dec. 1707 (Montagu House papers).

² Torcy, *Journal* (ed. Masson, 1884), 352.

thirty votes. If the cards were played well, the back-benchers argued, 'Robin the Trickster' should be at their mercy: his tried pilotage must take the ship to sea, but when it reached open waters, he must take his sailing orders from the saloon.

In 1708, then, everything pointed to fusion: 'I do not take Mr. Bromley for a great negotiator,' wrote Marlborough, 'but a less able man than himself will reconcile Lord Rochester and Mr. Harley at this time.' Therein he under-estimated his man, for Bromley, though a trifle stiff, as befitted a senior burgess for the University of Oxford, was certainly downright and above artifice. His reply to Harley's first vague approaches was crisp and almost brutal. Without reproach, he asked leave to apply to Harley the blasphemous protest of a Puritan preacher in the Civil War: 'Oh God! many are the hands that are lift up against us, but there is one God, it is Thou Thyself, O Father, who has done us more mischief than they all.' He agreed with Harley that matters of general importance must be raised in Parliament to arrest the nation's attention, 'but you must allow me to say this description is very general', and when they met on the eve of the session, 'I hope you will be more free and open, which will be necessary to unite us.'¹

On the necessity of thorough union, St. John was simultaneously spurring his leader with epistles from Bucklersbury. There, five-and-twenty miles from Windsor, still on good terms with his long-suffering wife, the rejected candidate had retired, rather freely congratulating himself to his friends on this new freedom: his books, his horses, his dogs—what could a man want more? 'Three years time to live to myself, which is a blessing I never yet enjoyed.' But, for an eremite, his political appetite was extraordinarily active, and grew with events. In another year he had begun, as Marlborough sardonically wrote, 'to entertain more favourable thoughts of the world', clearly unprepared, as he wrote himself, 'to sit still', and promising, if occasion offered, to 'make no despicable figure'.²

¹ Marlborough to the Duchess, 23 Aug. (Coxe); Bromley to Harley, 18 Sept. 1708 (Portland, iv).

² St. John to James Graham, 18 July and 16 Sept. (Bagot papers); Marlborough to St. John, 14 Oct. 1709 (Macknight).

In 1708 he advised Harley that, to redeem them 'from more than Egyptian bondage', there was but one way. The Queen's weakness in the winter had proved that she could not be counted on. 'There is no hope I am fully convinced but in the Church of England party, nor in that on the foot it now stands, and without more confidence than is yet re-established between them and us.' He must 'gain Bromley entirely'; 'you broke the party, unite it again': 'you will have it in your power by reasonable measures to lead them to reasonable ends'. 'No one living', he added, was in such a position as Harley to save the public, but not the least progress could be made, 'unless a number of gentlemen be satisfied of their danger, unless they be convinced that to preserve themselves they must follow you, unless you inspire your party with industry and courage, which at present seems only to be possessed by the factions, and with as much of that virtuous love of the country as this vile generation is capable of receiving and which at present seems not to have the least share in the guidance of any side. The fiery trial of affliction has made the gentlemen of the Church of England more prepared to form such a party than from their former conduct it might have been expected.'¹

Harley did not wait for such injunctions, and had already pledged both Harcourt and himself to support the nomination of Bromley for the Speakership. But this, perhaps owing to some tendency in others to back the more moderate Hanmer, never got beyond good wishes,² and against the large Whig majority in the new House of Commons the exploits of the new joint Opposition, during the session of 1708-9, were not impressive. Still, on two election petitions, which unseated two of Harley's immediate followers, Harcourt and Winnington, and on an attempt to revive the Greg revelations against him, Bromley and his Tories gave loyal support. By skilfully angling for the Scottish vote, they ran the Government majority down to six on the Scottish Treason Bill; they kept ministers on the *qui vive* by threatening motions to bring over the Hanoverian successor, and they turned a vote of thanks to General Webb of Wynendael fame into a demonstration

¹ St. John to Harley, 11 Oct. and 6 Nov. 1708 (Bath, i).

² Harley to Harcourt, 16 Oct. (*ibid.*); Tindal,

against Marlborough's avarice. They had, too, the complete satisfaction of seeing the Whigs, acting as 'superannuated women rather than senators',¹ finally outrage Anne by begging her to consider a second marriage.

To St. John the progress made in the summer of 1709 appeared painfully slow, but in point of fact Harley was, after his kind, constructing a real Opposition. Mrs. Masham was employed to reintroduce Rochester's merits to the Queen, the tub-thumping Lord Haversham pledged his support, George Granville and Mansell were doing yeoman work in sounding the unconverted.

And now, with the new year of 1710, the great moment had arrived. In January, roused by the Queen's command to give Abigail's brother a regiment, Marlborough presented the Queen with the alternatives of her favourite's dismissal or his own. The Ministry, riddled by the feuds of the last two years, fell into fragments. To the Duke's indignation, Somers and Cowper refused to support him, and even Godolphin hesitatingly took their side. Sunderland and Walpole wanted an address against Abigail from the Commons, but in the House the Queen's servants, on this as on every other matter, were in open disagreement—Walpole and Vice-Chamberlain Coke (St. John's friend) giving flatly contradictory versions of Her Majesty's feelings. The Queen's hostility to the Duke was further marked in February, when both Houses asked her to send him back to take charge of the peace negotiations. Godolphin had drafted an answer in flaming language, recognizing Marlborough as 'God Almighty's chief instrument of my glory and my people's happiness', but the Queen amended it to the flat key, of 'a just sense' of Marlborough's 'eminent services'.

All that month, and all March, the Sacheverell trial roused party feeling to its climax. The scene was Westminster Hall, Wren had planned the seating, and, in the arena where Strafford had pleaded for Monarchy, the great matter of the Revolution was argued out again for posterity. Two generations there met to dissect the motives and consequences of the work they, and their fathers, had accomplished. Two future Prime

¹ Abigail to Edward Harley, 7 Feb. 1709 (P. iv.).

Ministers, Walpole and Spencer Compton, presented arguments on which Burnet and Wharton fixed the stamp of veteran Whig authority: Harcourt's oratory in defence¹ put the classic case for the new Tory school, and the old Duke of Leeds, moved to tears, justified in these last months of his life the distinction between a necessary revolution and the abstract right of resistance. The greatest ladies of England fought for places at seven in the morning, and 'wet all their clean handkerchiefs' at the Doctor's final defence, which had been polished up for him by Atterbury, Friend, and the best brains of the High Church, and was declaimed from among a stalwart circle of the Queen's chaplains. Double guards at Whitehall and St. James's, the trained bands patrolling the precincts of Parliament, wild mobs sacking Dissenting chapels, and pressing to kiss their hero's hand as he drove each day from the Temple to Westminster—all these were signs that the long Whig day was nearing dusk. By seventeen votes only (69 to 52), the Lords declared Sacheverell guilty: by six, they suspended him from preaching for three years: by one, they rejected a motion to make him incapable of preferment for the same period. His procession to his new Shropshire living, by way of Oxford and Worcester, brought out thousands of horsemen, bonfires, bells, and flowers on King Charles's statues. Great crowds welcomed Harcourt on circuit at Hereford and Shrewsbury.

Nerved by this proof of popular feeling, in April the Queen struck the first of three mighty blows, and appointed Shrewsbury Lord Chamberlain in place of the colourless Marquis of Kent. The second followed on the 13th June, when Sunderland was dismissed; the third on the 7th August, when the white staff was taken from Godolphin. Two factors explain the gradual nature of this process: it was necessary to widen and apply the quarrels in the Whig party, and, again, time was needed to form a Government which would be agreeable alike to the Queen, Harley, and the Tories. The mere destructive work was comparatively easy. Godolphin's 'slowness and coldness' were terrible to men of action like Sunderland and Walpole, and the long-sown distrust between his interest and

¹ 'He had the greatest skill and power of speech of any man I ever knew in a public assembly'. Speaker Onslow.

the Junto now bore fruit. If it is amazing that Shrewsbury's professions of moderation deceived Godolphin, it is still more extraordinary that the Whig leaders allowed Sunderland to fall without an effort; Walpole alone seems to have looked further ahead, and was emphatic that it must end in 'the dissolution of this parliament and in the destruction of the Whigs'.¹

In one thing only they agreed—on the necessity of Marlborough not resigning his command; but, politically, they were ready to sacrifice both Duke and Treasurer, if this would preserve office for themselves. Somers on the 24th June accepted another *douceur* of £1,000 from the secret service money, continued for six weeks after Godolphin's fall to hope for office, and only resigned on the 19th September. Halifax was deeply committed to Harley, Orford wanted a garter, Newcastle wished to keep his place, even Wharton nibbled at the bait dangled by Abigail. Argyll and Somerset had long shown their patrician jealousy of the Junto, and a body of Whig commoners, led by Richard Hampden, had promised Somerset support.²

On all this liquid mass of faction the art of Harley played like vinegar on oil, and the Whigs' blind confidence, that he could not weather the difficulties of management, materially helped him to succeed. Tactically, a slow and gradual process was essential, if public credit was to be maintained, and if many waverers were to be won. Too pronounced a Tory line would alienate some of his most powerful forces: Argyll, for instance, had refused to vote for the complete acquittal of Sacheverell, on the express ground that this would tend to 'promote a high Tory scheme',³ and the tiresome Somerset had to be humoured, at least so long as he could be of use in ejecting the Junto.

But, tactics apart, there can be no doubt of Harley's genuine wish to form a Government of Moderates. His closest correspondent, Newcastle, on whose daughter and heiress he was

¹ Sunderland to Marlborough, 21 Feb. (Coxe); Walpole to the same, 6 June (Coxe, *Walpole*).

² Coxe, iii, *passim*; St. John to Harley, 8 March (Portland, iv); Harley to Newcastle, 5 Aug. et seq. (P. ii); Leadam, 160 n.

³ Orrery to Harley, 14 March (P. iv).

keeping a solicitous eye in his son's interest, was a vapouring and wealthy Whig, whose test of a Ministry's principles was the degree of its dependence upon himself. He now put forward Moderation as the policy, and he it was who, after Sunderland's fall, introduced the Bank of England's directors to the Queen, to deprecate in the interests of public credit any further Cabinet changes and, above all, any talk of dissolving Parliament. And overwhelmingly positive evidence shows that originally Harley was determined to build his Ministry on what Defoe called 'those blessed mediums of this nation's happiness which lie between the wild extremes of all parties'.¹ The first man to whom he offered Sunderland's place was Poulett, his old ally in the West Country against Seymour; the man appointed, Dartmouth, was a firm Tory, but one congenial to the Hanoverians and approved by Somerset. He begged Boyle to cut himself off from Godolphin and to continue in office.² He asked Cowper to keep the Lord Chancellorship; Harcourt, as late as the 16th September, was still only Attorney-General and made Lord Keeper only after Cowper's definite resignation. Even before appointing Harcourt, Harley repeatedly pressed the non-party Trevor to take the Seal. He tried to induce Shrewsbury himself to be Lord Treasurer and, failing that, offered places in the commission to Hanmer and to Richard Hampden. The Treasury Commission actually appointed (9th August) was Harleyite in the extreme: it included Poulett as First Lord, Harley as Chancellor of the Exchequer, his friend Mansell, Paget, a client of Newcastle, and Benson, a very watery Tory who followed Dartmouth. Even then the Whig Smith, late Chancellor of the Exchequer, was given the pleasant work of Teller.³ Walpole was approached, and continued in his work as Treasurer of the Navy till January 1711. An

¹ Halifax to Newcastle, 8 July (P. 11); Harley to A. Moore, 19 June (ibid., iv); Defoe to Harley, 17 July (ibid.).

² Poulett to Harley, 7 June (ibid.); Wentworth to Raby, 12 June and 18 July; Shrewsbury to Dartmouth, June, Electress Sophia to Dartmouth, 2 Sept., Jersey to Dartmouth, 8 Sept. (Dartmouth papers, i); Harley to Newcastle, 12 Sept. (P. 11).

³ Harley to Newcastle, 16 Sept. (P. 11); Trevor to Harley, 22 Sept. and 8 Oct. (P. 14); Shrewsbury to Harley, endorsed 22 July (Bath, i); Wentworth papers for Aug.; *Hanmer Corr* (ed. Bunbury, 1838); Luttrell, Cowper's *Diary* (Roxburghe Club, 1849).

inspired pamphlet, *Faults on Both Sides*, generally ascribed to some scribe of Harley's, most emphatically asserted the broad Whig principles, even while it belaboured the Whig politicians.

All through June and July conferences continued, in which Harley and Dartmouth took the leading part on one side, Halifax and Cowper on the other, with Newcastle (who was detained at Welbeck by 'a difficulty of breathing') throwing in peaceful advice by every post. Apart from a considerable amount of personal insincerity, in which both documentary evidence and later tradition brand Halifax as particularly guilty, the greatest apple of discord was the question of dissolution. Both Whigs and Moderates were anxious to avoid it, for a big Tory landslide at the polls was looked on as certain. But the Whigs' vague professions, and even more the hostility of their friends, the City financiers, seem to have convinced Harley that his new Ministry could not carry on with the old Parliament: average Tory opinion in England and Scotland was loudly calling for an end of it, and, indeed, many Whigs recognized that only a dissolution could end the present maddening uncertainty. Somers, who had plainly agreed to Godolphin's removal, finally set his face against dissolution, but by the middle of August at latest Harley had made it clear that on this he could not yield. In the first week of September a first crop of changes in the Lord-Lieutenants showed the elections were near: the replacement of Godolphin by Rochester in Cornwall, even more that of the true Whig Duke of Bolton in Hampshire by the Tory Duke of Beaufort, were clear portents.¹ All efforts to renew the conferences, after Godolphin's fall in August, broke down. Wharton was now insistent against accommodation, and many Whigs thought Harley's Government could never last, while Godolphin, still completely confident of 'a very good' new Parliament, did all he could to induce the Whigs to resign. Most important of all, Harley's Tory followers were restless and indignant, and some of his immediate circle had made this plain.

¹ Luttrell; Corr. in P. ii and iv between Harley, Somers, Cowper, Halifax, and Newcastle; Hanmer to Prior, 15/26 June (Bath, iii); Wentworth papers; Horace to Robert Walpole, 18 Aug. N. S. (Coxe).

As early as March St. John, in discussing the distribution of office in the Ministry even then being planned, suggested that he himself had claims to something better this time than the Secretaryship at War, and by August his pretensions to be Secretary of State were recognized.¹ In June an extremely outspoken and manly letter from Poulett insisted that 'the Tories must be united', and begged Harley not to sacrifice this essential 'for a Duke of Newcastle, who quietly parted with you in danger and disgrace'. Poulett himself, partly for the very reason that he was looked on as too near to Harley, refused to accept Sunderland's Secretaryship, and urged the appointment of Anglesey, who was in fact the popular Tory candidate. 'Half a score half-crown Whigs', he wrote, would make up the loss of Newcastle.²

A fortnight later Harcourt was saying that something must be done to satisfy 'the Church of England' of the Queen's intentions: 'the Duke of Newcastle's friends have made such an impression as is not to be wiped off, but by facts'. All through the summer reports were current of Rochester's discontent, and that the long delays were due to disagreement between him and Harley as to the allotment of places: Harley's friends, meantime, clearly took it for granted that he did not mean 'to fling more power into my Lord Rochester's hands than was absolutely necessary'. The rift threatened to grow. The Dean of Christ Church told his friends to put no trust in Harley, 'that spawn of a Presbyterian', and the Duke of Rutland over his second bottle launched out in public against 'Robin the Trickster'. Bromley spoke for a dozen others in clamouring for more rapid changes in the Lord-Lieutenancies. Harley's son-in-law Dupplin wrote that Tories in Scotland felt like 'a brave, numerous, bold army, without a commander to give them orders', and he was by no means alone in blaming the 'slowness at London'. The whole party were demanding

¹ Onslow's note on Burnet, vi. 13; Auditor Harley's account, P. v. 650; Godolphin to Seafield, 13 Sept. (Seafield papers); Stratford to E. Harley, 17 Aug. (P. vii).

² Poulett to Harley, 7 June, and Dartmouth's note on Burnet, vi. 9. To Godolphin, Poulett took a different line and made the old Treasurer's disapproval the ground of his action—surely most improbable; meanwhile, he told his friends that 'a porter's life is a better thing' (Rutland papers, ii. 190).

dissolution : in the constituencies they began to set up ' rigids ', who disclaimed all idea of a new Coalition, and from the North, East Anglia, and Lancashire experienced members plied Harley with guarantees that, given a clear lead, a safe Tory majority was assured. A cloud of loyal addresses had filled the *Gazette* for months past, and the Tory fever in the country, coupled with the Whigs' distrustful jealousy, decided Shrewsbury and Harley to take the plunge.¹ On the 21st September the royal proclamation dissolved Parliament. Simultaneously, Rochester succeeded to Somers as Lord President, Buckingham to Devonshire as Lord Steward, and St. John to Boyle as Secretary.

At what exact date the final bargain was struck must remain uncertain. We may assume that a dissolution was really settled early in August, but a great mass of evidence, as we have tried to show, tends to the conclusion that, only with reluctance and as a second best, did Harley and Shrewsbury come to terms with the right wing : perhaps it was only after the last long conference of Rochester with the Queen²—at which, it was understood, he urged the impossibility of coalition. As it was, the prospects before the ministers were a repetition of those of 1705, but exactly reversed ; instead of the Tories it was now the Whigs who were desperate and distrustful, and instead of the Whigs, it was now the Tories who were offering their support and on the crest of the wave.

The high hopes which the Tory electioneers had held out were this time actually fulfilled. Some two hundred and seventy members lost their seats, and among them the foremost in every section of the Whigs. The ex-Speaker, Onslow, was beaten in Surrey. The Harleys ousted their old rival Coningsby from Leominster. Wharton's candidates failed to a man in Buckinghamshire, Stanhope was beaten at Westminster, four Tories carried all the City seats. In Cornwall they achieved a ' complete victory '.

Even in early August the Whig grandees—a decisive factor perhaps in Harley's orientation—had begun to concert an

¹ Harcourt, 21 June, Monckton, 21 Aug., Orrery, 29 Sept., Bromley, 12 Aug., Dupplin, 13 Aug.—to Harley (P. iv) ; Wentworth to Raby, 12 June—31 Oct.

² Hoffmann, 19/30 Sept.

independent electoral campaign, which was a bad omen for the prospects of coalition. Newcastle's agents assisted Stanhope at Westminster, and set up 'junto' candidates in the Midlands: Sunderland had urged him to refuse his influence to all candidates who had been 'crying up the hereditary right'. Somerset, whose hostility was declared by August, left London the very night of the dissolution, far too angry to have supper, and vowing 'to keep out as many Tories and Jacobites in this new Parliament as I can'.¹

But 'the Sovereign' lost all his pocket boroughs in Wiltshire and Sussex, and the opposition was compared to a man trying to stop the Thames at London Bridge with his thumb. On this high sentimental tide even Jacobites like young Oglethorpe or William Shippen were floated into Parliament. True, Harley's assurances of moderation, spread by agents like Defoe, and the steps taken to suppress fanatic Tory preachers, bore fruit in a big Dissenting vote cast for the new Government, but that was the minor key. The major was 'huzzas for the Queen, Church, prosperity and success to the new faithful ministry', and 'a violent torrent against everything that did smell of low Church'. Swift rather optimistically put the proportions elected at six Tories to one Whig; but even if the figures were really more like three to one, the Tories came back confident in a comfortable majority, recalling the good days of 1702.

What would Robin, 'to whose indefatigable diligence and industry and wonderful intelligence is owing all this turn', do with the giant he had roused from sleep? ²

¹ Sunderland to Newcastle, 31 Aug. (B. M. Lansdowne MSS. 1236, f. 255); Somerset to Newcastle, 27 Sept. (P. II), and see P. IV, *passim*; *Corr.*, I. 3.

² Wentworth to Raby, 27 Oct; Beaufort to Harley, 23 Sept.; Christ Church Wake MSS. 31 Oct; Joanna Cutts to —(?) , Aug. (Frankland-Astley papers); an analysis of the electoral results by W. T. Morgan in the *American Political Science Quarterly*, Dec. 1922.

XVI

THE GREAT MINISTRY, 1710-14

THE curtain had thus risen on a scene brilliant and triumphant: it was to drop less than four years later amid inexpressible dreariness.

In accounting for that transformation one cause will be found ever present—the fact, which we must emphasize at the outset, that the Ministry of 1710 was always a Coalition. Shrewsbury stood in a class by himself: Harley, Harcourt, and St. John had been members of the previous coalition; Poulett was more Harleyite than his leader: Newcastle was a Whig, Dartmouth was a moderate Tory, while Buckingham had deserted all parties so frequently that he was reckoned either outside party or below it.

Only Ormonde, the new Lord-Lieutenant, and the septuagenarian Rochester stood for the pure Tory creed. As far back as May the Queen had refused to hear of Nottingham; she had never forgiven his advocacy of the Hanoverians and to her he was reckoned as ‘personally disagreeable’.¹ Jersey was a parallel case. A staunch Tory and head of a great Court family, he pressed once and again his claims to office, partly, we may suspect, to pay his everlasting debts. The Queen objected; popular rumour branded Jersey as a Jacobite, and for another year he was kept out. Incidentally, the whole tone of his correspondence with Harley at the time is an odd commentary on the allegation conveyed to the French court by Gaultier, and repeated by later historians, that Jersey, this suspect Jacobite, was a power in the inner counsels of Harley and St. John.

Even Rochester, there is good ground for saying, showed more moderation in this last year of his life than in all his previous forty years of politics. The Electress Sophia had

¹ Dartmouth's note on Burnet, vi. 9; St. John to Orrery, 20 July 1711 (*Corr.*).

a high opinion of him, on the characteristic grounds that 'he had plenty of *esprit* and was no way a republican', and to the greatness of his contribution 'to keep things steady' during the winter of 1710-11 there is evidence from all quarters. In the last month of his life he is found opposing the dismissal of Marlborough and supporting Harley against St. John; he died on the 2nd May, active to the last, within an hour of first feeling ill, as the City bells were ringing to celebrate the passage through the House of Commons of Harley's scheme to redeem the National Debt.¹

Nor did the reshuffle of 1711, partly consequent on the deaths of Rochester and of Newcastle, reveal any change of mind in the Queen and her intimate advisers. On the contrary, Harley's elevation to be Lord Treasurer was the crowning triumph of the policy he represented, and he was succeeded as Chancellor of the Exchequer by Benson—a *parvenu*, a giver of excellent dinners, and a recent convert to the moderate Toryism of his brother-in-law Dartmouth. The promotion of 'John of Bucks' to be Lord President meant nothing: 'You may always turn him out', said Poulett, 'without offence to either party.' Poulett himself succeeded Buckingham as Lord Steward. Jersey, who indeed had served King William faithfully, after standing in a white sheet for a season to clear himself of Jacobitism, was nominated as Privy Seal, and on his sudden death was replaced by the staid and neutral diplomat, John Robinson, Bishop of Bristol.²

Nottingham's claims were once more canvassed, and again rejected. Some time in the winter of 1710-11 he had attended a meeting of the principal ministers and urged the taking of drastic steps to prevent a Whig revival: Sunderland, he suggested for one, should be impeached.³ In what Harley endorsed as 'a prudent letter', Poulett (like Dartmouth) protested against such a policy, and the man who voiced it.

¹ Ward, *Electress Sophia* (2nd ed.), 382 n.; King to Swift, 15 May 1711; St. John to Drummond, 28 Nov. 1710 (*Corr.*); George Clarke's autobiography in the Leyborne-Popham papers; Harley's account, written in June 1714 (P. v); Wentworth papers, *passim*; Bothmar's dispatches in Saloman, from the Hanover archives; Cowper, *Diary* (Roxburghe Club, 1849).

² 'Bonhomme, simple, adroit': Gaultier, Jan. 1712 (Weber, from *Archiv. Étr.*).

³ Dartmouth's note on Burnet, vi. 41.

'The credit of Rochester's confidence and friendship remains alive in you', he wrote to Harley, but Nottingham 'is party sense in person without respect to the reasons of things, whereas you cannot keep the Tories on their legs as Tories but only as you make them your own followers. Nottingham has undone them once and you have saved them': if he enters the Cabinet, 'he oversets the balance, you can no more raise the scales again.'

The Queen, Swift wrote later, had determined to form 'a moderate or comprehensive scheme', Harley was pledged in the same sense, and with this objective of reconciliation 'upon a national foot' it is clear that the principal ministerial arrangements of 1710-12 never conflicted.¹ The changes in the minor offices lagged, too, far behind Tory wishes: the Whigs John Holland and Lord Cholmondeley went on, for a year and two years respectively, quietly enough as Comptroller and Treasurer of the Queen's Household, and the Paymaster-General Brydges, Pope's 'gracious Chandos', was retained in office through the friendship of Shrewsbury and St. John.

Much more important were the attempts made in 1710-11 to put the Ministry upon a really broader foundation. In the summer of 1711 the first of many flattering offers was made to Sir Thomas Hanmer—husband of that Duchess of Grafton, Arlington's daughter, who amused the Court of Queen Anne by her Restoration coiffures, and himself a most superior person who affected contempt for politics and a zeal for polite learning. He was fast rising to be an unofficial leader in the Commons, who liked his stately and prepared orations, and even at this time he was a 'Whimsical', that is, a candid friend of any and every administration. But his oratorical prestige would be an asset, his zeal for the House of Hanover was known, and his refusal to accept office a distinct blow.²

The attitude of ministers towards the outstanding figure of Marlborough is of vital importance. His name alone would be to the Allies a guarantee of British stability far better than

¹ Poulett to Harley, 18 April and 4 May, 1711 (P. iv); Swift, 'An Enquiry into the behaviour of the Queen's last Ministry'; Harley to Newcastle, 14 Sept. 1710 (P. ii).

² *Bolingbroke Corr.*, i. 171; Wentworth papers and *Stella*, *passim*.

any Bank of England, while a resignation of his war command might well shatter the Government. The great Duke's own sentiments on this dilemma shine through his confused letters. To cling to his command might save his Duchess, finish the building of Blenheim, maintain the Grand Alliance, and crown his glory. 'I detest Mr. Harley', he told his wife, but he could swallow this detestation—indeed he was prepared to swallow most things, even Sarah's dismissal from the Bed-chamber, which happened at last in January—if the great objects of his heart, public and private, could be saved from the wreckage of the Whig Ministry. From the first, however, Harley doubted the possibility of a thorough reconciliation with the Marlboroughs.¹ His first overtures in the summer had been coldly received, and union with Marlborough meant, moreover, instant alienation of his military rivals Orrery and Argyll, whose Parliamentary interest was of importance. 'The breaking our army and restoring the civil power' was taken by his closest confidant, many years later, to be Harley's best epitaph,² and it is certain that no minister of his purely civilian temperament could have long acquiesced in the military dictatorship of Marlborough and the arrogant language of his underlings. But he and his wisest advisers, eminently Swift, were satisfied that to neutralize Marlborough was good policy; he must be taught the measure of the new régime, but not driven to desperation, unless he proved unexpectedly obstinate.

The first weapon used in these tactics was intimidation. In the *Examiner*, the 'infamous print'³ which, the Duke complained, stabbed him to the heart, Swift launched during November into attacks on Marlborough as a veteran Jacobite, and, looking back to Cromwell, lashed the Whig journals' boasts, that the Whig army would yet retrieve the defeat of the Whig electioneers. 'Whence came this wonderful sympathy', the writer asked, 'between the civil and the military powers? Will the troops in Flanders refuse to fight, unless they can have their own Lord Keeper, their own Lord President

¹ Harley to Newcastle, 29 Dec. (P. 11); to Drummond, 7 Nov. (P. 14).

² Lewis to Swift, 4 Aug. 1737.

³ Duchess of Marlborough to Godolphin, n. d. 1710-11 (B. M. Add. MSS. 28057).

of the Council, their own chief governor of Ireland and their own Parliament?' In the letters which St. John wrote to his agent Drummond at The Hague (and Drummond was seeing Marlborough constantly and pressing reconciliation upon Harley), he threw out similar threats, which yet had in them a strong blend of entreaty. He detailed the provocations received—the Duchess's threat to print the Queen's letters, the drunken exploits of the three generals who had been cashiered for publicly drinking 'confusion to the Ministry', the Duke's efforts to save them, and his jealousy of military rivals. He must be made to realize that 'there can be no thoughts of returning now to Egyptian bondage'. He must 'begin entirely upon a new foot', surrender the politics of his wife and his Grand-Vizier notions, or else 'the moment he leaves the service and loses the protection of the Court, such scenes will open as no victories can varnish over'. Yet why does he trust to the Whigs? 'Who supported him in the King's time but we? Who gave my Lord Godolphin and himself a party in the beginning of the Queen's reign but we?'¹ It is at least clear that, in spite of many just provocations and the diatribes of both parties' journalists, ministers in the first half of 1711 made a serious effort to keep on decent terms with Marlborough. Money was forthcoming to continue the everlasting building at Blenheim, and his friends still in the Ministry, Craggs and Brydges, were employed to bridge the gulf. The *Examiner* openly appealed to him to come to terms, and there was a common impression in London that all might yet go smoothly.²

The ministers' first object, that Marlborough should keep his command pending the secret conclusion of the peace preliminaries, was thus (though by no very honourable means) achieved, and this perhaps was all Harley hoped for. In St. John there was probably a more genuine and more ambitious idea—to induce his old patron, his first model, the greatest Englishman of his time, to join the political train of Henry St. John. Certainly, in negotiations for reunion, he had gone

¹ *The Examiner*, 23 Nov. 1710, St. John to Drummond, Nov.—Jan. 1710-11 (Corr.).

² *Examiner*, 15 Feb. 1711, Wentworth papers, 177.

so far as to be suspected by the Tories of a secret agreement : in March 1711 he expressed the hope ' never to see again the time when I shall be obliged to embark in a separate interest from you ' : Craggs and he thought it easy to restore ' that confidence which is to be desired among people who can, and who, for the public good, should give the law ' : in May he told Cadogan he would wish to see ' unhappy distinctions . . . entirely buried '.¹ The differences in the Ministry, Swift reported in August, were partly over ' their notions of a certain general '.

Yet whatever the truth of this hypothesis—and a firm tradition of Bolingbroke's approaches to Marlborough in 1714 would support it—the breach between Harley's Government and the Duke was as inevitable as things can be in politics, for ten years of faction and two furious women were behind it : with every step towards the Peace of Utrecht it widened, and the winter of 1711-12 made it complete.²

But if Harley had never seriously meant this particular measure of reunion, other experiments in ' moderation ' were a persistent feature of his Ministry. The ostentatious pains taken to placate the Hanoverians, the emphasis placed in the royal speech on the Act of Toleration, the damping down of the Commons' bills for resumptions and reprisals, were all part and parcel of the scheme. Most interesting of all was the line taken by what may be called the official organ, the *Examiner*, which, under Swift's editorship, was the life of Tory politics during the first half of 1711, and was read aloud to village congregations by country clergy. In high relief the editor set the crimes of the Junto Whigs—their wanton prolongation of a costly war, their oppression of the Queen and her prerogative, the humiliation of the Church, the subjecting of Great Britain to Dutch interests and of landed gentry to profiteers, the unholy union of atheists with Presbyterians, and of grandees with democracy against the old English constitution. But even in the *Examiner*, as in his semi-official correspondence,³ Swift now and then sounded a different note, and stated the

¹ *Stella*, 25 Jan and 20 Oct. 1711, 31 Dec. 1710; St. John to Marlborough, 27 March, to Cadogan 1 May, 1711 (*Corr*).

² Swift to King, 26 Aug.; Burnet, vi 147, and notes.

³ e.g. to King, 19 Feb 1711.

new Tory political philosophy, which had been so clearly enunciated in Harcourt's arguments at the trial of Sacheverell. 'I am not sensible', he said in his issue of the 22nd March, 'of any material difference there is between those who call themselves the old Whigs, and a great majority of the present Tories.' Tory thought must not be judged 'from the writings or common talk of warm and ignorant men', and the passive obedience he would support was that due not to the sovereign alone, but to the whole legislature. In public and private the shrewdest heads of the party preached the doctrine of 'no other distinction, but for or against the government', the 'mighty difference between the politics before and since the Revolution, and how often he must be in the wrong who takes his measures of Whig and Tory now from what was the constitution of them at that time'.¹ More wrong, indeed, than perhaps the writers dreamed of, since in May at the latest the head of the Government reopened his long series of secret negotiations with the Whig Lord Halifax.

But, after all, a party is less usually wagged by its head than by its tail, and the great Tory majority returned at the election were distrustful of all moderation and, therefore, of at least half their leaders. It was generally suspected that ministers had done their best to prevent the election of too many Tories, and sharp warnings that this shilly-shallying must stop began with the first meeting of the new Parliament. The aged Duke of Leeds, mindful of the good days of 1675, painted for Harley the moral of the elections: 'if the Queen do not lay hold of this time both openly to encourage some of her friends and as openly to discourage some of her enemies, the last error will be worse than the first and past any possibility of remedy for the future.' Simultaneously the great disappointed—the whole flight of Finches (Nottingham, Guernsey, and Winchilsea), Jersey, Haversham, and Peterborough—were urging their own unimpeachable claims to office.²

The Tory majority was, besides, much too big, and was showing every symptom of this not uncommon party disease.

¹ Poulett to Harley, 4 May (P. 1v); St. John to Drummond, 10 April (*Corr.*).

² Leeds to Harley, 7 Dec., Winchilsea to the same, 15 Jan. 1710-11 (P. 1v); Shrewsbury to Harley, 20 Oct., 1710 (Bath, 1).

In addition to the dozens disappointed in the allotment of places, there was a chronic tendency to split between Right and Centre, which showed itself at the very opening of the session in a contest for the chairmanship of the important Committee on elections.¹ Before 1710 ended, the malcontents formed themselves into a separate organization, the October Club, made up mostly of new country members and reckoned to number 150.² It was a powerful unit, pledged to support as a body in the House what they had agreed to in caucus, insistent on calling the old Ministry to a reckoning and on the dismissal of every Whig from top to bottom. During the sessions they met nightly at a tavern in Westminster, dining at long tables and fomenting their passion on October ale. In sharp contrast to the Government's platform of 'moderation', the October men called for the impeachment of Godolphin and Wharton: threats of a dissolution left them unmoved, and they were not long in proving their independence. The ejection of two of Newcastle's candidates on election petitions (in one of which Harley opposed his party) showed the weak hold of 'moderation' on the Commons. The Club contrived, further, to procure the rejection of one important financial resolution, and to force through the Commons a bill to resume royal grants. Till the middle of 1711, at least, they kept up this hostile attitude—so much so that Swift refused to dine as their guest, as unbecoming an intimate of the ministers.

From the leaders' point of view this first session was a wretched business. Two pressing needs weighed upon them; to recover the finances, and to maintain a war system even in the act of making terms of peace. These needs in themselves involved an appeal to 'moderation'—for the City, our army of 250,000 men, and our Allies must not lose confidence in the British Government—and Harley's conduct of finance placed him high even in Whig opinion. Faced by an unsecured debt of nine and a half millions, he restored public credit, got the year's supplies and, assisted by the financial experience of Halifax, raised in two lotteries £3,500,000 secured by new duties on leather, hops, playing cards, and postage. For the

¹ Swift to King, 28 Nov.

² *Stella*, 13 April; Peter Wentworth, 20 Feb.

further liquidation of debt, he pledged the country to a new South Sea Company trading to the Spanish Indies—an arrangement which, incidentally, implied a friendly settlement with the ruler of Spain.¹

But if Harley had to struggle through the present and build for the future, the eyes of the October Club were glued on the glorious past, and a terrific series of recriminatory or punitive measures showed the Tories' resolution to break the hated Junto. Once more they raked up the grey ashes of the quarrel between Galway and Peterborough, once more they passed a bill to resume King William's grants: the Commons carried another to repeal the Naturalization Act, and condemned the Palatines' immigration as of 'dangerous consequence to the constitution in Church and State'. They set on foot yet another Place Bill, and carried into law their old favourite which established property qualification for their members, of £600 a year in land for a knight of the shire and £300 a year for a burgess. Finally, their Committee of Accounts reported in April, by most curious arithmetic, that thirty-five millions of public money still remained unaccounted for.

As the session wore on, without the clean sweep of Whigs long expected, the Right wing carried all before them, and the ballots for the Public Accounts and Resumption Bill committees resulted in lists which included the bitterest Tories or even Jacobites, like Lockhart, Shippen, and Hindo-Cotton. The last address of the session, under a guise of attacking the Junto, was really a declaration against the Prime Minister: 'wild and unwarrantable schemes of balancing parties', 'a false pretence of temper and moderation'—were not these the very kernel of Robin's system? And when the Place Bill, the Resumption Bill, and the Bill to repeal Naturalization were rejected or extinguished in the Lords, the wild men's suspicions of their leaders deepened into certainty. How far it was justified deserves closer examination. On one matter at least the Prime Minister was in entire accord with his followers. His brother Auditor Harley's activity in the House, the very

¹ Onslow's and Hardwicke's notes in Burnet, vi. 69; Halifax to Harley, 11 Feb. (P. iv); Auditor Harley's account, and Harley's own words, P. v. 464, 650.

language of his later patent of peerage—these and his constant rôle make it certain that he supported the inquiries made into the last Ministry's financial lapses. But he opposed the Place Bill on its first reading, as his friend Poulett did in the Lords: the Resumptions scheme did not originate as a Government measure: and the high Tories' general distrust of him was well grounded.¹

In St. John we can see, from the very beginning of this Parliament, a different vein working. True, he still spoke of 'the broad and generous principle', but he was clearly determined to build it, if at all, on a firm Tory foundation. The best of evidence shows that he furiously supported inquiries into the Junto's management. As to the bill for landed qualifications, which the Whigs feared might cost them two hundred members at the next election, he had taken charge of it for the Government, and in doing so indicted the moneyed men 'as an administration within an administration, a Junto'. He pressed on the Cabinet a project for the reversal of Sacheverell's impeachment, and fiercely attacked Somerset's opposition to it: 'hereafter,' he wrote to Harley, 'I hope good measures will not be neglected, or bad ones pursued, because he cannot be convinced.'² Under the glamour of promotion, conscious of that majority in the Commons waiting for the huntsman to hallo them on to game, St. John's never abundant bump of restraint began to fade away. Already in January he had brought forward his pet scheme for an expedition to Quebec, under the command of Abigail's brother, Colonel Hill; Harley, and ultimately Rochester, had disapproved, but during the former's illness the ardent Secretary had his own way with the Queen.³ In April his defence of his friend Brydges, the Paymaster-General, in the matter of the missing millions looked like a quixotic, but was really perhaps a calculated, indiscretion. Outside politics, his life at this time was hectic and vicious, his alternate moodiness and wild exhilaration

¹ P. Wentworth, 12 Dec.; E to A. Harley, 6 Feb. (P. iv), Coxe, iii. 396.

² St. John to Drummond, 12 Dec. 1710; to Harley, 5 Mar. 1711 (P. iv); Wentworth, 21 Dec., Townshend papers, 79; Swift, *History of the Last Four Years*.

³ St. John to Harley, 17 Jan. and 19 Apr. (P. iv); *ibid.*, v. 655 for Auditor Harley's charge, that St. John and Abigail had a financial interest in this expedition.

baffling his guests. Swift was trying to stop his potations of champagne and burgundy, and his oldest friends like Stratford, 'the fat Levite' of kindlier days, and now Canon of Christ Church, began to avoid a Cabinet minister who deserted a sick wife to chase women of the streets. But Sacheverell was bestowing blessings on St. John, 'that eminent patriot', and to this wayward dazzling figure men of action and men of prejudice began to look for a lead. The dullest October man was echoing Peterborough, 'tell St. John, he must find me work in the old world or the new'.¹

At a Cabinet meeting on the 8th March 1711 the blow was struck which decided the whole future of this Government. All the ministers except Shrewsbury were assembled at 3 o'clock in St. John's office at the Cockpit, to examine the emigré Marquis Guiscard on a charge of traitorous correspondence. Harley sat facing the window; the prisoner had been put behind him so that the light might fall on his face. Just as the messengers were being called in to remove him, Guiscard leaned over Harley and drove a penknife into his chest: blunted first by the heavily brocaded flowers on Harley's best blue and silver waistcoat (for it was the Queen's accession day), the point of the knife broke off on his breast-bone. St. John running bareheaded the whole way to St. James's Palace, Swift racing by chair from Golden Square to Harley's house, Argyll tearing up the Privy Garden—we find suddenly all political England converging on the sedan which, carrying the wounded minister (the only person entirely calm and collected), slowly wended home to Duke Street, Strand.

From his home he did not emerge at all for a month, and till May he was weak and feeble, naturally trying to avoid the strain of Cabinet meetings. In these two months of debility the political crisis, already urgent, reached its height. St. John tasted the sweets of leading the House of Commons, and was now for the first time, necessarily so in Harley's absence, admitted to the full secrets of the peace negotiations. The *Examiner*, with his connivance, declared that Guiscard had meant to murder him and not Harley, and St. John took no

¹ Swift to Argyll, 16 Apr.; Peterborough to Swift, 18 Apr.; Stratford to E. Harley, 12 Apr., et seq. (P. vii); Sacheverell to Swift, 31 Jan. 1712.

pains, in congenial company, to conceal his pride in this easy martyrdom. Meanwhile, everything showed that Harley alone had kept the House and the Government steady. The October Club played havoc with the Budget, and Harley's schemes for restoring the funds lay dormant. Against his wishes, St. John created and dispatched the expeditionary army of the St. Lawrence. In April the peace preliminaries were communicated to the Dutch, and the chances of peace or war turned on a hair. Both at home and abroad death was upsetting all human policies. The Emperor Joseph died on the 17th April (N.S.), and Rochester on the 2nd May. Harley was by admission of friend and foe the one man indispensable, and round the dumb oracle—who, old Leeds vowed, had 'a budget full of miracles upon all occasions'—played all the discordant voices of the Ministry.¹

Wounded by a French Papist while carrying the whole burden of the State upon his shoulders, Harley stood at this moment on the pinnacle of his prestige—the different factions striving at present not to dislodge him but to seize him as a hostage. Newcastle was insistent that Harley must be Treasurer and Prime Minister, for 'the security of the Protestant religion and the tranquillity of Europe'. Somers repeated the same to the Queen. Halifax declared the alternatives were 'a vigorous asserting of the Queen and her Government, or being lost for ever'. Shrewsbury acquiesced, and called for more removes. Poulett, as we have seen, implored Harley to stand out as head of a national government, and deprecated any changes of a Tory trend. Tories like Leeds and Anglesey begged Harley to proceed in the precisely opposite direction, and to complete his work in saving 'all your friends from the slavery we were under'. St. John said the crisis was as momentous as that of the previous August, and bitterly complained of the Prime Minister's 'terrible' silence since his illness: he alone was the channel of royal favour, and there must be 'perfect stagnation till he is pleased to open himself and set the water flowing'. Yet St. John, too,

¹ Salomon, 201 n.; Swift to King, 8 Mar.; Wentworth, 27 Mar.; Poulett to Oxford, Nov. 1711 (P. v); for Harley as 'the Sorcerer' see *Letters of Sarah Duchess of Marlborough*, from Madresfield Court MSS (1871)

clearly hoped that Harley would come down on the Tory side, as did the anxious Harcourt, who was pressing for big changes among the Lord-Lieutenants.¹ 'How to save the present Ministry' was engaging Swift in hard work every day. Every October man hoped for office, pinning their faith to St. John, their rising star. Others, and those 'not inconsiderable', declared for moderation, 'and would make fair weather in case of a change'. In April the dismissal of St. John from the Cabinet appeared as a near possibility, and a retrospective bitterness against his secret intrigues during this crisis comes out in Harley's later memoir of 1714. 'The contrivances carried on', he wrote, 'during his life's being despaired of are better forgotten than mentioned': to this resentment now engendered in the whole Harley clan we must partly ascribe the rapidity of the later quarrel.²

But for the present Harley stood so high that St. John's rivalry was harmless, and 'grown by persecutions, turning out, and stabbing', he reappeared at the end of May as Earl of Oxford and Lord Treasurer. The chief changes and removes of this summer bore, as we have seen, an emphatically Harleyite complexion, and the minor promotions given to the right wing did not nearly counterbalance the resounding power of the Lord Treasurer, or the promotion of his followers Poulett, Robinson, Mansell, and Benson. The Buck-hounds for Wyndham, the Vice-Treasurership of the Navy for Caesar (*vice* Walpole), a Commissionership of Plantations for old Francis Gwynn—these were the poor crumbs thrown to the high-fliers from the great man's table.

In spite, then, of some open Tory grumbling, this most exhausting session, which, wrote St. John, 'has half murdered me for one', closed in June with apparent triumph for the Treasurer. Swift, in his final editorial in the *Examiner*, declared that the main object of his journalism was achieved,

¹ Poulett, 18 Apr. and 4 May; Halifax, 18 Apr.; Davers, 28 Apr.; Harcourt, 20 May—to Harley (P. iv); Swift to Argyll, 16 Apr.; Shrewsbury to Harley, 25 Apr. (Bath, i); Auditor Harley's Memoir, P. v; St. John to Orrery, 18 May (Corr.).

² Swift to Peterborough, 4 May; *Stella*, 27 Apr. and 5 May, *Memoir Relating to that Change which happened in the Queen's Ministry*, and *An Inquiry into the Behaviour of the Queen's last Ministry*; Harley's 'account of public affairs', June 1714 (P. v); Stratford to E. Harley, 25 June (P. vii).

and that 'a great majority of the nation' was satisfied with the new Ministry. Harcourt cautiously prepared to support Oxford against the Secretary, and Bromley, for the past six years the Right's official leader, in expressing his loyalty to his chief, professed full confidence that Oxford would appreciate the Tory basis of his power. They were, he wrote, 'embarked in the same bottom, engaged in the same interests'. He hoped 'that such reasonable care will be taken to satisfy and make our friends easy, that I may be able to serve him'.¹

But while the country gentlemen were dispersed at their homes, and Society this hot summer sweltered at Bath, the political situation which centred at Windsor did not realize the hopes of Oxford's supporters. The Queen, taught by bitter experience, was jealous of falling again under the control of her ministers, and the Somersets, the Duke and the Duchess (who now held Sarah's place in the Bedchamber), amply represented this personal side of her rule: with the Treasurer the Duke was on cold, with St. John on openly hostile, terms. On the 12th August, after long abstention, Somerset claimed to exercise his right of attendance at the Cabinet, but St. John refused to sit 'with a man who had so often betrayed them'. His fury at the present policy was undisguised: Harleyites again began to speak of his dismissal as certain, Swift dreaded it, St. John himself swore he must 'be upon a better foot, or none at all'.² Oxford was ill from a conglomeration of ailments—his wounded chest, sore throat, and failing eyesight. The favourite, Mrs. Masham, was away from Court during two crucial months, ill too, while the Somersets besieged the Queen. Yet never was union more necessary, for in the autumn came the crisis of the matter nearest to the heart of the whole party—whether Harleyites or Octobrists—the making of peace.

On the Peace of Utrecht, and the negotiations leading thereto, the last three years of this Tory history do indeed wholly turn. Torics had engaged in the war with reluctance; the bulk of them disliked its strategy and the extension of its original

¹ *Examiner*, 7 June; Stratford to E. Harley, June to Aug., P. vii; *ibid.*, 24 Sept., for the Duke of Beaufort's criticism on Robinson's appointment.

² Swift to King, 26 Aug., *Stella*, 13 Aug. and 20 Oct.; Stratford to Harley, 8 Sept.

purpose. Their chief platform against the Whigs had been its needless prolongation. Peace, and not Dr. Sacheverell's fiery cross, had carried them to power, and the necessity of peace had brought Shrewsbury into alinement with Harley. Peace would end at last the reign of the moneyed men and the increase of land armies: in peace lay the way of escape from the entanglements of Europe towards restoring that insular-maritime policy so long preached by the 'country school': peace, as Bolingbroke wrote later and as all shades of Tories would have agreed, was 'the only solid foundation whereupon we could erect a Tory system'.

But on the peace, once more, hinged the feud between Oxford and his rival. To carry the peace, 'moderation' must be maintained; thereafter would begin, so the Tories hoped and had (said Bolingbroke) been led by Oxford to believe, 'the millenary year of Toryism'. From the peace negotiations, again, dated the end of all hopes for co-operation with Marlborough, the breaking away of the 'Whimsicals' or Hanoverian Tories, and the definite despair of reconciliation between the Tory main body and the Hanoverian Court. This despair and the accusation of French intrigue—both based on the terms of peace—drove the party back towards Jacobitism, and at the same time impelled the great middle magnates, Shrewsbury, Somerset, and Argyll, back to the Whigs. From the peace, then, their one great constructive achievement, came the very causes of the Tories' ruin: 'the very work', said he who thought himself its chief architect, 'which ought to have been the basis of our strength, was in part demolished before our eyes, and we were stoned with the ruins of it.'¹

With all these ulterior consequences flowing directly from the peace negotiations we shall be concerned hereafter, but to explain, or still less to defend, the principles and methods of its making need not here be attempted. No historical case has been so fully recorded; in *The Conduct of the Allies*, drawn up by Swift and revised by St. John, and in the latter's contemporary correspondence, as in his mature and revised works, we can find every motive exposed and the gauntlet

¹ Bolingbroke's letter to Sir William Wyndham, corr. of Shrewsbury and Harley, Bath papers; Klopp, xiii-xiv, *passim*.

thrown down to posterity. 'The principles on which they proceeded were honest, the means they used were lawful, and the event they proposed to bring about was just.'¹

With the means used in making the peace we need not deal in a sketch of party history: whether with all their faults they were not (in view of the previous failure at Gertruydenberg, and the entire decomposition of the Alliance) the only means left—this seems, as with many other international settlements, a question less for the moralist than for the general historian. More significant for us is the Tory ministers' statement of their aims. In a solemn warning addressed, in December 1711, to the factious Somerset, the Treasurer declared that, whether in office or out of it, he had never ceased to think it imperative 'to get out of this ruinous war': if the present treaty were now wrecked, or wrested 'out of the Queen's hands, there will be a peace, but such a one whenever it is as Britain will have no share in, either of honour, safety or profit'. On the necessity of peace, no one could be more emphatic than Marlborough himself. 'I am perfectly convinced', he told Oxford, 'that besides the draining our nation both of men and money almost to the last extremity, our allies do by degrees so shift the burthen of the war upon us that, at the rate they go on, the whole charge must at last fall on England.'²

On this point, in short, there was no question: peace was necessary, for both England and Holland were determined to have it: a peace, moreover, which would leave some portion of the Spanish territories to a French prince on the lines of King William's treaties, was also inevitable, if for military reasons alone, and the Dutch were perfectly ready to treat for a separate peace on this basis if England would not agree. In his claim, then, that the Allies had departed from the original essentials of the alliance, and that Englishmen in particular had 'engaged as confederates, but we were made to proceed as principals', Bolingbroke was thoroughly justified upon the facts. But true to his excitable political temperament—which makes his historical narrative half reconstruction and

¹ Bolingbroke, *On the Study and Use of History*.

² Oxford to Somerset, 1 Dec. 1711 (P. v); Marlborough to Oxford, Oct. (Coxe, iii, 450).

half travesty—he ranged further back to find his principles, and even in his contemporary dispatches sketched that philosophy of a Tory ‘little England’ foreign policy which he afterwards painted at full length. For us, however, the interest of that philosophy is rather its link with the thought of the old ‘country party’—with the dicta we have heard so often on the lips of Clarges or of Foley. ‘We have combated’, Bolingbroke said, ‘a habit of thinking falsely which men have been used to for twenty years.’ Under this new system of land wars, England had become simply ‘a province to the alliance’, and her true interest on the seas had been sacrificed to the Dutch Barrier. An island power must not again surrender her peculiar interests to European confederates. Austria had been ‘the evil genius of Britain’; our claimant for the Spanish throne, the Archduke Charles, was now himself Emperor, and what British interest could be served by fighting on for more years, only to rebuild the universal empire of Charles V?

On the original basis, then, of the Alliance—that is, a separation between France and Spain, a barrier for the Dutch, compensation for the Emperor, and naval security for Great Britain—the Ministry had in December 1710 opened secret negotiations with the French: in April 1711 a skeleton agreement was communicated to the Dutch Government, and in September the preliminary articles of peace between France and Great Britain were signed.

For Great Britain, they comprised recognition of the Queen’s title and the succession, a pledge of a treaty of commerce, the cession of Gibraltar, Port Mahon, and Newfoundland, and the monopoly of the Asiento, or slave-trade to Spanish America. As for the Allies in general, France pledged herself that the crowns of France and Spain should never be united, promised a barrier for the Dutch and another for the Empire, the demolition of Dunkirk in exchange for an equivalent, recognition of the English succession, commercial concessions for Great Britain and Holland, and general satisfaction for all the belligerents. Only the terms affecting all the Allies were published to the world, and it was with these that the Ministry had to confront Parliament and Europe in the autumn of 1711.

The Allies’ indignation was deep, their protests were en-

venomed, and the Whigs could count henceforward on their practical support. The Austrians were particularly bitter, for indeed it was largely against the Austrian scheme for Europe that Tory policy was directed, and the large place taken by Savoy in the British proposals was highly offensive to the Empire. It was Savoy, Bolingbroke wrote a year later, which 'must be for the time to come the bulwark of that crowd of indolent droning princes, and of those States, who with all the vices of a Commonwealth have not one republican virtue'.¹

The Austrians had long won the Tories' peculiar dislike, and heartily they reciprocated it. Their envoys, 'that puppy Hoffman'² and that excellent press agent Gallas, lived in the pocket of the Wharton faction. Their irritation overreached itself, and in October Gallas was forbidden the Court for publishing the peace preliminaries in the Press and writing violent letters to Dartmouth. Simultaneously, the Emperor's protest came out in print, and he announced his intention of sending Prince Eugene to England. Buys arrived in October to voice the apprehensions of Holland, and her wish for a share in the Asiento. On the 17th November Marlborough landed in company with Bothmar, the Hanoverian envoy, and a few days later the Elector's protest appeared in the *Daily Courant*. Marlborough put his own objections before the Queen, and the Elector wrote to Oxford that France was being placed in a position to give the law to Europe. It was abundantly clear that the war party were mobilizing all their forces.³

The great crisis of the Ministry had come, and party feeling in this winter rose to heights not reached again till the days of the American War. The atmosphere was thick with libels and lampoons, St. John was arresting printers and booksellers by dozens at a time, and Oxford getting more than his wonted ironical amusement from a deluge of anonymous letters. On Queen Elizabeth's birthday, the 17th November, bad riots were expected, the trained bands called out, and mob attacks on the ministers' houses headed off: many worthy Tories

¹ 20 Feb. 1712/1713 (B. M. Add. MSS. 37273, f. 80)

² *Stella*, 16 Dec. 1711. How carefully Gallas studied the English press appears from his archives, summarized in *Archiv für Österr. Geschichte*, xli (1869).

³ Oxford to Strafford, Dec. (*Corr.*, 1, 328 note); Elector of Hanover to Oxford, 7 Nov. (B. M. Lansdowne MSS. 1236, f. 277).

believed that some more murderous project had been planned.¹ On the 27th appeared Swift's *Conduct of the Allies*, of which eleven thousand copies were sold in the next month. London drawing-rooms were broken into two camps, Whig and Tory ladies glowered at each other from different sides of the Opera, and the Duchess of Marlborough announced to an incredulous world her intention of entertaining on a lavish scale.

Even in early November ministers were fully aware of the breaking storm. They knew that the Junto Whigs were holding party meetings and projecting a memorial to the Queen: they were advised that, if they wanted a safe majority, they must not spare a day in hurrying the Scottish peers to London. Somerset's hostility was unconcealed; it was common knowledge that he had canvassed the royal pensioners against the peace, and yet Oxford's efforts to shake his influence with the Queen were so far unavailing. Shrewsbury, true to character at a crisis, was wobbling—fearful of the peace terms² and complaining of lack of royal confidence. London was crowded with Whigs; but the Tory members were, as usual, slow in putting in an appearance, and Bromley sent the Treasurer an earnest warning. 'Gentlemen', he said, were anxious 'to answer the expectations of those that sent them thither, and to act as becomes a House of Commons chosen by a spirit raised from an opinion of great corruption in the late administration, that it would be now detected and punished, and that something would be done to secure our constitution in Church and State.' The Commission of Public Accounts might 'for the present' satisfy them in the first point, 'but the other is only to be done by putting the power into the hands of our friends, and by wholesome laws.'³ Faced by threats of such opposition, hampered by the illness both of the Queen and the Treasurer, and anxious to make up for lost time in whipping Tory members to Town, the ministers prorogued the meeting of Parliament to the 7th December. By this time, too, they had a more serious piece of intelligence, in

¹ The Queen to Oxford, 19 Nov. (Bath, i); Stratford to E. Harley, 20 and 25 Nov.; Wentworth, 25 Nov.

² Weber, *Der Friede von Utrecht*, 55.

³ The Queen to Oxford, 16 Nov. (Lansdowne MSS, loc. cit., f. 261); 19 Sept. and 15 Nov. (Bath, i); Harcourt to Oxford, 12 Nov., Bromley to Oxford, 25 Nov., Somerset to the same, 29 Nov. (P. v, which see *passim*).

the threatened coalition between the Junto and Lord Nottingham.

Whatever the genuineness of Nottingham's aversion to the peace terms and whatever his fears for the succession, it is plain that he was bitterly disappointed at his failure this summer to be appointed Privy Seal. His reply to Oxford's letter communicating the peace preliminaries was childish in its frigidity: he was 'extremely surprised' at 'the honour of a letter'; he could not profess to judge, 'not having for some time been acquainted with any matters relating to the public administration.' He was glad the terms of peace were so good, but in that case 'the accounts of it in the prints must be very imperfect'. In short, he was, as Poulett found him in November, 'as sour and fiercely wild as you can imagine anything to be that has lived long in the desert.'¹ As one of the original authors² of the extended war programme to take the whole Spanish monarchy from the Bourbons, we may, of course, credit him with a nobler, if a wrong-headed, resentment. Swift wrote to Stella that 'Dismal' had been bribed, and in one sense this was true, for the Whigs, the historic champions of religious liberty, had consented to his preliminary condition, and pledged their support for his futile Occasional Conformity Bill, in return for his assistance against the peace. Whatever the Dissenters' feelings, the political Whigs were exultant: 'Dismal would save the nation', said the bitter Wharton. But Dismal's apostasy did not in itself mean many votes—only his brother Guernsey, his old friend Weymouth, and a few more peers like Thanet and the youthful Carteret, not dangerous in quality, though embarrassing in a closely balanced House of Lords. The real danger to the Treasurer's policy lay elsewhere.³

Oxford was determined to resist the threatening attitude of Marlborough and his foreign allies, and in this he was assured of support from the Queen, whose heart was set on the

¹ Nottingham to Oxford, 15 Oct.; Poulett to Oxford, n. d., Nov. (P. v). The Harleyite view in Stratford's letter to E. Harley—'Everyone is sorry that he should throw away his reputation at such an age'—9 Dec. (ibid., vii).

² Klopp, x. 250; Salomon, 43.

³ Burnet, vi. 84; Auditor Harley, P. v 66r; Bodl. Ballard MSS. 20, f. 44 and 21, f. 175; Stella, 5 Dec.

preliminaries passing.¹ The very words of the royal speech, which on the fatal 7th of December announced the opening of a treaty—'notwithstanding the arts of those who delight in war'—were a declaration against the general. The ministers' anxiety, so far as the Queen was concerned, came from another quarter: from her adherence to her personal followers, and her refusal to dismiss old officials to make room for convinced Tories—in short, from what Swift called 'her confounded trimming and moderation'. 'We are beaten', wrote Poulett after the event, 'for want of the Queen declaring for herself.'²

The Treasurer, as we know, had much secret sympathy with this point of view, and prepared to achieve his end by means more subtle than any in the minds of his Tory colleagues, and by a step which might, if successful, be harmonized with the Queen's detachment from party. If Wharton had split the Tories by winning Nottingham, Oxford might counter by dividing the Whigs, and early in November he had opened conversations with Halifax and Somers. From the scanty records of this abortive bargaining, it is tolerably clear that he would give ample assurances against the introduction of an Occasional Conformity Bill, but that, when the Whigs pressed concessions on the peace preliminaries, he was obdurate. The reports of Burnet and Bothmar, that the Treasurer was simultaneously sapping the Opposition from the other end, and trying to buy Nottingham off by himself introducing a bill against Occasional Conformity, must in face of the other evidence be discounted: nor would such a bill, unaccompanied by concessions on the peace or hopes of office, ever have satisfied 'Dismal'.³

The Ministry entered then on the great issue, unassisted or unhampered by any understandings. On the 7th December Nottingham carried by six votes an amendment to the address, that 'no peace could be safe or honourable to

¹ The Queen to Oxford, Sept.-15 Nov. (Bath, i); cf. *Stella*, 1 Jan., 'the Queen and Lord Treasurer mortally hate the Duke.'

² The Queen to Oxford, 12 Oct.; *Stella*, 29 Dec.; Poulett to Strafford, 20 Dec. (B. M. Add. MSS., 22222, f. 188).

³ Halifax to Oxford, 9 Nov.-6 Dec. (P. v); Auditor Harley (*ibid.*); Swift to King, 8 Jan.; Bonnet (Ranko), 2 Sept. 1712. Contra, Bothmar's reports in Solomon and Burnet.

Great Britain or Europe, if Spain and the West Indies were allotted to any branch of the house of Bourbon'; on the 15th he introduced in the Lords his bill against Occasional Conformity.

For three weeks the Government's fortunes trembled in the scales. At Court the two parties crowded the levees, watching the Queen's least action, and each other's faces. Oxford's secretary, Lewis, spoke gloomily of retiring to his native Wales. Dartmouth murmured resignation. The Whigs already reckoned on a dissolution and a new Ministry, in which Somers was to be Treasurer and Walpole Secretary. 'The Queen is false', St. John told Swift, who gave up all for lost. Only the Treasurer kept his usual phlegmatic confidence: 'you had better keep company with me', he said to Swift, 'than with such a fellow as Lewis, who has not the soul of a chicken nor the heart of a mite.' For the last time in their lives he and St. John drew together, and the resolute action to which in the next few months the Treasurer impelled the Queen forms the turning point of this Ministry. In this they were assisted by the avowed intentions of the Marlborough-Nottingham interest to move for bringing over one of the Hanoverian dynasty immediately; this, Poulett thought, might persuade Anne to do 'that which none of her servants could persuade her to at first'—to make a clean sweep of the war party. Another steady asset lay in the Commons' Tory majority, who on the 7th had rejected by 232 to 106 an amendment cast on similar lines to that carried by Nottingham in the Lords. On the 21st the Commissioners of Accounts produced a report charging Marlborough with peculation: Oxford had told Strafford that the Whig proceedings would 'oblige the Queen, without reserve, to use the gentlemen of England', and this was the firstfruits. On the 29th the decision was taken to make twelve new peers, and on the 31st Marlborough was turned out of all his employments. Early in January 1712 followed the dismissal of Somerset. Optimists had hoped that his red-haired duchess would fall with him, but even so they were delighted; the Tories, we hear, 'say this is something like', they congratulated themselves that the Treasurer had at last woken up, and St. John thought that 'if the Queen will be so just to

herself, and to those servants who have ventured all for her, as to go on', a final victory was certain.¹

The Secretary ascribed the success so far won to 'the loyalty of the Church interest, which even ill usage could not alienate', and the immediate result during the spring session was certainly to give more power to the high-fliers. Hanmer was again entreated to take office² and closely associated with ministers' deliberations; with St. John, he was chiefly responsible for the Commons' *Representation*, printed in March, which gave a reasoned defence of the peace negotiations, together with an indictment of the Barrier Treaty. Walpole's ejection from the House, declared by Bromley the *unum necessarium*, on a charge of bribery was another cut at both Marlborough and the Whigs. The repeal of the Naturalization Act, legislation to restore private patronage in the Scottish Church and to restrain its jurisdiction over Episcopalian Dissenters,³ the resurrection of the Resumption and Place Bills—these were all triumphs for the high Tories.

St. John during this session reached the height of his power in the Commons. He was indefatigable in attendance, peculiarly ardent in attacks on the Barrier Treaty, and trying to bring the 'country' interest into his scheme and so to unite a solid party against the Junto. Both the Treasurer and himself had this winter taken special pains to break up the solid phalanx of October men; Bromley and St. John publicly dined with them, Swift plied them with exhortations to trust the Treasurer, and this spring St. John was the club's president. The majority of its members were now ready to follow his lead, though some extremists broke off and founded the March Club of 'Primitive October men'.⁴ But in spite of all efforts the Ministry's relations with the Tory majority continued to be unhappy. The Court influence in the Lords was used to defeat the October Club's favourite nostrum of a Place Bill.

¹ Poulett to Strafford (loc. cit.); Oxford to Strafford, *Corr.*, i. 328; St. John to Strafford, 8 Jan. 1712 (ibid.); Peter Wentworth, 1 Jan. The eviction of Marlborough was decided upon by the 15th December (Weber).

² Bromley to Oxford, 30 Dec. 1711 (P. v).

³ Promised, according to Lockhart (i. 340), as far back as the spring of 1711 by Rochester and Shrewsbury, unknown to Harley.

⁴ Swift's *Memoirs relating to that Change, &c.*; *Some Advice to Members of the October Club*; *Stella*, 23 Feb.; Wentworth papers; St. John to Strafford, 18 Jan.; Horace Walpole to Oxford, 23 June (P. v).

Only with difficulty did ministers induce the majority to drop a projected tack of the Resumption,¹ but since (though with reluctance) they had accepted the principle of such a bill, its defeat in the Lords, on a tie in the division, was a blow to their prestige. St. John, like Leeds, had warmly supported its last stages: now it was lost, he feared 'it would hang like the sword of Damocles in the air'.

Oxford's position in all this was uncomfortable and ill defined. It is noteworthy that half of the new peers—his son-in-law Dupplin, Trevor, Mansell, Thomas Foley, Granville, and Paget—were persons belonging to his own near circle, and the trend of his mind was shown in an offer of the Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland to Shrewsbury,² who had been 'pitched on as a sort of medium' to stop the furious Whig-Tory faction fight there beginning under the weak, though amiable, rule of Ormonde. Yet the essential rift in the party was growing wider. On one side Dartmouth, who had opposed the creation of peers, and his school were objecting to the growing hold of extremists; on the other, the Tory majority, perhaps ignorant of the Queen's reluctance, were badgering for more changes, and the Treasurer's constitutional propriety in taking the sole blame on himself masked the real obstructionist. In April Bromley returned to the charge with an upbraiding letter, which declared he had lost credit with his followers by promising them the removals to which Oxford was pledged, and saying that this lack of confidence 'will unavoidably increase, the longer the making those thorough changes are delayed'.³ But no such changes were made, and the promotion of St. John's follower Wyndham, in June, to be Secretary-at-War was nothing as compared with a simultaneous significant rebuff to his patron. St. John had asked for an earldom, which Anne refused: he recanted too late, and passed up into the Lords as Viscount Bolingbroke. His injured pride was little assuaged by his rôle this summer as plenipotentiary in France, and was mortified afresh in October by the conferment of the Garter on the Treasurer. Swift never ceased efforts to patch up

¹ St. John to Peterborough, 27 May (*Corr.*); *Stella*, 10 May ('the Whigs came in to help us'); Wentworth, 2 and 9 May.

² Shrewsbury to Oxford, 29 Mar. (Bath, 1).

³ Bromley to Oxford, 29 Apr. 1712.

ministerial peace; but 'it is impossible', he wrote, 'to save people against their own will, and I have been too much engaged in patchwork already'. The personal feud was thus sunk deep: another period of strain would make it irremediable.

All through the summer and autumn of 1712 the cause of European peace or war was on the anvil. The 'restraining orders' to Ormonde to avoid battle, the armistice made in July with the French, the loss by our former Allies of Bouchain and other conquests of Marlborough—all these humiliations had to be endured, while month after month France haggled over the surrender of Tournai, over Philip's renunciation of his claims to the throne of France, or over the never-ending intricacies of Newfoundland fisheries. The Treasurer's long-cherished hope that Philip would choose to renounce Spain, which should then pass to the Duke of Savoy, had finally collapsed, and we were left with the *pisaller* of framing something like presentable guarantees for his renunciation of France. Constructing a Barrier that both France and Holland would accept, facing the menace of a separate Franco-Dutch understanding, balancing the alternatives of an imperfect peace or renewing hateful war—these were the matters which were keeping Bolingbroke at work till six in the morning and angry squires kicking their heels in an expensive capital with nothing to bite on. Parliament was eleven times prorogued pending the conclusion of peace, and only in April 1713 did it reassemble, when the French, brought to the point by a drastic ultimatum, had signed the treaties of Utrecht.

The brief session of April to July 1713 finally broke the Oxford-Bolingbroke partnership as a working government. The Cabinet's internal feuds were worse than ever, Dartmouth and Bolingbroke had for months been barely on speaking terms, and only Oxford's efforts and the Queen's wishes stopped the first retiring. That dangerous and jealous politician, Argyll, had gone into opposition, and with his brother Islay and Lord Orrery (best known before as editor of the *Letters of Phalaris*) was discussing, with the volatile Shrewsbury, schemes for a remodelled Administration.

More formidable was the opposition of Arthur Annesley, fifth Lord Anglesey, Vice-Treasurer of Ireland and Privy

Councillor since the end of 1710, who is another leading type of the neo-Tories. Like Harley's, his forbears were Puritan, his grandfather being that grim and unpopular first Lord, who played so long a part in Restoration politics. Like Harley, he was both cultivated and ambitious, but his churchmanship, more bitter possibly because of his Irish political interests, was far higher than the Treasurer's. As a burgess for the University of Cambridge he had supported the Occasional Conformity Bill and was elected as a 'Tacker' in 1705, but in spite of this, he had ever since March 1708 worked cordially with Harley, was a member of the outer ring at the Saturday dinners of ministers (Saturday, which Harley called 'whipping day'), and till 1713 was a pillar of the Government both in England and Ireland. His deepest ambition, it was now understood, was to be Lord-Lieutenant, and the key to his divergencies in 1713-14 would seem to be that he was trying to combine the two difficult rôles of an Irish Tory Churchman and an English Hanoverian.

Parliament reflected the faction of the leaders. The country gentlemen were annoyed at the wearisome prorogations, and showed their teeth repeatedly against the Court. Their invitation to Sacheverell (now unmuzzled after his three years' enforced silence), to preach before them on Restoration Day, did not promise 'moderation'. Contrary to the plans of ministers, the Commons applied the Malt tax to Scotland at the same rates as to England—a piece of political recklessness which violated the Union, both in letter and in spirit. The whole Scottish vote in both Houses was alienated and, supported (hardly to their credit) by some of the main authors of the Union, like Somers, and Halifax, pressed a motion in the Lords for its dissolution: only the proxies saved ministers from defeat by four votes.¹

This 'driving to an inch', which had long been getting on the nerves of the new Dean of St. Patrick's, could not go on indefinitely, and in June the Government suffered a fatal defeat. One of the agreements concluded at Utrecht in April was a

¹ Lewis to Oxford, 13 and 14 Oct. 1712; the Queen to Oxford, 21 Oct. (Bath, 1); Bolingbroke to Shrewsbury, 29 May 1713 (*Corr.* 11); Wentworth, 26 May; Oxford's memorandum of June 1714 (P. v); Swift, *Stella*, 11 April, and *An Inquiry*, &c.

Treaty of Commerce between France and Great Britain, the 8th and 9th articles of which stipulated reciprocity and most-favoured-nation treatment—France undertaking to return (given that such reciprocity was fixed by statute within a period of two months) to her tariff of 1664. Immediately a violent mercantile outcry arose against these clauses: British commerce, especially the Portugal trade and the silk industry, was declared to be in danger, the established claims of port and woollens seemed to be threatened by the clarets and silks of France, and the Whig managers, with one eye, Bolingbroke thought, on the near general election, took up this congenial battle-cry. On the first reading in the Commons all went well enough for the Government, except the defaulting of two or three back-benchers, but on the 18th June, when the bill had passed Committee, on the motion for engrossment they were beaten by 194 to 185. A meeting of members to oppose the bill had been summoned by Anglesey and Hanmer: the City representatives and the Scottish members voted for rejection irrespective of party, and some prominent placemen with them. Personal disappointment¹ was thought to account for the action of Anglesey, and Hanmer's opposition had long been discounted. He had protested in February at peace being so long delayed, he was noted then by Swift as 'out of humour', and now in the debate he declared 'he would never be blindly led by any ministry'.

Much more serious was a rumour persistently spread that the Treasurer 'left it entirely' to the free opinion of the House, and would not press the commercial clauses. He had, without much doubt, at one time thought of surrendering the bill so as not to split the party, and, though he seems to have stopped short of this, his hesitation was widely known and the damage was done. But it is significant that the majority included, in addition to Whigs, two entirely different groups of Tories—'Whimsicals', who opposed the French alliance, and 'country' members of the October type (the Berties being prominent), who were aiming at the destruction of the Treasurer.² Each

¹ L'Hermitage, 18 June (Macpherson).

² Bolingbroke's contemporary references (20 June, to Strafford, and (n. d.), June, to Oxford, P. v. 299) do not blame the Treasurer; Stratford's Corr. with

section in the Ministry proceeded to blame the other—Harleyites imputing it to the hot men of the Church party, while Bolingbroke praised the staunchness of 'the body of the Tories'.

With the triennial general election in sight—Parliament being dissolved on the 8th August—it was imperative to get some settlement in the Government. A month before the session closed, Bolingbroke complained to Shrewsbury that they acted 'as if we had nothing to do, but get this session over anyhow. No principle of government established and avowed, nobody but my Lord Treasurer, and he cannot be in every place and speak to every man'. As against the Harleyite scheme of a coalition controlled by one chief minister, who represented the channel of royal favour, Bolingbroke demanded 'peremptory resolution', reconstruction on pure party lines, and Cabinet government, and behind him there was much solid Tory feeling. For 'non-party' government has, as its commonest corollary, one-man rule. In the Cabinet Harcourt was with Bolingbroke: he had long been pressing for some deference to the Church party, and to the Queen's displeasure asked bishoprics for both Atterbury and Sacheverell. Bolingbroke was writhing at what he considered an unnecessary losing of the game: 'to play, like children, with it, till it slips between our fingers'—this, he told Prior, 'distracts a man of spirit'. On the 27th July he put his programme before the Treasurer. 'Separate', he wrote, 'in the name of God, the chaff from the wheat, and consider who you have left to employ: assign them their parts: trust them as far as is necessary for the execution each of his part: let the forms of business be regularly carried on in Cabinet, and the secret of it in your own closet.' Too much 'of the honey is consumed by the drones', and 'a right use' of the friends they had was 'the certain way to have more'.¹

Harley does not breathe the idea; see also Esther Vanhomrigh to Swift, 23 June. In August we find Oxford's electoral interest bespoken *against* a member who had opposed the commercial treaty (P. v. 325); cf. also the terms of the Queen's speech of 16 July, promising reintroduction of the treaty in the next session. *Contra*, Wentworth papers, Boyer, and Carte's information (Macpherson). See also on the whole incident Bodl. Ballard MSS. 31, f. 104.

¹ Bolingbroke to Shrewsbury, 29 May and 4 July (*Corr.*), to Prior, 25 July (*ibid.*); to Oxford, 27 July (P. v); Jacobite letter of 23 June, Macpherson, ii, P. v and vii, *passim*; Dartmouth's note on Burnet, vi, 176.

Nothing was further from Oxford's mind than capitulation. True, his health was fast breaking up under the strain of enormous business, execrably late hours, and a good deal of quiet conviviality. His eyesight was failing; he was often in bed; his putting off of business was the despair of his friends. But his party insight was unabated. He had in the previous autumn renewed his correspondence with Halifax, and their interviews in the spring of 1713 were so frequent and open as to give great offence to the Tories. If Oxford was willing, as seems likely, to pledge his support to the Hanoverian succession, the Whigs were not able to satisfy him as to his place and security in a future combination, and for that matter there is much reason to conjecture entire insincerity on Halifax's part at least.¹ Still, that Oxford meant to declare for the Whigs as soon as peace was made, became a rooted conviction among Tories of the Anglesey school, and it was at least certain that he was resolved to resist the Bolingbroke faction.

It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that, at the date in question, he had yet lost general Tory support: on the contrary, his adroit Parliamentary management had recovered some lost ground in the late session by arranging the payment of debts on the Queen's civil list, and he had an invaluable asset in the candid loyalty of Speaker Bromley, the Churchmen's official head. Harleyites were still confident in June that, if a breach had to come, Bromley with 'a standing body of the Church and gentry' could be counted on, and the Speaker himself urged Oxford to have a prompt dissolution of Parliament, while the bonfires and illuminations for the Peace were fresh in every villager's memory.²

On the 25th July Oxford wrote to Bolingbroke the letter (seen and approved by Lady Masham), from which he later dated his loss of real power.³ Apart from mere departmental criticism, its solitary constructive contribution seems to have

¹ Halifax to Oxford, 26 Dec. 1712-28 May 1713 (P. v); Stuart papers (Macpherson); Halifax's interviews with Schutz, B. M. Stowe MSS. 225; Wentworth, 20 March; *Stella*, 21 March.

² Stratford to Harley, 21 June (P. vii); Bromley to Oxford, 24 July; Bagot papers, 8 July.

³ A résumé in *Parl. Hist.*, vi, App.; Oxford's 'Account', drawn up in June-July 1714 (P. v); Oxford to Swift, 27 July 1714.

been a recommendation that Bromley should replace Dartmouth as Secretary, since Hanmer had refused. Bolingbroke's reply, as it has come down to us, was correct enough. It stated the conception of Cabinet and party given above, suggested that Bromley was most useful where he was; in the Speaker's Chair, and concludes, as it had begun, in warm tones of friendship.¹ Whatever other demands were made—and they were such as to 'amaze' Lord Harley's correspondent Stratford—they were resisted, and the appointments of the autumn were a severe blow to the Bolingbroke section. His friend Wyndham succeeded Benson, now Lord Bingley, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Francis Gwynn, who took Wyndham's place as Secretary at War, might also be reckoned as of the extreme Right. But Dartmouth, though he resisted Oxford's eleventh-hour pressure upon him to keep the secretaryship, was not ejected, as Bolingbroke had clearly wished, but became Privy Seal, and Bromley as the new Secretary was Oxford's answer to his rival's efforts to monopolize the leadership of the Churchmen. Part of Bolingbroke's patronage was taken away by the appointment of Lord Mar as Secretary for Scotland, and part of Harcourt's by naming Lord Findlater Keeper of the Scottish Great Seal. By the transfer of Bolingbroke himself to the southern province of the Secretariat, he lost direct handling of the important area of The Hague. Shrewsbury was at last declared Lord-Lieutenant, *vice* Ormonde. The Treasurer's activity, never so great as in personal management, had extended to recapture some of the lost sheep; Hanmer, by Bromley's mediation, promised to accept the Speakership in the forthcoming session, and Anglesey, by Swift's good offices, reconciled himself with Oxford and was reckoned henceforth a mortal enemy to the Secretary.²

Deep and abiding was Bolingbroke's resentment, and in August his retirement, or his dismissal, was freely canvassed. If he swallowed his defeat, it was due partly perhaps to the influence of Swift, who had been hurriedly summoned from

¹ Bolingbroke to Oxford, 27 July (P. v) ; Lewis to Swift, 30 July ; *Hanmer Corr.*, 148.

² Lewis to Dartmouth, 10 Sept. (Dartmouth papers, i) ; Oxford's 'Account' loc. cit. ; Lady Masham to Oxford, 6 Aug., Bromley to Oxford, 9 Aug., Anglesey to the same, 21 Nov. (P. v) ; *ibid.*, and P. vii, *passim*.

Ireland by the Treasurer, but in effect his best card, the Church party, had been, for the moment at least, entirely trumped, and neither his private finances nor his party sense allowed of resignation. Once more he declared to his friends that the common cause made him 'pass over mortifications, which I would have been crucified rather than have endured',¹ but the plain fact was that, outside the Tory party, there was not the glimmering of a chance for him, and that inside it he had to bide his time. The odd blend of party loyalty and personal self-interest, dividing this curious nature, as yet prevented an open quarrel, and he was still advising others to cling to the Treasurer: it would, he told Orrery, who was sickened by Oxford's procrastination, be in his opinion 'a wrong measure if you either asked to retire out of disgust, or engaged in any separate scheme'.²

The general election of August and September was, in such conditions, a surprising Tory success: peace still dwarfed all else in the popular mind, and the Whigs' badge of wool in their hats, signifying the loss of our commerce, was a mediocre cry against Peace and the oak-leaf. The number of Whigs elected, though increased, was not estimated at over 150. George Granville, now become Lord Lansdowne as a Utrecht peer, put the Tory preponderance in Cornwall at 10 to 1; in the middle West the Harley interest stood firm, the Government carried their whole list of Scottish peers, and got the old members re-elected for the City of London.³

Taught by the last election, the Whig managers based their campaign upon detaching the 'Whimsical' Tories from their allegiance. If the platform of wool and trade would not do it, they hoped to have found another that would; during the election their pamphleteers carefully minimized old party distinctions, to concentrate on the object of splitting their enemies by terming them 'Hanover Tory and Pretender's Tory, English Tory and French Tory'.

For this was the single question to which English party

¹ To Strafford, 2nd Sept. (*Corr.*).

² To Orrery, 18 Sept. 1713 (B. M. Add. MSS. 37209, f. 156).

³ Schutz, giving Cadogan's evidence, 29 Sept./10 Oct., B. M. Stowe MSS. 225; Lansdowne to Oxford, 11 Sept., and Findlater to Oxford, 8 Oct. (P. v); Swift to Kin^e 20 Oct.

politics were now reduced. High Church and Low Church, peace and war, landed and moneyed men, the 'gentry' and the Dissenters, prerogative and Cabinet government—upon all these the genuine distinction of parties had been, or was rapidly being, removed. The passions, the resentments, and the affiliations they had left were being grouped anew under the single heading of Hanover or Saint-Germain—the decision of which must fix the supremacy for another generation, and politicians thought no further of either a Whig or a Tory England. It was by their attitude to the succession that the Tories were judged in 1714, it was by their purposeless clinging to sentiments of the past that the body of the party courted destruction: fireworks of the Pope embracing the Pretender displayed in front of St. James's Palace, sermons and pamphlets, plays and ballads—by such intensive propaganda the horror of Jacobitism was driven into the popular consciousness at every street corner. But the entirety of the Tories' ruin was due first to the Queen, and after that to their leaders—to the policy these leaders adopted, and the decisions which they shirked.

In dealing with this question we are handicapped by our large dependence on the word of furiously interested partisans, whether Jacobite agents or Hanoverian envoys, whose reports try to force the truth into the impression they wish conveyed. We find, again, the same entire lack of principle common to the whole generation of 1689, and even the same men pre-eminently unprincipled—Marlborough, for instance, in February 1714 simultaneously asking for a pardon at Saint-Germain and assuring the Hanoverian Elector that life and limb were at his service.¹ We shall not, then, find the historic truth in charges laid at Hanover by enemies of the Tory Ministry: statements like Sunderland's, that the ministers were planning a Stuart restoration with the aid of France, or like Marlborough's, that the Dutch had evidence of a settled scheme for this purpose, have only to be tested to fall to the ground.²

¹ Berwick to James III, 11 March (Stuart papers); Marlborough to Robethon, 26 Feb (Macpherson); cf. Bothmar's note of 30 July/10 Aug. 1714, *ibid.*

² Marlborough to Robethon, 6 Jan. 1714 (B. M. Stowe MSS. 242); Sunderland to Bothmar, 1/12 Aug. 1713 (*ibid.*, 225).

That the Tory party as a whole was only half-hearted in the Jacobite cause, both the Pretender himself and the Hanoverians allowed,¹ nor is it less true of the Ministry. Bromley was certainly a convinced Hanoverian, who believed in the 'imposture' of the Pretender's birth, and was asked to take office in the next reign: the same is true of Harcourt and of Hanmer.² If Mar rose for the Pretender in 1715, it is nearly certain that in 1714 he intended to do nothing of the kind.³ Dartmouth was generally trusted by the Hanoverians; Ormonde in July and August of this year was acting closely, not with the Bolingbroke but with the Oxford section of the Tories, while Berwick's letters even up to December breathe increasing discontent at his merely general professions. Nor need much solid weight be attached to the free use which Bolingbroke made of his past and present colleagues' names, as he spread himself in prognostications to the French ambassador.⁴

The case of Oxford and Bolingbroke is, of course, the crux. The presumptive evidence in favour of the view that Oxford never seriously meant a Stuart restoration is overwhelming; his vacillating and cautious nature, the whole of his past career, his Dissenting sympathies, the large stake his family had in the country—all these would pin him to the path of constitutionalism and safety. In 1711 Marlborough told the Hanoverians that, left to himself and if he could come to terms with the Whigs, Harley would never be a Jacobite: in 1714 such hostile evidence as that of Cadogan or of the Austrian envoy is even more emphatic. The solid achievements of his policy gave no loophole to the Jacobites; even in January 1713 he had signed a new and modified Barrier treaty with the Dutch, who were thereby pledged to defend the Protestant succession, with a fleet and an army, at the request of the Queen or of the Protestant heir. It is, however, perhaps enough to put on

¹ Schutz, 10 Nov. 1713, *ibid.*; James III to Torcy, 19 Jan. 1713 (Salomon); Stratford (P. vii. 181) confirms Schutz's statement that many Tories wished to bring over the Electoral Prince.

² Schutz to Robethon, 29 Jan./9 Feb. (Macpherson); Ward, *op. cit.*, 415; Bromley to Charlett, 7 Oct. 1701 (Bodl. Ballard MSS. 38, f. 74).

³ Mar to his brother, July-Aug. 1714 (Mar and Kollie papers); Berwick to James III, 8 April (Stuart papers, i).

⁴ Bolingbroke to Swift, 13 July; Oxford to Dartmouth, 12 Aug. (Dartmouth, i); Stuart papers, i, *passim*; Iberville's dispatches in Salomon.

record the testimony of Saint-Germain and Hanover—to point to the conclusions of the Electoral agents in 1713, or Berwick's furious remark, when the Jacobite game was lost, that 'the Treasurer is as great a villain as Lord Sunderland was'; such evidence will be found borne out in detail throughout this intriguing year.¹

Bolingbroke, no doubt, had gone further. Unlike Oxford, he had burned his boats by an insolent reciprocation of Hanoverian hostility, and he was, moreover, far more closely than the Treasurer, linked to Jacobite sympathies by his close association with friends at Paris, with families like the Jerseys, and with Lady Masham. Yet to anything like civil war, he told the French agent Iberville, he would never give a hand, and nothing is more certain than the truth of his words in the letter to Wyndham of 1717, that the scheme had been no more than 'to fill the employments of the Kingdom down to the meanest with Tories', and to 'become too considerable not to make our terms in all events which might happen afterwards—concerning which, to speak truly, I believe few or none of us had any settled resolution'. His theme was the same during the actual crisis of 1714: the Queen, he wrote to the Hanoverian Anglesey, 'has but one life, and whenever that drops, if the Church interest is broke, without concert, without confidence, without order, we are of all men the most miserable'. Yet he had done nothing by that spring to take the practical steps towards a Restoration which the Pretender had personally asked him to put in train.² Even at the eleventh hour he is found explaining to the French envoy that a Hanoverian king must probably be accepted, even though an ultimate rebellion against him might be certain, and his first measure in July as Prime Minister was to explore the possibilities of conciliating the Whigs.

The key to all this vacillation lay in resolutions on the part

¹ Cadogan to Bothmar, 15/26 May 1714 (Macpherson), Hoffmann, 1 June (Klopp); Robethon to Bernstorff, 21 March 1711 (*ibid.*, xiv, App. I); Mears to the Elector, 12 Sept. 1713 (B. M. Stowe MSS. 225); Berwick to James III, 28 August 1714; Macpherson, ii, *passim*, for Jacobite distrust of Harley, and cf. Torcy, 401.

² Bolingbroke to Anglesey, 25 Jan. (*Corr.*); James III to Bolingbroke, 3 March (Salomon)

of two persons far more important in this drama than these two ministers—namely, Queen Anne and the Hanoverian Elector. In spite of the sympathies of some in her entourage and possibly of her own deepest feelings, there appears to be no evidence that the Queen gave the least substantial encouragement to the hopes of her brother's court—which, moreover, in October 1713 she had formally invited the Duke of Lorraine to expel from his dominions.¹ On the other hand, she was as offensive as she could well be to her legal successors. She had taken no step in their favour beyond the non-committal decency of inserting their names in the Prayer Book; she resolutely rejected the bare idea of any one of the House coming to England, and 'two courts in this country', said Oxford, 'was the thing to avoid breathing'.² She had slighted the suggestion that the Electress should have a revenue settled by Parliament, and met the single error made by the restrained Hanoverian diplomats—the demand in April 1714 that a Parliamentary writ should be issued to the Electoral Prince in his capacity as Duke of Cambridge—with a scream of indignation.³

On the other side, if generally the Hanoverians' attitude was wonderfully correct towards English parties, it had yet been plain enough, since the end of 1712, that the Elector would never commit himself to the Tories. Even two years before that he had lodged a protest against the change of government, and remained completely unmoved at the loyal assurances multiplied by the new ministers. He had resisted the tempting offer to succeed Marlborough as Commander-in-Chief, he had warmly thanked Nottingham for his motion against the preliminaries, he had sent Bothmar with a formal memorial against conclusions of terms with France, he had shown his resentment at attacks upon the Barrier treaty. To his envoys he expressed, once and again, a deep distrust of Oxford's character, and the half-hearted measures which were all the Treasurer could offer, such as the Act of 1712 giving precedence

¹ Bromley to Robinson, 20 Oct. 1713 (B. M. Add. MSS. 37273, f. 324).

² 14/25 April 1714 (B. M. Stowe MSS. 242, f. 96).

³ Ward, *cap. v, passim*. Her sharp letters of May to the Hanoverian princes were printed in London by July—query, whether by connivance of Hanover or of Bolingbroke; see Bromley's letter to Clarendon of the 27th (Stowe MSS., *loc. cit.*).

over all peers to the Electoral family, did not appease him. He required what the ministers could never get the Queen to perform, a statutory provision for the Electress and the removal of the Pretender from Lorraine.¹

Nor did the Hanoverian envoys find themselves able to keep that even keel between parties which their Court enjoined. The intimate social connexions they maintained with the Whig leaders, which were public property, were but the counterpart of a growing political understanding. By the spring of 1713 every detailed step which would be necessary on Anne's death had been determined, and a grand manifestation of Hanoverian Whiggism was requested for the general election. Eight of the Whig leaders suggested that the presence of the Electoral Prince would be invaluable, and £100,000 was asked as a campaign fund. Their demands—whether for the purchase of peers' votes against the commercial treaty, or the running of candidates for the London Common Council—extended over the following winter, and since the Elector declined to open his purse, Bothmar is found in January forwarding representations that a loan should be raised for the political debauchery of England.²

Steering between this Scylla of Hanover and that Charybdis of Windsor, the ministers' correspondence with Saint-Germain becomes more intelligible. Unable to give to Hanover guarantees which the Elector required, but which the Queen refused, uncertain of the future, and doubtful of each other, they began independently, in 1713, to transmit favourable messages to the exiles. As their channels were different, so, we must assume, was their standpoint. Oxford was assuring himself of support in all quarters and for all emergencies. He would not offend the Queen's sentiments for her brother; he would not drive the extreme Right and Jacobite votes into the Opposition lobby, into conspiracy, nor into the arms of France; he must, perhaps, even allow for a possibility that the Pretender might declare himself a Protestant. This, it would seem, is the likeliest key to the enigma of this revolutionary statesman

¹ Salomon, 30 and 169.

² Sunderland to Bothmar, 6/17 April 1713 (B. M. Stowe MSS. 225); L'Hermitage, 9/19 May, 28 July (N. S.), 10 Oct., 11/22 Dec. 1713, 9 Jan. 1714 (*ibid.*)

seeking, through a French agent, assurances of Jacobite support for his elections; his *ego et rex meus* may best be translated, 'the Harleys coupled with the stability of England'—to both of which Tories and Jacobites were but possible means. Nor should we overlook the Pretender's bitter complaint that for three years he had suspended Jacobite organizations and forbidden conspiracy, on the strength of Oxford's assurance of an early accommodation with the Queen.

Bolingbroke, on the other hand, was trying to forge a fierce and united Tory party, which should be ready to face and control a successor of either dynasty. It is, then, the more remarkable that the two men agreed in their one negative conclusion, that no ghost of a chance existed for a restoration unless the Pretender changed his religion: 'the Grand Turk' would sooner be accepted in England than a Roman Catholic. But at this point James III resisted the hints of these neo-Tories as firmly as had James II the outspoken pleadings of Rochester or Seymour. Arrived, then, at these three immovable personal factors—the Queen, the Elector, and the Pretender—neither minister ever pledged himself to a restoration, and the ministerial 'Jacobitism' of 1714 thus resolves itself into struggles to retain office, or to preserve their party.¹

With this dark storm growling on the near horizon, the Ministry, patched up once again, as we have seen, lumbered forward into the autumn of 1713. Delayed in part by continued negotiations with France and Spain for the commercial treaties, and in part by ministerial friction, the long postponement of Parliament till February 1714 allowed full scope to the furious agitation raging in the press, the coffee-houses, and the provinces, over the dangers to trade and dynasty. But the gravest reason for delay had been the Queen's very serious illness, which from Christmas Eve till the end of January threw all Tory England into despair. The

¹ Stuart papers, i, preface and pp. 249 et seq.; Macpherson; additional reports of Gualtier and Iberville in Wickham Legg's article in *E. H. R.* xxx; Klopp, xiv, *passim*. Salomon's brilliant diagnosis of Oxford's standpoint (especially caps. 9 and 10) seems to me convincing; I should, however, suggest that the evidence adduced for Anne's growing Jacobitism hardly warrants the conclusion that she was resolved positively to assist her brother. It is remarkable that his view coincides very nearly with Somerville's, written in 1798.

Whigs, Bolingbroke declared, said she was 'a percher', the Brigade of Guards, much under Marlborough's influence, had signalized its politics by indecent rejoicings.¹ As for the Tories, each asked, in Prior's words, 'what would become of us all', and if the prospect seemed 'dreadful to the masters of Mortimer Castle, Hinton St. George, Stanton Harcourt, or Bucklersbury, what must it be to friend Matt'? To his followers' amazement, Oxford stayed away from Windsor at this crisis. Constant illness, and the loss in November of his favourite daughter, Lady Carmarthen, had unstrung him, and whereas, in the month preceding Anne's illness, Bolingbroke had only left Windsor for a couple of nights, the Treasurer had hardly appeared once. His friends' warnings and reproaches began to multiply. Shrewsbury deplored his late hours of eating and sleeping, his brother the Auditor declared 'frequent meetings with some of the Lords and Commons' essential, and adds, 'you should appropriate more time for the dispatch of business by getting out earlier'.² The Jacobite Lockhart (who still fought with the long bow) deposed that the Treasurer never went to bed before four in the morning, and then sober scarcely once a week. In any case, the pictures drawn after his fall by the Queen, that he was unintelligible and drunk in her presence, or by Bolingbroke, of the 'vain discourses which he used to hold over claret', cannot be disconnected from these earlier warnings. In the very December we speak of, Anne had charged him 'to speak plainly, lay everything open, and hide nothing from me'. The alternative fits of energy and depression we shall mark in the next six months, of brilliant Parliamentary success alternating with the dreariest weakness—in short, all the signs that showed in him, as Swift said, 'the greatest inequalities of any man alive'—had their root, perhaps, in the same sort of physical decay which later twisted the morale of the far more heroic Chatham.³

Meanwhile, across the Irish Sea a gale had suddenly risen which must soon sweep across to England, and determine

¹ To James Graham, 21 Jan. 1714 (Bagot papers).

² Schutz, 4/15 Dec. (Stowe MSS. 225); Shrewsbury to Oxford, 9 Oct. (Bath, i); Edward Harley to the same, 29 March 1714.

³ Lewis to Swift, 27 July 1714; the Queen to Oxford, 8 Dec. 1713 (Bath, i); Bolingbroke's letter to Wyndham, 28 Dec. 1713.

ministerial vacillation one way or another. In England the succession question would be limited merely to a conflict of 'ins and outs' and the predominance of one or the other party, but in Ireland it involved the whole land settlement, the passions of rival Churches, and the supremacy of an alien ruling class. Two years' government by Sir Constantine Phipps, the Lord Chancellor who led the Irish Council during Ormonde's absence abroad, had roused a heated Whig reaction, and when Shrewsbury went over as Lord-Lieutenant at the end of October, he was met by a House of Commons with a Whig majority. Refusing to budge an inch if their grievances, especially the control of the Dublin Corporation, were not remedied, they voted supplies for three months only, threatened to impeach Phipps, and offered a reward for the Pretender, dead or alive. Oxford had in the summer exerted himself on behalf of Presbyterian liberties in Ireland, had disapproved the measures of the Irish Privy Council, and was plainly disinclined to uphold the Phipps system.¹

To Bolingbroke, however, it seemed that the limit of endurance had been reached. Even Irish Army officers, he observed, voted against the Court: 'I confess myself extremely tired of that lenity, which suffers a fleet and army to declare for a faction against the Crown.' To the Queen he predicted the evil effects such lenity would have on the British Parliament; 'I submit', he wrote in his best Disraelian style, 'with that humble deference which becomes me, but a warm and unfeigned zeal for your Majesty's safety, whether it is not time for the weight to be thrown into the honest and loyal scale.' He bade Phipps carry on: 'you may be assured that, on this side of the water, there are a number of men, who never did, nor never will bow the knee to Baal.' His sanguine and bold temper thought to conjure an escape out of the very extremity of their difficulties: did not the Whig violence in Ireland prove that 'thorough' alone could do it? Now was the opportunity, he told Oxford, for giving 'new spirit to your administration, and of cementing a firmer union between us'. And all his correspondence round this New Year sounded the same high

¹ Francis Iredell to Oxford, 23 Sept. (P. v); Shrewsbury to the same, Nov. 1713-Feb. 1714 (Bath, i).

note: 'I begin to reckon', he wrote to George Clarke, 'upon a clear Tory scheme, more concert, and better method.'¹

Such a scheme would, no doubt, ultimately demand the Treasurer's fall, but Bolingbroke's repeated professions to Oxford and others that for the sake of party unity he would submit to Oxford's leadership need not, we think, be questioned as to the greater part of the ensuing session. Even in his own interests it would be dangerous to evict the Treasurer before the Peace treaties were wound up: moreover, the failure of Lund's banking house had just hit him hard, and in the interests both of his party and his pocket he could not employ the threat of resignation. His endeavours till the end of January to persuade Shrewsbury to continue in Ireland, and his friendly advances to the hostile Anglesey, appear to be corroborative evidence that for the present he recognized the necessity of joint action.

He reined in his high-mettled temper to pursue a slower, and safer, plan. The Treasurer's Parliamentary interest was at least as strong as his own, his fall could only come from working upon the Queen, and that was always a lengthy process. It was to this point that Bolingbroke now directed his energy. By constant attendance, by solicitude for her health, by adroit communication of the Whigs' ill-judged pleasure at her illness, he touched the woman and impressed the sovereign. He flattered all her deepest feelings. He urged the need of Parliamentary union, in order to 'give you leisure and strength to influence foreign affairs, in that manner you have done and always ought to do'. His signature to the Queen, as one 'whose views go no further than yourself', anticipates perhaps the decisive factor in his later triumph: that he, unlike Oxford, was bold enough to take open steps which must widen the breach between Anne and the Hanoverians. It was Bolingbroke, we are told, who advised her to refuse the writ of summons as a peer, demanded in April for the Electoral Prince, and his pen was traced in the Queen's sharp letters of May to her successors.²

¹ Bolingbroke to Stanley, 3 Dec., to the Queen, 17 Dec., to Phipps, 22 Dec. (*Corr.*); to Oxford, endorsed 17 Dec. (P. v); to Clarke, endorsed 19 Dec. (B. M. Egerton MSS. 2618); to Graham, 21 Jan. (Bagot papers).

² Bolingbroke to the Queen, 8 Dec. 1710.

On the other hand, Oxford's relations with the Queen had become more and more uneasy. Looking back in June 1714, he dated the quarrel from his 'never enough to be lamented folly' during the previous September, in asking some title for himself or his family, which the Queen would not grant, and though no open sign occurred till March, Harleyite opinion some months earlier suspected a secret alliance between the Secretary and Lady Masham.¹ Retrospectively, Oxford and his followers attributed this understanding to corrupt bargains between the Secretary and the favourite, for shares in clothing contracts and in the Asiento; however that may be, it is safe to take the Masham influence, from March 1714 at latest, as definitely hostile to the Treasurer.

The Queen's speech in opening Parliament on the 2nd of that month seemed to mark, on the whole, a preponderance of the Bolingbroke interest. The passage on foreign affairs was redolent of the Secretary's favourite views. 'It was the glory', so the words ran, 'of the wisest and greatest of my predecessors to hold the balance of Europe: . . . this country can flourish only by trade, and will be most formidable by the right application of our naval force.' A shaft at the Hanoverians followed: attempts 'to render the possession of the Crown uneasy to me can never be proper means to strengthen the Protestant succession'. The war, it concluded, had 'greatly affected government itself'; let them 'lay the foundation of recovering from these disorders'.

The very first weeks of the session revealed the Ministry's weakness. True, Tory party allegiance still held good: Cadogan's election at Woodstock, for instance, was declared void by 194 to 140, and a majority of nearly 100 determined to expel Richard Steele from the House for his declarations, in *The Crisis* and *The Englishman*, as to the villainy of the peace and the danger of the succession. But the Whigs' intention to secure 'Whimsical' alliance, and their partial success, was

confirmation (7 Aug.), of the fact that Bolingbroke opposed Oxford's resignation; Ward, *op cit.* 426, and sources there cited; P. v. 379, &c., for Bolingbroke's requests to the Treasurer for various financial assistance.

¹ Oxford's 'brief account', July 1714 (P. v); Lady Masham's harsh letter of 22 March 1714 (*ibid.*); Hoffmann, 10 April (Klopp); Stratford to Harley, 26 Nov. 1713 (P. vii).

shown in Steele's elaborate glorification of the new Speaker Hanmer, the man who had thrown out 'that pernicious bill' of Commerce, and in Nottingham's heir, Lord Finch, supporting Steele. The Lords addressed the Queen against the author (known to be Swift) of *The Public Spirit of the Whigs*. On the main question the Government, for fear of losing the Scottish vote, dared not divide, and on an unsuccessful motion to brand the author as one in the Ministry's secrets some ministerialists divided against them. Denunciations from Nottingham and the Whigs on our desertion of the Catalans touched a sore place in the national honour.

On the 17th March a mysterious incident exposed the rift in the Cabinet. To the general surprise, Oxford moved for leave to bring in a bill, making it high treason to introduce foreign troops into the kingdom. Nottingham at once made the obvious point that this might exclude the Hanoverians, as well as the Jacobites, and it has been commonly assumed that this was the object of the motion. Bolingbroke followed Nottingham: if the Treasurer's motion, he said, applied only to troops levied for the Pretender—to which Oxford at once assented—it was superfluous, since the crime would be covered by the existing law. By the close of the same day Harcourt was aware that the Treasurer threatened resignation; on the 19th Parliament was adjourned, and a Cabinet crisis followed. The interpretation given, some time later, by Pensionary Heinsius attributed Oxford's offer of resignation to his zeal for the legal succession; there is much in the next two months to make it probable that herein lies the key to his so-called meaningless motion of the 17th, and that Bolingbroke's interpellation was meant to brand Oxford in the Queen's eyes as definitely Hanoverian. The Treasurer's compliance as to the arrears of pay due to the Hanover troops, his attitude to the writ, and his negotiations with the Whigs—all give support to this hypothesis. For the question of keeping decent terms with Hanover was by this time mixed up with the Treasurer's control over the Cabinet; the resignation of the staff, 'if he was not to hold it with honour', was the situation in Harleyite eyes.¹

¹ Harcourt to Oxford, 17 March, Drummond to the same, 21 April. Edward to Thomas Harley, 22 May 1710.

Harcourt had long since cast in his lot with Bolingbroke, and now complained that Oxford must see his followers 'at least protected'. But even he begged the Treasurer not to harbour resentment, and the bulk of the party clearly rallied strongly, though for the last time, on Oxford's side. Bromley once more stood out for unity: Trevor was called in to persuade Oxford to continue: the Whimsical leaders, Anglesey and Hanmer, declared that his fall would kill the Queen, and withstood for the moment Nottingham's bitter solicitations. The Queen exerted herself vigorously, closeted Harcourt, and refused to accept the Treasurer's resignation. Bolingbroke professed the only design he had was to see Oxford leading 'the Church of England party', and 'effectual measures taken to put those of our friends who may outlive the Queen beyond the reach of Whig resentment'. To Strafford he declared himself sanguine that their efforts to make Oxford 'renew a confidence with the Tories' would yet succeed.¹

Outwardly Cabinet peace was restored, and the same Government met Parliament on the 31st March. But the Treasurer went on with unconcealed intentions of revenge, and every 'Whig footman' knew the truce could not outlast the session—'nothing', wrote Lewis, 'could preserve the appearance of our being together, if our enemies were wise enough to sit still and see us tear one another to pieces.'² Little or nothing was done to placate the right wing: the removal of Argyll from his commands and some other small regimental changes was all the action at present taken against the Whimsicals.

On the attitude of this last session everything must turn: Hanmer in the Commons was reported to control 40 or 50 votes, while in the Lords Anglesey, the Archbishop of York, Ashburnham, Abingdon, and Carteret formed the heart of a flying squadron which might turn the scales.³ To get their alliance

¹ Stratford to Harley, 27 Oct. 1713 (P. vii); Harcourt to Oxford, 17 March; Bolingbroke to Oxford, 27 March; Bromley to Oxford, 21 March; Edward Harley, loc. cit. (P. v); Schutz to Bothmar, 26 March/6 April and 30 March/10 April (Macpherson); Auditor Harley's *Memoir*; Bolingbroke to Strafford, 23 March (*Corr.*).

² Lewis to T. Harley, 9 April (P. v); Oxford to Dartmouth, 4 April: 'I hope before long to have an opportunity to make them know themselves' (Dartmouth papers, i).

³ Bodl. Rawlinson MSS. Letters, 92, f. 626.

the Whigs, through the medium of Nottingham and Argyll, lavished promises: they would ask no place for themselves, if the Whimsicals would co-operate in securing the succession and driving the Pretender from Lorraine. For months the national fate hung on the inclinations of these mediocre politicians, for, if Oxford lost Whimsical support and was driven back on the high Tories, Bolingbroke's triumph was certain.

On the 5th April Anglesey declared in the Lords against the Peace treaties, and a motion that the Protestant succession was not in danger under the present Government was carried only by a majority of 12; 'saved by your dozen', as Wharton amiably remarked to the Treasurer. The corresponding vote in the Commons on the 15th was carried by 256 to 208, Hammer and his squadron voting in the minority. But, even so, the Whimsical peers were not disposed to eject the Treasurer without further consideration, and they assisted the same week to carry a motion, which left it to the Queen's discretion when exactly she should issue a proclamation for arresting the Pretender, if he should land. On the 9th Oxford by general consent triumphed once more over Argyll, who had charged him with subsidizing the Jacobite Highlanders; blackmail, indeed, they had received, as they had throughout King William's reign; they had 'opened their mouths wide, wide enough some thought to have devoured the little Minister'. Never, said Bathurst, had Oxford spoken 'bolder and clearer'. Wharton twitted him with sheltering under the Queen's name, and declared that ministers must be held responsible: the Treasurer, in avowing 'he would always stand by that maxim', hoped 'that same rule would be observed whenever they came upon the consideration of matters passed under the last Ministry'. Bolingbroke, it should be noted, took the opportunity to pronounce a eulogy upon the Treasurer and, according to Bathurst's information, 'the Queen herself interposed and keeps them together.'¹

In public Bolingbroke drew his usual bold moral from the situation. He implored Oxford to attack the Whimsicals: 'For God's sake let Finch, of the Jewel Office, who is the busiest

¹ Dobson to Charlett, 15 April (Bodl. Ballard MSS. 21); Bathurst to Stratford, 20 April (B. M. Add. MSS. 22221).

spark amongst them, be removed to-night.' They should have acted firmly a year ago: 'our numbers less, but our strength stronger' was his diagnosis—the troops that remain are firm and to be depended on'.¹

Meanwhile, these troops were shattered on the 12th April by a long-dreaded bombshell; that day Schutz, the Hanoverian envoy, demanded a writ of summons as a peer for the Electoral Prince. To this extreme the Hanoverians had for nearly a year been goaded by Marlborough, Nottingham, and the Whig leaders. On the position of Oxford the effects were fatal. If he agreed with the Queen, he would be accused of jeopardizing the succession—if with the Hanoverians, he would lose the Queen. It was, as he wrote to Cowper in May, 'driving him to the wall', and slowly this ineluctable dilemma worked itself out. At a Cabinet meeting summoned to consider Schutz's letter, the Queen and Bolingbroke, we are told on high authority, wished to refuse the writ, which Oxford and the majority, however, decided to grant.² The Treasurer exerted all his influence at Hanover to stop it taking practical effect; with precisely the same arguments he had used against the same proposal in 1706, when it was put forward by the Tories, he now opposed it as suggested by the Whigs: it would make the struggle one of dynasties, he wrote, it would rally the Jacobites to the Crown, and be from all points of view 'stark madness'.³ He promised to take charge of the Hanoverian troops' arrears, and to do his best 'to calm things'. To his influence must, presumably, be ascribed Anne's letter of the 30th April, which once more asked Lorraine to expel the Pretender. Cowper, to whom he had turned for advice, urged the formation of 'a ministry of one mind in the great point', Hanmer was invited to help in reaching a settlement, and there was in the first part of May a distinct rally of Whimsicals and moderate Whigs towards Oxford, as the best hope of national safety.⁴ Well-informed men, like Drummond, thought Boling-

¹ To Oxford, 21 April (P. v), (Finch was not removed, *ibid.* 487); to Prior, 20 April; to Strafford, 23 April (*Corr.*). ² Gaultier to Torcy, 29 April.

³ The Palatine resident thought the arrival of the Electoral Prince would be followed immediately by that of the Pretender, who would be able to count on all the sympathy of a furious Court party: Klopp, *xiv.* 575.

⁴ Ward, *op. cit.*, 423 et seq.; Oxford to T Harley, 12/24 April. (P. v);

broke might fall, the Secretary hinted once more at the charms of retirement and philosophy, and Harcourt this month trimmed his neat sails again for 'moderation'.

But in fact, at either pole of the succession controversy, Oxford's conciliatory policy found no echo. Thomas Harley's mission to Hanover did not bring back those advances towards the Queen for which the Treasurer pleaded. On the contrary, the Electoral memorandum of the 7th May reiterated the demands for expelling the Pretender and establishing the Electoral Prince in Great Britain. The Queen's personal letters of the 20th, to the Electress Sophia, the Elector, and the Electoral Prince, were firm and almost menacing. On the 13th the Treasurer, who was at the moment in close touch with Hanmer, invited his friends to support payment of the Hanoverian arrears: Bolingbroke instructed Anglesey that the Queen's wishes were to the contrary, and the successful resolution to reject this payment was first arrived at in a Tory party meeting at the Secretary's office.¹

If Hanoverian evidence can be accepted, it is plain that not only the Whigs, but the Whimsicals, demanded the coming of the Electoral Prince; strong rumour said that Oxford himself, had he only the power with the Queen, would accept it, and the tone of letters he received from the Elector showed a new and marked cordiality as the supremacy of Bolingbroke became more probable.²

It is, at any rate, certain that between the two ministers there was henceforward to be no quarter. To Phipps the Secretary lamented the failure hitherto to use the opportunity afforded, by the Irish Whigs' violence, to the 'whole Church interest' 'to vest all power in themselves, and by these means to establish themselves for the present age, and for futurity': had not the Queen, he asked significantly, given all the assurances 'an honest Tory heart' could wish? It was to that very Church interest, which had been his first ladder to fame, that

Cowper to Oxford, 14 May; Dartmouth to Oxford, 7 May; Salomon, 8 n.; Oxford to Hanmer, 13 May, *Hanmer Corr.*

¹ Stratford to Harley, 3 June, Bathurst to Strafford, 28 May (Wentworth); Bolingbroke to the same, 18 May (*Corr.*); Lockhart, i. 467; *Hanmer Corr.* 168.

² Cadogan to Bothmar, 15/26 May (Macpherson); Swift to Peterborough, 18 May; Elector of Hanover to Oxford, 15 June cited by Salomon from Ellis, *Orig. Letters*, 2nd series, iv.

he now turned to break his rival, and on the 12th May his lieutenant Wyndham introduced the Schism Bill. The design was to place education of Dissenters' children under the Bishops' management, and thereby to kill Dissent at the root. Tactically, it was a master-stroke: it rallied the mass of the party on a grievance they had denounced for a decade, distracted them from the dangerous ground of the succession, and checked the incipient union of the Whimsical Tories with the Whigs. The moderate Bromley spoke for the bill, rather ingenuously offering to drop it, if another were brought in to disfranchise Dissenters: Auditor Harley, with others of Oxford's party, spoke and voted in opposition. The bill passed the Commons by 237 to 136, and on the 1st June Bolingbroke moved the first reading in the Lords, proclaiming the Church as 'the best and firmest support of the Monarchy': the Whimsical leaders, Anglesey and Abingdon, supported him. On the 15th June the Lords passed the bill by 77 to 72. Oxford himself had not opposed a second reading, approving, it would seem, the main principle, but suggesting that the bill be amended in committee to meet hardships.¹

It was noticed that his friends Poulett, Foley, and Mansell backed a Presbyterian petition to be heard against the bill by counsel, and the amendments which they supported tried to exempt purely elementary education from the bill's operation, limited the maximum penalty to three months' imprisonment, and abolished the exclusive powers of the justices of the peace, as the Commons had drafted them. An amendment extending the bill to Ireland, moved by Anglesey and Bolingbroke and supported by Harcourt, was opposed by Shrewsbury, who had just arrived from his Lieutenancy, and carried only by six votes. Harleyites generally viewed the proceedings as almost a triumph. But Oxford had in the later stages not opened his mouth, and the Whigs vainly waited for him to propose union. Halifax had, as usual, invited him to 'save your country', and interviews are on record between Oxford, Walpole, and Cadogan, but these approaches did not go beyond generalities, and the Treasurer still hoped, it seems, not to be absorbed by

¹ *History of the White Staff*; Wentworth papers, *passim*; Auditor Harley's *Memoir*; Lockhart, 1; *Parl. Hist.*

the Whigs but to gather round himself a new Coalition of Moderates.¹

To such men, and even to some who had begun to salute the rising sun, the violence of Bolingbroke's proceedings was startling: indeed, even the Secretary himself dared not go so fast as his extreme supporters. A bill to resume the old Scottish Episcopalian revenues, now in the hands of the Kirk, had thoroughly alarmed the Queen, while Harcourt and Bromley (though the latter would support such a bill in principle) thought the general pace was far too hot. Shrewsbury was believed to be still firm for the Treasurer, and a joint offensive by these two ministers was actually the first serious blow at Bolingbroke.²

On the 12th April, as we have seen, the Lords had presented an address to the Queen asking her to issue, whenever she judged it necessary, a proclamation offering a reward for seizing the Pretender, should he attempt to land in any of her kingdoms. And now, on the 21st June, Oxford and Shrewsbury declared in Council that the moment had arrived. There is general concurrence as to the surprise their move excited, but Bolingbroke was unready to oppose it, even if he could have carried a majority of the Cabinet with him, and on the 23rd the royal proclamation appeared, offering a reward of £5,000 for the apprehension of James Stuart.³

The next day Auditor Harley seconded a motion in the Commons for an address of thanks to her Majesty: both Harleyites and Whimsicals supported the Whig resolution, that the reward should be raised to £100,000, the very sum which it was known Oxford had pressed in Council, and this was carried against the protests of Bromley and Wyndham.⁴ A few days before, there had been mention in the Commons of the Asiento contract and the three articles 'explanatory' of the Treaty of Utrecht, so far as it affected commerce between Spain and Great Britain. On the 2nd July Nottingham

¹ Stratford to Harley (P. vii); Halifax to Oxford, 29 May; Bothmar, 2/12 June (Klopp).

² Harcourt to Oxford, 24 May and 13 June (P. v); Stratford to Harley, 17 and 22 June (*ibid.* vii); Lockhart, i. 445 et seq.

³ Galke to Robethon, 25 June/6 July; Kreyenberg to the same (Macpherson); Lockhart, i. 471.

⁴ Höffmann, 25 June/6 July (Klopp); Wentworth papers, 25 June.

formally raised this question in the Lords: the Queen was addressed for all relevant papers, and asked for the names of those who had advised her consent to the commercial clauses, while Oxford supported a motion that the London merchants' representations against them should be heard. On the 5th he censured the three articles, and in subsequent examinations it was his old friend Monckton, who, as a Commissioner of Trade, gave information very damaging to Arthur Moore, Bolingbroke's chief agent in these dubious transactions.

The Treasurer's hold over the purely Parliamentary situation was generally admitted. When the first breath of the Spanish revelations ruffled the waters, Bolingbroke himself wrote to Oxford a letter which can only be described as an appeal for protection, and he now begged his extreme Tory followers to co-operate in passing the Money Bills in order to wind up the session. Till Parliament was prorogued, the dismissal of the Treasurer would be almost impossible. He had on his side perhaps half the Cabinet, most of the Whigs, and a fair proportion of the Tories, and London waited daily for the grand disclosures, which were to end in a Harleyite-Whig move for the impeachment of Bolingbroke.¹

But there was one gaping wound in Oxford's system, as well he knew: the Queen's enmity was now declared. She had offset her proclamation of the 23rd June by the stiffest possible instructions for Clarendon, the agent of Bolingbroke's choice, who was just going to Hanover, and her reply to the Lords' demand for the names of her counsellors was acid in the extreme. On the 9th July she prorogued her last Parliament in a speech worthy of her paternal grandfather: 'Tranquillity', she declared to Lords and Commons, could never be secured, 'unless you show the same regard for my just prerogative and for the honour of my government, as I have always expressed for the rights of my people.'

The speech confirmed Harleyites in their opinion that the Treasurer's fall was now determined, and they shared in the general amazement that he did not openly declare war against

¹ *Parl. Hist.*; Wentworth papers; Hanover dispatches, *ut supra*; Bolingbroke to Oxford, 3 June (P. v), Arbuthnot to Swift, 26 June; Lockhart, i. 476; Lewis to Swift, 6 July; Hoffmann, 10 and 17 July.

his rival. Foreign observers thought that he feared an open breach with the Queen, that he dreaded being involved in Bolingbroke's ruin, or (alternatively) that he was now incapable of running a straight course, even if he wished to. All these are, no doubt, partial explanations, but another, perhaps even more potent, was his reluctance to lose Tory support by throwing himself unconditionally upon the Whigs. The Whimsicals, who could turn the divisions in the Lords, had, after all, very distinct limitations to their Whiggishness. Anglesey was markedly anti-Bolingbroke, and had moved the last address for the names of the Queen's advisers, but he had on the 2nd stoutly championed, as against Wharton, the Tory bill for Commissioners of Accounts, and on the 8th took a moderate line in touching on the royal share in the Asiento contract.¹ To the attitude of Shrewsbury, the Treasurer probably attached even more importance. This great enigma had, once at least, taken Bolingbroke's side over the Spanish treaty, but the Secretary was thoroughly uncomfortable at Shrewsbury's easy return to influence, and it was in concert with Shrewsbury that Oxford, after the Queen's death, hoped to renew his old panacea, 'an established consistent government' independent of either party.² Certainly his supporters hailed Shrewsbury's appointment as Treasurer, on the 30th, with glee, as calculated to upset 'the schemes of the new intended ministry'.

It is, besides, tolerably plain that Oxford hoped, if resignation were forced upon him, to carry with him part of the Tory Cabinet: on Dartmouth and Poulett he thought he might count, and if the hostility of Harcourt was certain, others were reckoned doubtful and might still be won. Bromley had steered clear of the ministerial feuds, though Harleyites feared that, if Ormonde and Anglesey joined a Bolingbroke Government, Bromley might continue out of party loyalty.³ Swift long reckoned upon Ormonde as a peacemaker; but though

¹ Stratford to Harley, 1 July (P. vii), Bolivar to Robethon, 13/24 July (Macpherson); Wentworth papers.

² Ford to Swift, 6 July; Arbuthnot to Swift, 17 July; Oxford to Dartmouth, 12 Aug. et seq. (Dartmouth, 1); Duchess of Shrewsbury to Oxford, 30 July (Bath 1); Anon. to Abigail Harley, 31 July (P. v); Weber, 466, 4740.

³ Stratford to Harley, 1 and 7 July; Ford to Swift, loc. cit.

the Duke went far enough in this direction to win Bolingbroke's distrust, he had now abandoned the task, if he ever seriously attempted it: he was, too, dissatisfied at Oxford's slowness in meeting his wishes in clearing the Guards of Whig officers. Still, when faced again by personal factors, the Treasurer's energy seemed suddenly to have returned, and never was he more busy planning new combinations than in the fortnight preceding his fall—'he visits, cringes, flatters'. But it was an ageish and hectic activity; under the strain his old serene temper gave way, and all we get is violent language about Lady Masham, furious tirades at Harcourt, 'impotent, womanish, behaviour', at which his best friends sickened.

Energy and passion were both too late. In Parliament, his proper sphere, Oxford might be supreme, but it was not yet the age of full Parliamentary government, and he fell, as he had risen, by unparliamentary means. Both the Queen and the favourite had declared against him. Anne, according to Arbuthnot, than whom none could know better, was highly offended: the official version, as retailed by Lady Masham, was the Queen's determination 'to take her power' out of the hands of 'that wretched man', who would 'throw away good advice and despise everybody's understanding' but his own. The 'two ladies' were encouraged by Bolingbroke in an idea that there should be no Prime Minister, 'but that all power shall reside in one, and profit in the other.'¹

By the 23rd July all hope was over: in vain the Treasurer, in interviews with the Queen, predicted the ruin Bolingbroke would work in and outside England, warning her especially against the probable return of Marlborough. On the 27th, at an evening meeting of the Council, he resigned his staff—once more, before he left the room, passionately charging his enemies with corruption. The Council sat on till the small hours of the next morning, Wednesday the 28th: Anne was present throughout, but no agreement was reached as to the new Commissioners of the Treasury. At the meeting ministers noted her weakness: she had shown signs of wandering, and asked the same question three times over. That day the doctors found her pulse bad, and on Thursday and Friday one

¹ Lewis, 6 July, Arbuthnot, 24 July, Lady Masham, 29 July—to Swift.

seizure followed another. At the Council on the 30th (Friday), the Whig magnates, Argyll and Somersct, reappeared. The same day the dying Queen from her bed handed the white staff to Shrewsbury—all the powers of an interregnum, which must settle the fate of the Stuarts for ever, thus coming back to the man of 1688. Ten battalions were recalled from Flanders, the heralds were warned to be ready to proclaim the new King, at Bothmar's house the black box, containing the Regents' names, was got ready and stood waiting for its moment of power. Soon after seven in the morning of Sunday, the 1st August, Queen Anne, last defender of the Stuart faith, breathed her last: at twelve Bolingbroke's man brought the news to Wantage, riding for dear life to hurry his master's supporters to town.¹

Four miles from Wantage Swift had, since the first week of June, immured himself in Letcombe Bassett Rectory, despairing of reconciliation between his leaders and declining to assist the one to destroy the other. Yet neither in private letters, nor in contemporary writing meant for the press, did he conceal his opinion, that in Bolingbroke's policy lay the sole hope of Tory salvation. Since her last illness at Windsor the Queen, he urged, had been far more ready for this solution. One great chance had then been missed, but Swift had never ceased asking Oxford so to act that the Tories might not 'lie at mercy on this great event'.

What Bolingbroke would have done had Anne lived, as he hoped, over the next winter—down that romantic bridle-path we need not look too closely: for the last months of old Tory history, it is more important to note the very severe limitations to his power. One fundamental point, at least, is clear: Bolingbroke, that great schemer, had no scheme ready. Towards Saint-Germain he had made no definite advance: he vapoured vague encouragements to Jacobite members, but Berwick even in January 1715 was still uncertain of his sincerity.² The few steps we can trace in the three days of

¹ Salomon, 299, and sources there quoted; Stratford to Harley, 24 July; *History of the White Staff*; Anon. (? Edward Harley) to A. Hailey, 31 July; Swift's *Corr.*, *passim*; Wentworth papers; Hoffmann, 10-11 Aug.

² Lockhart, i. 477; Berwick to James III, Stuart papers, 11 Jan. 1715; Ibelville, July 1714 (Salomon, 305, note).

his Ministry show the same pondering hesitancy which had continued the whole early summer: if to Gaultier he was still¹ breathing general hopes that the Pretender would satisfy the Tories in essentials, there were many indications on the part of the Court that there was no present intention of breaking with Hanover. The Elector was officially assured that Oxford's fall meant no change of policy, and the same message was sent privately by one of the Queen's suite to General Schulenburg.² True, the new Premier was setting to work to form the alliance system he had long planned, between Great Britain, France, Savoy, and Spain, but that must be a work of time, and a much more immediate problem, his projected Ministry, reveals only uncertainty and doubt.

Lewis put the case in a nutshell: 'The man of Mercury's bottom is too narrow, his faults of the first magnitude; and we cannot find, that there is any scheme in the world how to proceed.' In the existing House of Commons he was not in the least certain of a working majority, and men of both sides predicted an extremely uneasy session for him the next winter, had the Queen lived. The very nomination of the Whimsical leaders, Anglesey and Nottingham, among the Lord Regents on the 1st August, showed that with that section he could expect no reconciliation. The famous dinner party he gave in Golden Square on the 27th July to Stanhope, Craggs, and Pulteney,³ proves surely that he was desperately trying to neutralize the young Whig opposition, and, if it be true that they asked the Pretender's removal from Lorraine and Marlborough's restoration to command, as their price, it is one more proof that there was no mean between a Parliamentary Hanoverian succession and a Stuart restoration by force of arms. It was widely believed that among his plans one bulked largely for an understanding with Marlborough; to Iberville he was still talking of what that mysterious packet of the Queen's secret papers (if ever found) might contain: turn where we will, everything seems to show him catching

¹ Gaultier to Torcy, 27 July/7 Aug. (Mahon).

² Bromley to Clarendon (Macpherson); Leibnitz's works, ix. 502 (cited by Klopp)—same date.

³ Walpole was asked, but was out of London: W. Michael, i. 358.

at any straw, and twisting round half a dozen contradictory schemes.¹

The Queen, and therefore Lady Masham, once removed, Bolingbroke had no secure understanding even with the relics of the Tory Ministry. True, none had resigned with Oxford. Harcourt no doubt, and we may conjecture even Ormonde and Bromley, had projected joint resignation if Oxford were not dismissed, and had abruptly refused his last proposals for accommodation.² Even Trevor, on whose judgement Oxford had in old days so often depended, seems now to have been ready to accept office and to have ranked himself definitely with Bolingbroke.³ A beginning, too, had been made, by Molesworth's dismissal from the Commission of Trade, with that purge of Moderates for which the Secretary had for months been clamouring. But Shrewsbury seems to have gone out of his way, in interviews with the Whigs, to deplore the dismissal of Oxford, whom he avowed to be in earnest for Hanover, and to dissociate himself from Bolingbroke.⁴ Moreover, the names on men's lips during the last week of July might well appal Swift.⁵ They promised not the least political support, save from that far Right wing which was officered by incendiaries and made up of backwoodsmen: Atterbury as Privy Seal, Wyndham Chancellor of the Exchequer, Campion, Strangways, Stonehouse, and Pakington for minor appointments—such names were no guarantees of solid Parliamentary backing. On one of the first divisions of the new reign, Wyndham and Campion even now opposed payment of the Hanoverian troops' arrears, and if their attitude does little credit to their leader's political sense, their complete failure showed that this sort of policy was as dead as Queen Anne.

¹ Lewis to Swift, 6 and 29 July; Stratford to Harley, 20 June; Swift to Arbuthnot, 22 July; Mahon, i. 91. As to a Bolingbroke-Marlborough understanding, see the Jacobite view in Lockhart, i. 460, the Harleyite in Auditor Harley's *Memoir*, and the Whig tradition in Burnet, vi. 147, note, incorporating Walpole's information to Speaker Onslow.

² Stratford to Harley, 24 July; Lewis to Swift, 10 Aug.

³ Ford to Swift, 6 July; Swift to Arbuthnot, 25 July; Berkeley to Strafford, 13 Aug; Auditor Harley to Oxford, 31 March 1715.

⁴ Bothmar to the Elector, 30 July/10 Aug. (Salomon).

⁵ So I read his letter of 22 July to Arbuthnot: it says that, when he left London, 'Lord Bolingbroke's language to me was quite contrary' to his present proceedings.

If, then, there was no guarantee for the success of a Bolingbroke Ministry even while the Queen lived, there was still less for Tory harmony under Bolingbroke's leadership after her death. Half the Ministry broke sharply off, and prepared to discuss terms with the successor. Harcourt was one of the first, Dartmouth was naturally another, while the honest Bromley was offered a place in the Treasury. Shivering in a sudden cold blast of reality, an unreal situation dissolved and faded away, and parties and men drew near to their real affinities. The loose talk of an Oxford-Bolingbroke reunion, which Swift had prayed for, soon evaporated: Dartmouth and Bromley began to discuss with Oxford possibilities of a Moderate Coalition, and Oxford himself to make clear approaches to the Whigs.¹ Already he had lost no time, immediately after his fall, in laying before the Hanoverian Court copies of Marlborough's letters to Berwick.² But Bolingbroke still professed to be sanguine. On the day of Oxford's fall he declared the sole hope now was 'to act a clear game with the Tories and on that foundation to establish the Queen's government', and outwardly his attitude was unchanged after Anne's death. His 'spirit', he told Swift, still burned within him: they would brand the Whigs as Jacobites, and the Constitution 'with a little good management might be kept in Tory hands'. The Dean's sombre reply recalls the sublime despair of the fiends' dialogue in *Paradise Lost*. The battle was lost, but 'to be at the head of the Church interest is no mean station, and that, as I take it, is now in your Lordship's power'. The Secretary even began to attempt a campaign for the elections: there were no such illuminations or bonfires as his in Golden Square when King George was proclaimed, and no such letters as his to the new King, proclaiming the end of factions: was not he the recognized chief of the Tory party, and could this foreigner do without him?³

¹ Harcourt to Atterbury, 10 Aug. (Beeching); Dartmouth to George I, 4 Aug., and Oxford to Dartmouth, end of Aug. (Dartmouth, 1); Swift's *Corr.* for August, *passim*; Bolingbroke's 'Letter to Sir William Wyndham'.

² Salomon, App. 5. This, even apart from the violent rancour shown later by the Marlboroughs [e.g. in the Madresfield Court letters of Sarah] may dispose of the interested stories spread by the Whigs (Macpherson) and by Bolingbroke (*Corr.* II), of Oxford's intrigues with the General; cf. Klopp's comments, xiv. 624.

³ Bolingbroke to Primate of Ireland, 27 July (*Corr.*); Swift to Bolingbroke,

On the last day of August the blow fell, and Bolingbroke was dismissed. In October the new Whig Ministry took office; its chief was Townshend, the author of the Barrier Treaty, he who superbly said after Anne's death 'it was my fate to be often in a very different way of thinking from her Majesty's'.¹ Cowper was Chancellor, Orford again at the Admiralty, Wharton Privy Seal, Devonshire again Lord Steward, Somerset once more Master of the Horse, with the future leaders, Walpole and Stanhope, high in office. Only Nottingham and Shrewsbury, in honorific places, stood for a different principle, and the two sister kingdoms were committed to the true blue merciless hands of Brodrick and Argyll. In January and February 1715 the Whigs swept the elections, and a Whig majority of over 150 in the Commons opened the epoch of Townshend and Walpole. Some time in March Bolingbroke and Oxford had their last interview: 'Harry' had appealed once more to 'the Master' for union. His nerve, shaken perhaps by a bad relapse into debauchery during the previous summer, was now going: he could not face the seizure of Strafford's papers, or the possibility of revelations from Prior. His head, he declared, was in danger. On the 28th March he fled to France: in July Oxford was lodged in the Tower. The long mirage was broken: 'the grief of my soul is this, I see plainly that the Tory party is gone'.²

Gone it was, for fifty years, but it had been an unconscionable time in going. The Revolution had shattered its first principles. Warfare against the legitimist King, a Parliamentary succession excluding him, an Erastian Church settlement, statutes invading every branch of royal prerogative—all this had been managed by a series of Governments, usually Coalitions, in which Tory ministers had taken a full part. Pre-Revolution distinctions had been blurred, in the end almost extinguished, and the Tory party had been recast by receiving into its ranks men of Whig descent and modern outlook, for whom

7 Aug.; Addison to Robethon, 4 Sept. (Macpherson); Iberville's dispatches, 19 and 28 Aug. (Salomon).

¹ B. M. Add. MSS. 28052, f. 152.

² Drummond to Oxford, March 1715 (P. v); Wentworth to Strafford, 29 June 1714; 'Letter to Sir William Wyndham'; Macknight; Bolingbroke to Atterbury, Sept. ? 1714 (Macpherson).

the right divine of King and Church had lost all of its original meaning.

Well might Defoe scoff at the 'loyalty' of the Church of England, and tabulate for writhing Tory coffee-houses the manifold occasions on which the Tory party had, by their works, denied every article of their faith. To Harley, St. John, and Harcourt, the 'Church' interest was not the Church of the Apostolic succession, nor even of the Laudian tradition; it was the Church of the established laws, the Church of the gentry, the vessel of English conservatism and of party coherence. Moreover, the Whig spirit, so far as it represented the cause of modernity, had invaded the Tory ranks, and not merely the leaders. To take the two fiercest partisans of 1701: Davenant's practical genius had soon led him to oppose the Occasional Conformity Bill, while the commonplace books of Anthony Hammond are soaked in Whig and sceptical philosophy.¹ Even Swift, who had quarrelled with the Whigs for their Laodicean churchmanship, professed himself in politics 'to be what we formerly called a Whig', and in every writing, private or public, of his mature prime laid down the very political principles upon which Harley had consistently acted, and which Bolingbroke in the two sanest periods of his life professed. Legitimism, he wrote in 1722, was to him nothing 'except upon two accounts: first, as it was established by law, and secondly as it has much weight in the opinion of the people'. He justified the Revolution upon grounds of 'the public good', and discerned the real dangers to the State, not in the Revolution, but in its spurious offspring—standing armies, standing Parliaments, and the moneyed interest.² A glance at the Harley of 1692 and the Bolingbroke of 1730 will prove the descent of this teaching, and is enough to show that the cause for which Oxford suffered imprisonment, and Bolingbroke exile, was not intrinsically that of 1660 or 1681.

Yet in one sense the converse is true, for none can doubt that the Tory *débâcle* in 1714 was essentially brought about by

¹ 'No text or example from Scriptures] can be urged for determining controversies in the theory of government': Algernon Sidney is 'generally right': Filmer is nonsense; 'Télémaque' shows 'a great sense of liberty which is surprising to come out of France'; Bodl. Rawlinson MSS. D. 174, ff. 41 et seq.

² To Steele 27 May 1713; to Pope, 10 Jan. 1722.

their association with the Pretender's cause, and the reason for this apparent paradox is plain. It is that the process of party fusion which Foley, Clarges, and Harley had begun was never completed. The sentiments and beliefs of three generations cannot be transnuted in a single lifetime, and the motives and circumstances which drew Harley and Seymour together in a common camp could not make the average Tory forget, in stormy days when the ocean bed of politics was quaking, the ancient creed of his fathers. Who was 'Robin the Trickster' to force his formulas of comprehension on the Pakingtons and the Musgraves, on those who had sheltered Hammond and Allstree, or had taken up arms against the Harleys of only one generation before? Robin had been brought up at the feet of Baxter, but Atterbury felt his way back through seventeen centuries of the Church's apostles and martyrs.

This was the fatal fissure in the Tory *bloc*. A party moves, after all, not at the pace of its newest recruits or of its first-class brains; but to that of average men and average women, and when the day of battle comes, it responds not to its reason but to its heart. In summer weather Harley could carry two-thirds of the party with him in working partnership with Godolphin, with Boyle, and the Whig moderates; but when the Tories were threatened with the loss of all their fathers had treasured, they turned back to the old faith still held at Oxford or Saint-Germain, or in any manor-house where hung the armour, rusty but not yet perished, of Newbury and Marston Moor.

Swift once compared the leading of his party to a crew quarrelling within gunshot of the enemy, but historically (to keep the metaphor) it was the ancient mariners who in 1712-14 stormed the bridge. The shipwreck was made inevitable when one of the captains sided with the mutineers: when Bolingbroke—the libertine, the friend of Voltaire, the heir of the 'mutinous' St. Johns—put himself for three decisive years at the head of the embittered partisans of a lost cause. This it was which stamps the last act with its peculiar atmosphere of inevitable doom. 'How art thou fallen from Heaven, O Lucifer, son of the morning!' Where was now the sacred union of 1705, the *via media*, the burying of the former factions in the Crown's service?

No legerdmain of Bolingbroke in 1714 could have preserved the Toryism of Church and King beyond the death of Queen Anne, and for this we may vouch to warranty the St. John of 1705 or the Bolingbroke of 1730. In the eye of history, then, Harley must continue as the 'Master' and Bolingbroke as his 'faithful Harry', for whatever is permanent in the latter's teaching had long been anticipated in Harley's practice.

In what must be counted a splendid tribute from a high Tory colleague, Dartmouth tells us that Harley 'understood and loved the constitution upon the ancient establishment of a legal, limited, hereditary monarchy', and that he took his part because he thought King William's reign after Mary's death 'a dangerous violation of the constitution'.¹ These 'old Whig' principles were Harley's special contribution to Tory development, and the future resurrection of that party only came about in the middle eighteenth century, when the new synthesis, which he had falteringly practised, had been absorbed by two generations of Englishmen. The man who educated these generations was undoubtedly Bolingbroke, who in the 'Letters' and 'Dissertations' of his later life Harleyized, that is to say modernized, the whole basis of Tory thought. In all this his motives were often dubious and his inconsistencies many, but the work done in his later days was done once for all, and represents the permanent joint contribution of Harley and himself to the party history of the future. Not that it is their contribution alone: for the national and enlightened creed which descended to Disraeli had begun, as we have seen, with the muddled patriotism, the momentary alliances, of men like Nottingham, Clarges, and Foley.

It was only on the 12th December 1751 that Bolingbroke's life at last flickered out: we may recall that one of his first leaders, Sir Christopher Musgrave, had taken the oaths to the Commonwealth nearly a century before, and marvel at the speed of history in two men's lives. In that span Clarendon had established Rupert's Cavaliers on the fast legal basis of 1641: Danby in twenty-five years of work adapted the party,

¹ Note on 1.t, vi. 50. He adds, with comment on Harley's vanity and untrustworthy friendship, 'he had no doubt his failings; but no man had a more affectionate zeal for the interest of his country, or less for his own.'

which Clarendon had nursed, to the new needs of a Parliamentary machine: Harley overlaid it with the veneer of the Revolution; it was reserved for Swift and for Bolingbroke to build that Revolution into its very system.

Yet, though they adopted the Revolution principles, it was with a difference, and they looked at the genesis and functions of Parliamentary monarchy with eyes still half turned to older forms of worship. The principles of 1640 and 1688 read very differently, therefore, when passing from Bolingbroke through Pitt to Disraeli, and again in the rival channel from Locke through Fox to John Russell, and have lost their original identity in becoming part of ancient and rival political systems.

The original and native elements in each party system may well be disputed, as they have often been exaggerated; but the tangible difference between Tory democracy and Radical democracy warns us of their reality, and it would seem that only the investigation of origins can determine the essence of any party's creed.

He who would trace the stream of nineteenth-century Toryism to its source must, then, pass by the modern buildings of Pitt and the new foundations laid by Bolingbroke, back past Harley and Danby, right back past the sterner upland fields where Strafford laboured: at length he will reach the watershed of modern and medieval history, whence both party streams descend, and find the springs of the Reformation.

XVII

EPILOGUE

WE may still see in deserted harbours the white graveyard-looking stones which marked, for bygone mariners, their highest recorded tides: in the same way, an old Tory political theory survives to indicate the ebbings and flowings of the full party stream we have followed. Periodically, this theory has emerged in the course of our narrative. Here, before finally leaving the subject, we may attempt briefly to summarize its formation and decay.

In so doing we need not exaggerate the immediate relation of theory to the events, for, if political abstractions come unnaturally to the English genius, they are doubly so to the conservatively minded, who take their stand on a philosophy of fact, and preach from the single text, *Stare super vias antiquas*. Far-fetched historical or ethical reasons for their political obedience were, thus, freely disowned by the Revolution Tories: 'some have sent us', complains one typical voice of 1690, 'to Tacitus and as far as Germany to learn our English constitution: . . . I cannot understand the necessity of looking any further than to the Statute of Recognition in the beginning of King James I's reign and the oath of Allegiance, to the Act of Uniformity and the Statutes concerning the militia under King Charles II.' ¹

But passively to defend 'our glorious constitution' has never proved an adequate answer to revolution, and we have already seen that, under the first Stuarts, nothing was more disputable than the law or more controverted than the interpretation of statutes. Royalists were forced to defend, not merely the existing laws but the very ground of law itself, and, abandoning the merely defensive armour of precedents, turned to weapons of more tried steel and more ancient design.

¹ *An Answer to the Vindication of the Letter from a Person of Quality in the North*

For the warfare of political principle, which swept seveneenth-century England, was still essentially the same as that which had divided mediaeval Europe. Against the new State-Church of the English Reformation, the Church-State of Rome brought out that venerable artillery which had done duty against the Holy Roman Empire. Above the State's laws, men were told, was the law of God, which was identical with the law of reason: a previous contract linked the ruler with his people, and bound him to defer to the divine rule: tyrannical or heretic kings might, then, justly be deposed. The second Church-State, Geneva, borrowed the political precepts of her mighty sister, and the history of France and Scotland from 1560 onwards was enough to show that the radical theory of the Jesuits was in practice indistinguishable from that of the Kirk and the Huguenots. The historic alliance between the Churches and democracy, thus marked afresh, was noted by every Royalist thinker: Monarchy, said Sir Robert Filmer, 'hath been crucified (as it were) between two thieves, the Pope and the People: for what principles the Papists make use of for the power of the Pope above Kings, the very same, by blotting out the word Pope, and putting in the word People, the Plebists take up to use against their sovereigns.'¹

The new stream of political theory which penetrated into England with Calvinism found there, still existing, much liberal teaching descended from the Middle Ages, and Puritan common-lawyers developed a fellow feeling for the ecclesiastic Bracton and the ecclesiastically minded Fortescue. According to the latter's teaching, the first Englishmen, 'the fellowship that came into the land with Brute', had tied their leaders by an original contract: the new Whig philosophy rejoiced at the discovery of its own antiquity, and drew strength from the rich deposit of mediaeval liberal tradition.

Meantime, the fierce individualism which underlay the Reformation was pushed by the Commonwealth Levellers to the full claims of human equality, and conservatives of 1640 were faced not merely by aristocratic claims for limited monarchy, but by a metaphysical theory of politics, the 'right'

¹ *The Theory of a Contract*.

of revolution and the 'rights' of man. Their distrust of this extremist teaching was not due to any academic lust for abstract discussion. Like Pitt two centuries later, the founders of the Anglican system deemed themselves to be at war with 'armed opinions': the Catholic claim to depose Elizabeth had been followed at no long interval by the Gunpowder Plot, Buchanan's theory had borne fruit in the long rebellions of the Scottish Kirk, and democrats of 1649, in the name of Christ or of Nature, seized the land for the people and proclaimed the millennium of humanity.

Against this dismal prospect of anarchy and the same 'tumultuous pedantry' which Castlereagh noted in Rousseau's unworthy disciples, the conservative mind of England developed its own protective philosophy of divine right. From reason and St. Peter the Anglicans turned to the Scriptures and St. Paul, and weighed the non-resistance of the Apostles against the political theory of the Apostolic See. For more than a century from 1560, the English Church taught undeviating obedience to the powers that be. A rebel, said Elizabeth's second book of Homilies, 'is worse than the worst prince, and rebellion worse than the worst government of the worst prince.' The Canons of 1606 and 1640 reiterated that God himself is the author of society, and that they who resist receive to themselves damnation: if, we hear in 1649, 'of God's lieutenant, you would make the King only the people's chief officer, your quarrel is not with the King only and the Crown, but with God himself also, the author of political order, power, and government.'¹

Bitter experience in the Great Rebellion redoubled the force of this teaching, which for the next twenty years commanded, at least on paper, almost universal adherence from English theorists. Even the most liberal teachers—Stillingfleet, Burnet, Tillotson, and Locke himself—till the end of Charles II's reign emphasized obedience as a sacred obligation, and this abstract doctrine became, by the different oaths of non-resistance forming part of the law of the land, 'a shibboleth between those that are fit to be countenanced in a Government and those upon which there is a necessity of keeping a strict

¹ *The Charge Against the King Discharged*, 1649.

eye' ¹ The reasoning by which a generation, not (as we have seen) entirely illiberal, reconciled this divinely authorized autocracy with English constitutional government, was spruce but unsatisfying. Liberty and privilege, it was held, were due only to the mere and sole grace of kings.² At the regicides' trial in 1660, Orlando Bridgeman, a moderate if ever there was one, laid it down, 'we have as great liberties as any people have in Christendom, but let us owe them where they are due: we have them by the concessions of our Princes.'³ But what, we may venture at this stage to ask, if the vicegerent of God revoked the concessions given by his fathers?

That a divinity hedged the King was thus the main argument of Royalist theory, and for this Scripture was their main warrant, but from fields beyond the Scriptures they drew morals of even more permanent significance. Hooker in the *Ecclesiastical Polity*, though stipulating a contract as the origin of society and putting 'the grand mandates of morality' above mere positive law, still laid all the onus of his conclusion against the individual, and preached an overwhelming prescription in favour of authority. But he was the Burke of his age, and few contemporaries shared his historical insight. Against the theocracy or democracy dreaded by Whig and Tory alike, Aristotle furnished the more usual reservoir of argument. His functional view of Nature was matched against the rigid deductions of the egalitarians, and obedience or order, allegiance or monarchy, were declared to be founded upon Nature's rule. 'The underived majesty of the people', observed Filmer, 'was such a metaphysical piece of speculation as our grand philosopher was not acquainted with,'⁴ and in his *Patriarcha* the author, resting his case for monarchy more upon Nature than on the Scriptures, grounded the rights of kings in the natural, universal, instincts of man.

If we disregard the ephemeral evils of the Stuart kingship, this stress on the State's natural origin was a real service to

¹ *Protestant loyalty fairly drawn*, 1681.

² *The Freeholders Grand Inquest Touching Our Sovereign Lord the King*, 1648.

³ To the same effect Bramhall's argument, cited in *History of Passive Obedience*, 1689.

⁴ *Observation upon Aristotle's Politics*, 1652, cf. the argument in Calvin's case, 1608, and *A Looking-Glass for the Parliament*, 1648.

political theory, and the radical fallacies of the social contract were usefully exposed by the Royalist school. Where, they asked, could this mighty document be seen? If the whole people's expressed consent were required to sanction positive institutions, by what authority did the unreformed Parliament claim the right of revision? Who represents, asked Sancroft at the Revolution, 'those that gave negatives in the choice, men of 39s. per annum and under, copyholders, women, leaseholders, personal estate men: and (who are somebody) the *Mobile*, who have little or no estates of any kind, but yet as much right to the legal government as the best peer of England'?¹ If the Whigs, giving up this position as untenable, fell back, as did John Locke, on a theory of 'tacit' consent on the part of the community, then 'none so free born', said the mocking Charles Leslie, 'none such free subjects, as the Mutes of the Grand Seigneur.'²

But the individual's 'natural' and inherent rights were of course fair game, and the Royalists' constructive ideas must be looked for beyond this easy criticism. Even before the issue of Hobbes's *Leviathan*, some had revived the Roman civilians' far-reaching conception, that power had its source in the people, but was by them delegated to the ruler in an immutable contract. Suarez and the French *Politiques* had used this notion on the Continent, and it reappeared in the English Civil War: 'in the nonage of the world', the people 'desired to live under Kings for their own advantage, that they might be restrained from wild exorbitant liberty and kept in unity.'³ The State's unity, which the individualist school threatened to destroy, was naturally found by all Royalists in the Crown, but in Hobbes and in Dudley Digges the resignation of all power to the sovereign was pushed to more faithful conclusions: the compact in their scheme became something like a 'general will', and in their sovereign the people found its common identity. And sovereignty, it was argued further, must from its very nature be arbitrary. 'Every power of

¹ B. M. Add. MSS. 32520, f. 135.

² *The New Association*, Pt. II, 1705.

³ Janet, *Histoire de la Science Politique*, ii. 54 (1887); Hanotaux, *La France en 1614*, 263 (1913); *The Instruments of a King*, 1648

making laws must be arbitrary':¹ to this, experience of the Civil War was bringing men of all opinions.

Whether this philosophy of sovereignty can ever be a tolerable one is not here the question, but it is certain that the Stuart kings' practice made the theory then unendurable. In any case, abstract notions of sovereignty or a general will were not the familiar shape of divine right teaching. This fundamentally rested upon the Anglican Church, and a Church—even the Anglican Church of the seventeenth century—can never form a perfectly safe base for a theory of absolutism. Any appeal to morals is in itself a potential challenge, and in the notion of passive obedience the Church had a large moral safety valve. True, it could never forcibly resist the Lord's anointed; but if the anointed broke the law of the Lord, any Churchman, albeit with tears, was at full liberty not to obey, provided that such disobedience were 'passive'. But here opened a yawning chasm; for if individual turned to massed disobedience, the tears would hardly be confined to the 'Lachrymists'.

A deeper flaw in Anglican teaching, if considered as a theory of despotism, was that nowhere had its authoritative declarations professed hereditary monarchy, or even monarchy itself, as the sole legitimate form of government.² The powers ordained by God were, on its theory, simply the powers that be. If Christ had rendered tribute to Caesar, if his first followers bowed the head to Nero, implicit obedience to any *de facto* government must be for Churchmen a sacred duty. King James I, snuffing the political atmosphere as was his wont, had scented danger in this Anglican wind. The Canons of 1606, he told Archbishop Abbot, were playing with edged tools; for on this reasoning the King of Spain might invade England, and if successful be accepted by Churchmen. The Commonwealth usurpation brought into broad daylight this deadly issue of *de facto* power against legitimism, and it was now that Filmer, discerning the rift in his party's theory, endeavoured to patch it up by tracing a title for legitimate rule back to 'the

¹ Filmer, *Anarchy of a Mixed Monarchy*, 1648.

² e.g. the extracts from Jackson's *Christian Obedience*, cited by Figgis, *The Divine Right of Kings*, 387 (2nd ed.); or Bishop Maxwell's *Sacro-Sancta Majestas*, 1680.

natural and private dominion of Adam'. But a far more popular and representative writer, the nameless author of *The Whole Duty of Man*, still at the end of the Commonwealth was evading the crucial point; and, with the comforting reflection that Cromwell's had never been a settled government and was therefore no true test, Anglican opinion turned over on its side and slept on this awkward matter for another generation.

In 1688 it fell upon them like a thunderbolt, to be evaded no longer. The contradictory elements we have seen in Royalist theory now in a moment fell violently asunder, and under the shock the whole party broke in pieces. The interest of the future lay with those who accepted the new revolutionary order, and their efforts to pick up such fragments as remained of their faith, and to piece them into a refashioned system, formed the last legacy of the Tory party which vanished in 1715.

The time-worn pleas of obedience to the law, of 'necessity', and *salus populi* (which the managers for Sacheverell advanced), obviously begged the point: for who could legalize the legislation of 1689, or who cannot plead emergency upon occasion? Stricter Churchmen, represented by Nottingham or by Sherlock's second thoughts, justified their obedience on quite different grounds which, if entirely untrue to the actual situation, were far more consistent with their Church's teaching. William and Mary, this school said, were conquerors; God, 'who never intended princes to be such Leviathans', had overthrown James, and his usurping children had 'the broad seal of Heaven' for their claims. Lloyd of St. Asaph, the most erratic genius of 'the glorious Seven', dovetailed passive obedience with Hobbism into a perfect miracle of casuistry. 'War is an appeal to the justice of God', and in Lloyd's philosophy it could hardly end except in one way. For, if the legal king 'can no more do the office of a King to his people', then they may cry to the Lord 'by reason of their oppression, and He may raise them up a deliverer, that shall take the government into his hands'.¹ Sherlock's conversion to the cause of Revolution was the more bitter to the Tories because his second thoughts were the first thoughts of their Church.

¹ *A Discourse of God's Ways of Disposing of Kingdoms*, 1691.

His deduction from Overall's Convocation Book of 1606, that Churchmen could only recognize the King 'settled on the throne in the actual administration of sovereign power', was historically true enough, but if hereditary right and oaths of allegiance had any meaning, to what 'a deluge of perjury' must this argument lead! ¹ No wonder that Jacobites complained that Sherlock made the Almighty the 'harlequin' of his farces.

These miserable self-delusions of the Conquest school could hardly satisfy the reason of post-Revolution Tory politicians. That the effect, conquest, was valid, while the cause, resistance, was not: that resistance was barred to man, but provided by a *deus ex machina*: that the Revolution had not been a case of resistance at all—these might do for Doctor Sacheverell, but hardly for the signatories of the Association, or the authors of the Act of Settlement. If Toryism as a body of political doctrine was to survive in any shape, a bridge had to be found from indefeasible hereditary right to limited monarchy, and from non-resistance to the social pact. To this the way was open, for the human mind had long been turning from theology to reason as the deciding sanction of authority.

Political theories, after all, must be at least approximately true to the facts of their environment, and divine right had had its day. It had served its purpose: the militant politics of Rome and Geneva threatened the existence of English sovereignty no longer. The philosophy of the seventeenth century, in Hobbes, Descartes, and Spinoza, had sapped the Churches' citadel; and the eighteenth-century Church of England, penetrated through and through with rationalism, could not consistently preach the divine right of the King. Even Filmer had built patriarchal power partly on grounds of Nature, and Nature, read in the light of reason, plainly called for a more candid interpretation than he had given. The clergy began to rationalize the Gospel teaching. The Archdeacon of Huntingdon summed up the views of moderate Churchmen, in a visitation during 1710; Scripture, he said, 'can never be intended to take away the fundamental rights

¹ *The Case of the Allegiance due to Sovereign Powers*, 1691; *Concerning the Case of Taking the New Oath of Fealty and Allegiance* 1680

and liberties of any people: . . . undoubtedly there be prime laws of Nature and Reason and civil government, which Our Blessed Saviour came not to destroy but to fulfil.' ¹ Generally admitting such fundamentals, the new school reasoned that arguing the origin of authority was to beat the air: the true criterion was the use men made of it, for 'if we must be slaves, . . . it is all one, whether a King has power from God or from the people'. This postulate, that utility is the test of institutions, linked itself on to the infant benevolent optimism of the eighteenth century: the scheme of things was Nature's, it was good if it was useful, and Nature was the voice of God. The same sensible writer last quoted could, therefore, cheerfully ask—'why then do men trouble themselves to seek for the source and origins of power, and think they do much in showing that it comes from God and God only? Whereas we have here before us power running down from the fountain head a long way, and in all its course like itself, the same it was, pure and clean. . . . If, then, men will have us to say that power comes from God, and only from God, we may well allow it: because we know that Nature, and an inclination to sociable living and order, come from God. . . . Who knows but the limitations and restrictions of power may come from God too?' ²

If obedience, then, were due to rulers, it must be due, as Harcourt admitted at Sacheverell's trial and as Swift wrote in public and private, to the whole community as represented in its legislature, and the divine rule was seen to be reflected in no static despotic order, but in the fluid and expanding claims of humanity. The art of rational free government was, then, conceded to flow direct from man's nature, and the business of the new Tory thought of Swift, Bolingbroke, and Pope was to build this broader conception of Nature, so far as might be, into the older Tory theory. The 'Sentiments of a Church of England man', the 'Dissertation on Parties', and the 'Essay on Man' measure the strides made by Tory speculation since the Oxford pundits of 1683 had condemned their party to immobility, and show, taken with their authors'

¹ 16 May 1710. Christ Church, Wake MSS.

² *Seasonable Reflections on a Late Pamphlet, entitled A History of Passive Obedience*, 1690.

works as a whole, that in Tory theory—in spite of some inconsistencies, insincerities, and tawdry emotion—there still hovered a living germ, one day to be revived.

The age of Scripture could not, indeed, turn into the age of reason without passing through a long twilight of sophistry, and the acclimatizing of 'natural rights' to the system of authority was only to reach something like synthesis in the days of Burke. Yet, from the first, the Whig contract ideas took with Swift and Bolingbroke a more concrete and historical form, and the right of resistance to oppression, conceded by them to be implicit in man's nature, was never by them grounded on the Lockean system of abstract and equal rights. But the full working out of the historical and rational theory of conservatism was to take the greater part of a century, and in 1714 still lay for the majority far distant and undiscerned.

If any lesson may be learned from this century of political theory, it is that men's finest instincts may be harnessed by circumstance to drag some indefensible system: the divine voice of Hooker may be distorted to shield the Star Chamber, as Locke was wrested later to defend American slavery, or Burke to whitewash the Six Acts. The conditions, which clog the highest human speculation, must even more necessarily attach to the old Royalist and Tory parties. Yet they, too, preserved through a century, even if in imperfect and dislocated form, those lasting conceptions of English politics—the divinity of the State, the natural sanctity of order, the organic unity of sovereign and people, and the indisputable authority attaching to the work of time—without which a nation would lapse to a drab barbarism. The cause, then, they strove for can never entirely lose its interest, for, stripped of its seventeenth-century dress, it proves to be nothing less than the half of human nature.

APPENDIX I

[LIST OF MEMBERS OPPOSING THE FIRST EXCLUSION BILL, MAY 1679]¹

S ^r Hū. Manno.	S ^r Nath. Hearn.
Jo ⁿ Stone.	S ^r John Trever.
Ed. Viscount Latimer.	S ^r Hen. Ford.
S ^r Hūp. Winch.	S ^r Geo. Strode.
S ^r Tho. Exton.	Wadham Strangways.
Wm. Ld. Allington.	S ^r Rob. Eden.
S ^r Tho. Chichley.	Jo ⁿ Tempest.
Bern. Greenevil.	S ^r Walter Clerges.
Walt. Kendal.	S ^r Jo ⁿ Bramston.
S ^r Wm. Godolphin.	S ^r Jo ⁿ Gyse.
S ^r Viel Viyian.	Hen. Powell.
Nic. Courtney.	S ^r Hen. Capel.
Wm. Herbert.	S ^r Herb. Croft.
Jo ⁿ Trelauney.	Boslock Harford.
Jo ⁿ Trelauney jun.	James Pits.
S ^r Jos. Tredenham.	S ^r Nic. Pedley.
Hen. Seymor Sen.	Ed. Hales.
S ^r Rob. Southwell.	S ^r Jo ⁿ Bankes.
Wil. Corriton.	S ^r Ed. Hales.
Jonath. Rashley.	Rich. Surkby. ²
S ^r Jo ⁿ St. Aubin.	S ^r Rob. Car.
Sidney Godolphin.	S ^r Jo ⁿ Chichley.
S ^r Jo ⁿ Coriton.	Charles L ^d Ankram.
Hen. Seymor Jun.	S ^r Wm. Poultney.
S ^r Jo ⁿ Lother of Whitehaven.	S ^r Nevil Catlin.
S ^r Ph. Howard.	Aug. Brigs.
S ^r Chr. Musgrave.	S ^r Wm. Coventry.
Orlando Gee.	S ^r Jos. Williāson.
Wm. L ^d Cavendish.	S ^r Rog. Norwich.
Ed. Seymor.	S ^r Hugh Cholmonley.
Wm. Glyde.	S ^r Ralph Dalaval.
S ^r Ed. Seymor.	S ^r Geo. Downing.
Jo ⁿ Basset.	S ^r Wm. Hickman.

¹ State Papers Domestic, Charles II, vol. 417, No. 232 (1): endorsed, in nineteenth-century hand, 'Found with 14 June 1683'.

² Richard Kirkby, M.P. for Lancaster.

Henage Finch.	S ^r John Talbut.
Dr. Edgbury. ¹	John Deane.
S ^r Rich. Corbet.	Tho. Neal.
Somerset Foxe.	Laur. Hide.
S ^r Hugh Smith.	S ^r Fr. Winnington.
S ^r Haswell Iynt.	Hen. Coort (?). ⁴
Ed. Noel.	S ^r Ed. Genings.
Geo. Leg.	Rich. Hearne.
S ^r Rich. Mason.	Hen. Guy.
S ^r R. & J. Holmes.	S ^r Henry Gudrick.
S ^r Tho. Clerges.	Basil Bamel. ⁵
Tho. Thynne of Tamworth.	S ^r Edw. Dearng.
Gilbert Leyfeild. ²	Herbert Stapley.
Tho. Allen.	Hen. Buckley. ⁶
Ed. Huntingtowre. ³	Rich. Buckins. ⁶
S ^r Charles Gaudy.	Altam Vaughan.
Tho. Jermin.	Tho. Buckley. ⁶
S ^r Rich. How.	S ^r Jo ⁿ Winne.
Tho. Demalhoy.	Willia Vagament (?). ⁷
Jo ⁿ Lukenor.	Ed. Vaughan.
Rich ^d May.	Ed. Vaughan.
John Chealc.	S ^r Stephen Fox.
Hen. Goring.	Tho. Lucy.
S ^r Tho. Littleton.	Peter Rich.
S ^r Hen. Pickering.	S ^r Rob. Atkins.
S ^r John Clopton.	S ^r Fr. Russel.
Tho. Lambert.	S ^r Rob. Thomas.
Rich. Lewis [M.P. for] West-	M ^r Paston.
bury.	James Herbert of Kindsay.

[Endorsed]

The names of sev^l people

¹ John Edisbury, burgess for the University of Oxford.

² Gilbert Lindfeild.

³ Lionel Tollenmache, Lord Huntingtower, M.P. for Orford.

⁴ The list runs by counties, and I conjecture Henry Coventry.

⁵ Paul Barrett, member for New Romney ?

⁶ Bulkeley.

⁷ William Vincent, M.P. for Michael Borough ?

APPENDIX II

A LIST OF THOSE THAT WERE AGAINST MAKING
THE PRINCE AND PRINCESS OF ORANGE KING
AND QUEEN ¹ [5 February 1689]

Berkshire

Lord Norris.

Buckinghamshire

Sir Ralph Verney.

Cambridgeshire

Sir Levinus Bennet.

Sir Robert Cotton.

Sir Robert Sawyer.

Cornwall

Sir Boucher Wrey.

Fran. Roberts.

Sir John St. Aubin.

Charles Godolphin.

Nich. Glynn.

John Tanner.

Alexander Pendarvis.

James Praed.

John Rashleigh.

Fran. Vivian.

John Specot.

Sir Jos. Tredenham.

Hen. Seymour.

Sir John Coriton.

John Prideaux.

Cumberland

Sir Christ. Musgrave.

Derbyshire

John Coke.

Devonshire

Sir Edward Seymour.

Christof. Bale.

Sir John Fowell.

Rawlin Mullack.

William Cary.

Henry Nortleigh.

Sir Arthur Chichester.

Edm. Walrond.

Wm. Hayn.

Wm. Coleman.

Dorsetshire

Tho. Strangways.

John Pole.

Sir Robert Napier.

Edward Nicholas.

Rich. Fowns.

Will. Okeden.

Durham

Will. Lambton.

Robert Byerley.

George Morland.

Gloucestershire

Wm. Cook.

Tho. Master.

Sir Fra. Russell.

Herefordshire

Hen. Cornwall.

Huntingdonshire

John Bigg.

Kent

Sir John Banks.

Sir John Twisden.

Caleb Banks.

¹ *Somers Tracts*, 2nd Series, iv. 127 et seq.

Lancashire

Fran. Cholmondeley.
Sir Edw. Chisnall.

Leicestershire

Sir Tho. Halford.
Tho. Babington.

Lincolnshire

Charles Bertie.
Sir John Brownlow.

Middlesex

Sir Charles Gerrard.
Ralph Hawtrey.

Monmouthshire

Marq. of Worcester.

Norfolk

Sir Wm. Cook.
Sir Nevyl Catlin.
Sir John Turner.
Sir Fran. Guybon.

Northamptonshire

Edw. Montague.
Gilbert Dolben.
Sir Justinian Isham.
Lord Wenman.

Northumberland

Wm. Forster.
Philip Brickerstaff.
Sir Ralph Carr.
Roger Fenwick.

Nottinghamshire

Lord Eland.

Oxon

Sir Robert Jenkinson.
Sir Thomas Clarges.
Hen. Bertie.
Sir John Doyley.

Rutland

Sir Tho. Maccworth

Salop

Edward Kynaston.
Andrew Newport.
Sir Fran. Edwards.
Sir Edward Acton.
George Weld.

Somerset

Sir Richard Hart.
Sir John Knight.
Edw. Berkeley.
Sir Wm. Basset.
Sir Wm. Portman.
John Sandford.
Sir Francis Warr.
Francis Luttrell.
Nathan Palmer.
Sir Edw. Windham.
Will. Helyer.
John Hunt.
Tho. Sanders.

Southampton

Franc. Morley.
Sir Benj. Newland.
Sir Robert Holmes.
Earl of Ranelagh.
Thomas Done.
Francis Gwynn.
William Ettrick.
John Pollen.

Staffordshire

John Gray.
Robert Burdett.
John Chetwynd.
Sir Henry Gough.

Suffolk

Sir John Cordell.
Sir John Rous.
Sir John Barker.
Tho. Glemham.
Sir Hen. Johnson.
William Johnson.
Sir John Poley.

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